MESOPOTAMIA NEWS : ABRHAM / IBRAHIM FOLLOWS THE MONEY !

al-monitor This picture taken Dec. 12, 2019, shows a view of the board at the Stock Exchange Market (Tadawul) in Riyadh.

Jan 13, 2021

Recent diplomatic breakthroughs in the Gulf, specifically the normalization of ties with Israel and the lifting of the blockade of Qatar, have a common driver: the drying up of foreign direct investment across the region. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain normalized diplomatic relations with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords in September 2020, followed by Sudan and Morocco. Saudi Arabia orchestrated the easing of the long-standing rift with Qatar, along with Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt.

In the end, 2020 seems to have made a very powerful case for mending fences in the Gulf. Their revenue streams have been devastated by an oversupplied market, a global pandemic has stripped demand for oil, and there is a growing consensus that alternative energy is both a better investment and a political lightning rod. The only recourse is tighter fiscal policy, implementing new taxes and fees, borrowing, and attracting new investment.

For the UAE, Israel represents a sizable source of foreign investment, technology access, and a new set of tourists and property buyers. Fifty-thousand Israelis reportedly have visited the UAE since the signing of the Abraham Accords. Forgiving Qatar means that Saudi Arabia is eager for tourists and investors, especially if they can drive over a land border.

In April 2020, PwC estimated that 400,000 jobs in the tourism sector of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region could be lost to the pandemic; for the broader Middle East, the job losses in the tourism sector could reach over 3 million. Saudi Arabia’s hosting of the GCC summit in al-Ula, the site of a Nabatean archaeological wonder and the literal poster of Saudi tourism aspirations, created a leadership moment for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to call for unity, and to signal to his critics that he is focused on the economic challenges of the future, not the foreign policy adventurism of the last five years.

They did it for the money. It’s not the only reason, but it is a compelling one. Politics in Washington are certainly relevant — whether to placate outgoing President Donald Trump and establish ties with Israel, or an effort to curry favor with the incoming Joe Biden administration by putting an end to the Gulf dispute. But the general sense of the future of the Gulf is that while the region is influenced by events and power shifts in Washington, it is now more responsible for its own security, reputation and investment climate. New Gulf diplomacy is not doing Washington’s bidding but taking charge of its own affairs.

The UN Economic Commission for West Asia estimates find Arab states are likely to lose 45% of FDI (foreign direct investment) inflows in 2020. Intra-GCC FDI has been especially difficult since 2017 and the blockade of Qatar. GCC visitors accounted for more than 50% of arrivals in Qatar before 2017. Qatar suffered for its dependence on foreign deposits in the local bank sector during the blockade, which the government stepped in to replace. Large project spending, much of it due to completed awards for the 2022 World Cup, is expected to decline sharply in 2021 — as much as 20%, according to the Qatar Ministry of Finance and the International Monetary Fund.

Qatar clearly needed the blockade to ease, but the advantages go more to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Having Qatar in the fold, available to contribute to shared GCC objectives like developing a regional infrastructure and market for electricity-sharing as well as providing fiscal support to weaker economies, is a priority. An important side-effect of the easing of the blockade will be Qatari citizens traveling to the UAE and Saudi Arabia for business and pleasure.

2020 marked a disastrous year for global FDI, with UNCTAD estimates of a 49% decline in the first half of the year. China was on the receiving end of FDI more than it deployed. For the Middle East, China has all but exited the region as a source of FDI. According to AEI’s China Global Investment Tracker, there was no Chinese FDI into the UAE or Saudi Arabia, and contract awards amounted to 8% of 2019 awards in the first half of 2020.

Moreover, China’s foreign investment flows into Pakistan and Egypt, while strong in 2019, evaporated in 2020. But so too has outgoing FDI from the Gulf to the Middle East, Pakistan and the Horn of Africa.

Source: AEI Gulf FADI Tracker, fDi Markets

The Gulf Financial Aid and Direct Investment (FADI) Tracker lists FDI from the six GCC states to eight recipient states across the Middle East and the Horn of Africa (Lebanon, Jordan, Pakistan, Oman, Djibouti, Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt). 2020 saw sharp declines in Gulf FDI to these cases compared with 2019. There was one exception: Oman. Of the eight cases, only Oman saw continued and increased incoming FDI from the GCC, almost entirely driven by the UAE. FDI to Oman from other sources, including China, the European Union, the United States and other Gulf states, declined sharply from 2019 to 2020. Egypt, Ethiopia and Jordan saw substantial declines in FDI from the GCC states.

Source: AEI Gulf FADI Tracker, fDi Markets

For 2021, we should expect that diplomatic efforts will try and lower the temperature of political conflict in the Gulf, including with Iran. But there will be increasing competition between the Gulf Arab states for foreign investment. At least there will also be the opportunity to share profit from the success of neighbors. Expect more shared interest in tourism events such as the 2022 World Cup, along with common infrastructure projects, property development and technology platforms.

 

 

MESOPOTAMIA NEWS INTEL BY MEIR AMIT CENTER / ISRAEL – Spotlight on Global Jihad (January 7-13, 2021)

Main events of 2020

  • Last week, ISIS published several infographics, summing up the activity of its provinces in Iraq and Syria in 2020. According to these infographics, and according to the ITIC’s data and several publications, five provinces stood out in 2020:
    • The Iraqi Province remains the epicenter of ISIS’s activity and reorganization. In Iraq, there was a sharp increase in the scope of ISIS’s activity, with the largest number of attacks (a total of 1,422, averaging close to 120 attacks per month). Most of the attacks (499) were carried out in the Diyala Province, a mixed Sunni-Shiite region north of Baghdad. Most of the attacks were “simple” guerrilla operations in the form of planting IEDs, shooting attacks, sniper fire and targeted killings. ISIS’s most notable successes in 2020 were the killings of several senior Iraqi army officers with the ranks of brigadier general and colonel. However, ISIS still refrained from carrying out complex attacks such as the deployment of large-scale forces or deadly suicide bombing attacks.
    • The Syria Province is in second place among the various provinces in the volume of attacks (593). Most of ISIS’s activity focused on the Euphrates Valley and the deserts in eastern Syria. A smaller number of attacks were carried out in the Daraa region in southern Syria and north of Aleppo, near the Syrian-Turkish border. Most of the attacks were “simple” guerrilla operations in the form of planting IEDs, shooting attacks, and targeted killings. However, ISIS carried out several deadly attacks in deserts in eastern Syria, a region where the scope and quality of activity of the attacks are on the rise.
    • The West Africa Province (Nigeria and its neighbors): This province ranks third among ISIS’s provinces in the number of attacks (385) and first in terms of the number of fatalities in these attacks. From northeastern Nigeria, the epicenter of the West Africa Province, ISIS’s activity also spills over to Nigeria’s neighbors (Niger, Mali, Chad and Burkina Faso). Terrorism researchers believe that the countries of Africa, which are preoccupied with coping with the COVID-19 crisis and are characterized by domestic political instability, are gradually becoming ISIS’s most important area of activity at the global level.
    • The Sinai Peninsula: In the northern Sinai Peninsula, ISIS operatives continued to carry out successful guerrilla attacks against the Egyptian security forces, which repeatedly failed to provide an effective response to ISIS’s activity. ISIS’s peak achievement in 2020 was a large-scale attack against the Egyptian army near the village of Rabi’a, west of Bir al-Abd (about 30 km from the Suez Canal). Dozens of soldiers were killed in the attack, after which ISIS operatives took control of several villages in this region and held them for about three months, until the Egyptian security forces managed to drive them out.
    • Afghanistan (Khorasan Province): In Afghanistan, ISIS recovered from the blow that it had suffered at the hands of the Afghan army with US support in the Nangarhar Province (southwest of Kabul). In February 2020, the Khorasan Province resumed its activity after several months of inactivity. Most of ISIS’s activity was carried out in the capital Kabul and it included deadly suicide bombing attacks. From Kabul, ISIS’s activity spilled over into additional provinces The attacks represent an effort on ISIS’s part to take advantage of the political uncertainty stemming from the US-Taliban agreement and the intention of the US to withdraw from Afghanistan. An increase in ISIS’s power in Afghanistan could lead to its activity spilling over to India and other countries in Southeast Asia.
  • ISIS is optimistic about the global developments which, in ISIS’s assessment, may facilitate its activity in 2021. An article published in ISIS’s Al-Naba’ weekly claims that after the elections, the US will be preoccupied with its internal affairs, at the expense of activity outside its borders, and this is expected to weaken the International Coalition against ISIS. The article notes that the US has already significantly reduced its activity against ISIS around the world on the false grounds that ISIS has been defeated.
The Syrian arena
Summary of ISIS’s activity in Syria in 2020

Recently, ISIS released an infographic summing up its activity in Syria in 2020. In the past year, ISIS carried out 593 attacks, i.e., close to 50 attacks per month. Most of the attacks focused on the Euphrates Valley and the desert region west of it (448 attacks, of which 389 were in the Deir ez-Zor Province and 59 in the Al-Raqqah Province)[1]; they are followed by the desert region in the eastern part of the provinces of Homs and Hama (38 in the Homs Province and 3 in the Hama Province); then come 39 attacks in the Al-Hasakah Province, in northeastern Syria (the region controlled by the Kurds); 36 attacks in the northern part of the Aleppo Province, near the border between Syria and Turkey[2]; and 29 attacks in the Daraa region, in southern Syria. The most common type of attacks was the activation of IEDs (256), followed by targeted killings (191), and exchanges of fire (123) (Amaq, January 6, 2021). The Idlib Province, which is controlled by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), does not appear in the infographic in the list of provinces where ISIS is active.

ISIS’s attacks in Syria in 2020

ISIS’s attacks in Syria in 2020

Type of attacks by ISIS in Syria in 2020

Type of attacks by ISIS in Syria in 2020

  • According to ISIS’s data, 1,327 people were killed and wounded in attacks carried out in 2020. The highest number of casualties, higher by far than in the other provinces, was in the Euphrates Valley and the desert region west of it (908). It is followed by the desert region in the western part of the provinces of Homs and Hama (194); northern Aleppo Province, i.e., the area near the Syrian-Turkish border (97); Al-Hasakah Province in northeastern Syria (72); and the Daraa region in southern Syria (56).
  • The highest number of casualties in ISIS’s attacks was among the SDF fighters (901). In the ITIC’s assessment, the Kurdish SDF forces were the main target of ISIS’s attacks in the Euphrates Valley. They are followed by the Syrian army and the forces supporting it (407 soldiers and fighters, most of whom killed in the desert region in eastern Syria) and the Free Syrian Army (19 fighters who, in the ITIC’s assessment, were killed near the Syrian-Turkish border).
Infographic summing up ISIS’s activity in Syria in 2020 (Amaq, January 6, 2021)
Infographic summing up ISIS’s activity in Syria in 2020 (Amaq, January 6, 2021)
The Syrian arena
The Idlib region

In the Idlib region, exchanges of artillery fire continued between the Syrian army and the forces supporting it, and the rebel organizations, mainly HTS. The incidents occurred mainly in the region several dozen kilometers south and southeast of Idlib. In addition, HTS snipers fired at Syrian soldiers. Russian aircraft reportedly carried out an airstrike about 40 km southwest of Idlib (Edlib Media Center, January 9, 2021).

ISIS’s activity in Syria[3]
The region of Deir ez-Zor and Al-Mayadeen
  • On January 11, 2021, an SDF intelligence operative was targeted by machine gun fire in the village of Shahil, about 10 km north of Al-Mayadeen. He was killed.
  • On January 9, 2021, an IED was activated against a convoy. One of the vehicles in the convoy carried a senior IRGC commander, an Iranian named Hajj Gholam Hossein Dehghan. He was killed along with two of his escorts (Khotwa, January 10, 2021; ISNA, January 11, 2021). Iranian sources reported that Hajj Gholam Hossein Dehghan had died of COVID-19 on January 9, 2021; they did not mention the said incident (Ayn Al-Furat, Eye of Euphrates, January 10, 2021). So far, no organization has claimed responsibility for the attack, but it was probably ISIS.
Death notice for Hajj Gholam Hossein Dehghan (ISNA, January 10, 2021)
Death notice for Hajj Gholam Hossein Dehghan (ISNA, January 10, 2021)
  • On January 9, 2021, an SDF fighter was targeted by gunfire about 10 km northeast of Deir ez-Zor. He was killed.
  • On January 8, 2021, an SDF headquarters was targeted by machine gun fire and RPG rockets in the village of Shahil, about 10 km north of Al-Mayadeen. One fighter was killed and another was wounded.
  • On January 8, 2021, an SDF fighter was targeted by machine gun fire about 20 km north of Al-Mayadeen. He was killed.
  • On January 7, 2021, two SDF vehicles were targeted by machine gun fire about 10 km north of Al-Mayadeen. Two fighters were killed and two others were wounded.
  • On January 5, 2021, an IED was activated against an SDF vehicle about 5 km northeast of Al-Mayadeen. The passengers were wounded.
The desert region (Al-Badia)
  • On January 11, 2021, a vehicle carrying two Republican Guard officers was attacked on the Ithriya-Khanaser road (northeast of Hama). They were wounded. The Syrian army sent reinforcements to the scene of the incident (Khotwa, January 11, 2021). So far, no organization has claimed responsibility for the attack, but it was probably ISIS.
  • On January 10, 2021, ISIS squads exchanged fire with fighters of the Homeland Defense Forces who were carrying out searches in the Deir ez-Zor Desert. Several fighters of the Homeland Defense Forces were killed (@ALBADIA24 Twitter account, January 10, 2021). So far, no organization has claimed responsibility for the attack, but it was probably ISIS.
  • On January 8, 2021, a bus carrying three officers and nine soldiers of the Homeland Defense Forces was attacked about 70 km northeast of Hama. The charred remains of the bus were found. The fate of the officers and soldiers who were inside is unknown (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, January 10, 2021). So far, no organization has claimed responsibility for the attack but in the ITIC’s assessment, it was probably ISIS.
Counterterrorism activities in the desert region
  • On January 7, 2021, an IED was activated against a vehicle carrying a commander in the Palestinian Al-Quds Brigade, on the Deir ez-Zor-Palmyra highway (about 50 km southwest of Deir ez-Zor). The commander was killed (@ALBADIA24 Twitter account, January 7, 2021). ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack, stating that the vehicle was destroyed and all the passengers were killed or wounded (Telegram, January 9, 2021).
The wreckage of the Palestinian Al-Quds Brigade commander’s vehicle (Telegram, January 9, 2021)    The wreckage of the Palestinian Al-Quds Brigade commander’s vehicle (Telegram, January 9, 2021)
The wreckage of the Palestinian Al-Quds Brigade commander’s vehicle
(Telegram, January 9, 2021)
  • On January 7, 2021, an IED was activated against a Syrian army vehicle on the Ithriya road, about 100 km northeast of Hama. An officer serving in the Suheil al-Hassan forces was killed (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights; Al-Badia 24, January 7, 2021). So far, no organization has claimed responsibility for the attack, but it was probably ISIS.
  • On January 8, 2021, the Syrian army along with the forces supporting it carried out a search operation in the Jabal al-Bishri region, west of Deir ez-Zor. The operation was launched after recent escalation in ISIS’s attacks, killing dozens of Syrian soldiers and fighters of the forces supporting them (Deir ez-Zor 24, January 8, 2021).
Al-Raqqah region
  • On January 10, 2021, an IED was activated in central Al-Raqqah against the vehicle of a judge in the SDF courts. He was wounded.
  • On January 9, 2021, an IED was activated against an SDF vehicle northwest of Al-Raqqah. The passengers were killed or wounded.
Al-Hasakah region
  • On January 9, 2021, an intelligence operative of the International Coalition was targeted by machine gun fire about 80 km south of Al-Hasakah. He was killed.
  • On January 7, 2021, an IED was activated against an Al-Qaterji tanker carrying oil for the Syrian regime, southwest of Al-Hasakah. It was damaged.
 The Iraqi arena
Provinces of Iraq (Wikipedia)
Provinces of Iraq (Wikipedia)
Summary of ISIS’s activity in Iraq in 2020

Recently, ISIS released an infographic summing up its activity in Iraq in 2020 (Amaq, January 9, 2021). According to the infographic, ISIS carried out 1,422 attacks in the various provinces in Iraq, i.e., about 120 attacks per month. Most of the attacks, far more than in the other provinces, were carried out in the Diyala Province (499), north of Baghdad (a province with a mixed, Sunni and Shiite population, with terrain suitable for guerrilla warfare). The number of attacks carried out in the other provinces: Salah al-Din (335); Kirkuk (235); Al-Anbar (204); Baghdad (83); Babel (49); and Nineveh (17). The leading modus operandi was the activation of IEDs (485 attacks), followed by exchanges of fire (252); targeted killings (94); sniper fire (334) and other attacks (257).

Breakdown of ISIS attacks in the various provinces

Breakdown of ISIS attacks in the various provinces

  • Types of attacks carried out by ISIS: Activation of IEDs (485); sniper fire (334); exchanges of fire (252); targeted killings (94); and “other attacks”[4]. The targets were the Iraqi army; security, intelligence and police personnel; the Popular Mobilization forces (Shiite militias sponsored by the Iraqi regime) and the Tribal Mobilization forces (Sunni militias sponsored by the Iraqi regime); the Peshmerga (the Kurdish military force); “collaborators” and “agents”.
Types of attacks in Iraq in 2021

Types of attacks in Iraq in 2021

  • A total of 2,748 people were killed and wounded in the attacks. The highest number of casualties, by far greater than in other provinces, was in the Diyala Province (724), where the largest number of attacks was carried out. The other casualties were in the following provinces: Salah al-Din (643); Al-Anbar (567); Kirkuk (474); Baghdad (210); Babel (104); and Nineveh (26). The level of deadliness of the attacks in Iraq, i.e., the ratio between the number of attacks and number of casualties, was about two casualties per attack. Most of the attacks carried out by ISIS were “simple” guerrilla actions with a relatively small number of casualties (even though 2020 also witnessed some showcase targeted killings, such as the killing of several senior Iraqi army officers with the ranks of brigadier general and colonel).
Summary of ISIS attacks in Iraq in 2021 (Amaq, January 9, 2021)
Summary of ISIS attacks in Iraq in 2021 (Amaq, January 9, 2021)

ISIS attacks in the various provinces[5]

Diyala Province
Killing of a senior Popular Mobilization officer
  • On January 11, 2021, ISIS operatives activated several IEDs inside a Popular Mobilization compound about 40 km northeast of Baqubah. An officer with the rank of brigadier general was killed along with his escort. Several other fighters were wounded (Telegram, January 12, 2021).
Other incidents
  • On January 11, 2021, two Iraqi soldiers were targeted by machine gun fire about 5 km south of Baqubah. They were both killed.
  • On January 10, 2021, a fighter of the Iraqi counterterrorism unit was targeted by machine gun fire about 20 km northeast of Baqubah. He was killed.
  • On January 6, 2021, a Popular Mobilization fighter was targeted by machine gun fire about 40 km northeast of Baqubah. He was wounded.
  • On January 5, 2021, Iraqi soldiers were targeted by machine gun fire about 80 km northeast of Baqubah. Three soldiers were killed and another was wounded.
Salah al-Din Province
  • On January 8, 2021, an Iraqi army compound was targeted by machine gun fire and hand grenades about 30 km north of Baghdad. One soldier was wounded.
  • On January 7, 2021, an Iraqi army compound was targeted by machine gun fire in the Mashahada area, about 30 km north of Baghdad. Two soldiers were killed and another was wounded.
  • On January 6, 2021, a rocket was fired at a refinery near the city of Baiji (Note: on November 29, 2020, ISIS fired two rockets at that refinery, causing a fire in one of the oil pipelines).
  • On January 5, 2021, an Iraqi police compound was targeted by machine gun fire northeast of Samarra. One policeman was killed and four others were wounded. ISIS operatives ambushed a rescue force arriving at the scene and fired machine guns at a vehicle. The passengers were killed or wounded.
Al-Anbar Province
  • On January 10, 2021, ISIS ambushed and fired at a vehicle carrying Iraqi soldiers near Al-Rutba, in western Al-Anbar Province. An officer and two soldiers were killed and others were wounded. When a rescue force arrived at the scene, it was targeted by heavy and medium weapons. One APC was put out of commission and additional soldiers were wounded.
  • On January 9, 2021, an IED was activated against an Iraqi army vehicle about 150 km northwest of Baghdad. The passengers were killed or wounded.
  • On January 5, 2021, a Popular Mobilization compound was targeted by machine gun fire east of Al-Rutba. One fighter was killed and two others were wounded.
Babel Province
  • On January 5, 2021, an Iraqi soldier was targeted by machine gun fire about 15 km south of Baghdad. He was killed.
Counterterrorism activities by the Iraqi security forces
Salah al-Din Province
  • On January 9, 2021, teams of the Salah al-Din Intelligence Directorate apprehended three wanted ISIS operatives who operated in the Samarra region. The three admitted in their preliminary interrogation that they had taken part in carrying out attacks against the security forces and Iraqi civilians (Al-Sumaria, January 9, 2021).
Al-Anbar Province
  • On January 12, 2021, members of the Iraqi Counterterrorism Apparatus apprehended two “terrorist operatives” (implicitly, ISIS operatives) in the Fallujah region (Facebook page of Iraqi Armed Forces Spokesman Yahya Rasoul, January 9, 2021).
  • On January 9, 2021, an Iraqi army force carrying out searches captured two wanted “terrorist operatives” (implicitly, ISIS operatives) about 10 km east of Al-Qaim, near the Iraqi-Syrian border (Facebook page of Iraqi Armed Forces Spokesman Yahya Rasoul, January 9, 2021).
  • On January 8, 2021, a security force carrying out searches in the Al-Rutba Desert, in the western Al-Anbar Province, captured an ISIS squad numbering four operatives (Al-Sumaria, January 8, 2021).
Kirkuk Province
  • On January 12, 2021, Coalition aircraft carried out airstrikes about 30 km south of Kirkuk. The remains of seven ISIS operatives were later found at the site. A tunnel and two hiding places were also located (Facebook page of Iraqi Armed Forces Spokesman Yahya Rasoul, January 12, 2021).
  • On January 12, 2021, members of the Iraqi Counterterrorism Apparatus captured two “terrorist operatives” (implicitly, ISIS operatives) in the Kirkuk Province (Facebook page of Iraqi Armed Forces Spokesman Yahya Rasoul, January 12, 2021).
The city of Baghdad
  • On January 12, 2021, members of the Iraqi Counterterrorism Apparatus captured a “terrorist operative” (implicitly, an ISIS operative) whom they described as a “quality target” in the city of Baghdad (Facebook page of Iraqi Armed Forces Spokesman Yahya Rasoul, January 12, 2021).

MESOPOTAMIA NEWS SYRIA – TROUBLE IN THE KURDISH FAMILY

Tensions grow between Syrian Kurdish parties over return of Rojava Peshmerga

The Rojava Peshmerga “are honest patriotic Kurds, and they belong to patriotic Kurdish families, whose history of struggle is decent,” one Syrian Kurdish official said.

January 13 2021   03:17 ERBIL (Kurdistan 24) – Tensions have increased between various Syrian Kurdish parties after discussions about the possible return of the Rojava Peshmerga from the Kurdistan Region to Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava).

weiterlesen / click to continue

MESOPOTAMIA NEWS :  Vorwürfe gegen Bildungsstätte Anne Frank

Von Stefan Simon FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU  14 Jan 2021 – Betriebsrat sieht seine Arbeit massiv behindert und spricht von Einschüchterungsversuchen.

Ein harmonisches Arbeitsklima scheint es bei der Bildungsstätte Anne Frank nicht zu geben. Zumindest beschleicht einen dieser Eindruck am Mittwochmittag vor dem Arbeitsgericht. Denn dort fand ein Beschlussverfahren zwischen der Bildungsstätte Anne Frank und dem im Sommer 2020 gegründeten Betriebsrat der Einrichtung statt. Dieser sieht sich in seiner Arbeit massiv behindert. Unter anderem ist die Rede von Einschüchterungsversuchen gegenüber Angestellten und von Drohungen, Gehälter nicht auszuzahlen.

weiterlesen / click to continue

MESOPOTAMIA NEWS : PAUL EHRLICH INSTITUT UNTERSUCHT DIE ERSTEN  ZEHN TODESFÄLLE NACH CORONA IMPFUNG

EINE STUNDE NACH IMPFUNG – Rentnerin (90) stirbt in Pflegeheim

Eine Stunde nachdem eine Rentnerin in einem Altenheim die Corona-Schutzimpfung bekam starb die Frau

Artikel von: SASCHA WIMMER UND CORINNA PERREVOORT veröffentlicht am14.01.2021 – 14:49 Uhr BILD ZEITUNG

Weyhe (Niedersachsen) Sie hatte gerade erst die Corona-Schutzimpfung erhalten, eine Stunde später war sie tot!

weiterlesen / click to continue

MESOPOTAMIA NEWS : More than half of Americans want Trump removed

It’s still Trump’s party – Mike Allen, Margaret Talev  AXIOS

Data: Axios research, ProPublica. (Non-voting members excluded). Graphic: Michelle McGhee and Sara Wise/Axios

He got impeached. Twice. But polling indicates Republicans still have his back — and views — by vast majorities.

Why it matters: Anyone who thinks Trump is a politically dead man walking appears pointedly dead wrong.

Just look at the numbers: 

  • Two-thirds of House Republicans voted to decertify the election results — in the hours after an insurrection.
  • 93% of House Republicans voted against impeachment yesterday.

In an Axios-Ipsos poll taken Tuesday and yesterday:

  • 64% of Republicans said they support Trump’s recent behavior.
  • 57% of Republicans said Trump should be the 2024 GOP candidate.
  • Only 17% think he should be removed from office.

House and Senate Republicans tell me they strongly believe Trump will remain a force in the party’s 2022 and 2024 races — even if he were to be convicted in the forthcoming Senate trial, and barred from holding federal office himself.

weiterlesen / click to continue

MESOPOTAMIA NEWS QUESTION : Muss Israel den Palästinensern Corona-Impfstoff geben?

Daniel Pomeranz, HonestReporting, 7. Januar 2020

Israels weltweit führende COVID-19-Impfkampagne wurde schnell globaler Anlass zu Neid und es folgten Berichte darüber in den Nachrichten. Viele vermittelten ein klares Bild, aber einige implizierten oder sagten sogar unverblümt, Israel drücke sich um seine Verpflichtung die Palästinenser mit Impfstoff zu versorgen, womit es gegen das Völkerrecht verstößt.

Ein besonders dramatisches Beispiel war dieser Artikel im Guardian mit suggestivem Sprachgebrauch von „Siedlern“ und dem Foto eines orthodoxen Juden.

Palestinians excluded from Israeli Covid vaccine rollout as jabs go to settlers https://t.co/ETQ3ZDAB5h

— The Guardian (@guardian) January 3, 2021

Der Guardian enthielt den Satz: „Menschenrechtsgruppen beschuldigen Israel es entziehe sich der Verpflichtungen gegenüber Millionen Menschen in den besetzten Gebieten, die noch Monate auf die Impfung warten müssen.“ Und tatsächlich hatten Gruppen wie Amnesty die fadenscheinige Behauptung aufgestellt, Israel verstoße gegen das Völkerrecht. Ansonsten positive Artikel in der Washington Post, der New York Times und anderer erhoben ähnlich falsche Aussagen zum Völkerrecht.

Der ehemalige CNN-Korrespondent Marc Lamont Hill fasste auf seinem Instagram-Account eine gemeinsame Mentalität zusammen (wie in diesem Tweet von HonestReporting zu sehen ist):

The guy is literally obsessed with smearing Israel.

To think this was the mindset of a prominent @CNN analyst…@marclamonthill pic.twitter.com/NCqULPAoWZ

— HonestReporting (@HonestReporting) January 5, 2021

Aber obwohl politische Kommentatoren, Fernsehsprecher und allerlei NGOs Israel auffordern, Israel solle Palästinenser impfen, gibt es eine Instanz, die das damals auffälligerweise nicht machte: die Palästinenser-Regierung.

Tatsächlich wurden offizielle PA-Vertreter mit der Aussage zitiert:

Wir arbeiten selbst daran aus einer Reihe von Quellen Impfstoff zu bekommen … wir sind keine Abteilung des israelischen Verteidigungsministeriums. Wir haben unsere eigene Regierung und Gesundheitsministerium und die unternehmen große Anstrengungen den Impfstoff zu bekommen.

Um es klar zu sagen: Israelischen Bürgern und dauerhaft dort Lebenden wird derselbe Zugang zu Gesundheitsversorgung und Impfungen, ungeachtet der Religion, Ethnie oder nationalen Herkunft. Das wirft eine interessante Frage auf: Wenn die Palästinenserregierung Israels Hilfe bei der Beschaffung von Impfstoffen nicht will, ist Jerusalem gemäß dem Völkerrecht und internationalen Verträgen trotzdem verpflichtet ihr zu helfen?

Kurz gesagt: Israel ist nicht nur nicht verpflichtet zu helfen, sondern ihm war zur Zeit, als diese Artikel veröffentlicht wurden, rechtlich sogar verboten das ohne Kooperation der PA zu tun.

Fakt ist: Die PA-Regierung änderte Berichten zufolge erst am Mittwoch ihre Politik und reichte die erste Anfrage um Hilfe beim Impfstoff ein, eine Entwicklung, die später in diesem Text noch behandelt wird.

Völkerrecht

Es ist bei Experten, Fernsehmoderatoren und NGOs bestürzend üblich etwas wie „verletzt das Völkerrecht“ zu sagen, ohne zu sagen, welches Recht verletzt wird und ohne jegliche juristische Analyse zu liefern, wie das Völkerrecht verletzt wird. Das ist ein Hinweis, dass die Äußerung irreführend oder sogar vollkommen falsch war. Zumindest sollte es ein Hinweis an die versierten Nachrichten-Leser und kluge, professionelle Journalisten sein, dass weitere Recherche erforderlich ist.

Das Völkerrecht ist kein „Gesetz“ im juristischen Sinn – es ist kein Regelsatz, der von einem Gremium mit übergeordneter Autorität über andere Länder weltweit verabschiedet wurde. Stattdessen ist das Völkerrecht eine Vereinigung von Verträgen und Vereinbarungen zwischen und unter zahlreichen souveränen Staaten. In diesem Fall gibt es drei internationale Vereinbarungen, die relevant sind: die vierte Genfer Konvention (GK IV), die Haager Konvention und die Oslo-Vereinbarungen. Alle drei müssen zusammen gelesen werden, um die Verpflichtungen der Seiten vollständig zu verstehen.

Das allgemeinste Konzept kommt von der GK IV, insbesondere den Artikeln 55, 58; API Art. 69 erklärt:

Die Besatzungsmacht hat die Pflicht sicherzustellen, dass die angemessene Versorgung mit Lebensmitteln und medizinischer Versorgung sowie Kleidung, Betten, geschützter Unterkunft und anderen für das Überleben der Zivilbevölkerung der besetzten Territorien notwendig sind sowie den Dingen für die Ausübung der Religion gewährleistet ist.

Unter Israelis gibt es wie unter Juristen Diskussion darüber, ob Israels Beziehung zur Westbank eine „Besatzung“ im klassischen Sinn darstellt. Der oberste Gerichtshof Israels hat hingegen bei zahlreichen Gelegenheiten bis zurück ins Jahr 1971 geurteilt, dass Israel das Völkerrecht zu Besatzung Folge befolgen muss, ob Israel sie als solche bezeichnet oder nicht. Dieser Schluss ist daher israelisches Recht und die israelische Regierung nimmt ihre Verpflichtungen ernst.

Die Haager Konvention (insbesondere die Artikel 42 bis 47) geht genauer auf dasselbe Thema ein als die GK IV, und schließlich beschreiben die Oslo-Vereinbarungen die Art, wie sich diese Verpflichtungen zwischen dem Staat Israel und der PA-Regierung auswirken (ausdrücklich die israelisch-palästinensische Interimvereinbarung zur Westbank und dem Gazastreifen von 1995, auch bekannt als „Oslo II“, Anhang III, Artikel 17).

Dieser Satz aus Oslo II ist von besonderer Bedeutung:

Israel und die palästinensische Seite werden Informationen zu Epidemien und ansteckenden Krankheiten austauschen, werden bei deren Bekämpfung kooperieren und Methoden für den Austausch medizinischer Akten und Dokumente entwickeln.

Oslo II selbst sagt nicht, dass Israel die Pflicht hat, der PA Gesundheits-Versorgung zur Verfügung zu stellen, aber die GK IV tut das. Genauer gesagt sagt die GK IV nicht, dass Israel Hilfe bieten muss, sondern dass Israel „die angemessene Zurverfügungstellung sicherstellen“ muss. Das bedeutet, Hilfe kann auch aus weltweiten Fremdquellen kommen, solange Israel sicherstellt, dass sie geliefert wird.

Die GK IV behandelt in der Regel Situationen, in denen das besetzte Volk keine eigene Regierung hat, also gibt es kein Problem wegen der Koordination und die Besatzungsmacht handelt einfach als direkte Obrigkeit. Oslo änderte das allerdings, indem es die PA-Regierung schuf, also muss Israel die Autonomie der PA und ihr Recht bestimmte Hilfen abzulehnen respektieren.

Das macht absolut Sinn: Stellen Sie sich vor Israel würde den Palästinensern Hilfe aufzwingen. Wie würde das ablaufen? Würden israelische Soldaten in Palästinenserstädte eindringen und die Leute zwangsimpfen? Würden sie Krankenhäuser stürmen und Versorgungsgüter dort deponieren, die nicht gewollt sind? Das zu tun wäre offensichtlich moralisch falsch und würde aufgrund der Oslo-Abkommen auch das Völkerrecht verletzen.

Warum Hilfe ablehnen?

Stand letzter Woche demonstrierten Äußerungen von Palästinensern wie „Wir sind keine Abteilung des israelischen Verteidigungsministeriums. Wir haben unsere eigene Regierung.“ eine Haltung des Stolzes und den Wunsch Selbstversorgung zu zeigen. Man kann darüber streiten, ob diese Entscheidung weise ist: Opfert die PA die Gesundheit ihres Volks, um ein politisches Statement abzugeben? Vielleicht. Oder vielleicht hat die PA recht, wenn sie Selbstständigkeit und Unabhängigkeit betont. Darüber hinaus haben Verschwörungstheorien dafür gesorgt, dass viele Palästinenser israelischen medizinischen Versorgungsgütern misstrauen, daher könnte das ein Grund dafür sein, das die PA solche Hilfe meidet.

Was definitiv gesagt werden kann, ist, dass die PA das Recht hat israelische Hilfe auszuschlagen und dass Israel nicht versuchen darf eine solche Entscheidung außer Kraft zu setzen.

Die PA fordert Impfstoffe an

Abgesehen davon hat die PA-Regierung am Mittwoch offenbar Hilfe mit den Impfstoffen erbeten. Information darüber, was genau die PA angefordert hat und was genau Israel zur Verfügung stellt, ist nicht ganz bekannt, aber Israel hat bereits angefangen Impfstoff in kleinen Mengen an die PA zu liefern; diese sind für dringenden humanitären Bedarf bestimmt. Es wird erwartet, dass nächsten Monat rund zwei Millionen Dosen in Ramallah ankommen.

Es ist ungewöhnlich, dass eine Verpflichtung aus den GK IV zur Bereitstellung von Hilfe in einem Kontext stattfindet, in dem Versorgung so begrenzt und Timing so wichtig ist, dass Hilfe zu geben tatsächlich die Bürger des sie zur Verfügung stellenden Landes schädigt. Die Universale Erklärung der Menschenrechte, wie sie von der UNO übernommen wurde, macht deutlich, dass Staaten die Pflicht haben die Sicherheit und das Wohlergehen der eigenen Bürger zu schützen.

Dennoch schafft die GK IV die Pflicht eine Gruppe von Leuten zu schützen, die keine Staatsbürger sind. Beide Dokumente haben die Kraft des Völkerrechts und daher muss Israel seine Verpflichtungen gegenüber den eigenen Bürgern gegenüber denen der PA sorgfältig abwägen.

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MESOPOTAMIA NEWS THEORIE : PÖBEL – MOB – REBEL ROUSERS  – QUERDENKER –  Der Grundwiderspruch der heutigen politischen LINKEN

„Die Unterscheidung von Volk und Pöbel gehört nicht zur Funktionsweise von Demokratie, sie ist – wie schon in der Simplicissimus-Karikatur – noch immer eine sozial unangemessene und mit Gewalt angereicherte Diskursfigur der Exklusion.“

VOM PÖBEL ZUM POPULISMUS

von Roman Widder MERKUR DEZEMBER 2020

Wer ist das Volk? Die Münchner Satirezeitschrift Simplicissimus hat diese noch immer umstrittene Frage 1897 mit einer klugen Karikatur unter dem Titel Der – Die – Das beantwortet. »Das Volk« besteht darin ausschließlich aus den gebildeten Ständen, die zur Demonstration in Frack und Zylinder aufwarten. »Der Pöbel« hingegen wird als eine schmutzige, schreiende, mit Stöcken und Pistolen bewaffnete Personengruppe dargestellt. »Die Menge« schließlich vermittelt zwischen Volk und Pöbel nicht nur durch ihr grammatisches Geschlecht, sondern auch politisch. Sie ist das passive Pendant zum militanten Pöbel und bewundert die Parade der Armee. Es ist die soziale Seite des Volks-Begriffs, an welche die Karikatur damit indirekt appelliert: Dieses Volk in Frack und Zylindern, will sie sagen, ist nicht das eigentliche, zumindest nicht das ganze Volk. Wer das Volk sucht, findet es eher in den anderen Bildsegmenten: Es ist gespalten in eine Figur widerständiger Militanz (Pöbel) und die Neugierigen und Bewunderer (Menge). In allen drei Teilen spielt allerdings die Armee eine wichtige Rolle: Die von der Menge bewunderte Armee dient offenbar dazu, das Volk der Gebildeten und Gesättigten vor der militanten Entrüstung des Pöbels zu schützen.

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DIE VERGEWALTIGUNG ALLER SPRACHE UNTER DER REGENBOGENFAHNE / JUDEN & NEGER  / ALLE SPRACHREINIGER HANDELN WIE NAZIS !

MESOPOTAMIA NEWS :  „Die aufrichtigen Menschen, die glauben, dass sie auf diese Weise zur Gerechtigkeit beitragen, sollten jedoch eine Regel beachten: Immer, wenn man der Sprache Gewalt antut, verletzt man die Menschlichkeit.“ (OLGA MARTYNOVA)

 

WER DER SPRACHE GEWALT ANTUT  – Warum mir das Bemühen, bestimmte Worte zu verbannen, unheimlich ist. – Von Olga Martynova

„Beschuldigt mich nicht des Antisemantismus. Einige meiner besten Freunde sind Wörter”, hieß es 1983 in der seinerzeit berühmten Graffiti-Sammlung von Hans Gamber.

Etwas Ähnliches hört man heute, aber nun ganz ernst gemeint: „Ich bin kein Sprachpolizist, aber Neger (Kanake, ‘Mitte, Zigeuner, was auch immer), das kann ich nicht aussprechen/dulden/hören, tut mir leid.”

Gut. Und wohin dann mit Carl Einsteins kunsthistorischem Buch „Negerplastik”? Oder mit der berühmten neapolitanischen Porosität von Walter Benjamin: „Ausgeteilt, porös und durchsetzt ist das Privatleben. Was Neapel von allen Großstädten unterscheidet, das hat es mit dem Hottentottenkral gemein”?

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MESOPOTAMIA NEWS per ordre du jour : On Liberty / Über die Freiheit  in pandemischen Zeiten

“Kein Mensch hat (…) das Recht zu gehorchen”! 

Hannah Arendt  

POLITICAL CORRECTNESS & PARADOXIE –  Über Sprachzerstörung & Meinungsmodulation

Die Situation der Methodik der politisch korrekten Umerziehung durch paradoxe Indoktrination existiert auch in „Alice hinter den Spiegeln“, wo Alices klare Mitteilungen durch die Gehirnwäsche der Schwarzen und der Weißen Königin verdreht werden.

Sie beschuldigen Alice, etwas verneinen zu wollen, und schreiben diese Absicht ihrem Geisteszustand. zu:  

„Aber das sollte doch gar nicht bedeuten -‘, fing Alice an; die Schwarze Königin jedoch fiel ihr ins Wort:  

„Das ist ja gerade das Traurige! Es hätte eben bedeuten sollen! Wozu, glaubst du denn, soll ein Kind gut sein, wenn es nichts bedeutet? Sogar ein Witz bedeutet irgendetwas – und ein Kind wird doch wohl noch mehr sein als ein Witz, will ich hoffen. Das könntest du nicht bestreiten, selbst wenn du beide Hände dazu nähmst,»  

«Zum Bestreiten nehme ich doch nicht die Hände», wandte Allice ein.  

«Das behauptet ja auch niemand», sagte die Schwarze Königin; «ich sagte nur, du könntest nicht, wenn du sie nähmst.“  

«Sie ist in einer Verfassung», sagte die Weiße Königin, „in der sie gern irgendetwas bestreiten möchte – nur weiß sie nicht genau, was!»

 „Ein schlimmer, bösartiger Charakter», bemerkte die Schwarze Königin, und darauf folgte eine längere, unbehagliche Stille [;p, S. 232 f.].

 

Wer mit den Kommunikationseigenarten der Familien Schizophrener vertraut ist, dürfte beim Lesen dieses Zitats ein deja-vu-Erlebnis haben, und er wird die Intuition des Autors Lewis Carroll für die pragmatischen Wirkungen solcher unlogischer Kommunikationen bewundern, denn als die Königinnen die Gehirnwäsche fortsetzen, läßt er Alice in Ohnmacht fallen. 

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