Wirtschaftliche Arsenale: Der Aufstieg des Nahen Ostens zu einem globalen Zentrum der Verteidigungsindustrie
MESOP MIDEAST WATCH ÜBERSICHT : Juni 2023 Al-Monitor PRO Trendbericht –ALLE RELEVANTEN QUELLEN
Einleitung
Als die bedeutsamen und umstrittenen Präsidentschaftswahlen in der Türkei in die Endphase gingen, war es schwer, die herausragende Rolle zu ignorieren, die Drohnen, Haubitzen und ein glänzendes neues amphibisches Angriffsschiff im Wahlkampf spielten. Das heißt, der Schlüssel zum Stumpf des türkischen Präsidenten Recep Tayyip Erdogan war die Hervorhebung einheimischer Verteidigungsprodukte – sowohl als Projektion türkischer Macht als auch industrieller Fähigkeiten.
Der Sektor verzeichnete im Jahr 4 Rekordexporte im Wert von 4,2022 Milliarden US-Dollar, ein Lichtblick inmitten der ansonsten düsteren wirtschaftlichen Situation der Türkei.
Diese Taktik verhalf Erdogan zur Wiederwahl und unterstrich den Aufstieg der Türkei zu einem Kraftzentrum der Waffenproduktion. Laut David DesRoches, Professor an der National Defense University in Washington DC, begann dieser Aufstieg der Industrie vor fast 50 Jahren, als die Türkei – im Namen der nationalen Souveränität – ein wirtschaftlich ineffizientes Programm startete, um Eigenständigkeit in Bereichen wie der Waffenproduktion zu erreichen.
Das zahlt sich jetzt für Ankara aus, aber was noch wichtiger ist, es dient auch als Vorbild für regionale Nachbarn, denen es nacheifern und die sich verbessern können. “Die Golfstaaten haben die Möglichkeit, dies teilweise zu replizieren, vor allem, weil sich die Art des Waffendesigns von großen Fabriken, die Metall biegen, hin zu Software verlagert hat, die relativ schnell als nationale Kompetenz entwickelt werden kann”, sagt DesRoches gegenüber Al-Monitor.
Neben der laufenden Entwicklung der Verteidigungsindustrie in der Türkei und in Israel – den führenden Akteuren der Region – sind mehrere Länder im Nahen Osten damit beschäftigt, die Fähigkeiten des Sektors zu entwickeln. Dies ist besonders ausgeprägt in der Golfregion, wo Ölgelder und große Ambitionen den Aufstieg neuer Zentren der Verteidigungsindustrie vorantreiben. Gleichzeitig diversifizieren die Länder des Nahen Ostens zunehmend ihre Beziehungen zu ausländischen Waffenlieferanten. Dies führt zu Bewegungen, die gegen die Konvention verstoßen, wie z. B. die Kündigung eines Militärhubschraubervertrags mit Airbus in Höhe von 879 Millionen US-Dollar durch die VAE im Mai 2023, wobei das “Versäumnis, die Wertziele im Land zu erreichen” als Hauptgrund für die Kündigung durch einen emiratischen Regierungsbeamten genannt wird.
Letztlich bedroht dies alles den Einfluss, den US-amerikanische und europäische Rüstungsunternehmen seit langem im Nahen Osten genießen, ein Trend, der durch Chinas wachsenden regionalen Einfluss und die konkurrierenden Prioritäten des Westens in der Ukraine noch verstärkt wird. Dabei stehen Verträge in Milliardenhöhe auf dem Spiel, mit erheblichen Auswirkungen auf die lokale Wirtschaft und die Unternehmen der globalen Verteidigungsindustrie gleichermaßen.
- Stand der Dinge: Autarkie und Souveränität
Der Nahe Osten ist ein verlockender Markt für globale Rüstungsunternehmen – denken Sie nur an Abu Dhabis alle zwei Jahre stattfindende internationale Verteidigungsausstellung, bekannt als IDEX, die im Februar 130 rund 000.2023 Besucher anzog. Dazu gehörte auch eine starke internationale Präsenz (ganz zu schweigen von den Schultern der US-Spieler mit chinesischen und russischen Rivalen). Dennoch hatte das Dealmaking einen ausgesprochen lokalen Charakter: Die VAE unterzeichneten während der IDEX über 50 Vereinbarungen im Wert von insgesamt 6,3 Milliarden US-Dollar, von denen mindestens 5,9 Milliarden US-Dollar an lokale Unternehmen gingen. Dazu gehörte auch, dass der Rüstungsriese EDGE aus Abu Dhabi einen Vertrag über 1,3 Milliarden US-Dollar für seine Tochtergesellschaft Halcon zur Lieferung fortschrittlicher präzisionsgelenkter Gleitmunition an die Streitkräfte der VAE erhielt.
Nach der IDEX-Ausgabe 2021, bei der die VAE 5,7 Milliarden US-Dollar ausgaben, bot dies einen weiteren unverkennbaren Einblick in die größeren Handlungsstränge, die die Landschaft der Verteidigungsindustrie der Region dominieren.
“Der allgemeine Trend in der gesamten Region des Nahen Ostens geht in Richtung Autarkie und Autarkie.”
Andreas Krieg, Dozent an der School of Security Studies am King’s College London, sagte gegenüber Al-Monitor. Die Staaten des Nahen Ostens konzentrieren sich zunehmend darauf, autarker zu werden und weniger abhängig von ausländischen Rüstungsunternehmen zu sein – ein Trend, der durch das Ausfransen der Beziehungen zu traditionellen westlichen Sicherheitspartnern noch verstärkt wird.
Die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate und Saudi-Arabien seien überrascht gewesen, als einige Waffenlieferanten aufgrund ihres Verhaltens im Jemen-Krieg Waffenlieferungen diskutierten oder einführten, stellt DesRoches fest. “Sie haben erkannt, dass politische Bedenken in anderen Ländern ihren Zugang zu Waffen zu einem Zeitpunkt ersticken könnten, an dem sie sie am dringendsten benötigen, und haben daher versucht, Wege zu finden, zuverlässige und ununterbrochene Waffenquellen zu sichern, damit sie ihre Sicherheitsinteressen so verfolgen können, wie sie sie sehen, nicht wie der Bundestag sie sieht”, sagte DesRoches.
Die Golfstaaten sehen sich auch als fortgeschrittene Länder, die als ebenbürtig mit einigen NATO-Mitgliedern angesehen werden sollten, aber sie reiben sich an sicherheitstechnischen und technischen Beschränkungen für Waffentransfers und betrachten sie als Verletzung ihrer Souveränität. Ein Paradebeispiel: US-Restriktionen für chinesische Infrastruktur als Sicherheitsbedingung für den Verkauf von F-35-Kampfflugzeugen an die VAE. “Durch die Entwicklung einer heimischen Industrie, so der Grund, werden die Golfstaaten die volle Kontrolle über eine souveräne Verteidigungsversorgungslinie haben”, sagte DesRoches.
Das führt zu einer Welle von Industrieaktivitäten, wobei die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate, Saudi-Arabien und Katar stark in ihre Verteidigungssektoren investieren.
So kündigte Riad – das bis 50 2030 % der militärischen Beschaffung lokalisieren will – im Jahr 2021 an, in den nächsten zehn Jahren über 20 Milliarden US-Dollar in seine heimische Militärindustrie zu investieren.
Die lokalen Verteidigungsausgaben im Königreich erreichten im Jahr 11 7,2021 % der Gesamtausgaben, gegenüber 2 % im Jahr 2018. Es gibt auch die Initiative für den Hauptsitz Saudi-Arabiens zu berücksichtigen, die multinationale Unternehmen dazu verpflichtet, ihren Hauptsitz im Nahen Osten in das Königreich zu verlegen, um sich Regierungsaufträge zu sichern, was auch für Rüstungsunternehmen gilt.
Nach Angaben des Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) sank die Rate der Waffenimporte der VAE zwischen 40 und 2018 im Vergleich zum vorangegangenen Vierjahreszeitraum um fast 2022 %. Auch emiratische Unternehmen sind zu Exportakteuren geworden, wobei Ägypten, Jordanien und Algerien die größten Kunden sind, während EDGE auf der IDEX einen 1,1-Milliarden-Dollar-Deal über den Bau von Schiffen für die angolanische Marine unterzeichnete.
Neben der Diversifizierung der Lieferanten streben die VAE auch Investitionen in ausländische Unternehmen an.
So erwarb EDGE im Februar 2023 eine Mehrheitsbeteiligung an der estnischen Milrem Robotics.
Dennoch sind die Bemühungen am Golf im Vergleich zu den traditionellen Schwergewichten der Rüstungsindustrie in der gesamten Region noch im Entstehen. Israel, lange Zeit führend in der Forschung und Entwicklung im Verteidigungsbereich, verzeichnete drei Unternehmen in der Liste der 100 besten Industrieunternehmen, die von Defense News im Jahr 2022 veröffentlicht wurde: Elbit Systems mit 31, Israel Aerospace Industries mit 37 und Rafael Advanced Defense Systems mit 41. Auch israelische Akteure haben von den Abraham-Abkommen profitiert, wie Rafael, der Anfang 2023 die Eröffnung eines neuen Büros in Abu Dhabi ankündigte.
Von den rekordhohen 12,5 Milliarden US-Dollar an israelischen Verteidigungsexporten im Jahr 2022 waren fast 3 Milliarden US-Dollar Exportgeschäfte mit arabischen Ländern.
Dennoch hat die Türkei in den letzten Jahren gegenüber Israel zugelegt und ist zu einem mächtigen Waffenlieferanten in der Region und darüber hinaus aufgestiegen. Laut SIPRI rangiert es derzeit auf Platz 12 der größten Waffenexporteure weltweit, während Israel auf Platz 10 liegt. Der Verteidigungssektor hat sich bei der Herstellung von Drohnen hervorgetan und bringt weiterhin neue Entwicklungen hervor, wie z. B. den im Inland produzierten Kampfjet der 5. Generation mit dem Namen KAAN, der 2023 abheben soll.
Ankara strebt in diesem Jahr Exporteinnahmen in Höhe von 6 Milliarden US-Dollar an, gegenüber einer rekordverdächtigen Gesamtsumme von 4,4 Milliarden US-Dollar im Jahr 2022. Außerdem hat Erdogan damit geprahlt, dass die lokale Industrie der Türkei heute 80 % des militärischen Bedarfs erfüllt, verglichen mit nur 20 %, als er vor 20 Jahren an die Macht kam. Drei türkische Unternehmen sind im Jahr 100 in der Liste der 2022 besten Rüstungsunternehmen vertreten: Aselsan mit 49, Turkish Aerospace Industries mit 67 und Roketsan mit 86. Das einzige andere regionale Unternehmen, das in die Rangliste aufgenommen wurde, war Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI), ein Unternehmen, das sich vollständig im Besitz des Public Investment Fund befindet und auf Platz 98 der Liste debütierte.
Alongside strategic autonomy, domestic arms production is being championed as a means of economic diversification. It’s also an opportunity to reduce large cash outflows in a decarbonizing world. After all, weapons are expensive and they’re purchased by governmental fiat, meaning they’re ripe targets for either cuts or substitution by domestic production, notes DesRoches. Yet, Middle East government defense budgets remain dynamic. Heading into 2022, Saudi Arabia’s government budgeted $46 billion for military spending; instead, Riyadh splashed out an estimated $75 billion, a 16% increase year-on-year, according to SIPRI. That marked its first spending hike since 2018 and made it the world’s fifth largest military spender. Meanwhile, Qatar’s military expenditure surged by 27% in 2022, reaching $15.4 billion, but other regional counterparts cut their military spending, including Turkey’s 26% reduction and Israel’s 4.2% drop.
Despite aspirations to attain self-sufficiency, Middle East countries remain heavily reliant on defense imports and technology transfers. For example, Saudi Arabia still ranks as the world’s second largest arms importer and the UAE is 11th, with the United States the dominant supplier, again according to SIPRI. Even Turkey remains notably reliant on foreign tech, including elements of its KAAN fighter jet. Ultimately, joint ventures with external partners have loomed large: Krieg points to Saudi Arabia having long used this tactic to produce arms and ammunition domestically that would otherwise be sanctioned by European suppliers, while the UAE’s EDGE and Qatar’s Barzan Holdings have used their capital endowments to enter partnerships with overseas companies to create subsidiaries or joint ventures that can produce and develop domestically.
- A Chinese offensive
Among big ticket deals at IDEX 2023, a comparatively small one proved particularly consequential: a UAE agreement to acquire a dozen Hongdu L-15 jet trainers from China. The deal’s value wasn’t disclosed, but China reportedly sells L-15s for $10–15 million each, placing the order in the $120-$180 million range. Price tag aside, the deal was widely seen as a pointed message to Washington after the UAE walked away from acquiring F-35s in 2021 after the Biden administration paused transferring the jets and pressured Abu Dhabi to drop contracts with Huawei for 5G networks.
The timing is no accident: amid a perceived decreasing US commitment to regional security, China’s growing diplomatic clout and economic inroads in the Middle East are looming larger. US concerns about China’s weapons sales in the Middle East aren’t new and Beijing likely has little interest in attempting to replace the United States as the top security provider in the Middle East anytime soon, but Chinese defense companies have rising opportunities to quickly expand their regional footprint — and signs increasingly point to the potential for major new deals.
Alongside the L-15 transaction, Chinese firms turned out in force at IDEX in 2023. That comes after Saudi Arabia’s defense ministry inked an ammunition deal worth roughly $115 million with China-based Norinco in 2022 and Riyadh’s ACES Co. struck a joint venture with China’s third-largest state-run electronics firm to locally develop Saudi UAVs. Although reports were never substantiated, Chinese media claimed that following the Zhuhai Air Show in November 2022, Riyadh had agreed to purchase $4 billion worth of armed drones, hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missiles and a counter-drone platform from Beijing. Plus, a leaked US intelligence document from December 2022 warned that Saudi Arabia plans to expand its “transactional relationship” with China by procuring drones, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and mass surveillance systems.
Meanwhile, the policy of forging partnerships with foreign players to boost development suffers from the inability and unwillingness of Western companies to sign their crown jewels away, notes Krieg, which is where competitors can make an impact. “The UAE and Saudi Arabia have been quite successful in attracting partnerships and JVs with Chinese companies, especially in the tech and AI field, but also in the missile field,” said Krieg. “China appears to be ready to share more easily because they need Gulf investments.”
There’s plenty at stake for American defense players. For instance, Saudi Arabia imports nearly 80% of its arms from the United States, according to SIPRI. The kingdom serves as America’s largest foreign military sales customer, with over $100 billion in active contracts. That said, defense deals between Saudi Arabia and China were also starkly absent from President Xi Jinping’s landmark visit to the kingdom in December 2022, which saw the two countries expand economic, energy and tech cooperation. A joint Saudi-Chinese statement from the summit stopped short of new defense announcements, but emphasized “determination to strengthen cooperation and coordination in various fields of defense.”
The summit came only weeks after the United States openly warned that certain deals between Arab states and China would force Washington to curtail cooperation with Gulf partners. Meanwhile, the Biden administration’s halt to offensive arms sales in the Gulf over conduct in the war in Yemen has contributed to a significant request backlog from regional governments, further straining ties and raising concerns China could capitalize as a result. Yet, the White House has still sought to advance military cooperation with Gulf states and continues providing defensive weapons. The United States also did approve a potential $1 billion sale of an anti-drone system to Qatar in late 2022.
- Outlook
- The coming period is likely to see plenty of defense industry activity in the Middle East, powered by Gulf countries. Expect further localization of procurement in key areas and new partnerships with foreign players that further alter the status quo, with key implications for Western suppliers. Additional strategic investments into foreign firms to help secure defense supply lines are also likely.
- Saudi Arabia is poised to be quite active: Riyadh is set to host its second World Defense Show in February 2024, which will likely be bigger and busier than its inaugural edition in 2022. The kingdom sees the expo as a major platform to showcase investment and trade opportunities for foreign companies and it will also be keen to demonstrate the progress of domestic capabilities. That should produce a number of deals boosting local companies as well as see the kingdom begin developing an export footprint.
- That said, the global market for weapons is competitive and there are generally more providers than buyers. “For the foreseeable future, Gulf weapons sales will not be profitable,” notes DesRoches. “Sales in the short term should be viewed as loss-leaders.” That means Gulf states will find their market is either with extremely cost-sensitive purchasers or with buyers who want technology that isn’t sold by traditional weapons suppliers because of sanctions, technology transfer concerns or other policy reasons. “It will be some time and there will be considerable expense before the Gulf states become major exporters of weapons along the lines of Turkey,” said DesRoches.
- Although US defense contractors will continue enjoying robust regional business, the foundation for stronger industry ties between China and the Middle East has been set. Jean-Loup Samaan, a senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute, is particularly interested to see how Beijing increases its local visibility within Middle East’s defense industry after the UAE-China jet deal at IDEX, among other moves. “I felt this went under the radar in the mainstream media and I’m curious to see how this may translate in terms of volume of sales from China in the region,” said Samaan.
- So far, China’s defense industry sales remain low in the Middle East, but it’s nearly inevitable that Bejing will score more wins here. Saudi Arabia in particular looks ready to do more business on this front. The key question: will these be more warning shots or will Riyadh cross a line with Washington?
- Chinese defense firms should also become more prominent in the Saudi capital by answering the kingdom’s call to establish regional headquarters in Riyadh by 2024. Meanwhile, major US and European defense companies have yet to comply, a notable development considering the magnitude of government contracts at stake. It’s likely some will ultimately make the move.
- Another area to watch: new high-profile weapons deals between regional players.Domestic defense industries offer a convenient platform to forge stronger local economic partnerships, mend ties and amass influence alongside reducing reliance on global suppliers.That’s already happening with Turkish drones, opening the door for Ankara to expand sales (and political ties) with key regional counterparts. Israel is also well-placed to benefit here.
- Turkey’s 2023 presidential election saw the defense industry serve as a key talking point for Erdogan and challenger Kemal Kilicdaroglu, but radical sector changes were never expected regardless of the outcome. “I do not expect any major shifts in Turkey’s defense industry trajectory,”said Sitki Egeli, a military and security studies analyst teaching at Izmir University of Economics.
- However, Turkey’s defense industry does face headwinds, such as question marks around how to fund serial production of new weaponry, a national brain drain and continued reliance on foreign technology. Plus, the emphasis on local procurement means that market saturation will be a factor. However, continued export growth can help offset some of that.
- The next wave of Turkish export success could come from smart munitions, or long-range precision guided weapons, opines Egeli. “A lot of them are upcoming right now,” said Egeli. “There’s big demand for them internationally, even more so after the war in Ukraine.”
- However, Turkey’s relationship with Western partners remains frosty after the United States booted itfrom its F-35 fighter jet program and imposed sanctions in 2020 over its purchase of Russian S-400 missile systems. Although the United States in 2023 has been weighing the sale of F-16 fighters to Turkey, it’s unlikely Ankara will regain entry to the F-35 program.
- Elsewhere, Israeli defense firms have benefitted from the Abraham Accords, but regional inroads may prove fleeting if Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s hardline government undercuts hard-won progress with neighbors and fails to see normalization with Saudi Arabia.
- Case study: Baykar
As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine unfolded in early 2022, an unlikely hero emerged on the battlefield — or more aptly, above it. The Bayraktar TB2, an armed drone manufactured by Turkish defense firm Baykar, played a decisive role in helping Ukraine repel Russia’s initial offensive. Along the way it became a symbol of Kyiv’s resistance and garnered global exposure.
That fame spotlights how Turkey’s drone market offerings are emerging as challengers to existing global players. It’s also a key sign of Turkey’s growing impact as a weapons manufacturing powerhouse, with Baykar proving an apt posterchild for this rise. Founded in 1986 by the family of Erdogan’s son-in-law, Baykar has risen to become a key Turkish defense industry exporter. Although a private company, Baykar’s direct linkage to Turkey’s president underlines his government’s strong focus on the defense industry.
The battlefield success of the Bayraktar TB2, which reportedly sells for about $5 million and first entered service in 2014, isn’t limited to Ukraine; it has proven a huge export success, with its appeal driven by relative affordability and Turkey’s willingness to sell weaponry to customers without strings attached.
Gulf countries have lined up too, starting with Qatar which signed an agreement to acquire six Baykar drones in 2018. More recently those deals have gotten more consequential: in January 2023, Kuwait’s defense ministry signed a $370 million agreement to acquire Bayraktars, a contract Baykar won despite competition from significant global firms in America, Europe and China. That comes after Reuters reported that Baykar delivered 20 Bayraktars to the UAE in 2022. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has also reportedly expressed interest in Baykar drones.
However, Baykar’s success in Ukraine has been both a boon for Turkey and a problem for Ankara. On one hand, the drone’s success strongly promotes its prized defense industry, but it also complicates its relationship with Russia, a major trading partner. Erdogan has also touted his “special relationship” with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Notably, the publication Daily Sabah quoted Turkey’s former Deputy Foreign Minister Yavuz Selim Kiran in 2022 as saying that Kyiv’s drone purchases were directly from Baykar and not a form of aid from Ankara. Still, there’s little doubt the government heavily monitors defense exports and the Russians have reportedly expressed their frustration to Turkey regarding drone sales to Ukraine.
Regardless, Baykar has emerged as a key industry player to watch in the region. The firm reported $1.4 billion in revenue for 2022, with 99.3% of that from exports. At least 28 countries have struck deals to acquire Bayraktar TB2s, including four NATO members. Looking ahead, the company is currently developing an unmanned fighter aircraft dubbed Kızılelma and plans to start serial production in 2024. Baykar also recently unveiled a new cruise missile for use on its combat drones.
- Key takeaways:
➡ Fueled by investments decades in the making alongside rising ambitions from upstart players in the Gulf, the Mideast’s defense market is evolving, motivated by a desire to secure greater self-sufficiency and national sovereignty. That’s creating opportunities and challenges alike for global weapons suppliers targeting regional business.
➡ Turkey and Israel remain home to the region’s most powerful defense industries, but Gulf upstarts have the ambition and financial firepower to become more impactful players in the region and beyond. However, they have plenty of ground to make up.
➡ It will take time for Gulf states to develop advanced manufacturing capabilities able to compete with Turkey, Israel and global players, but there’s also potential to expedite growth by focusing on innovative software-based defense solutions that require less industrial infrastructure and related technological capacity.
➡ Although economic diversification is championed as a key factor underpinning the development of domestic defense industries, homegrown sectors in the Gulf are still a long way from contributing greatly to national growth. Most regional exports remain relatively low-tech and have yet to make an impact in advanced markets. “To the extent that Gulf states export weapons, it’s to offset the costs of developing their own weapons production, which will probably never be cost-efficient in strictly financial terms,” said DesRoches.
➡ Amid efforts to localize spending, Middle East countries are still largely reliant on foreign technology and expertise to help develop industries capabilities. Joint ventures with external companies remain key to accessing R&D and edgy tech. “This approach has certainly led to billions of dollars being spent [but] it has still not cut the reliance on foreign defense contractors whose know-how and R&D is basically still imported indirectly,” said Krieg. “The challenge will be to attract talent who can do R&D domestically completely independently from overseas input.”
➡ Even Turkey’s robust domestic arms industry is a recipient of foreign equipment and technologies and remains very much integrated with the US and especially European industries. That calls into question the broader ability of Middle East countries to fully localize supply chains and achieve true national sovereignty.
➡ Still, the Turkish template to industry development has proven potent: the affordability of Turkish arms and the flexibility of its export policy has given Turkey significant advantages over competitors. “The growth has been phenomenal,” notes Egeli. “It’s the outcome of a very long-term investment going back to 1980s.”
➡ Global defense firms eying business in the region must prepare for increasing local competition as homegrown giants like EDGE and SAMI evolve and Israeli players expand their footprints. That should only amplify the importance of partnerships and technology transfer as a means to secure lucrative contracts. Local firms and subsidiaries of players like EDGE will likely be favored by their respective governments unless foreign companies demonstrate openness to help develop local intellectual property.
➡ More broadly, the perceived US disengagement and its strained ties with long-time allies is poised to have billion-dollar consequences for the Middle East’s defense industry landscape. The door is open for China to play a more impactful role. US armaments will remain critical and coveted for the foreseeable future, but regional governments won’t fail to use this moment to seek more leverage and autonomy.