MESOPOTAMA NEWS : THE CHINESE SYSTEMS OF FAKE NEW & BLACK PROPAGANDA !

Uncovering A Pro-Chinese Government Information Operation On Twitter and Facebook: Analysis Of The #MilesGuo Bot Network

May 5, 2020 –  By Benjamin Strick  

BELLINGCAT
An ongoing information operation is using a network of bots made up of newly created and stolen accounts to target a businessman, exiled from China, who has spoken critically of China’s response to COVID-19.

Yet identifying the network has revealed a much larger operation amplifying content across multiple languages, platforms, countries, and topics, with links to information operations against protests in Hong Kong, as well as involving cryptocurrency, coronavirus disinformation, and the most significant of all, the long-standing targeting of Guo Wengui, an exiled Chinese businessman residing in the United States.

Over a period of nine days, I captured data from Twitter, both in real-time and past, and conducted an ongoing analysis of the dataset as it grew. This report will show the initial findings from the dataset.

The findings indicate that there is a well-structured information campaign displaying a number of criteria similar to those of past campaigns identified as “significant state-backed information operations” originating from within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in a disclosure report by Twitter in August 2019.

This report does not focus on the veracity of the targets of the information operation, nor does it seek to discredit or support the claims presented herein. The analysis is on the structure and operations of the network alone.

Methodology: Capturing Data And Conducting The Analysis

The dataset was made by capturing activity from Twitter over a period from 25 April – 3 May, 2020. I captured data that was based on two hashtags that were present in many of the tweets:

  • #郭文贵
  • #milesguo

Here is an example of the content and style of the tweets:

The data around these hashtags was captured in real-time using the open source platform Gephi, and historical data was also captured for accounts and tags using the Python tool Twint.

The data that was captured consisted of tweets, retweets, likes, comments, and mentions.

In total, more than 2500 accounts were collected, which forms the basis of this analysis.

While the dataset is large enough to identify trends, there is the limitation of time, location, account history, and details only Twitter is privy to.

Given more time spent capturing this data in the same manner, or given a chance that Twitter would publish account details in its regular transparency reports, a more complete picture of the network could be analysed.

However, the following evidence is what is present in this existing dataset, and it is already very interesting.

Visualising The Network: The Modularity Graph

The data captured was visualised in Gephi. Using both modularity and hit detections automatically categorised the accounts into modularity classes and allowed for clusters to be formed based on their interractions in the network. You can see these clusters in the overview below.

In the visualisation above there are two important features present:

  • The coloured dots, which are referred to as nodes’ signify individual Twitter accounts
  • The lines between them, which are referred to as edges, are the interactions between the accounts

Of the 2504 accounts, there were 8714 edges, or interactions in a directed graph format.

Structure Of The Network: “The Great Retweet”

This network operates in a structured manner to ensure brand new accounts with zero followers and zero accounts following are able to post one tweet and have that tweet magnified with, on average, between 200 and 1000 likes and retweets.

This can be seen in the image above. The red boxes included are clusters that operate within this network to post and amplify the campaign’s agenda.

This is a sustainable and effective model for the network — when it suffers account closures and mass deletions, it can simply create new accounts to re-support that model.

To carry out that task, the network consists of two limbs: posters and amplifiers. Each has their function in the chain of operations. This can be seen in the image below, which shows central accounts that would have posted content, and the surrounding accounts that retweeted it.

First, I will use the example of account mutorcsmitak. It operates as a poster. It has 10 people following, and 4 followers.

Below is an example of a tweet it posted that is critical of Guo Wengui.

The likes and retweets are unnaturally high for an account of this nature.

However, it is not the only account posting content like this. Many other accounts with very few followers — yet with exceptionally high retweet and like ratios — are posting this content.

In the data visualisation, we can see mutorcsmitak’s amplifier network, with the accounts surrounding mutorcsmitak, seen below.

The network accounts surrounding mutorcsmitak are the amplifiers of mutorcsmitak’s content, as well as other poster accounts that require amplification.

This smaller cluster of poster and amplifier accounts, like mutorcsmitak’s cluster, is repeated across the entire network, drawing resources from many other accounts. You can see this in the image below, which shows stronger edges (the lines) forming the links between clusters in the network.

Creation Of New Accounts To Fuel The Network

The network supports its operations by creating new accounts every day. Over the time the dataset was collected, many new accounts were created to join the network.

Over the space of four days, the following numbers joined the network:

  • April 27, 2020: 52 accounts
  • April 28, 2020: 97 accounts
  • April 29, 2020: 109 accounts
  • April 30, 2020: 151 accounts

I have provided screenshots below of samples from those dates to show the accounts created, their generic Twitter handles, and usernames.

Not only are the mass creation dates and times visible in this, but also the nature of the accounts’ names, of which many appear in cyrillic, yet support a pro-Chinese government narrative.

Language Themes Of The Network’s Accounts

The accounts providing the amplification vary in languages and the style of names Twitter, and when there is a bio present, they vary in that too.

Some accounts use names written in Chinese, while other accounts in the network use Russian Twitter account names written in Cyrillic alphabet.

For example, let’s look at account FFJdream, one of the posters of the more common media seen displayed under the MilesGuo hashtags.

The retweets appear to come from a mix of different accounts, but for the majority, they display in Cyrillic-based languages, primarily in Russian.

It is evident by looking at the data in spreadsheet format that there is a tendency to use Russian names. Below are some of the screenshots from the days that saw significant account creations. The names column is identified in red.

Content Of The Network: The Case Of Guo Wengui

Many of the accounts are part of a sustained information campaign against Guo Wengui, an exiled Chinese businessman residing in the United States.

This is not the first time Wengui, also known as Miles Kwok, has been subject to a coordinated campaign on Twitter. A report from ASPI in 2019 identified operations targeting him as far back as April 2017.

Wengui has been critical of the Chinese government in the past, and more recently he has criticised its response to COVID-19. Many of the accounts in the network target these claims specifically.

This analysis does not support claims made by Wengui, nor does it negate them. The focus of this report is on the network, not Wengui.

Common points of the network are the previously mentioned poster and amplifier system, as well as the posts, which consist of graphics and text written in Chinese.

The text is critical of Wengui and his claims and appears to counter some of the claims he makes.

These posts are echoed largely in the network, as seen below

The content is also present on Facebook, where the network also operates using hijacked accounts and pages.

Content Of The Network: Alternative Topics

The network on Twitter does not just amplify content based on Wengui. It also appears to target other areas in coordinated efforts, for example the Hong Kong protests, cryptocurrency, and COVID-19.

Hong Kong Protests Content

The same network amplifying content related to Wengui is also critical of the Hong Kong protest movement. These findings are consistent with the 2019 report made by ASPI as well as the targeting of political opponents and protestors.

In the network, a number of amplifier Russian-themed accounts have been identified. By looking at the activity of those accounts we can identify the links to potential efforts of the network.

Below is an amplifier account active in that network.

It retweets content consistent with the efforts of the network — as seen below, there are tweets about Wengui and tweets on Elon Musk and cryptocurrency (these will be shown as part of the network’s targeting in the next section).

The same account reposted this tweet supportive of China’s actions in the Hong Kong protests.

The network amplifies a series of tweets supportive of the police in Hong Kong and critical of those who seek independence. Screenshots of some of the posts in the network by other Russian or Chinese-named amplifiers are as follows.

Cryptocurrency/Elon Musk Content

Another example of the content retweeted by this network is evidenced below. It is content related to Elon Musk and cryptocurrency.

The graphic below represents retweeters of one of the Wengui posts on the left and those same accounts retweeting the Elon Musk crypto post. I have matched them to all retweeting the same Elon Musk/crypto-related post that was a comment underneath a post from Donald Trump.

COVID-19 Content

That same cluster seen above has also amplified specific posts on COVID-19, targeting the U.S.  These accounts posting the content follow the same structure of name, account creation, and targeted campaign areas.

The posts seen include subject matter of health posts on links between vaping and COVID-19 and allegations of biosecurity incidents in the U.S. with the tags #coronavirus and #TruthAboutCovid. Examples can be seen below, these are screenshots from two of the same accounts that were seen above (Johny Ochoa Correa, Наталья).

Again, the retweets of the above post follow the same signs present among amplifiers in the network.

And below are the retweets of the post above.

Summary Of Findings  

This analysis shows that there is an active network of accounts targeting subjects in a coordinated approach to skew the narrative around varying topics, and to push set agendas. Many of these agendas are supportive of the Chinese government and critical of either popular figures or protestors who are against it.

The network operates through consistent account creation to add more numbers and seeming veracity to its network, using a system of poster and amplifier accounts to “stage” trending topics, and to provide the illusion of viral tweets.

This network exists on both Twitter and Facebook.

Content of the accounts correlates with findings made in the past, both by Twitter and other entities, of state-linked information operations that are being run out of People’s Republic of China.

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MESOPOTAMIA NEWS: PUTIN’S SPY CONTRA MADAME MERKEL

Who Is Dmitry Badin, The GRU Hacker Indicted By Germany Over The Bundestag Hacks?

May 5, 2020 – By Christo Grozev – Bellingcat 

On 5 May 2020, German media reported that Germany’s Federal Prosecutor has issued an arrest warrant against Russian citizen Dmitry Badin, the main suspect in the 2015 hacking of the German Bundestag.

What Was The 2015 Bundestag Hack?

In April 2015, members of the German parliament as well as members of Merkel’s Bundestag office, received an email that ostensibly originated from the United Nations, based on its visible domain name “@un.org”. The mail was titled “Ukraine conflict with Russia leaves economy in ruins“. The email carried malicious executable code that installed itself on the victim’s computer.

Over the next several weeks, the malicious software — which appeared to steal passwords and spread via the local networks — had taken over the whole Bundestag IT infrastructure, rendering its online services and external website inaccessible. In the background, logs later showed, over 16 gigabytes of data had been sucked up by a foreign-based hacker. These included complete mailboxes of German parliamentarians. According to media reports, Angela Merkel’s parliamentary office was also breached.

Who Is Dmitry Badin?

German media report that the German Federal Police has been able to link the 2015 phishing campaign and subsequent data theft to Dmitry Badin, an assumed member of GRU’s elite hacking unit 26165, better known among cyber security analysts as APT28. The operations’ linkage to him has reportedly been made based on log analysis and “information from partner services”; however, no specific evidence of how the attribution was made has yet been made public.

Dmitry Badin was already on the FBI’s wanted list over his alleged involvement in several hacking operations attributed to GRU’s APT28 unit. Among these operations was the hack of the anti-doping organization WADA while it was investigating a doping administration program, as well the DNC hack on the eve of the U.S. presidential elections.

Validating Dmitry Badin’s Linkage To The GRU

FBI documents describe Dmitry Badin briefly as “alleged to have been a Russian military intelligence officer, assigned to Unit 26165”, born in Kursk on 15 November 1990. His passport photograph was published as part of his Wanted package.

Based on analysis of data from primarily open sources, we can confirm that Dmitry Badin, born 15 November 1990, indeed works for GRU’s unit 26165.

Using Russian social-media reverse-image search application FindClone, we found Dmitry Badin’s photographs in his wife’s VK account. We then re-validated that this is the same person by comparing the two photos in Microsoft Azure’s Face Verification tool

A search for Badin’s full name and birth date in previously leaked Moscow car registration databases provided a match: Dmitry Sergeevich Badin, born on 15 November 1990, purchased a KIA PS car in June 2018. The car registration included the owner’s passport number and place of issue (St. Petersburg), as well as his registered address. Badin’s registered address, as of 1 June 2018, was Komsomolsky Prospect 20.

This is the address of GRU’s military unit 26165, as can be seen from publicly available Russian corporate registries. Unit 26165 is also known as the GRU’s 85th Main Center, specializing in cryptography. The center first gained public notoriety in 2017, when our Russian investigative partner The Insider discovered that an officer from this unit had inadvertently left his personal metadata in a document leaked as part of the so-called Macron Leaks.

Address registration for Unit 26165

We have previously identified a breach in the operational security of Russia’s military intelligence that allowed the identification of at least 305 officers who had their cars registered at this same address. Dmitry Badin was not among the list of 305 officers we identified then due to the fact that he purchased his car after the car-registration database we consulted in October 2018 had been publicly leaked.

Scaramouche, Scaramoush!

Currently, we have no knowledge of how German investigators were able to link Dmitry Badin to the Bundestag hack. However, open-source evidence we discovered may point to his role in many more than the three hacking operations that his name has been linked to.

Using the license plate number of Badin’s car, we searched a leaked Moscow parking database and found that he frequently parked his car near the dormitory of Russia’s Military Academy, at Bolshaya Pirogovskaya 51. The parking logs also contained two phone numbers that he had used for mobile payments for his parking sessions. We then looked up both of these numbers in various phone messengers and reverse-search phone databases.

One of the numbers appeared in the Viber messenger app under the obviously assumed name of Gregor Eisenhorn, a character from the fantasy Warhammer 40,000 game.

The other number appeared in two different phone-number look-up apps, both under his real name and under what would later appear to be his favorite alias: “Nicola Tesla.”

We then checked if this number was linked to a social media account in Russia, and discovered that it had been connected to a now-deleted account on VKontakte (VK). Searching through archived copies of this account, we discovered that as of 2016 it had been used under the name Dmitry Makarov. Even earlier, however, it had borne the name Nicola Tesla, and also had the user name “Scaramouche”. 

Data from archived copy of the now-defunct VK account, showing two linked numbers, including a Kursk land-line numbe

During this period — which we could not date precisely from the archived copy — the user of the VK account had been based in Kursk, which is where Dmitry Badin was born, and where he grew up before moving to St. Petersburg. His Petersburg period — which can be established both from the place of issuance of his passport and from photos on his wife’s VK account prior to 2014 — is likely linked to his university studies. Our prior investigations into members of GRU’s hacking team have established that a large number of the hackers graduate from St. Petersburg computer science universities.

We also found out that Badin’s mobile number is linked to a Skype account, which, like his now defunct VK account, is in the name of “Nicola Tesla”, but uses the username Scaramoush777.

Scaramouche, from the Italian word scaramuccia, literally “little skirmisher”, is the standard evil-ish clown character from 16th-century commedia dell’arte. The word is probably better known from the well-known recitative from Queen’s Bohemian Rhapsody. However, to cyber security researchers investigating state-actor hacking operations, this word carries an additional payload.

In March 2017, the cyber threats unit of the cyber security firm SecureWorks(c) published its own attribution white paper, reasoning its conclusions that the hacking exploits by APT28 (which SecureWorks refers to with its own code name “Iron Twilight”) are a government-sponsored operation, which is most likely linked to Russia’s military intelligence. In its report, SecureWorks lists both the targets that it has identified APT28 as having attacked, as well as the tool set used by this shadowy hacker group.

The endpoint kit used by APT28 to perform screen captures and steal targets’ credentials, is called Scaramouche. This particular set of malware got its name from the SecureWorks Cyber Threats Unit who named it, in their own words,“after the Scaramouche username found in the PDB path of both tools”.

Given that Dmitry Badin used the Scaramouche username —judging by all evidence — before he joined the GRU, it is unlikely that he usurped a pre-existing user name for his VK and Skype accounts. This is clear when based on being part of a team of GRU coders called “scaramouche”. Much more plausibly, the user name “scaramouche” discovered by CTU was namely Badin’s own user name. This, in turn, would mean that the endpoint kit written by Dmitry Badin was a crucial piece of the malware used in all hacks attributable to APT28. from attacks on Russian opposition figures and journalists to Western media organizations (including Bellingcat), the MH17 investigation team, the German Bundestag, and the DNC.

It would be prudent to ask: is it plausible that such a prolific and savvy hacker would leave such traces that would readily implicate him in serial cyber crime? It is not so hard to believe, given GRU hackers’ own nonchalance towards covering their own tracks. Badin’s colleagues who were caught trying to hack the OPCW’s lab in the Hague, for example, were carrying on taxi receipts explicitly showing a route from GRU’s headquarters to the airport. We could easily identify 305 of them simply by the address they had registered their cars at, not to mention Badin himself registered his vehicle to the official address of his GRU unit.

The most surreal absence of “practice-what-you-breach” among GRU hackers might be visible in their lackadaisical attitude to their own cyber protection. In 2018, a large collection of hacked Russian mail accounts, including user name and passwords, was dumped online. Dmitry Badin’s email — which we figured out from his Skype account, which we in turn obtained from his phone number, which we of course got from his car registration — had been hacked. He had apparently been using the password Badin1990. After this, his email credentials were leaked again as part of a larger hack, where we see that he had changed his password from Badin1990 to the much more secure Badin990.

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How Netanyahu defeated his political enemies & Machiavellied them

MESOPOTAMIA NEWS : NETANJAHU CRITIC BY SETH FRANTZMAN

By SETH J. FRANTZMAN  10 May 2020
Netanyahu is going to run yet another government in Israel, as his foes look even weaker than in the past. All that remains in opposition is a much smaller Yesh Atid party and Naftali Bennett’s small right wing party. Lapid and Bennett were once useful for Netanyahu, now they are discarded so he can use the new centrist Gantz for his purposes. He has cued in and then crushed many parties along the way, playing the centrists like a fiddle and dividing the right and left, isolating the far-left and Arab parties. He only has around 30 seats in the Knesset, but it is always enough.

Let’s understand Netanyahu how Netanyahu absorbed Israel’s center, destroyed it’s left leaning Labor party and divided and marginalized the far-right…to make himself undefeated and indispensable to so many parties, playing them like an orchestra and sidelining them so he can stay in power…turning Israel’s politics into a circus where he is the leader…

Netanyahu’s second government

Netanyahu first came to power briefly in the 1990s as the face of opposition to the Oslo peace accords. He next emerged in opposition to the Gaza withdrawal in 2005. “I am not prepared to be a partner to a move which ignores reality, and proceeds blindly toward turning the Gaza Strip into a base for Islamic terrorism which will threaten the state,” he wrote. He led a Likud of bittereinders to a dismal 12 seats in March 2006, but circumstances brought him back to the front as Kadima stumbled under Olmert during Amona clashes, Operation Summer Rains in 2006, the 2006 war in Lebanon and 2009 war in Gaza.

Feb. 2009 elections: Netanyahu’s Likud comes in second with 27 seats but he forms a government as Livni fails.

Bar Ilan speech given by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Bar–Ilan University on 14 June 2009. He appears to support two-state solution.

January 2011, Labor Party leader Barak formed a breakaway party, Independence, which enabled him to maintain his loyal Labor’s MK faction within Netanyahu’s government.

May 2012: Israel’s prime minister calls off plans for early elections after forming unity government with centrist Kadima party now under Mofaz.

September 2012; Netanyahu said to gamble on Romney victory.

Oct. 2012: Netanyahu and Liberman’s Beitnu merge

November 2012: the Israel Defense Forces launched Operation Pillar of Defense

Elections: January 2013: Likud-Beitnu gets 31 seats in elections.

March 2013: A coalition of Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu, Yesh Atid (which came in second in the elections), the Jewish Home and Hatnua (Livni).

July 2014: Protective Edge, war in Gaza

November 2014: Adelson-aimed bill curbing free newspapers advances in Knesset.

March 2015 speech to Congress about Iran deal: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said a deal the U.S. and its allies are pursuing with Iran over its nuclear program is “very bad.”

March 2015 elections: Likud gets 30 seats, Zionist union falls short. Kahlon’s Kulanu emerges as new party, and Joint List runs for first time combining left/Arab parties.

September 2015: Netanyahu’s lightning visit to Moscow after Russia intervenes in Syrian war.

May 2016 Bogie Yaalon quits as defense minister citing Netanyahu’s conduct, he will later call for Netanyahu to resign and say the government is full of extremists.

September 2018: The Israeli military on Tuesday acknowledged that it has conducted airstrikes against over 200 Iranian targets in Syria since 2017.

November 2018: Yisrael Beytenu chairman Avigdor Liberman announced that he would be resigning as defense minister; Bennett and Shaked threaten to leave but don’t.

December 2018: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, holds five ministerial portfolios: prime minister, defense minister, foreign minister, health, immigration and absorption.

December 2018: Israel launches Northern Shield operation to stop Gaza tunnels.

January 2019: Former IDF Chief of Staff says Israel has struck over 1,000 times in Syria.

January 2019: Zionist Union head Gabbay pushes Livni out, she quits politics in February. Once poised to lead Israel, she is sidelined.

April 2019 elections: Likud gets 35 seats and ties with Blue and White’s Gantz; failure to form government after enticements to Liberman lead to new elections called for 17 September 2019.

May 2019: The Likud secretariat on Tuesday approved a merger deal between the party and Moshe Kahlon’s center-right Kulanu; later Likud agreed to a deal with Zehut, whereby the latter party would drop out of the election.

September 2019 elections: Likud comes in second with 32 seats.

January 2020: Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit on Tuesday filed the indictment against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for charges of bribery, fraud in three cases.

March 2020 elections: Likud gets 36 seats, Gantz tapped to form next government by President Rivlin.

Apr 20, 2020: Netanyahu, Gantz agree unity government, Blue and White party splits up and Lapid’s Yesh Atid goes its separate way into opposition.

April 25: Labor Party leader Peretz secretly signs coalition agreement

April 28: Lapid offers to back Netanyahu to cancel deal with Gantz.

May 10: Israel’s Yamina party, led by interim Defense Minister Naftali Bennett, announced it would join the opposition, angry at Netanyahu for not giving it portfolios and right wing pledges. Netanyahu backed by 72 Knesset members of 120.

Postscript

Netanyahu has broken and destroyed all of those who tried over the years to get power, and he has absorbed others; from Kahlon to Bennett, Lapid, Gantz, Livni, Peretz, Barak, Liberman…each served their purpose and then went outside government. Together they could all have unseated Netanyahu but they dislike each other more than they want to oppose him

 

MESOPOTAMIA NEWS : NEUSTE ATTETATE AUS DER IMPORTIERTEN ISLAMISTEN-SZENE

„Das ist, weil ich Türke bin“

10 Mai 2010 . Seit Mitte April wurden in Waldkraiburg vier Geschäfte türkischer Inhaber attackiert, eines brannte komplett aus. Der Tatverdächtige wurde nun mit Sprengstoff festgesetzt. Wir haben die Betroffenen besucht.

Von Sophie Aschenbrenner, Waldkraiburg  – Der Döner-Imbiss in Waldkraiburg wurde am Mittwoch von einem 25-Jährigen attackiert.

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MESOPOTAMIA NEWS ACHILLE MBEMBES „NEGERDENKEN“ ! / SOLIDARITÄTSAUFRUFE & TEXTE

04.05.2020. Nun mobilisiert ein breites Bündnis von Professoren für Achille Mbembe. Ein Papier israelischer Akademiker fordert die Absetzung des Bundesbeauftragen für Antisemitismus, Felix Klein. Ein weiteres Professorenbündnis um die Assmanns, Eva Illouz, Wolfgang Benz und viele andere verteidigt den Vergleich als Methode des Erkenntnisgewinns. Aleida Assmann fürchtet außerdem in der Berliner Zeitung, dass die Debatte um Mbembe vom wahren Antisemitismus ablenke. Die taz erinnert an den israelischen Beitrag zur südafrikanischen Apartheid. Außerdem: Die SZ erinnert daran, dass Aufklärung nichts ist, wenn sie nicht an der Kanalisation arbeitet. Und Golem erklärt am Beispiel von Xiaomi, was eine “Hintertür mit Telefonfunktion” ist.

Schwerpunkt Debatte um Achille Mbembe

Nun wird nochmal breit für Achille Mbembe mobilisiert.

Mbembe sei vor allem ein Theoretiker des “Negerdenkens“, schreibt Dominic Johnson in der taz (der die Übersetzung von Mbembes Titel “Critique de la raison nègre” als “Kritik der schwarzen Vernunft” mutlos findet). “Neger” sei für Mbembe praktisch jeder, der nach einem universalisierten Kolonialismusmodell unterdrückt wird: “Die Vorwürfe gegen Israel stehen bei Mbembe nicht im Hauptwerk, sondern bloß in Streitschriften, die im Kontext der universitären Debatten Südafrikas entstanden. Denn der Apartheid-Vorwurf gegenüber dem israelischen Besatzungsregime ist in Südafrika und auch in Israel selbst gang und gäbe, und in beiden Ländern ist auch präsent, dass Israel und Apartheid-Südafrika einst militärisch zusammenarbeiteten und dass Israels radikale Siedlerbewegung das Homelandsystem bejubelte. Heute tritt Israel in Afrika vor allem als Elite-Militärausbilder sowie als Anbieter von Spitzentechnologie zu Kampf- und Überwachungszwecken auf: Hightech gegen den ‘Neger‘.”

Zugleich zirkulieren zwei höchst prominent unterzeichnete Akademikerpetitionen, auf die die taz heute verweist. Im ersten Schreiben fordern israelische Universitätsleute (darunter Eva Illouz) eine Absetzung des Antisemitsmusbeauftragen der Bundesregierung, Felix Klein. Sie beklagen vor allem einen Missbrauch der Antisemitismusdefinition der “International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance” (IHRA). Hier werde Antisemitismus mit “Kritik und Aktivismus mit Bezug zu Israel vermengt, um Gegner der israelischen Politik zu diskreditieren und zum Schweigen zu bringen. Auch hier beobachten wir, dass Herr Klein in Synergie mit der israelischen Regierung arbeitet.”

Im zweiten Schreiben verteidigen prominente Wissenschaftler, darunter die Assmanns, Micha Brumlik, Wolfgang Benz, wieder Eva Illouz, Andreas Eckert und Susan Neiman Mbembes Apartheid-Vergleiche: “Ohne die vergleichende Betrachtung wäre ein Erkenntnisgewinn in der Geschichtswissenschaft, wie in den meisten anderen Wissenschaftsdisziplinen, grundsätzlich nicht möglich. Unseren Kollegen dafür der Verharmlosung der Shoa oder gar Gleichsetzung des Genozids an den europäischen Jüdinnen und Juden mit dem rassistischen Regime Apartheid-Südafrikas zu bezichtigen, stellt eine fundamentale Grundlage der Wissenschaft in Frage und ist deshalb falsch.” Und in der Berliner Zeitung verteidigt Aleida Assmann Mbembe nochmal extra und beklagt, dass die Einmütigkeit, die wir im Kampf gegen Antisemitismus so dringend brauchen, “gerade durch eine Debatte gestört (wird), die von dieser Aufgabe ablenkt, die Gemüter verwirrt und die falschen Gegner ins Visier nimmt”.

Mehr via www.mesop.de

MESOPOTAMIA NEWS BACKGROUNDER : The Rami Makhlouf saga poses a dangerous challenge for Assad  May 6, 2020 – BY MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE (MEI)

By Danny Makki  

 

Seldom has an expression in Syria generated as much irony as “ya mukhalef ya Makhlouf,” meaning you are either a Makhlouf or working illegally. While the phrase has been accurate for the past 20 years, the tables have turned and now it is Makhlouf who is the mukhalef.

Rami Makhlouf, the godfather of a financial empire estimated to have controlled a staggering 60 percent of Syria’s pre-war economy, is out of favor, out of access, and seemingly at the point of no return. Yet despite his fall from grace, he remains a powerful figure.

Makhlouf is more than just a mere name, he is a shadow ruler of the country’s black markets, a key financial pillar of its flailing economy, and has been under immense pressure from a government crackdown on corruption — augmented by the sharpened knives of his domestic enemies — for almost a year.

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MESOPOTAMIA NEWS BACKGROUNDER: Putin und Ruhani – In Syrien kämpfen die Russland und der Iran um die wirtschaftliche Macht.

Macht und Geld – Die Besatzungsmächte fordern eine Entschädigung für ihren militärischen Einsatz in Syrien. In der komplizierten Konstellation zeichnet sich nur schwer eine Lösung ab. HANDELSBLATT 9 Mai 2020

Istanbul, Moskau, Tel Aviv Ein Streit zwischen Mitgliedern des Assad-Clans könnte größere Verwerfungen innerhalb der Machtstruktur des syrischen Staates nach sich ziehen. Rami Makhlouf, ein steinreicher Cousin des syrischen Staatspräsidenten Baschar al-Assad, hat in mehreren Facebook-Videos dem Staatschef subtil gedroht. Damit deutet sich ein Machtkampf in Damaskus an, der große Auswirkungen auf die Zukunft des Landes haben könnte.

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MESOPOTAMIA NEWS : DON’T LOCKDOWN THE  DISCLAIMERS ! RED CHINA & WHO

Trump und die WHO, die „FIFA unter den Weißkittelverbänden“

Für die „Tagesschau“ und andere deutsche Journalisten ist jeden Tag Wahlkampf gegen Trump – nun soll Corona schaffen, was Hillary nicht gelang. Von Stefan Frank – 9. May 2020 – Jüdische Rundschau

Seit Beginn ihrer Berichterstattung über das Thema Covid-19 stellt tagesschau.de die Epidemie in den Vereinigten Staaten als die Folge des Versagens eines einzigen Menschen dar. Wer ist schuld? Trump. Präsident Donald Trump tue „seine Ignoranz als ‚Erfindung‘ der Demokraten ab, die ihm schaden wollten“ (so Klaus Scherer, NDR). Er sei ein „zaudernder Kriegspräsident“ (so Sebastian Hesse, MDR) der „nicht mal ansatzweise“ so wirke, „als ob er noch Herr der Lage ist“ (so Julia Kastein, MDR), und dessen „tägliche Corona-Briefings“ „berüchtigt“ seien (so Torben Ostermann, Radio Bremen).

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MESOPOTAMIA NEWS UP TO DATE : Hitler’s Man In Turkey: The Unbelievable Story of a Nazi Spy Inside the British Embassy / CODENAME CICERO!  

Elyesa Bazna, a Turkish servant of the British Ambassador in Ankara, betrayed his employers to the Nazis in October 1943 for what would be $1.2m in total, the highest price for a spy to that point, or would have been if the Germans paid him in real money

Codename: Cicero. – by Kelly Bell  3. May 2020

On the evening of October 29, 1943, a middle-aged man, innocuous in appearance but for his deep-set, penetrating eyes, appeared at the German embassy in the Turkish capital of Ankara. The facility’s intelligence officer, Ludwig Moyzisch, who at first was unimpressed by his after hours caller, received him. Conversing in their common language of French, the Austrian intelligence operative and his shadowy Turkish visitor became more intense as they continued to speak.

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MESOPOTAMIA NEWS : US effort to invest dispute between Russia, al-Assad; suspicious role of Turkey in Tunisia

The United States of America seeks to invest the dispute between Russia and Bashar al-Assad and expressed its willingness to cooperate again with Moscow over Syria, while Tunisians expressed concern about Turkish moves in Tunisia and the region.

 

On Saturday morning, Arab press focused on the Syrian situation, in addition to the Turkish role in the region.

Al-Arab: An American optimism that warned against reviving cooperation with Russia in Syria

The Arab newspapers issued this morning dealt with the Syrian issue with several issues, the most prominent of which was the Russian-American relationship. In this context, Al-Arab newspaper said, “The developments in the relationship between Damascus and Moscow have paid off after many reports spoke about the cracking of the relationship between Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the Russian President.” Vladimir Putin to the emergence of new US positions optimistic but remains cautious about the nature of the US-Russian relationship in the Syrian file

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On Thursday, Washington expressed its readiness to cooperate again with Russia, which could soften Moscow’s stances on many outstanding issues, including the Constitutional Committee.

The US administration did not hide that the reason for its new optimism was based mainly on what appeared to be signs of worsening relations between the Russian and Syrian allies on the one hand and between Moscow and Tehran on the other.

The US special envoy in charge of the Syrian file, James Jeffrey, expressed cautious optimism about the possibility of cooperating again with Russia to put an end to the war in Syria, indicating that Moscow may have been fed up with President Bashar al-Assad.

“Russia may be more prepared now,” Jeffrey said. “We have seen some indications in the Russian media and in certain Russian actions, to be more flexible about the constitutional committee.”

In recent months, nearly four and a half years after the start of the Russian military operation in Syria, there were signs of cracks between Moscow and Damascus.

This change in Russian attitudes towards al-Assad regime has been manifested through the semi-official writings that have been explored in Russia and criticize the inability of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to find a political settlement to the conflict that is tearing his country apart.

Many observers agree that the relations between the Russian and Syrian allies are living in their worst conditions since the beginning of the war in Syria in 2011, and this was summed up in an article published by former Russian ambassador in Damascus Alexander Aksinoyuk, who said that Moscow’s positions reflect the growing Russian frustration with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

The United States is trying to enter this gap and use it to its advantage, especially after it has tried in recent months to keep Ankara away from any political decision taken by Moscow on the Syrian file, noting that the NATO paper to which Turkey belongs.

“The Russians may be ready again to discuss with us how to solve the Syrian file without a military victory, because it is very clear at this stage for Russia that they will not achieve a military victory, certainly not soon,” said James Jeffrey.

Talking about the future of relations between Russia and the United States, Jeffrey referred to the publications of Cousin of al-Assad, the influential Syrian businessman Rami Makhlouf, on Facebook.

He said that the publications “reveal dirty washing in one of the worst systems of the 21st century,” adding that “we hope it will be an indication of more imbalance and disintegration in this evil system.”

Al-Bayan: The European “IRINI” addresses Turkey’s terrorist policies in Libya

On the Libyan issue, Al-Bayan newspaper said, “The mission of” Irini “carried out by the European Union, with the aim of monitoring the implementation of Security Council resolutions to prevent the supply of arms to Libya, has entered the stage of active activity since last Sunday, when it began to address Turkey’s terrorist policies in Libya.

And the operation “Irini” was actually launched last Sunday, relying on a French frigate and a naval patrol plane from Luxembourg, with two ships from Italy and Greece to join the process soon, in addition to two patrol planes from Germany and Poland and the Maltese team to monitor the sea freight.

Diplomatic sources told Al-Bayan that Italy worked strongly to receive the leadership of the mission, relying in this on the experience it gained from the previous Sofia mission and its geographical proximity to Libya, while Greece sees it as the most capable of managing the mission that has a name taken from its language. , Which is the name “Irini” in the sense of peace, questioning Italy’s ability to succeed in the task under the circumstances it is currently experiencing due to the spread of Coronavirus, and the sources confirmed that there is a compromise that was developed in European circles, that requires Italy to take the lead first, before It is later assigned to Greece, indicating that a rotate the leadership between the two countries will be every six months.

The sources pointed out that Turkey and some of its allies in the region put pressure to exclude Greece from leading the mission due to the conflict between Athens and Ankara, but they failed to do so, and the European Satellite Center (SatSan), which is located in Turgon de Aduz in Spain, will monitor all Moves off the Libyan coast. The Libyan National Army welcomed the European mission.

Al-Sharq al-Awsat: Tunisian questions about the “suspicious” role of Ankara

In a related context, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper said, “The arrival of a Turkish plane at the Tunisian airport in Djerba yesterday raised widespread questions and debates within political circles about Turkey’s” suspicious “role in the region and revived the differences between the Renaissance movement, led by Rashid Ghannouchi (Islamic), and a number of parties. The opposition, which seeks to exclude the influence of Turkey and Qatar on the local and regional political scene.

Some Libyan news websites were surprised to send Turkey aid to Libya via Tunisia specifically, and not to direct it directly to Mitiga airports, or the airstrip of the Air College in Misurata, especially since the official Turkish News Agency quoted the Turkish Ministry of Defense, announcing the preparation and sending of an aid shipment to Tunisia to support efforts in combating the Corona pandemic, but without mentioning Libya, which created additional doubts about the content of this shipment.

T/S

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