MESOP MIDEAST WATCH : Iranische Website kritisiert Präsident Raisi erneut: “Der wichtigste Faktor für Raisis Scheitern ist seine Schwäche und sein Mangel an Wissen in Verwaltungsangelegenheiten”; “Der Stoff, aus dem er gemacht ist, ist nicht für die Verwaltung geeignet”; “Der Chef ist es gewohnt, Befehle zu erteilen … Wie zum Beispiel: “Die Inflation muss reduziert werden… Geflügel muss billig sein.”

  1. August 2023 Iran| SonderversandNr. 10772 MEMRI REPORT

Nach zwei Jahren seiner Präsidentschaft geriet der iranische Präsident Ebrahim Raisi unter Beschuss der gemäßigt konservativen iranischen Website Asr-e Iran, die am 31. Juli 2023 einen Artikel veröffentlichte, in dem sie ihn als Chef der iranischen Exekutive scharf kritisierte und dieses administrative Versagen auf seine Persönlichkeit und seine mangelnden Verwaltungsfähigkeiten zurückführte. Diese Kritik kam einen Monat nach früherer Kritik an ihm auf der Website – ein Artikel, der sich auf sein Wahlversprechen konzentrierte, in einem Jahr eine Million Wohneinheiten zu bauen. [1]

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MESOP MIDEAST WATCH: Irak und Iran einigen sich auf Entwaffnung kurdischer Gruppen

 

Der Irak hat sich dazu verpflichtet, kurdische Oppositionsparteien in der KRI bis Mitte September zu entwaffnen und umzusiedeln. Es handelt sich um eine Forderung des Mullah-Regimes in Iran.

  • ANF TEHERAN/BAGDAD Dienstag, 29 Aug. 2023, 12:53Der Irak hat sich nach Angaben Irans dazu verpflichtet, gegen kurdische Oppositionsparteien auf seinem Territorium vorzugehen. „Separatisten“ und „terroristische Gruppen“ sollen entwaffnet und ihre Stützpunkte geschlossen werden, kündigte ein Sprecher des iranischen Außenministeriums am Montag in Teheran an. Bagdad habe eine entsprechende Vereinbarung mit der Führung im Nachbarland unterzeichnet.

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MESOP MIDEAST WATCH : „ Die USA, die nicht mehr Vertragspartei des JCPOA sind, wollen möglicherweise, dass ihre europäischen Partner den Iran wegen der Ukraine unter Druck setzen, um weitere Zugeständnisse bei der iranischen Unterstützung für Russland zu erzwingen.“

Zahlt sich Bidens Neustart in Bezug auf den Iran aus?

@AlMonitor Andrew Parasiliti 18. August 2023

Anzeichen von Pragmatismus in einer seit langem schwierigen Beziehung

Die Herangehensweise der Biden-Regierung an den Iran spiegelt einen hartnäckigen Realismus wider, der für den verwalteten und nicht gelösten Charakter der iranischen Herausforderung notwendig ist.

Und es könnte funktionieren.

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MESOP MIDEAST WATCH : The First Iran, the Second Iran, and the Potential for Political Change

Iranian society is divided: alongside both pro-regime hardliners who are loyal to the religious establishment and liberal-secular opponents of the regime is the “silent majority,” which does not support the regime but does not necessarily oppose religion or conservative ideology. Only by integrating this majority, which does not see the reality as either black or white, might it be possible to achieve genuine and sustainable political change

Special Publication, August 14, 2023  עב  Raz Zimmt

Raz Zimmt – INSS  ISRAEL NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES

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MESOP MIDEAST WATCH: THE MOSCOW-TEHRAN AXIS BEGINNING TO SHOW SIGNS OF STRAIN

Bottom Line Up Front:  4-8-23 THE SOUFAN CENTER USA

 

  • Russia’s apparent siding with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on a longstanding territorial dispute with Iran suggests that Iran’s vision of an enduring strategic alignment with Moscow is threatened.
  • Moscow’s stance on the Persian Gulf territorial dispute coincides with the apparent collapse of a deal for Iran to purchase Russia’s modern Su-35 combat aircraft.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin might be taking Iran’s support for granted while seeking to expand ties to the Arab Gulf states that offer far more economic and political benefits than Iran.
  • An expanded rift with Moscow would render Tehran relatively isolated and more vulnerable to U.S. and Western sanctions and other forms of pressure.

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THEO VAN GOGH WORLDWATCH BACKGROUNDER: Während Bolivien iranische Drohnen erhält, konzentrieren sich südamerikanische Nachrichtenagenturen, die mit dem Iran und der Hisbollah verbunden sind, auf bolivianische Lithiumreserven – eine Schlüsselressource für das iranische Atomprogramm

  1. August 2023 MEMRI REPORTS Iran, Libanon| SondersendungNr. 10735

Am 21. Juli 2023 veröffentlichte die libanesische Propagandaplattform für den Iran und die Hisbollah, Al-Mayadeen, auf ihrem Telegram-Kanal einen Artikel, in dem es heißt, Bolivien verfüge über die größten Lithiumreserven der Welt. In dem Artikel wurde behauptet, dass “Bolivien zusammen mit Argentinien und Chile 85 Prozent der weltweiten Lithiumreserven beherbergt”, und betonte, dass das Metall für die Entwicklung von Batterien für Mobiltelefone und andere tragbare Geräte sowie Elektrofahrzeuge unerlässlich ist. Lithium ist auch ein wichtiges strategisches Metall für die Entwicklung von Atomwaffen,[1] eine Tatsache, die von der libanesischen Nachrichtenagentur sorgfältig nicht erwähnt wird. Der Artikel konzentrierte sich stattdessen auf die Verwendung von Lithium beim Übergang zu einer globalen ‘grünen Wirtschaft’.” [2]

Der Artikel wurde einen Tag nach der Unterzeichnung eines Abkommens mit dem Iran über den Erwerb iranischer Drohnen veröffentlicht, was darauf hindeutet, dass Bolivien dem Iran im Gegenzug Zugang zu seinem Lithium angeboten haben könnte. Ähnliche Artikel wurden in den Wochen vor dem Abkommen von den vom Iran unterstützten Medien HispanTV und Al-Manar veröffentlicht.

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MESOP MIDEAST WATCH : Iran should be catalyst for Israel-Saudi normalization

 

MESOP MIDEAST WATCH : Iran should be catalyst for Israel-Saudi normalization

 

AL MONITOR –  29.7.23 The Biden administration has labelled Israel’s judicial reform bill “unfortunate” and is now pressing ahead with Israel-Saudi normalization which, if successful, would re-set the strategic landscape in the Middle East.

Normalization is more than an aspirational legacy issue for US President Joe Biden and his Saudi and Israeli interlocutors. A Saudi-Israel peace deal has a logic and urgency, given the possible collapse of the Palestinian Authority; the prospects of another Palestinian uprising; and especially the need for an even more robust deterrent posture relative to Iran.

Biden’s tough love on judicial reform

 

Let’s start with the reform bill, which sparked a political earthquake in Israel. Half of the country, it seems, is on the streets to protest a law that limits the power of Israel’s Supreme Court to challenge government rulings and laws. As a sign of protest, some Israeli reservists have given notice they may not serve, as Ben Caspit reports.

For the other roughly half of Israel that backs Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition, the legislation is an overdue check on the court’s application of a “reasonableness” standard used to undercut government laws and decrees.

Biden took up the cause of those concerned about the consequences of the legislation for Israeli democracy, but it’s a tricky one for US diplomacy at any level. Netanyahu’s government was democratically elected and holds the majority in the Knesset, or parliament. No US aid or assistance is contingent on a US interpretation or standard of Israeli democratic governance or judicial practice.

Biden’s willingness to press the case probably comes from a heartfelt belief in the “shared democratic vales” that underpin and animate the US-Israel relationship — and that he believes are challenged by the legislation.

There will be subsequent Israeli legislation in the fall, and perhaps a “broader consensus through political dialogue,” as the White House has advised, can be formed before then, facilitated by US mediation.

Daoud Kuttab meanwhile reports disappointment in the West Bank and Gaza that Israel’s pro-democracy movement has found little common ground with the Palestinians.

Iran may be wild card for Saudi-Israel normalization

National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and White House Special Middle East Coordinator Brett McGurk met with Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud on Thursday to advance talks on Israel-Saudi normalization, among other regional issues.

If successful, normalization could rival the Egypt-Israel peace agreement and the Camp David accords in resetting the strategic landscape in the Middle East.

All three parties — Washington, Riyadh and Tel Aviv — may want the result, but the outcome is not assured.

Saudi Arabia’s terms are steep: a defense pact with the United States; support for its civilian nuclear program; and access to the most advanced US weapons systems. The US, for its part, wants an end to the Yemen war and a massive Saudi investment in the Palestinian Authority, which is on the verge of collapse. Netanyahu considers Saudi normalization a legacy issue, as it would be for all three leaders. But Bibi will have a tough sell with his right-wing coalition partners if any accommodation with the Palestinians is part of the deal.

Biden is weighing the options, according to the New York Times’ Tom Friedman. All of these asks would also require congressional buy-in, and that wouldn’t come easily.

But Biden is right to press ahead with what would likely be long and difficult negotiations.

Perhaps more than any other single initiative, Israel-Saudi normalization could provide both a lifeline for a two-state solution and an enhanced deterrent posture toward Iran, in addition to the potential for trade and investment.

Let’s start with the near-dead two-state solution. The Palestinian Authority is collapsing in a crisis of authority and legitimacy, and a new Palestinian uprising appears likely, anchored by increasingly militant armed groups in the West Bank towns of Jenin and Nablus.

And the problem is not just with the PA. It takes two. Netanyahu would need to enact his own turnaround toward the Palestinians by reining in his radical right ministers, including Itamar Ben-Gvir, who visited the Temple Mount, Haram al-Sharif, on Thursday, eliciting protests and condemnation throughout the region, as well as a statement of “concern” from Washington.

Maybe such turnarounds are impossible under current leadership in Tel Aviv and Ramallah. But there is recent precedent for this conditionality in peace-making. The UAE normalized with Israel in 2020 only after getting assurances that Netanyahu would not annex parts of the West Bank.

A Saudi-Israel peace deal would also boost the US and regional deterrent posture toward Iran. Absent the more intrusive inspections and monitoring required in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran will remain a nuclear weapons threshold state, requiring heightened vigilance. In October 2023, the JCPOA calls for lifting UN restrictions on Iran’s import and export of missile- and drone-related technology. Last week Iran bragged about its development of a new ballistic missile employing AI technology.

In the long game of diplomacy and deterrence with Iran, you can’t have enough deterrence, especially given Iranian interests and influence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza. US and regional security interests are, simply put, better served with Israel and Saudi Arabia aligned. No diplomatic outcome is ever assured, but this one is worth the effort.

 

 

AL MONITOR –  29.7.23 The Biden administration has labelled Israel’s judicial reform bill “unfortunate” and is now pressing ahead with Israel-Saudi normalization which, if successful, would re-set the strategic landscape in the Middle East.

Normalization is more than an aspirational legacy issue for US President Joe Biden and his Saudi and Israeli interlocutors. A Saudi-Israel peace deal has a logic and urgency, given the possible collapse of the Palestinian Authority; the prospects of another Palestinian uprising; and especially the need for an even more robust deterrent posture relative to Iran.

Biden’s tough love on judicial reform

Let’s start with the reform bill, which sparked a political earthquake in Israel. Half of the country, it seems, is on the streets to protest a law that limits the power of Israel’s Supreme Court to challenge government rulings and laws. As a sign of protest, some Israeli reservists have given notice they may not serve, as Ben Caspit reports.

For the other roughly half of Israel that backs Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition, the legislation is an overdue check on the court’s application of a “reasonableness” standard used to undercut government laws and decrees.

Biden took up the cause of those concerned about the consequences of the legislation for Israeli democracy, but it’s a tricky one for US diplomacy at any level. Netanyahu’s government was democratically elected and holds the majority in the Knesset, or parliament. No US aid or assistance is contingent on a US interpretation or standard of Israeli democratic governance or judicial practice.

Biden’s willingness to press the case probably comes from a heartfelt belief in the “shared democratic vales” that underpin and animate the US-Israel relationship — and that he believes are challenged by the legislation.

There will be subsequent Israeli legislation in the fall, and perhaps a “broader consensus through political dialogue,” as the White House has advised, can be formed before then, facilitated by US mediation.

Daoud Kuttab meanwhile reports disappointment in the West Bank and Gaza that Israel’s pro-democracy movement has found little common ground with the Palestinians.

Iran may be wild card for Saudi-Israel normalization

National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and White House Special Middle East Coordinator Brett McGurk met with Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud on Thursday to advance talks on Israel-Saudi normalization, among other regional issues.

If successful, normalization could rival the Egypt-Israel peace agreement and the Camp David accords in resetting the strategic landscape in the Middle East.

All three parties — Washington, Riyadh and Tel Aviv — may want the result, but the outcome is not assured.

Saudi Arabia’s terms are steep: a defense pact with the United States; support for its civilian nuclear program; and access to the most advanced US weapons systems. The US, for its part, wants an end to the Yemen war and a massive Saudi investment in the Palestinian Authority, which is on the verge of collapse. Netanyahu considers Saudi normalization a legacy issue, as it would be for all three leaders. But Bibi will have a tough sell with his right-wing coalition partners if any accommodation with the Palestinians is part of the deal.

Biden is weighing the options, according to the New York Times’ Tom Friedman. All of these asks would also require congressional buy-in, and that wouldn’t come easily.

But Biden is right to press ahead with what would likely be long and difficult negotiations.

Perhaps more than any other single initiative, Israel-Saudi normalization could provide both a lifeline for a two-state solution and an enhanced deterrent posture toward Iran, in addition to the potential for trade and investment.

Let’s start with the near-dead two-state solution. The Palestinian Authority is collapsing in a crisis of authority and legitimacy, and a new Palestinian uprising appears likely, anchored by increasingly militant armed groups in the West Bank towns of Jenin and Nablus.

And the problem is not just with the PA. It takes two. Netanyahu would need to enact his own turnaround toward the Palestinians by reining in his radical right ministers, including Itamar Ben-Gvir, who visited the Temple Mount, Haram al-Sharif, on Thursday, eliciting protests and condemnation throughout the region, as well as a statement of “concern” from Washington.

Maybe such turnarounds are impossible under current leadership in Tel Aviv and Ramallah. But there is recent precedent for this conditionality in peace-making. The UAE normalized with Israel in 2020 only after getting assurances that Netanyahu would not annex parts of the West Bank.

A Saudi-Israel peace deal would also boost the US and regional deterrent posture toward Iran. Absent the more intrusive inspections and monitoring required in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran will remain a nuclear weapons threshold state, requiring heightened vigilance. In October 2023, the JCPOA calls for lifting UN restrictions on Iran’s import and export of missile- and drone-related technology. Last week Iran bragged about its development of a new ballistic missile employing AI technology.

In the long game of diplomacy and deterrence with Iran, you can’t have enough deterrence, especially given Iranian interests and influence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza. US and regional security interests are, simply put, better served with Israel and Saudi Arabia aligned. No diplomatic outcome is ever assured, but this one is worth the effort.

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MESOP MIDEAST WATCH „CHANGING OF THE GUARDS!: US-Außenministerium informiert Abgeordnete über Suspendierung des Iran-Gesandten Malley

“Eine Verurteilung würde nicht unbedingt ein Atomabkommen außer Acht lassen”, sagte Analyst Matthew Brodsky. “Aber es würde eine Grundlage für mehr Kontrolle durch den Kongress bieten.”  BRADLEY MARTIN

 

Der US-Sondergesandte für den Iran, Robert Malley, spricht am 7. März 2021 im US-Außenministerium in Washington, D.C., mit VOA Persian. Bildnachweis: VOA Persian via Wikimedia Commons.

(27. Juli 2023 / JNS) JEWISH NEWS SYNDICATE

Details bleiben unklar, aber Robert Malley bestätigte Anfang des Monats, dass das US-Außenministerium ihn von seiner Rolle als Sondergesandter für den Iran suspendiert hat.

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MIDEAST WATCH : Wie kann die Abschreckung des Iran mit der nächsten US-israelischen Militärübung verstärkt werden?

 

Bradley Bowman und Ryan Brobst von der Foundation for Defense of Democracies argumentieren, dass die USA die nächste Juniper Oak-Übung ausweiten sollten, um ein starkes Signal an Teheran zu senden.

Von BRADLEY BOWMAN und RYAN BROBSTam 26. Juli 2023 Auf 12:20 BREAKING DEFENSE USA

 

Während Israel politische Turbulenzen durchmacht, haben die USA versucht, ihre starken Beziehungen zwischen den Milizen aufrechtzuerhalten. Das zeigte sich bei der jüngsten Iteration der Juniper Oak-Übung. In dem folgenden Kommentar legen Bradley Bowman und Ryan Brobst von der Foundation for Defense of Democracies dar, wie sie glauben, dass die nächste Übung ein stärkeres Signal an den Iran senden könnte.

Die Vereinigten Staaten und Israel hielten diesen Monat in Israel eine kombinierte Militärübung Juniper Oak 23.3 mit mehreren Domänen ab. Die Übung, die sich auf eine Reihe von Fähigkeiten konzentrierte, die für einen Schlag gegen das iranische Atomprogramm relevant sind, folgt auf eine frühere Iteration der Bemühungen im Januar, die ein Pentagon-Sprecher als “größte gemeinsame Übung zwischen den USA und Israel in der Geschichte” bezeichnete.

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MESOP MIDEAST WATCH : IRAN LOOKS TO EAST AFRICA FOR MORE FRIENDS

 
Bottom Line Up Front: THE SOUFAN CENTER USA  18. July 23
  • Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi’s July visit to three East African countries aimed to blunt Iran’s growing economic and political isolation from Europe and the effects of U.S.-led economic sanctions.
  • The visited countries – Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe – have generally sought to avoid involvement in major geopolitical schisms such as the war in Ukraine, where Iran is aligned with Russia.
  • Raisi sought to bond with his hosts by stressing shared views on social issues, including those on which some East African leaders are sharply at odds with the West.
  • Iranian leaders also sought to expand trade relations with East Africa and potentially circumvent U.S.-led sanctions.
In mid-July, Iran’s President Ibrahim Raisi visited three countries in East Africa: Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Iranian media touted the trip as launching a “new beginning” in relations with Africa; it was the first by an Iranian president since the 2013 visit by then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The visit should be viewed in the context of Iran’s growing diplomatic isolation and escalating economic pressure at the hands of the United States and its allies in Europe, particularly over its material support for Russia’s war against Ukraine. In late June, Iran suffered a major setback when the European Union (EU) announced it would retain its sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile programs, which had been set to expire in October 2023 in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which accompanied the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear deal. The EU decision was based on: Russia’s use of Iranian drones against Ukraine; the possibility that Iran might transfer ballistic missiles to Russia; and Iran’s nuclear escalations, which would have violated the terms of the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement had it not been scrapped by the United States in 2018, including enriching uranium to levels approaching the 90% purity required to qualify as “weapons grade.”

Although Iranian officials characterized the visit to East Africa as primarily to boost trade and commercial ties, Raisi indicated that his objectives were to build new alliances with which to exert leverage against the growing economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran from the United States and Europe. Kenya and Uganda are U.S. counterterrorism partners against Al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates. However, members and institutions of all three governments – Zimbabwe in particular – have been targeted by U.S. sanctions for alleged human rights abuses, corruption, and election-related violence. While Kenya has not been subject to such sanctioning in some time, Ugandan officials were recently sanctioned over the country’s anti-homosexuality legislation. Resentment over U.S. sanctions resonates strongly in Iran, as well as in the countries visited by Raisi.

On the Russian war against Ukraine, in which Iran is materially supporting Russia’s war effort, Zimbabwe and Uganda abstained from the key UN General Assembly vote in March 2022 to condemn the Russian invasion. Kenyan President William Ruto, on the other hand, has sided with NATO leaders by asserting that internationally recognized boundaries must be respected. Yet Ruto, who warmly received Raisi upon arrival, recently characterized “tensions between North and South” as similar to the deteriorating relations between the West and China. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni said in late 2021 that Western companies should “stop giving us lessons,” a reference to what he claims is Western economic pressure on his government not to expand its economic ties to China. It is clear from this trip that Tehran perceives East Africa as fertile ground for much of the regime’s messaging.

Yet Raisi’s efforts in East Africa might backfire by further alienating Tehran from Western leaders. During his stop in Uganda, Raisi painted Kampala as aligned with Tehran’s views on social issues, calling Western nations’ support for homosexuality one of the “dirtiest” episodes of human history. He supported Uganda’s recently-passed legislation prescribing the death penalty for “aggravated homosexuality” – legislation that attracted widespread Western condemnation. After meeting with Museveni, Raisi stated: “I believe that this issue, and these strong attacks by the West against the establishment of families and against the culture of the nations, is another area of cooperation for Iran and Uganda.”

Beyond building new partnerships, Iranian leaders and their East African counterparts also sought practical outcomes from the visit. First and foremost, as was evident in Raisi’s June trip to three Latin American countries with whom the United States has strained or hostile relations (Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua), Raisi and the Iranian businessmen in his delegation sought to forge economic ties that would help Tehran undermine the effects of Western sanctions. In advance of the travel, Iran’s foreign ministry publicly forecast that trade with all African countries will increase to more than $2 billion in 2023, although Iranian officials did not provide comparative data for the prior year. Raisi has specifically mentioned Africa’s mineral resources and Iran’s petrochemical experience as potential bases for expanded economic cooperation.

The visit, coupled with prior efforts, yielded some modest, if vague, trade and economic agreements with East African countries. Kenya, which is East Africa’s economic hub, represented the centerpiece of Raisi’s excursion. According to Kenyan President Ruto, Iran intends to set up a manufacturing plant for Iranian vehicles in Kenya’s port city of Mombasa. During the Raisi visit, Iranian and Kenyan ministers signed five memoranda of understanding related to information technology, fisheries, livestock products, and investment promotion. Ruto stated that he also sought Raisi’s commitment to facilitate the export of more Kenyan tea, meat, and other agricultural products to Iran and via Iran to Central Asian countries.

Iran and Uganda have, over the past decade, discussed various forms of energy cooperation, including the development of Uganda’s nuclear program. Uganda is trying to set up a nuclear power plant that authorities say will generate electricity by 2031. As an outcome of the Raisi visit, President Museveni asserted that Uganda would engage Iran for support to develop its energy sector, especially its oil and nuclear programs, through technology transfer or project financing. Raisi might have also obtained some help from Uganda to evade U.S.-led sanctions: in 2022, Museveni proposed that the two countries engage in barter trade to evade U.S. sanctions on Iran.

Setting the groundwork for the Zimbabwe leg of the trip, in early 2023, a Zimbabwean ministerial delegation visited Tehran to deepen cooperation in areas including energy trade. The two countries signed 12 agreements, including establishing a tractor manufacturing plant in Zimbabwe with an Iranian company and a local partner. Other agreements expand cooperation in energy, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and telecommunications, as well as research, science, and technology projects. Still, many of the agreements and pledges reached during Raisi’s East Africa trip are vague and subject to further negotiation, and it is not clear whether, or how extensively, any agreements reached will be implemented.

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