MESOPOTAMIA NEWS : THE RED CHINESE VIRAL ROUTE TO EUROPE Friday, October 2, 2020 – by THE SOUFAN CENTER
THE SECURITY CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY CHINA’S ‘HEALTH SILK ROAD’ 

 

Bottom Line Up Front:
  • China recently declared its intentions to deepen multilateral health cooperation with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia.
  • During the COVID-19 pandemic, China has revamped its ‘Health Silk Road’ as an instrument for Beijing to tout itself as a responsible global leader.
  • China’s ‘Health Silk Road’ has seen the provision of bilateral medical aid and championing Beijing’s pandemic response in multilateral forums.
  • The ‘Health Silk Road’ and China’s attempts at making multilateral inroads under the cover of the pandemic brings with it a host of security issues.
On September 17, official Chinese government media agency, Xinhua News, published an announcement by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that China, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia had signed agreements to deepen multilateral health cooperation. This is but one example of Beijing’s efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic to revamp the concept of the ‘Health Silk Road’—a paronomasia on Xi’s signature foreign policy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The concept was initiated in 2017 through a memorandum of understanding between China and the World Health Organization (WHO), which made ambitious, but vague pledges to build an international community of health cooperation. It has remained largely dormant, until the COVID-19 pandemic spread across the world, when Beijing has made use of the ‘Health Silk Road’ to boost its image on the world stage, as well as to protect and advance the economic and political interests of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

To advance its national interests, China has pursued several lines of effort under the banner of the ‘Health Silk Road’—providing bilateral medical aid, selling medical equipment, lending economic support, and championing Beijing’s pandemic response in multilateral forums, through diplomacy, and on social media. These actions serve to refashion China’s image on the world stage from being the arsonist of the pandemic to the firefighter—often highlighting European and U.S. butchered responses to control the virus and praising China’s successes. The ‘Health Silk Road’ also presents an economic opportunity for Beijing to reframe the BRI in the midst of the economic fallout from the global pandemic. The pandemic has highlighted vulnerabilities in labor and supply chains, as well as the economic unsustainability of Chinese loans. In a post-pandemic world, many BRI recipient countries may not perceive costly and ambitious infrastructure projects as attractive options. The ‘Health Silk Road,’ however, offers solutions that ensure Xi’s project will live on—even in an economically devastated world and in a time of a slower Chinese economic growth. Critically, the ‘Health Silk Road’ also offers an important narrative to China’s domestic audience—the CCP as a legitimate and responsible ruling party. Beijing seeks to juxtapose its response to COVID-19 to that of liberal democracies like European countries and the United States, which have suffered more from the pandemic.

There are several security issues and challenges accompanied by China’s ‘Health Silk Road.’ First, these ostensibly benevolent engagements have also been accompanied by more malicious actions, such as sophisticated disinformation campaigns, intimidation, ‘Wolf Warrior’ diplomacy, and cyber-attacks. Such actions raise questions about China’s true intentions and geopolitical ambitions. For example, when aiding Italy at the onset of the pandemic, China also sought to amplify anti-EU sentiment in the country with the aim of sundering European unity and straining trans-Atlantic relations. Second, the prospect of China marrying the ‘Health Silk Road’ with the ‘Digital Silk Road’ threatens to further aid authoritarian leaders and stifle human rights in BRI countries, by exporting emerging technologies used for surveillance under the guise of increasing public health and security. Third, China’s actions have been met with criticism from local populations, while leaders turn a blind eye to avoid damaging important economic relations with Beijing. The same day that Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Mongolia, popular protests erupted in Ulaanbaatar criticizing the CCP’s restrictive ‘assimilation policies’ and violent crackdown targeting minorities, including ethnic Mongols, in China. Similarly, protests have taken place in Kazakhstan over China’s oppression of ethnic Kazakhs, Uighurs, and other minorities in Xinjiang. Thus, while touted as an inclusive program, the ‘Health Silk Road,’ could serve to destabilize regions, solidify authoritarian tendencies, and further infringe upon the sovereignty and independence of a number of countries.

While the United States has recoiled from a leadership position in the midst of a global crisis, China is taking advantage of the vacuum to further its own interests and claim the position as a responsible world leader. Utilizing the ‘Health Silk Road’ to engage and deepen multilateral ties with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members signals that China is seeking to harness policies like the BRI, and forums, like the SCO, to further solidify its position on the world stage. In addition, Chinese leadership and diplomatic engagement with SCO countries also suggests that the organization now serves as a springboard for Beijing to forge consensus and cooperation with members outside of the traditional security issues it was originally created to address—something that could cause geopolitical ripple effects in the region and beyond.

MESOPOTAMIA NEWS „BLUT FÜR ÖL“? – Rohstoffförderer Aserbaidschan : Der Krieg einer Öl-Macht

Aserbaidschan liefert wichtige Rohstoffe nach Europa. Ein militärischer Konflikt mit Armenien könnte die Handelsbeziehungen nun gefährden. Die Türkei will das verhindern – aus eigenem Interesse.  – Von Andreas Mihm, Wien FAZ – 01.10.2020-18:07

Für die Wirtschaft gibt es Chancen über Chancen. So als wäre in der Region in den vergangenen Wochen kein militärischer Konflikt ausgebrochen, will keiner der Redner auf dem ersten Kaspisch-Europäischen Forum am Donnerstag auch nur eine einzige dieser Chancen auslassen: Der kirgisische Außenminister lobte die Ressourcen für grüne Energie, der kasachische Industrieminister hebt die Möglichkeiten der Wasserstoffproduktion hervor, der iranische Energieminister preist sein Land als Brücke von Asien nach Europa, Aserbaidschans Energieminister seines als zuverlässigen Öl- und Gaslieferanten Europas und künftigen Knotenpunkt auf der Glasfaserstrecke nach Asien. Eine „Region der Möglichkeiten“, sagt auch Michael Harms, der Geschäftsführer des Ost-Ausschusses der Deutschen Wirtschaft.

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MESOPOTAMIA NEWS INTEL BY MEIR AMIT CENTER ISRAEL – Spotlight on Global Jihad (September 24-30, 2020)

Published:

Main events of the week
  • In the Idlib region, the incidents continued, consisting mainly of exchanges of artillery fire between the Syrian army and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).
  • ISIS’s provinces in Africa and Asia continued their routine activity. One noteworthy attack this week was carried out by West Africa Province operatives who attacked a convoy of the Nigerian security forces escorting residents returning to their homes, killing dozens of soldiers and policemen.
  • Main activity in the other provinces:
    • Iraq: most of the activity centered on the Al-Anbar, Diyala and Salah al-Din provinces. Prominent modus operandi included targeted killings and the activation of IEDs against vehicles and soldiers.
    • Syria: ISIS’s activity continued to center on the Euphrates Valley, in the Deir ez-Zor-Al-Mayadeen region. Prominent modus operandi included targeted killings and attacks on vehicles.
    • The Sinai Peninsula: This week, ISIS continued its guerrilla activity against the Egyptian security forces in northern Sinai, most of which consisted of activating IEDs. In one noteworthy incident, an Egyptian army force was ambushed near Jabal al-Halal (about 60 km south of Al-Arish). Two soldiers were killed and five others were wounded. Thousands of residents who fled their homes when ISIS took over the villages in the Rabi’a region have not yet returned.
  • Noteworthy counterterrorism operations this week occurred in the following countries:
    • Libya: a spokesman for the Libyan National Army (under the command of Khalifa Haftar) announced the killing of ISIS’s leader in North Africa. The incident took place in the city of Sabha, about 650 km south of Tripoli. Eight other commanders were killed along with him.
    • Lebanon: Lebanese internal security forces uncovered an ISIS network numbering 15 operatives. All the members of the network were killed in clashes that took place in the Wadi Khaled region, in the northeast of the country.
ISIS’s activity in the various provinces around the world
Summary of ISIS activity this week
  • On September 24, 2020, ISIS’s Al-Naba’ weekly published an infographic entitled “The Harvest of the Fighters,” summarizing ISIS’s activity on September 17-23, 2020. According the infographic, during this period ISIS carried out 58 attacks around the world, compared to 42 in the previous week (i.e., an increase of about 38% in the scope of the attacks). A total of 26 attacks were carried out in Iraq, 12 of them in the Diyala Province. Attacks were also carried out in ISIS’s other provinces in Africa and Asia: Syria (15); West Africa (7); Sinai Peninsula (3); Somalia (3); Khorasan, i.e., Afghanistan (2); and Central Africa (2) (Al-Naba’ weekly, Telegram, September 24, 2020).
  • A total of 119 people were killed and wounded in these attacks, compared to 121 last week. The largest number of casualties (42) was in Iraq. The other casualties were in the following provinces: West Africa (35); Syria (25); Somalia (8); Sinai Peninsula (4); Khorasan, i.e., Afghanistan (3); and Central Africa (2) (Telegram, September 24, 2020).
Activity of Salafist jihadi organizations
The Salafist jihad localization process

In his latest article, journalist-researcher Hassan Hassan deals with the process of localization of Sunni Salafist jihad. He estimates that elements in radical jihadist organizations will not focus on “exporting” violence to the West, but instead on infiltrating local communities and building influence.[1]

The change in the orientation of Sunni jihadi organizations: from global activity to local activity
  • There are signs that radical Sunni organizations are changing the three pillars of their activity: transnational terrorism, suicide bombings and excommunication, i.e., accusing other Muslims, who do not follow their path, of being infidels (takfir). Instead, these organizations are focusing on infiltrating local communities and building influence. The significant transformation is happening in various countries, including Afghanistan, Yemen and Mali.
  • Jabhat al-Nusra (the Al-Nusra Front), al-Qaeda’s offshoot in Syria, provides an illustrative example of how the jihadist threat is changing across the region. In 2016, the group argued the merits of country-focused jihad over global jihad, stating that in the current moment, a focus on anything other than the local fight would be an “unacceptable distraction.” Thus, the group changed its tactics. Simultaneously, the group has moved away from the other two pillars of suicide bombing and excommunication, part of the grander effort not to alienate locals. In Yemen, the base of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the branch has renounced international operations and stopped recruiting foreign fighters as part of an agreement with local tribal and religious leaders.
The reasons for the change
  • One could easily dismiss these changes as limited or temporary, but there are two reasons to believe that they represent a genuine trend.
    • First, Sunni jihadists have become more involved in local struggles and prefer not to carry out global actions. Also, these Sunni jihadists sought to distinguish themselves from the hard-liners (i.e., ISIS) through relative moderation and localism, in order to gain local support. They are advocating a move away from a “jihad of the elite” that looks down on the masses, and toward a “jihad of the people” that respects local communities and reflects their priorities.
    • Second, pro-Iranian Shiite groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Islamic Dawa Party in Iraq, which pioneered transnational terrorism and suicide bombings, were the first to change their orientation and shift from a global worldview to a focus on the local arena. Over time, however, Shiite militant groups abandoned suicide bombings, which they came to view as counterproductive. Instead, they shifted from transnational terrorism to a more nationalist approach, infiltrating and then dominating local politics.
  • The Sunnis, who followed in the footsteps of the Shiites and also carried out suicide bombings, are now copying this Shiite orientation and basing their radical activity on a local strategy rather than an international one. In this context, the author notes that in 2003, Ramadan Shalah, the former leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, told the Saudi newspaper Al-Hayat in an interview that the tactic of suicide bombings had been borrowed from the Shiites (i.e., Iran and Hezbollah).
Summary and Conclusions

The future radical activity arena may be dominated by Sunni jihadist groups, which will adopt the orientation of their Shiite counterparts and base their activity on struggles in the local arena. The US needs to adapt to the changing nature of the jihadist threat. The new jihadists will not focus on exporting violence to the West, but instead on infiltrating local communities and building influence. In practical terms, the strategy should include consistent and long-term American support and oversight for governments to fill the vacuum in restive areas.

The Syria arena
The Idlib region

In the Idlib region, exchanges of artillery fire continued between the Syrian army and the forces supporting it, and the rebel organizations, mainly HTS. The exchanges of fire focused on the region several dozen kilometers south and southwest of Idlib.

Antitank missile fired at a Syrian force south of Idlib
  • On September 27, 2020, the Obvious Victory operations room, encompassing several rebel organizations led by HTS, fired an antitank missile at a force of the Syrian army and militias supporting it about 30 km south of Idlib. Four soldiers were killed or wounded (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, September 28, 2020).

ISIS’s activity in the Syria Province[2]

The region of Deir ez-Zor and Al-Mayadeen
  • On September 28, 2020, ISIS operatives broke into the house of an SDF intelligence operative about 20 km southeast of Al-Mayadeen. He was shot to death.
  • On September 27, 2020, an SDF intelligence operative was targeted by machine gun fire 8 km southeast of Al-Mayadeen. He was wounded.
  • On September 26, 2020, an SDF vehicle was targeted by machine gun fire northeast of Deir ez-Zor. The passengers were killed or wounded.
  • On September 26, 2020, an interrogator in an SDF prison was targeted by machine gun fire about 50 km southeast of Deir ez-Zor. He was killed.
  • On September 25, 2020, an IED was activated against an SDF vehicle about 10 km northeast of Deir ez-Zor. Two fighters were killed.
  • On September 23, 2020, an SDF intelligence operative was targeted by machine gun fire about 10 km north of Al-Mayadeen. He was killed.
  • On September 23, 2020, an SDF fighter was targeted by machine gun fire about 50 km south of Al-Mayadeen. He was killed.
  • On September 23, 2020, an SDF intelligence operative was targeted by machine gun fire about 5 km east of Al-Mayadeen. He was killed.
  • On September 23, 2020, an SDF intelligence operative was targeted by machine gun fire about 10 km north of Al-Mayadeen. He was killed.
Al-Hasakah region
Counterterrorism activity of the SDF and the International Coalition forces
  • On September 28, 2020, the International Coalition jointly with the SDF landed forces in the Markada Desert, about 80 km south of Al-Hasakah. During the operation, they apprehended an ISIS emir (senior commander) (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, September 28, 2020).
The desert region southeast of Aleppo
  • On September 23, 2020, Syrian soldiers were targeted by machine gun fire in a desert area about 65 km southeast of Aleppo (About 20 km east of Khanaser). Several soldiers were killed or wounded.
The Iraqi arena
Map of the provinces in Iraq (Wikipedia)
Map of the provinces in Iraq (Wikipedia)
ISIS’s attacks in the various provinces[3]
Al-Anbar Province
  • On September 24, 2020, an IED was activated against an Iraqi army vehicle about 80 km north of Al-Rutba. Two soldiers were killed.
  • On September 23, 2020, an IED was activated against an Iraqi army vehicle about 80 km east of Al-Qaim. Two soldiers were killed and another was wounded.
  • On September 21, 2020, an IED was activated against Tribal Mobilization fighters south of Fallujah, about 50 km west of Baghdad. Two fighters were wounded.
Diyala Province
  • On September 25, 2020, an IED was activated against fighters of the Tribal Mobilization and the Iraqi Military Intelligence about 50 km northeast of Baqubah. One fighter was killed and three others were wounded.
  • On September 24, 2020, fighters of the Iraqi counterterrorism unit were targeted by sniper fire about 20 km northeast of Baqubah. One fighter was killed.
  • On September 24, 2020, an IED was activated against an Iraqi army vehicle about 60 km north of Baqubah. The passengers were killed or wounded.
Salah al-Din Province
  • On September 27, 2020, ISIS operatives detonated IEDs in the house of an Iraqi Border Police fighter about 60 km north of Baghdad. The house was destroyed. When a vehicle of the Tribal Mobilization arrived at the scene, it was targeted by machine gun fire. One fighter was killed and four others were wounded.
Kirkuk Province
  • On September 26, 2020, Iraqi policemen were targeted by machine gun fire about 40 km southwest of Kirkuk. One was killed and four others were wounded.
  • On September 25, 2020, ISIS operatives broke into the house of an Iraqi intelligence operative in a village about 10 km northwest of Kirkuk. He was shot to death.
  • On September 24, 2020, several mortar shells were fired at Tribal Mobilization forces in a village about 40 km southwest of Kirkuk. ISIS reported accurate hits.
  • On September 24, 2020, ISIS operatives captured an Iraqi intelligence operative near Kirkuk and executed him. On the other hand, the Security Media Cell, affiliated with the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Office, announced that ISIS’s report was fabricated, using photos taken outside of Iraq. Iraqi Intelligence categorically denied that one of its men had been killed by ISIS (Al-Sumaria, September 27, 2020).
Two ISIS operatives (the one on the left holding a knife) standing behind an Iraqi intelligence operative before executing him (Telegram, September 25, 2020)
Two ISIS operatives (the one on the left holding a knife) standing behind an Iraqi intelligence operative before executing him (Telegram, September 25, 2020)
Nineveh Province
  • On September 23, 2020, ISIS operatives broke into the house of a Tribal Mobilization fighter about 30 km southeast of Mosul and executed him.
Counterterrorism activities by the Iraqi security forces
Nineveh Province
  • On September 26, 2020, Iraqi security forces located an ISIS weapons depot about 60 km southeast of Mosul. They found mainly explosives (Facebook page of the Iraqi Defense Ministry, September 26, 2020).
ISIS IEDs and tripwires found southeast of Mosul (Facebook page of the Iraqi Defense Ministry, September 26, 2020)
ISIS IEDs and tripwires found southeast of Mosul
(Facebook page of the Iraqi Defense Ministry, September 26, 2020)
  • On September 24, 2020, an Iraqi Military Intelligence force located a weapons depot in the area of Makhmur, about 70 km southeast of Mosul. The depot contained about 50 mortar shells and rockets of various types (Al-Sumaria, September 24, 2020).
Al-Anbar Province
  • On September 26, 2020, an Iraqi army force carrying out searches about 30 km northwest of Baghdad located several dozens of IEDs and tripwires for activating them. In addition, two IEDs and tripwires were located in the northwestern part of Ramadi (Facebook page of the Iraqi Defense Ministry, September 26, 2020).
Two IEDs consisting of canisters of plastic explosives found by the Iraqi army in northwestern Ramadi (Facebook page of the Iraqi Defense Ministry, September 26, 2020)  ISIS’s IEDs located by the Iraqi army northwest of Baghdad (Facebook page of the Iraqi Defense Ministry, September 26, 2020).
Right: ISIS’s IEDs located by the Iraqi army northwest of Baghdad (Facebook page of the Iraqi Defense Ministry, September 26, 2020). Left: Two IEDs consisting of canisters of plastic explosives found by the Iraqi army in northwestern Ramadi (Facebook page of the Iraqi Defense Ministry, September 26, 2020)
Salah al-Din Province
  • On September 26, 2020, the Popular Mobilization fired artillery at ISIS operatives about 90 km northwest of Baghdad. According to the Popular Mobilization, accurate hits were observed and ISIS sustained casualties (al-hashed.net, September 26, 2020).
“Work accident” of ISIS operatives in western Iraq
  • On September 26, 2020, an ISIS car bomb exploded in an ISIS hiding place in the western Al-Anbar Province while operatives were working on it. Five ISIS operatives were killed (Al-Sumaria, September 27, 2020).

MESOPOTAMIA NEWS PKK / PYD Politicians: Peoples unity paves way for decentralized Syria

 Syrian politicians praised the state of cohesion and solidarity between the Syrian peoples and components against foreign intervention and occupation, stressing that the unity of history and destiny is a common denominator among all peoples of the region.

POLITICS 01 Oct 2020, Thu – 06:25 2020-10-01T06:25:00 ALEPPO– MUHAMMAD ABDO – ARIF SULEIMAN BY ANHA

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MESOPOTAMIA NEWS BACKGROUNDER :  Armenia accuses Azerbaijan of using long-range weapons

 

By News Desk ALMASDAR NEWS – 2020-09-30

BEIRUT, LEBANON (5:00 P.M.) – The Armenian Ministry of Defense said on Wednesday that the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, during the military clashes in Karabakh, used various types of weapons, “including long-range weapons.”

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MESOPOTAMIA NEWS: DIE FORTSCHREITENDE EROSION DER EU – BRÜSSEL

Europäische Wirtschaftspolitik : Endspiel um die offene Marktwirtschaft

  • Von Hendrik Kafsack, Brüssel  – FAZ – -Aktualisiert am 01.10.2020- Gegensätzliche Vorstellungen: Emmanuel Macron (links) will mehr Protektionismus, der Niederländer Mark Rutte hält dagegen.

Vor dem EU-Gipfel tobt hinter den Kulissen ein Richtungsstreit, ob die Union sich stärker abschotten soll oder nicht. Und Berlin ist das Zünglein an der Waage.

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MESOPOTAMIA NEWS : ZUCKERBERG ZENSIERT STRATEGISCH ! facebook is  The FACT  ! TRUMP das Ziel !

Nach TV-Duell in Amerika : Facebook verbietet Werbung, die Legitimität der Wahl untergräbt  – 01.10.2020- – FAZ

Facebook will fortan schärfer gegen Werbung vorgehen, die Zweifel am Wahlergebnis oder an einzelnen Wahlmethoden verbreitet.

Als Reaktion auf das erste TV-Duell im amerikanischen Wahlkampf hat Facebook angekündigt, schärfer gegen Werbung vorzugehen, die Zweifel am Wahlergebnis oder an einzelnen Wahlmethoden verbreitet.

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MESOPOTAMIA NEWS  „SKANDAL!“ : ROT CHINA BAUT UIGHUREN LAGER – DAFÜR GRATULATION AUS DEUTSCHLAND

Hans-Peter Friedrich zum 71. Jahrestag der VR China – Ehemaliger Innenminister verbreitet Geburtstags-Propaganda  – Hans-Peter Friedrich (* 10. März 1957 in Naila) ist ein deutscher Politiker der CSU und seit Oktober 2017 Vizepräsident des Deutschen Bundestages.

„Hans-Peter Friedrich, Chef der ‚China-Brücke‘, gratuliert der Volksrepublik China zum 71. Geburtstag. In einem schamlos anbiedernden Video

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MESOPOTAMIA : DONALD TRUMP & THE “PROUD BOYS” CONSTRUCTION & WHITE SUPREMACY / THE DEBATE TRUMP & BIDEN

Alberto Fernandez  – Vice President of  The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI)

1 Oct 2020 – “Why this obsessive push to vilify such an obscure group? That is no mystery. For four months, rioters have torched and terrorized dozens of American cities. These were instigated and perpetrated by partisans of the left, while Democratic politicians made insane declarations about the need to abolish or defund the police. Belatedly, the Democrats have realized that burning cities and trashing civilization itself are a poor case for leadership. So, the effort is underway to rewrite four months of politically-motivated rioting as politically-agnostic ‘violence’.”

Seth J. Frantzman

Like in Israel a tiny group of soccer hooligans from Beitar called La Familia became a huge largely non-existent group. Also in the US the media largely invented the Boogaloo.

It’s typical media where you have a huge elephant of violence and you find some small violence that is the acceptable one to single out.

Like in Minneapolis they actually claimed “white supremacists and cartels” were behind the protests…like how we care about “mass shootings” but not the body count in Chicago which is more than many small wars.

 

Cockburn Guns – The press’s strange fascination with the Proud Boys / THE SPECTATOR

Why this obsessive push to vilify such an obscure group?

 

A Proud Boy in Portland last this week (Getty) – September 30, 2020

Tuesday night’s debate was full of strange moments, but the most bizarre of all may have come when Chris Wallace pressured Trump to condemn ‘white supremacists and militia groups’. When the President asked for an actual name, Joe Biden interrupted to announce the surprise debate appearance of Gavin McInnes’s all-male club, the Proud Boys.

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MESOPOTAMIA NEWS:  IRAQ WARNING INTELLIGENCE UPDATE: “OCTOBER REVOLUTION” ANNIVERSARY PROTESTS SET TO RESUME

Sep 30, 2020 – Katherine Lawlor – INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR – ISW

Key Takeaway: Iraq’s popular protest movement, set to recommence on October 1, may incite intra-Iraqi violence and could present a risk to US personnel and facilities in Iraq. Iraq’s popular protest movement is planning to resume mass memorial protests on the one-year anniversary of the “October Revolution” protests; these demonstrations will continue to condemn government corruption, Iranian influence, poor government services, mass unemployment, and the failure of the Iraqi government to hold security forces accountable for the mass killing of protesters in 2019. Iranian proxy militias and followers of nationalist Shi’a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr are likely planning to infiltrate the anniversary protests and use them to achieve their own objectives. This co-optation of the otherwise largely peaceful protest movement may spark clashes between Sadrists, Iranian proxy militants, and Iraqi protesters. In an unlikely but most dangerous scenario, Iran’s proxies could use the chaos of mass protests as a cover for attacks on the US Embassy, on Kadhimi’s government, or on any individual or organization affiliated with the United States or the US-led Coalition.

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