• In mid-January, Iran aimed a missile barrage at a range of adversaries based in Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria in a show of force intended to deter its two main adversaries, the United States and Israel.
• Iran’s volleys deviated from Tehran’s classic strategy of acting through a network of allied militias and movements.
• The strikes on Iraqi and Pakistani territory produced an unintended backlash from both neighbors, threatening Iran’s regional relationships.
• Tehran calculates that displaying its military might will help accomplish its objectives on the spreading regional conflict sparked by the war in Gaza.

Little directly links the target sets in the three countries struck. Firing the Kheibar Shekan into Syria’s opposition-held Idlib Province, IRGC officials said they sought to strike militants of Islamic State (IS), a Sunni Muslim jihadist group opposed not only to Shia Muslim-dominated Iran but also to the United States, the broader West, and Israel. Tehran’s motivation for wanting to attack IS is clear. In Idlib, IS works in parallel with other groups opposed to the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a close ally of Tehran. Asserting it seeks to confront Iran’s “projects” in the region, IS claimed responsibility for the January 3, 2024, suicide bombing against Kerman residents commemorating the fourth anniversary of the 2020 U.S. killing of revered IRGC-Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani. The Kerman bombings killed more than ninety people, according to Iranian state media. IS has always blamed Soleimani for engineering Iran’s campaign to help Iraq beat back the group’s territorial conquests during 2014-2018. With respect to the volley that hit Pakistan’s territory, the IRGC claimed to have struck Jaysh al-Adl, an extremist Sunni Muslim group that promotes the separatist aspirations of the mostly Baluch inhabitants of Sistan and Baluchistan province, which borders Pakistan. Jaysh al-Adl was responsible for a December 15 raid on a police station in Rask, a town in the province, which killed twelve Iranian police officers, according to Iranian state media.

In Iraq, Iran targeted a major regional adversary, Israel, rather than a non-state actor. The IRGC claimed its missile volley landing in Erbil, in Kurdish-run northern Iraq, destroyed facilities linked to Israel’s Mossad spy agency as retaliation for Israel’s killing of Sayyed Razi Mousavi, the IRGC-Qods Force’s top commander in Syria, in a December 25 strike near Damascus. However, one of the victims of the Iranian barrage was a prominent Kurdish businessman that Iranian state media accused of harboring Mossad operatives in Erbil. The strike also reportedly hit the intelligence headquarters of the Kurdistan region, a site with little apparent connection to Israel, despite Tehran’s assertions. Similarly, in March 2022, as part of a broader Iran-Israel “shadow war” underway for at least a decade, Iranian missiles struck a Kurdish target near the U.S. consulate in Erbil in what Iran claimed represented retaliation for an Israeli strike in Syria that killed two IRGC officers. Both of the main Iraqi Kurdish parties, who dominate the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, have close relations with the United States but have worked cooperatively with Iranian officials as well. Kurdish officials in northern Iraq have repeatedly denied that they harbor any Mossad or covert Israeli presence.

The scope of Iran’s attacks sought to communicate a broader message to Tehran’s most feared opponents – the United States and Israel. At the strategic level, Iran seeks to deter both powerful actors by demonstrating it has the resources and military technology to defend itself and its allies from aggression. Iranian leaders are well aware that there are increasing calls in Washington to not only confront Iran’s regional allies more aggressively, but to expand U.S. deterrence efforts by striking targets inside Iran as well. Iranian strategists likely assessed that the U.S. decision in early January to begin pre-emptively striking Houthi missile systems signals that harder-line leaders in Washington might have begun to prevail in steering the U.S. response to the Mideast crisis. With its missile barrages last week, Iran arguably sought to warn the United States that it is not dependent on its axis of resistance partners to act in Iran’s defense, but that Tehran’s own forces are willing and able to apply pressure on the United States and its allies if needed. Attempting to message Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Tehran’s use of the Kheibar Shekan clearly signaled that Iran can add significantly to any rocket and missile attacks against Israelis that its close ally, Lebanese Hezbollah, might undertake in the event of a full-blown Israel-Hezbollah war. Iran is hoping to add to those voices in Israel cautioning Netanyahu that an escalation against Hezbollah to try to force the group to withdraw from the Israel-Lebanon border would produce devastating consequences for Israel. To address internal political considerations, the volleys were no doubt intended, at least in part, to satisfy hardliners in the IRGC and other institutions who want to deter what they see as attacks on Iranian stability by outside powers, Sunni jihadist groups, and domestic Iranian collaborators with these adversaries.

Yet, Iran’s escalation last week carries great risk for Iran’s regional diplomatic position. By striking inside Iraq, Tehran risks its close relationship with, and significant influence over, the relatively pro-Iranian government in Baghdad. Iran’s strikes represented a violation of Iraqi sovereignty, empowering those Iraqi political leaders who urge the government to distance itself from Iran, confront Iran’s Shia militia allies in Iraq, and align more closely with Washington and U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf and broader Arab world. Suggesting that Iran’s action lost its ground inside Iraq, the Baghdad government responded to Iran’s strikes in Erbil by filing a formal complaint against Iran at the UN Security Council. Iran has had normal relations with Pakistan, despite the presence of anti-Iran Baluch separatist groups and other militants there. Over the past fifteen years, the two had sought to cooperate on an ambitious natural gas pipeline project, although the plan ultimately dissolved over Pakistan’s concerns about U.S. sanctions on Iranian economic interests. Tehran likely did not expect that its strike on Jaysh al-Adl would produce the backlash that it did – Pakistan’s withdrawal of its ambassador, followed by a significant Pakistani strike on anti-Pakistan Baluch militants inside Iran. Still, the two sought to lower tensions immediately after the Pakistani strike, including conducting a joint naval drill, suggesting the Pakistan-Iran front would not escalate.

If Iran sought to deter Israel, Tehran’s message might not have gotten through. On Saturday, another Israeli strike in Syria killed five high-ranking IRGC advisers deployed there in support of the Assad regime. And Israel continued to escalate modestly against Hezbollah military targets across the northern border. Iran will have difficulty deterring Israel, in part because of Israeli confidence in its multi-layered missile and rocket defense systems. Some experts assessed that Iran’s missile launches in the three neighboring countries struck “soft targets,” facing missile defense not comparable in capabilities to those Iran would face in an attack on Israel. On the other hand, Iran’s willingness to showcase its capabilities might succeed in empowering those in Washington who caution that attacking Tehran would stretch too thin U.S. forces and weaponry already committed to helping defend Ukraine, Israel, and commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

Copyright © 2023 The Soufan Center. All rights reserved.
156 W 56th Street, New York, NY 10019

Want to change how you receive these emails?
You can update your preferences or unsubscribe from this list.

• Yesterday’s prisoner swap between the United States and Iran will include the release of $6 billion in Iranian assets, to be used to purchase food and medical equipment for the Iranian people.
• The deal has reignited a debate over U.S. concessions to Iran’s long-used tactic of incarcerating American citizens.
• Iran reportedly sought to complete the swap as the UN General Assembly meetings convene in New York City this week.
• U.S. officials see the exchange as not only bringing home American citizens detained abroad, but also paving the way for broader de-escalation with Iran.

Although many U.S. Republican political leaders criticize making any concessions to Iran, including prisoner exchanges, the release of $6 billion in Iranian assets has been the most controversial component of the swap. The release of the assets, to be used by Iran under strict conditions and monitored by Qatar and the U.S. Department of Treasury, was agreed upon by U.S. officials “to facilitate [the Americans’] release,” according to a sanctions waiver signed off on by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken. U.S. sanctions restrict the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and Central Bank of Iran, which are designated by the United States as entities that support international terrorism, from accessing or transferring assets held in third-country banks. U.S. officials can waive the threat of penalty on banks that hold the Iranian accounts or allow their transfer if doing so is reported to the U.S. Congress as necessary to protect national interests. According to Blinken’s September 11 announcement, the waivers enable banks and other financial institutions in South Korea, Germany, Ireland, Qatar, and Switzerland to transfer the funds or convert their currency without fear of U.S. penalty.

Critics of the deal asserted that releasing the funds for use by Iran, even under controlled conditions, amounts to paying a ransom to secure the release of U.S. hostages. They assert that the exchange follows a longstanding pattern in which Tehran seizes or incarcerates foreign citizens to wrest concessions – including sanctions relief – from the United States and other governments. In January 2016, coinciding with the implementation of the multilateral Iran nuclear agreement (JCPOA), the United States and Iran agreed to a prisoner swap under which Washington Post journalist Jason Rezaian and others were released. Simultaneously, U.S. officials agreed to settle a longstanding dispute with Iran by providing $1.7 billion in cash directly to Iran. This amount represented principal and interest payments for military equipment paid for by Iran under its former regime but withheld after the Iranian revolution brought the Islamic Republic into power. The Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1981 was settled only after U.S. officials agreed to release some of the Iranian assets frozen in the United States in response to the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Some fear providing concessions may present a moral hazard and encourage Iran to continue taking Americans prisoner in the future to obtain more concessions. Yet, partisan criticism aside, the U.S. and Iran have made deals on and off for the past four decades.

U.S. officials counter that the $6 billion represents money Iran earned from oil sales to South Korea, purchased when U.S. sanctions were suspended by the JCPOA or were otherwise permitted under U.S. sanctions law. Officials add that the funds can only be used for humanitarian purchases such as food and medical equipment “in accordance with written guidance from the U.S. Government,” as outlined by Secretary Blinken. To that extent, Iran will not be able to repatriate the funds or use them to purchase weaponry or to fund armed factions in the region that Tehran supports. Critics assert that the $6 billion asset release will free up an equivalent amount of Iran’s funds for purposes that empower Iran militarily and strategically, while proponents of the swap argue that sanctions were used effectively to help bring about the release of U.S. hostages.

Reports indicate that Iranian officials sought to complete the prisoner swap before or during the UN General Assembly (UNGA) meetings, which began yesterday, with hopes that the deal might overshadow expected anti-Iran demonstrations in New York and perhaps empower experts and officials who argue that diplomacy between the United States and Iran is preferable to unending confrontation with Iran’s current regime. However, with Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi slated to deliver a speech to the gathering today, exiled Iranian oppositionists and U.S. critics will certainly take advantage of Raisi’s presence in the United States to highlight and denounce Iran’s policies, including its repression of women. The UNGA meetings come just one year after the death of Mahsa Amini, who died in Iranian custody on September 16, 2022, setting off months of anti-regime unrest. Other critics focus on Iran’s supplies of missiles and armed drones for regional armed factions that commit acts of violence against U.S. forces in the region, its nuclear program, and Tehran’s supply of Iranian-designed armed drones to Russia for use against Ukraine.

The UNGA meetings also provide opportunities for U.S., European, and Iranian diplomats to build on the prisoner swap to achieve broader de-escalation in the region. International diplomats speculate that U.S. and Iranian officials might hold talks on the sidelines of the meetings – either directly or, more likely, through state mediators from the Persian Gulf, Europe, or elsewhere– to discuss voluntary Iranian restraints on its nuclear program, further assets releases by the United States, and de-confliction between U.S. and Iran-backed forces in Syria. In particular, U.S. officials and Gulf mediators have been pressing Iran to commit to restrain its uranium enrichment to sixty percent purity, which is the highest level to which Iran is currently enriching. Experts and officials assess that calls within the United States and Israel for military action against Iran will grow louder if the uranium reaches purity levels closer to ninety percent, at which point it would be considered weapons grade. However, the UN nuclear agency reported earlier this month that Iran had reduced its enrichment to its slowest pace since 2021. U.S. officials acknowledge that the obstacles to a more formal restoration of the JCPOA – which held Iran to much lower levels of uranium enrichment – are formidable in light of Iranian concerns that the United States might again withdraw from the deal, as the Trump administration did in 2018. For their part, U.S. officials are wary of providing Iran the sweeping sanctions relief outlined in the JCPOA, amid widespread criticism that U.S. leaders have been too quick to offer Iran sanctions relief in exchange for relatively modest Iranian concessions.