MESOPOTAMIA NEWS FOCUS : KCK (PKK) accuses KDP of giving Turkey location of PKK fighters killed in Iraqi Kurdistan

18 April 2020 – MESOP NEWS – QANDIL MOUNTAINS,— The Kurdistan Communities Union (Koma Civaken Kurdistan-KCK) on Friday accused the Barzani clan’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of passing information to the Turkish military that led to a deadly airstrike on a Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) camp in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region on Wednesday.

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MESOPOTAMIA NEWS SHORT CUTS – IRAQ  / KURDISTAN

Anti-ISIS operations April 16

by Seth Frantzman

Iraqi Security Forces, assisted by Coalition airpower conducted ground and air strikes against Daesh fighters in south of Kirkuk, April 13, killing more than 20 enemy fighters.

More via www.mesop.de

 

Coronavirus, the Fall of Populism, and Iraq – FIKRA FORUM

Also available in العربية

April 15, 2020

In her December 2019 piece for Quartz, the geopolitics expert Annalisa Merelli identified 20 countries now governed by populist movements and 14 other countries—Iraq included—where populist parties played a pivotal role in policy making. The quick spread of populist movements over the past few years has been a reactionary response to the consequences of globalization. Though there is no alternative to globalization, the widespread appeal of populism potentially heralds comprehensive corrective changes similar to what English economist John Maynard Keynes proposed as an economic system for capitalism after the Great Depression of the 1930s. Keynes proposed for the state to play a role in rebalancing the capitalist economy through direct supervision of production and distribution and adjusting the market balance between supply and demand.

The paradox now lies in that the same populism that benefited from the shortcomings of globalization will now suffer greatly from populist leaders and regimes’ inability to deal with the ramifications of the coronavirus crisis. Francis Fukuyama recently noted the significant similarity in mindset and decision-making between totalitarian regimes like China and Iran and democratic governments with populist leaders like the United States in dealing with coronavirus. Much like totalitarian leaders, populist leaders are characterized by a concern with how they are portrayed rather than the facts on the ground.

Iraq has also faced this deep challenge. Though its leadership structure is tenuous, populist figures have held major sway over Iraqi politics during the past few years. Social studies suggest that the societies which have championed populist leaders the most are the ones with a high sense of fear of what is foreign (xenophobia), and the lowest levels of trust in others. The latest statistics suggest that these are major trends in Iraqi society—80 percent of Iraqis suffer from xenophobia, while the percentage of those who trust others is only ten percent.

After Iraqis realized that the sectarian political rhetoric in Iraq was one of the reasons for the catastrophe of the “ISIS tide,” and after it was finally defeated in 2017, a new type of populist rhetoric began to emerge. This populist rhetoric focused on provoking new negative emotions such as regionalism or dividing Iraqis into axes of resistance against or support for the United States, among many other divisions.

Along with an emphasis on societal divisions, populist leaders also tend to emphasize the need for an individual savior rather than reliance on government or institutions. Institutions are presented as corrupt and therefore inhibiting, whereas the populist leader is unadulterated and pure. Herein lies the similarity between populist and authoritarian leaders, dictators, and totalitarian regimes. In each case, every opponent ranges from corrupt to evil—and must be removed or eliminated.

However, now that so many populist leaders are in power, their failure to meet the demands of coronavirus has shown cracks in their rhetoric. Among them, the decline of inflammatory populist rhetoric that aims to awaken the primal instincts of the masses, such as fear and panic, against others which has long been used by populist leaders to build their grassroots base. In light of the spread of the coronavirus pandemic, mobilizing people on the basis of fear of others is illogical, especially given that during this crisis people have experienced mass casualties, and this is surely tougher than any other form of fear.

As social interaction moves online, social media has played a pivotal role in strengthening feelings of solidarity between societies. Social media users have followed tragedies across the globe, facilitated by viewers’ free time during this period of isolation. Online rhetoric has increasingly included compassion and feelings of solidarity, which in some cases has prevailed over feelings of fear. Instead of the fear on which populism thrives, people have begun to feel compassion and sympathy, and Iraqi social media sites, like many sites around the world, have been filled with an outpouring of solidarity towards others.

The spread of the coronavirus pandemic has also led to an increased public interest in scientific research and facts. This interest in the nuanced and complicated issues of public health goes against the populist emphasis on ‘cure-all’ politics. Populist leaders are more akin to snake-oil salesmen or magicians. In Iraq, scientific facts have exposed a number of Iraqi populists who have relied on conspiracy theories or obscure religious principles to explain the coronavirus pandemic—some have even been forced to retract previous claims due to public skepticism.

The necessity of state institutions has also become increasingly clear to the Iraqi public. While populists view state institutions as hostile to the people, the reality is that during times of crisis there is a dire need for institutional and cooperative work rather than individualism. Crises also underscore the need to seek the help of experts, because their expertise—rather than populist rhetoric—is what is required for addressing the challenge. Whereas politicians have presided over all of Iraq’s past crises, this time the Minister of Health and the experts, health personnel, and hospitals are the ones who have led the fight. Many Iraqis now see these individuals as their saviors, and their instructions and recommendations are widely heeded.

In order to navigate major crises, history has demonstrated time and time again that logic, science, and knowledge, not myths and illusions, are needed to overcome it. Iraq has seen its own share of major crises. Most recently, the county faced a dual crisis, namely the threat of ISIS and the drop in oil prices in 2014 during the government of Mr. al-Maliki, who himself employed populist rhetoric that divided Iraq and led to sectarian conflict becoming more deeply rooted. This populist rhetoric paved the way for ISIS occupation of more than a third of Iraq’s territory and the loss of thousands of Iraqi lives and the displacement of millions. This also contributed to al-Maliki’s ouster despite his relative “victory” in the 2014 elections.

In contrast, balanced national discourse, non-populist decisions, cooperation with society and the international community, during al-Abadi’s government played an important role in mobilizing Iraqis on the basis of a national identity and in reducing hate speech, thus leading to the defeat of ISIS.

Past crises have uncovered those delusional populist leaders whose policies relied on fear mongering and pitting Iraqis against each other, and ultimately toppled them. Similarly, this current crisis will undoubtedly topple what remains of Iraqi populists, especially those who rose to power during the 2018 election—which saw large-scale election fraud as pointed out by many reports—and were at the forefront of the political scene, and thus restore the prestige of the state and its institutions.

MESOPOTAMIA NEWS KURDISTAN IRAQ :  BARZANI PDK entsendet Einheiten in die Qendîl-Berge gegen die PKK

Die PDK hat Kräfte mit schweren Waffen ins YNK-Gebiet im Qendîl-Gebirge entsendet. Die KCK warnt, dass von einem erneuten innerkurdischen Konflikt einzig und allein der türkische Staat profitiert.

  • ANF QENDÎL Dienstag, 14 Apr 2020, 18:35 Die PDK hat vor einer Weile bewaffnete Kräfte auf die oberhalb der Dörfer Zinê und Wertê im Qendîl-Gebirge gelegenen Berggipfel entsendet. Das Gebiet gehört zu der von der YNK kontrollierten Region. Während eigentlich erwartet wurde, dass diese Kräfte wieder abgezogen werden, sind am Montag weitere Einheiten mit schweren Waffen angerückt.

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Patriot Missile System Active in Iraq, Kurdistan Now: US Officials

Patriot Missile System Active in Iraq, Kurdistan Now: US Officials

11/04/2020 – 17:36 Published in Kurdistan

11 April 2020 – ERBIL — Patriot anti-missile air defense systems are operating in Iraq and Kurdistan Region now to protect the US and Coalition forces, US officials confirmed.

Earlier in March, Washington announced that it was planning to deploy air defense systems to its bases in Iraq and Kurdistan Region, a decision which was apparently made after increasing threats of more attacks by Iranian-backed militias in Iraq.

US officials told Washington Post on Saturday that Patriot missile launchers are now operating in Ain al-Assad airbase in Iraq’s western province of Anbar, and in another US base in Erbil, the capital city of Kurdistan Region.

Another short-range rocket defense system was installed at Camp Taji, central Iraq.

In early January, the US launched an airstrike in Baghdad that killed Iran’s most powerful military officer, Gen. Qassem Soleimani, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a leader of the Iran-backed militias in Iraq.

In response, Iran fired dozens of Ballistic missiles at US bases in Anbar and Erbil. It was followed by a noticeable increase in the small rocket attacks by Shia militias at the US embassy and other military bases. They killed two US and one British personnel.

MESOPOTAMIA NEWS BACKGROUND: IRAQ GOES FROM ZURFI TO KADHIMI: U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

by Michael Knights PolicyWatch 3295 -April 9, 2020If Kadhimi’s nomination goes through, it would be good news for Iraq, but Washington’s troubled relationship with Baghdad still needs a radical strategic reset.

On April 9, Iraqi prime minister-designate Adnan al-Zurfi withdrew from his short campaign to form a cabinet after coming under pressure to step aside. Taking his place is intelligence chief Mustafa al-Kadhimi, a candidate with the pledged support of all major political blocs. Despite radical differences in their personal styles, Zurfi and Kadhimi are both political moderates and Iraqi nationalists with good connections to Baghdad’s international partners. Both are also held in deep suspicion by the Iranian security establishment for being too close to the United States.

Yet a critical difference in process gives hope that Kadhimi will succeed where Zurfi failed.

While Zurfi’s nomination stemmed from a failure to reach Shia consensus and required the intervention of Kurdish president Barham Salih, Kadhimi has been introduced with consensus support and no veto from the Shia blocs. This can be presented as a face-saver for Iran-backed Shia parties who would reject him under normal circumstances.

Kadhimi now has until May 9 to ratify a cabinet—a process that will intersect with at least two U.S. policy steps in Iraq. First, on April 25, Washington must decide whether to issue a new sanctions waiver that lets Baghdad continue importing Iranian natural gas and electricity, and under what conditions. The current waiver was limited to an unprecedentedly short thirty days, an apparent signal that U.S. patience with Iranian meddling in Iraqi politics is wearing thin. Second, the Trump administration has proposed to launch a strategic dialogue with Baghdad in June, with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo aiming to reset the relationship under the rubric of the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA).

APPROACHING A BILATERAL CROSSROADS

The U.S.-Iraq relationship is long overdue for a strategic reset. If the 2003-2011 occupation was the first phase of modern relations and the post-2014 effort to defeat the Islamic State (IS) was the second, then the third phase is now beginning. Although the jihadist group is not yet defeated, an accumulation of complicating factors has been pushing the relationship toward this new phase, as shown most clearly when more than a hundred Iraqi parliamentarians called for the eviction of the U.S.-led military coalition in January. Drivers for this shift include:

  • U.S.-Iran competition. The war against IS has always had a subtext of competition between the coalition and the Iran-backed militias that contribute most of the combat power to Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The militias have sought to use the war and its aftermath to cement their hold over the political, business, and security sectors. Some of them have also acted on their desire to drive U.S. forces out of Iraq by attacking and killing foreign personnel, resulting in retaliatory U.S. strikes such as the January assassination of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani and PMF leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. These developments have created a volatile dynamic in which the Iraqi government is failing to protect its diplomatic and military guests, and the United States is being drawn into an open-ended series of strikes that are unlikely to deter or destroy Iran-backed militias.
  • Evolution of the counter-IS mission. After IS lost its last bit of territory in Syria in March 2019, the coalition began looking ahead to a late 2020 review that would have coincided with the mission’s sixth anniversary. Today, the combination of escalating militia attacks in Iraq and the coronavirus pandemic has accelerated this planned restructuring. Almost all non-American trainers left Iraq last month, while the United States has moved most of its forces away from frontline bases and consolidated them into four hubs: Baghdad International Airport, al-Asad Air Base on the Syrian border, the Kurdistan Region, and the training center at Taji. Many of the programmed budgetary assumptions for security cooperation in fiscal year 2021 will no longer apply under these conditions. Yet the counter-IS fight must endure in some form lest the movement achieve another resurgence.
  • Potential aid complications. Due to the coronavirus and other factors, Iraq will likely suffer a severe public health and economic crisis in the coming year, including tens of thousands of deaths and a collapse of household incomes. This would typically be a cue for the United States to ramp up aid delivery and coordinate global economic support packages. Today, however, the whole world is going through the same pandemic, much of the Middle East is feeling the pinch of the Saudi-Russian oil price war, and the United States happens to be in the middle of an election year. Thus, while Baghdad has never needed American support more than it currently does, America has never faced a more challenging environment in which to rally additional U.S. and international aid for the country.

MAKING THE STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WORK

When U.S. and Iraqi leaders gather under the rubric of the SFA later this year, their first priority should be an honest airing of grievances. This should then give way to recognition of mutual interests, as well as areas where the two countries can agree to disagree. For almost the entirety of Prime Minister Adil Abdulmahdi’s tenure—from his appointment in 2018 to his current caretaker status—the United States and other international supporters have lacked an active, clear-eyed partner in Iraq’s top office. In contrast, if Kadhimi were prime minister, U.S. officials could rest assured that any concerns he expressed to them would be coming from a respected Iraqi nationalist framing them with an eye squarely on his own country’s sovereign interests, not Iran’s.

The United States has signaled in the past that any SFA with Iraq is a package deal, meaning Baghdad cannot cherry pick aid benefits while taking (or tolerating) actions that undermine U.S. strategic interests. Although not explicitly transactional, the relationship has to be one of mutual give and take, not simply a one-way flow of aid to Iraq for no observable benefit. To reinforce this message with Iraqi officials, Washington should lay out its most fundamental, reasonable expectations:

  • Protecting American personnel. Under Abdulmahdi, the Iraqi government has demonstrated an unpardonable failure to safeguard not only forward-deployed U.S. military advisors, but also the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. The latter failure is particularly galling when government forces have been perfectly willing to kill scores (if not hundreds) of young Iraqis just to keep the Iranian embassy safe from months of protests against Tehran’s interference. This situation must change—Baghdad must order its forces to take action against any armed factions that attack its international guests.
  • Protecting U.S. currency. Despite a widening slate of sanctions, U.S. dollars are still being diverted to Iran or to U.S.-designated terrorist groups, including Iraqi actors. Baghdad must continue doing its utmost to prevent such diversions.
  • Keeping U.S. security assistance away from bad actors. U.S. weapons, training, and logistical sustainment are provided to Iraq under strict conditions regulated by U.S. law, including provisions that exclude those guilty of human rights abuses or association with the Iranian government. If Washington is to move forward with the programmed FY 2021 Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), then Iraq’s new government must take many corrective actions to put security cooperation on firm footing. These include intensified “Leahy vetting” of commanders, exclusion of U.S.-sanctioned figures from security roles, the renewal of U.S. advisory efforts with the Tribal Mobilization Forces, and explicit Iraqi protection of coalition-trained commanders.

Baghdad will no doubt have ground rules and reasonable expectations of its own, which the United States should observe. For one, unless U.S. forces are attacked inside Iraq, they should not target Iranian operatives and Iran-backed militias there. And absent evidence of Iraqi sanctions violations, Washington should commit to re-extending its waivers in continual 120-day tranches. Likewise, it should keep shielding Iraqi sovereign reserves from international lawsuits and avoid further threats to freeze these funds. Finally, U.S. officials should do everything they can to ensure Iraq gets its fair share of international relief—or even more considering the remarkable vulnerability of its public health and economic systems, whose stability holds major implications for wider regional security.

A commonsense strategic dialogue under a respectable “Iraq first” prime minister can restore a degree of normality and decorum to the bilateral relationship. Baghdad will sorely need this kind of reset in the coming months, when the full local impact of coronavirus becomes clearer, the oil crash forces it to enact its deepest economic austerity measures since 2003, and IS steps up its efforts to exploit the chaos.

Michael Knights is a senior fellow with The Washington Institute. Since 2003, he has conducted extensive on-the-ground research in Iraq alongside security forces and government ministries.


 


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Iraqi Kurdish (South Kurdistan-Iraq) authorities call for closure of NRT broadcaster over COVID-19 report

MESOPOTAMIA NEWS REPORT : COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS

Security agents are seen in Sulaimaniya, Iraqi Kurdistan, on March 14. 2020. Regional authorities recently called for local broadcaster NRT to be closed. New York, April 8, 2020 — Authorities in Iraqi Kurdistan should allow the NRT broadcaster to cover the COVID-19 pandemic freely, the Committee to Protect Journalists said today.

Yesterday, the Kurdistan regional government’s Health Ministry sent a letter to the attorney general requesting authorities close NRT and prevent it from broadcasting, according to a report from the broadcaster, NRT Director General Awat Ali, who spoke to CPJ via messaging app, and a report by the Metro Center for Journalists’ Rights and Advocacy, a local press freedom group.

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MESOPOTAMIA NEWS : GENERAL REPORT CORONA SITUATION IN SOUTH KURDISTAN (IRAQ)

Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the Coronavirus Response–Lessons Learned  – by Biner Aziz  – FIKRA FORUM   9 April 2020

Biner Aziz served as a visiting fellow at the Wilson Center in 2007 and as a cultural senior official in the Kurdistan Regional Government in 2008. Today, he owns a private construction material supply business and has lived in Erbil since 2010. He holds an MPA from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, which he received in 2009, and has published several essays on Iraq and Kurdistan.

 Also available in العربية April 3, 2020

Since March 13, my family and I have been locked at home in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), ordering all supplies and groceries via deliveries provided by the local supermarkets. As my neighbor Mr. Namiq, a public servant, put it: “Public daily routine has gotten complicated. [We have] a lock-down at home, with frequent sanitizing and hand-washing. We venture outside only for necessities. It is really annoying, and don’t know until when it will last. But our health is the most important thing.”

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MESOPOTMIA NEWS „ARGUMENT“:  The PMU Is Getting More Aggressive in Iraq

Since the assassination of Qassem Suleimani, Shiite militias like the PMU have taken on a new role in Iraq.

By Seth J. Frantzman  | April 7, 2020, 10:50 AM by FOREIGN POLICY

In January, Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of Iraq’s largest political party, traveled to Iran’s holy city of Qom to meet with representatives of several Iraq-based paramilitaries from the hugely influential Popular Mobilization Units (PMU). That visit was part of an attempt by Sadr to position himself as the face of public anger directed against the United States over the assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani.

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MESOPOTAMIA NEWS REPORT SOUTH KURDISTAN – Überleben in Irakisch-Kurdistan: Viele Helfer gehen

In Lagern rund um Halabja in Irakisch-Kurdistan leben 20.000 Geflüchtete. Für Corona sei die Region nicht gerüstet, sagt Journalist Qayssar Rahman.

20.000 Menschen, die vor dem IS-Terror im Irak und dem Krieg in Syrien geflohen sind, leben jetzt in Lagern rund um die Stadt Halabja in Irakisch-Kurdistan. Bisher gibt es unter ihnen keine bestätigten Corona-Infektionen. „Noch“, sagt der Journalist Qayssar Rahman. „Aber immer mehr Menschen haben kein Geld, um Milch oder Mehl zu kaufen.“

Eigentlich leitet er 43-jährige Familienvater seit Jahren die Nichtregierungsorganisation NWE Dangi, die ein unabhängiges Community Radio betreibt und sich für Frauenrechte und Umweltschutz einsetzt. Doch die Coronakrise hat seinen Alltag drastisch verändert. Morgens streift er Mundschutz, Handschuhe und einen Schutz-Umhang über und verlässt das Haus – als einer der wenigen 80.000 Einwohner von Halabja. Denn es gilt auch hier eine Ausgangssperre, Betriebe und Schulen sind geschlossen.

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