Reopening Turkey’s Closed Kurdish Opening? By : Michael Gunter
Middle East Policy, Vol. XX, No. 2, Summer 2013
Dr. Gunter is a professor of political science at Tennessee Technological University. He has written nine books on the Kurdish people.
The effort to find a solution to the Kurdish problem in Turkey is nothing new. It has been continuing ever since the Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan, or Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) — formally founded on November 27, 1978 — began its violent uprising on August 15, 1984.1 Over the years, PKK goals have evolved from initial plans to establish an independent Marxist state to current ones for the recognition of Kurdish political, social and cultural rights within a decentralized Turkey. However, Turkey has long considered the PKK a terrorist movement, a designation also accepted by its allies, the United States and the European Union (EU). Therefore, in most cases, the efforts to achieve peace have simply amounted to attempts to impose it by military means and, until recently, without any meaningful political reforms.
Nevertheless, over the years, the PKK had declared numerous unilateral ceasefires with the stated intention of having them lead to peace negotiations. In most cases, Turkey ignored these PKK ceasefires, deeming them mere signs of PKK weakness and imminent defeat.2 The only important exception occurred in March 1993, when then-Turkish President Turgut Ozal appeared close to accepting one of these PKK offers to negotiate. Ozal’s sudden death on April 17, 1993, however, ended the effort, and even heavier fighting soon ensued.
Turkey’s increasing military pressure in the late 1990s finally led to PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s being forced out of his safe house in Syria in October 1998; he was eventually captured by Turkish commandos in Nairobi, Kenya, on February 15, 1999.3 At that time, Ocalan’s capture seemed to end the conflict. The PKK declared another ceasefire and withdrew its forces from Turkey into the largely inaccessible Kandil Mountains of northern Iraq, bordering on Iran. However, Turkey continued to dismiss PKK offers to negotiate and demanded what amounted to a total surrender. By the summer of 2004, violence had begun again and gradually escalated so that by 2012 there were more deaths from the fighting than at any time since the late 1990s.
However, in the summer of 2009, the Kurdish problem in Turkey4 seemed on the verge of a solution when the ruling Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, or AKP),5 government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gul announced a Kurdish Opening or Kurdish Initiative (also known as the Democratic Opening/ Initiative). Gul declared that “the biggest
Gunter: Reopening Turkey’s Closed Kurdish Opening?
The PKK’s “peace group” gambit on
October 18, 2009 — to return 34 PKK members from northern Iraq home to
Turkey — also backfired badly when these
Kurdish expatriates were met by huge
welcoming crowds at the Habur border
crossing and later in Diyarbakir. These
celebrations were broadcast throughout
Turkey and proved too provocative for
even moderate Turks, who perceived the
affair as some sort of PKK victory parade.
The Peace Group affair seemed to prove
that the government had not thought out
the implications of its Kurdish Opening
and could not manage its implementation,
let alone its consequences.
Then, on December 11, 2009, the
Constitutional Court, after mulling over
the issue for more than two years, suddenly
banned the pro-Kurdish Demokratik
Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party,
DTP) because of its close association with
the PKK. Although the Baris ve Demokrasi
Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party,
BDP), quickly took the DTP’s place, the
state-ordered banning of the DTP could
not have come at a worse time; it put the
kiss of death to the Kurdish Opening. In
addition, more than 1,000 BDP and other
Kurdish notables were placed under arrest
for their supposed support of the PKK,
in yet another body blow to the Kurdish
Opening.12 Soon the entire country was
ablaze with fury, and the Kurdish Opening
seemed closed. The mountain had not
even given birth to a mouse, and the entire
Kurdish question seemed to have been set
back to square one.13
In May 2010, the Kurdistan National
Congress (KNK), an arm of the PKK,
charged that, since April 2009, more than
1,500 politicians, human-rights advocates,
writers, artisans and leaders of civil-society
organizations had been arrested. In addition,
problem of Turkey is the Kurdish question”
and that “there is an opportunity [to
solve it] and it should not be missed.”6
Erdoğan asked: “If Turkey had not spent
its energy, budget, peace and young people
on [combating] terrorism; if Turkey had
not spent the last 25 years in conflict,
where would we be today?”7 Even the
insurgent PKK itself, still led ultimately by
imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan, briefly
took Turkey’s Kurdish Opening seriously.8
For a fleeting moment, optimism ran high.
What happened? The main purpose of this
article is to analyze the initial failure of the
Turkish government’s Kurdish Opening of
2009 and its reopening, which began at the
end of 2012.
PROBLEMS
Shortly after its initial announcement,
it became evident that the AKP government
had not thought out its Kurdish
Opening very well; it then also proved
rather inept in trying to implement it. Specific
proposals were lacking. Furthermore,
despite AKP appeals to support its Kurdish
Opening, all three of the parliamentary opposition
parties declined. Indeed, the CHP
(Kemalists or Nationalists) accused the
AKP of “separatism, [bowing] to the goals
of the terrorist PKK, violating the Constitution,
causing fratricide and/or ethnic polarization
between Kurds and Turks, being
an agent of foreign states, and even betraying
the country,”9 while the MHP (Ultra
Turkish Nationalists) “declared the AKP
to be dangerous and accused it of treason
and weakness.”10 Even the pro-Kurdish
DTP failed to be engaged; it declined to
condemn the PKK as the AKP government
had demanded.11 Erdoğan, too, began to
fear that any perceived concessions to the
Kurds would hurt his Turkish nationalist
base and future presidential hopes.
Middle East Policy, Vol. XX, No. 2, Summer 2013
would be based on guidelines already listed
in the European Charter of Local Self-Government
adopted in 1985 and now ratified
by 41 states, including Turkey — with
numerous important conditions, however
— and the European Charter of Regional
Self-Government, which is still only in
draft form. Thus, one might actually argue
that earlier BDP proposals for some local
autonomy would bring Turkey into conformity
with EU guidelines by giving the
Kurds local self-government. Moreover,
one might also argue that the millet system
of the former Ottoman Empire offered a
historical model for local autonomy or
proto-federalism in Turkey.
However, the AKP was appalled when
the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Congress
(DTK) — a new nongovernmental
organization (NGO) that is close to the
PKK and BDP — met in Diyarbakir in
mid-December 2010 and outlined its solution
for democratic autonomy. It envisaged
Kurdish as a second official language, a
separate flag and a Marxist-style organizational
model for Kurdish society. The
DTK’s draft also broached the vague
idea of “self-defense forces” that would
be used not only against external forces,
but against the subjects of the so-called
democratic-autonomy initiative, who were
not participating in what was called the
“struggle.”21
The Turkish Republic created by
Kemal Ataturk in 1923 has always been a
strongly centralized state. Radical decentralization
as proposed by the PKK
and BDP goes against this strong mindset
and would thus be most problematic.
On the other hand, states such as Britain
and France, famous for their centralized
unitary structure, have recently rolled
back centuries of constitutional forms in
favor of what they consider a necessary
4,000 children had been taken to court and
400 of them imprisoned for participating
in demonstrations. Osman Baydemir, the
popular ethnic Kurdish mayor of Diyarbakir,
was scheduled to go to court on charges
of “membership in a terror organization,”
while Muharrem Erbey, the vice chairman
of Turkey’s largest human-rights organization,
the Human Rights Association (IHD),
had already been imprisoned. Jess Hess,
an American freelance journalist, had been
deported for reporting critically on humanrights
abuses against the Kurds.14
RENEWED PROBLEMS
Although the AKP won practically 50
percent of the popular vote, or 326 seats,15
in the parliamentary elections on June 12,
2011, while the BDP and its allies won
a record 36,16 new problems soon arose,
and hopes for a more successful Kurdish
Opening quickly foundered. Secretive talks
between Ocalan in his prison on the island
of Imrali17 and other senior PKK leaders
in Oslo with Turkish officials from the
National Intelligence Organization (MIT)
broke down.18 Violence flared to heights
not reached since the late 1990s.
Ocalan’s Proposals
Although Ocalan’s 160-page roadmap
for solving the Kurdish problem was confiscated
by Turkish authorities in August
2009 and therefore never even submitted,
its basic contents are known from testimony
at his trial for treason in 199919 and from
subsequent statements over the years.20 In
essence, the imprisoned PKK leader has
proposed a democratization and decentralization
of the Turkish state into what he
has termed at various times a democratic
republic, a democratic confederalism, a
democratic nation, or a democratic homeland.
Such autonomy and decentralization
problem. He also broke off contact with
the BDP and continued to declare that the
Kurdish problem had been solved and that
only a PKK problem remained.22
Then, on July 14, 2011, the DTK, the
umbrella pro-Kurdish NGO mentioned
above, proclaimed “democratic autonomy,”
a declaration that seemed wildly premature
and over-blown to many observers
and infuriated Turkish officialdom. Amidst
mutual accusations concerning who was
initiating the renewed violence and warlike rhetoric,23
the Turkish military on August 17, 2011, launched several days of
cross-border attacks on reported PKK targets
in northern Iraq’s Kandil Mountains.
The Turkish government claimed to have
killed 100 Kurdish rebels, while the PKK
maintained that it had lost only three fighters
and that an additional seven local Iraqi
Kurdish civilians had also been killed.24
Violence continued on June 19, 2012,
when the PKK attacked Diglica, a Turkish
outpost near the Iraqi frontier, and
killed eight soldiers, wounding another
16.25 The same outpost had been hit five
years earlier, so the latest strike seemed to
illustrate the lack of Turkish progress in
controlling the violence, viewed by many
as a result of the state’s failure to negotiate
with the PKK. Others argued, however,
that the ultimate problem was the inherent
ethnic Turkish inability to accept the
fact that Turkey should be considered a
multiethnic state in which the Kurds share
constitutional rights as co-stakeholders.
Moreover, during 2011 and 2012, more
leading intellectuals have been rounded
up for alleged affiliations with the KCK/
decentralization. Far from leading to their
breakup as states, this decentralization has
satisfied local particularism and checked
possible demands for future independence.
Thus, far from threatening its national
unity, some Turkish decentralization might
help preserve it.
However, given that more than half of
Turkey’s ethnic Kurdish population does
not even live in its historical southeastern
Anatolian homeland but is scattered
throughout
the country,
especially in
such cities as
Istanbul, as
well as the fact
that a sizable
number of Turkey’s ethnic Kurds have
assimilated into a larger Turkish civic
identity, a radical decentralization that
would be incompatible with modern Turkey’s
heritage may not be necessary. What
is needed, however, is for the state to begin
seriously talking with the most important,
genuine representatives of its disaffected
Kurdish minority: the PKK.
If Turkey is going to resume negotiating
with Ocalan and the PKK, of course,
the time must surely come for Turkey to
cease calling the PKK a terrorist organization
and challenge it to negotiate peacefully.
The term “terrorism” distorts the
discussion. It not only prevents the two
main parties from fully negotiating with
each other; it also impedes the European
Union and the United States from playing
stronger roles in the process.
Shortly after the election results of
June 2011 had been announced, newly reelected
Prime Minister Erdoğan seemed to
turn his back on an earlier promise to seek
consensus on the drafting of a new constitution
that would help solve the Kurdish
What is needed is for the state to begin
seriously talking with the most important,
genuine representatives of its disaffected
Kurdish minority: the PKK.
trial detentions, effectively denying them
freedom in the absence of any proof that
they have committed a crime. Although
precise figures are unavailable, Human
Rights Watch has declared that several
thousand are currently on trial, and that another
605 are in pretrial detention on KCK/
PKK-related charges.31
A REOPENING?
Recent events offer cautious hope that the time to renew the dialogue and resume
direct negotiations between the Turkish
government and the PKK may have arrived.
In late October 2012, for example, a
report in the respected news outlet Zaman
declared, “The government is preparing
to launch a new initiative to deal with the
Kurdish problem to hopefully pave the way
for arms to be buried for good.”32 The Zaman
report went on to say that the government
had learned from the past what steps
would not work. It concluded cryptically,
“Therefore, actors and factors that had
a part in the previous peace process will
not be included in the new process, while
for some other actors the government will
reach a decision based on observation of
the present attitude of those actors.”
The civil war in Syria might also be
encouraging a reprise of Turkey’s Kurdish
Opening. In July 2012, the embattled
Assad regime suddenly pulled its troops
out of Syria’s largely Kurdish-populated
northeastern area, and a de facto autonomy
quickly settled in. At first, Turkey showed
its traditional hostility to this development,
lest it spur Turkey’s own disaffected Kurds
to make similar demands for autonomy.
However, a more nuanced Turkish position
surely required a settlement with its own
disaffected Kurds — to
provide insulation
from the increasing instability threatening
to overflow Turkey’s southern border.
PKK,26 whose proposals for democratic
autonomy seem to suggest an alternative
government. Many of those arrested were
also affiliated with the BDP.
In addition, Leyla Zana, the famous
female Kurdish leader and BDP member
of parliament, was once again sentenced
to prison on May 24, 2012, for “spreading
propaganda” on behalf of the PKK.
The charges concerned nine speeches she
had made over the years in which she had
argued for recognition of the Kurdish identity,
called Ocalan a Kurdish leader, and
urged the reopening of peace negotiations
between Turkey and the PKK. In 1994,
Zana had been stripped of her membership
in parliament and imprisoned for 10
years on similar charges. However, for the
time being Zana remains free, given her
current parliamentary immunity. Interestingly,
shortly afterwards, she declared that
she had confidence in Erdoğan’s ability
to solve the Kurdish problem.27 On June
30, 2012, she actually met with the prime
minister, an event that caused bitter debate
within in the Kurdish community but
seemed to me a positive step.28
These aforementioned arrests and sentencings
point to serious problems. First,
there is the nature of the crimes, which
allege no violence. Mere “association”
is enough to be counted as a terrorist. In
addition, the connections are tenuous. As
Human Rights Watch has noted, “There is
scant evidence to suggest the defendants
engaged in any acts that could be defined
as terrorism as it is understood in international
law.”29 Second, the arrests come at
a time when Turkey is planning to develop
a new constitution.30 The silencing of pro-
Kurdish voices as constitutional debates go
forward is counterproductive for Turkey’s
future. Finally, there is the way suspects
are treated. Virtually all are subject to pre-
In late October 2012, Erdoğan’s visit
to Turkey’s Kurdish-populated southeast
led to speculation that he was about to
start a new opening to solve the Kurdish
problem. Erdoğan had already said he was
prepared to relaunch talks with Abdullah
Ocalan, the PKK leader still jailed on the
island of Imrali. Indeed, Erdoğan even declared
that the Turkish intelligence service
could “do anything at any moment. . . .
For example, if it is necessary to go to Imrali
tomorrow, I will tell the MIT chief to
go ahead.”33 Hasip Kaplan, a leading BDP
MP, actually suggested that new negotiations
were already underway: “I presume
that talks on Imrali have started anew.”
One reason for Erdoğan’s interest in
a renewed Kurdish Opening might be the
upcoming local elections. Erdoğan’s AKP
and the pro-Kurdish BDP were expected
to be the main rivals for support in the
southeastern Kurdish region. During the
prime minister’s recent visit to this area,
he reminded the locals that his governing
AKP was in a better position to provide basic
services for them than the pro-Kurdish
nationalist BDP. The immediate question
was whether the national elections of 2007,
when the AKP prevailed over the BDP’s
DTP predecessor in the region, or the 2009
local elections, when the DTP trumped the
AKP, would attract the voters.
Indeed, by January 2013, it was clear
that the Turkish government had renewed
the Kurdish Opening and that tentative
negotiations with the imprisoned Ocalan
had begun.34 The sudden murder of three
PKK activists in Paris on January 10,
2013, appeared to be an attempt to sabotage
these negotiations.35 Nevertheless,
subsequent reports indicated that officials
from the MIT were already meeting again
with such prominent PKK leaders in Europe
as Sabri Ok, while other negotiations
involved Ocalan.36
By the beginning of March 2013, these
contacts seemed to be moving forward
when a BDP group arrived in Sulaymaniya
in Kurdish-ruled northern Iraq to deliver a
message from Ocalan to the PKK guerrilla
leaders ensconced in the Kandil Mountains
bordering Iraq and Iran.37 A similar letter
was sent to senior PKK leaders in Europe.
In his letter, Ocalan spoke about a ceasefire,
the withdrawal of PKK fighters from
Turkey, the release of PKK prisoners, the
disarming and reintegration of some 7,000
PKK fighters into Turkish society, and constitutional
reforms.
In doing this, the imprisoned PKK
leader struck both optimistic and pessimistic
positions:
Everybody should know that we will
neither live nor fight as we used to. .
. . You should know well that neither
I nor the state will take a step back.
[We will achieve] a historic peace and
transition to democratic life.
Ocalan then explained,
The PKK’s withdrawal from Turkey
will be after a Parliament ruling
and the Turkish Grand Assembly
will approve it, a truth commission
will be established. [Kurdish people
who were exiled] will return to their
villages. If these conditions are not
met, the [PKK’s] withdrawal will not
become real.
Ocalan also elaborated on the subsequent
political environment he expected
after “the establishment of peace. . . . Neither
house arrest nor amnesty, there will
be no need for those. We will all be free.”
However, if the peace process fails, “a
ment in Edinburgh to see how power might
devolve from the center successfully, a
crucial point in the current bargaining
between Turkey and the PKK. The Turkish
government has also established an interdepartmental
agency — with responsibilities
ranging from security to education and social policy — to coordinate
policy and responses concerning the Kurdish
question. The agency’s head was a recent
participant in the visits to Britain.
For its part, the EU parliament endorsed
the reopened Kurdish peace process
in a special session. Lucinda Creighton,
an Irish politician speaking for the EU
presidency, stated: “It is clear that the
wider Kurdish issue can only be addressed
through a peaceful, comprehensive and
sustainable solution.”43 Stefan Fule, the
EU enlargement commissioner, added
that the reopened talks were “historic . . .
[and] would have a strong impact on the
[EU] accession process of Turkey as such,
as it would further consolidate the role of
the European Union as a benchmark for
reforms in Turkey.”
Unfortunately, these hopes for a successful
conclusion of Turkey’s new Kurdish
Opening appear tenuous for several
reasons. Enormous differences between
the two sides remain. The AKP government
seeks to solve the issue by having
the PKK disarm and its fighters involved
in previous violence seek asylum in
other countries, in exchange for the mere
removal of legal restrictions on Kurdish
identity and language. The PKK, however,
civil war will begin with 50,000 people.”
As for the Turkish side, public-opinion
polls showed that the renewed Kurdish
peace talks had tentative public support,
a great change from the past, when any
such suggestions were liable to bring
accusations
of treason.
Gradually,
the Turkish
government
has begun
to humanize
Ocalan in an
effort to pave
the way for
talks. Ocalan’s successful call for some
600 supporters to end a hunger strike that
was creating dangerous repercussions for
the government in the fall of 2012 was an
example of his own efforts.
In addition, Erdoğan declared that, “if
drinking poison hemlock is necessary, we
can also drink it to bring peace and welfare
to this country.”38 An AKP member of
parliament from Diyarbakir, Galip Ensarioglu,
said that “Ocalan is more reasonable
than those who are outside. Ocalan is
acting responsibly and [this] is a chance
for Turkey.”39 Hakan Fidan,40 the head of
MIT — who was involved in the earlier
Oslo talks with senior PKK leaders — has
been speaking with Ocalan since late 2012.
According to Ayla Akat, a BDP member
of parliament who recently visited Ocalan:
“Fidan and Ocalan have managed to
understand each other.”41
Background preparation has already
brought Turks and Kurds together in
Britain and Northern Ireland to learn about
the successful Good Friday Accords that
finally brought peace to that ancient quarrel.
42 Erdoğan has approved these contacts.
One such visit was to the Scottish parlia-
Background preparation has already
brought Turks and Kurds together in
Britain and Northern Ireland to learn
about the successful Good Friday
Accords that finally brought peace to that
ancient quarrel.
1 Earlier uprisings occurred in the 1920s and 1930s. See Robert Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism
and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925 (University of Texas Press, 1989); and David McDowall, A
Modern History of the Kurds, third revised ed. (I.B. Tauris, 2004). In addition, several legal pro-Kurdish
parties have existed since the early 1990s. Although they have been eventually banned by the Turkish government,
they too have played a role in what are in effect negotiations. See Nicole F. Watts, Activists in Office:
Kurdish Politics and Protest in Turkey (University of Washington Press, 2010).
2 For more on these earlier missed opportunities to find a solution, see Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller,
“Turkey’s Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed Opportunities,” Middle East Journal 51
(Winter 1997): 59-79.
3 For more on this topic, see Michael M. Gunter, “The Continuing Kurdish Problem in Turkey after Ocalan’s
Capture, Third World Quarterly 21 (October 2000): 849-69.
wants meaningful autonomy that would
give their supporters, including Ocalan
himself, significant power. If the historical
record is any guide, the Turkish government
will never be willing to grant such
concessions; it would seem to be leading
to the state’s break-up. In addition, disarming
the PKK would prove exceedingly
difficult, especially given its stated position
that it should have a role in maintaining
security in Turkey’s southeastern
Kurdish provinces. An ironic facet to all
this is Erdoğan’s attempt to gain Ocalan’s
and the BDP’s support for a new Turkish
constitution in which Erdoğan would
occupy the new position of “super-president.”
Ocalan, however, has responded to
the effect that American-style checks and
balances would be needed.44
All this leads to whether the costs of
the current fighting are really so high as
to demand a settlement. Probably they are
not. As Nihat Ali Ozcan, a Turkish counterterrorist
official, has asserted: “We can
tolerate 500 deaths a year. It’s considered
normal.”45 Indeed, there remain many
elements in both Turkey’s security-minded
Deep State and its PKK equivalent that actually
see themselves as benefiting from a
continuation of the fighting. Surely neither
side is ready to surrender its key positions
for an unfavorable peace that would be
seen as a betrayal of all the suffering that
has been endured.
Finally, even if Ocalan agrees to a
settlement, it is unclear whether he would
be able to bring along the hardcore PKK
guerrillas in the Kandil Mountains, among
others. After all, the titular PKK leader has
grown old as a prisoner in Imrali for more
than 14 years. New PKK leadership and
cadres have come of age who are unlikely
to meekly give up their positions on the
mere words of a person many probably
see as out of touch with current realities.
Ocalan can be still accepted as the PKK
head while imprisoned, but if he were to
seek to become the arbitrator of actual
daily events, it might be a very different
situation. Indeed, Ocalan himself recently
suggested that his colleagues in the Kandil
Mountains were not as enthusiastic about
his peace efforts: “Even the PKK does
not understand me. . . . Qandil [Kandil] is
pessimistic; it would be good if they get
over it. . . . I’m angry with them.”46 Thus,
although the current reopening offers a
historic opportunity,47 clearly there remain
many serious obstacles to overcome before
any permanent settlement can be reached.
4 For recent analyses of the Kurdish problem in Turkey, see Mustafa Cosar Unal, Counterterrorism in Turkey:
Policy Choices and Policy Effects toward the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (Routledge, 2012); Marlies
Casier and Joost Jongerden, eds., Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism and the
Kurdish Issue (Routledge, 2011); Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the
Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey, second ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); and Aliza Marcus, Blood and
Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence (New York University Press, 2007), among others.
In addition, see the proceedings of the Ninth Annual International Conference of the EU Turkey Civic
Commission (EUTCC), “The Kurdish Question in Turkey: Time to Renew the Dialogue and Resume Direct
Negotiations,” December 5-6, 2012, European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium. For some of these proceedings,
see http://www.mesop.de. Also see my earlier comments in Michael Gunter, “The Closing of Turkey’s Kurdish
Opening,” Journal of International Affairs (online), September 12, 2012.
5 For recent scholarly work on the AK Party (AKP), see Umit Cizre, ed., Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey:
The Making of the Justice and Development Party (Routledge, 2007); William Hale and Ergun Ozbudun,
Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP (Routledge, 2010); and M. Hakan
Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge University Press, 2009). Also see Michael
M. Gunter and M. Hakan Yavuz, “Turkish Paradox: Progressive Islamists versus Reactionary Secularists,”
Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 16 (Fall 2007): 289-301.
6 Cited in “Gul: Kurdish Problem Is the Most Important Problem of Turkey,” Today’s Zaman, May 11, 2009,
http://www.todayszaman.com.
7 Cited in Today’s Zaman, August 12, 2009. Also see Marlies Casier, Joost Jongerden, and Nic Walker, “Fruitless
Attempts? The Kurdish Initiative and Containment of the Kurdish Movement in Turkey,” New Perspectives
on Turkey, no. 44 (Spring 2011): 103-127.
8 Author’s contacts with Kurdish sources in Europe and the Middle East. Also see Cengiz Candar, “The Kurdish
Question: The Reasons and Fortunes of the ‘Opening,’” Insight Turkey 11 (Fall 2009): 13-19.
9 Hurriyet, issues of November 18, 2009; December 2, 2009; December 9, 2009; and December 14, 2009;
as cited in Menderes Cinar, “The Militarization of Secular Opposition in Turkey,” Insight Turkey 12 (Spring
2010): 119. Also see E. Fuat Keyman, “The CHP and the ‘Democratic Opening’: Reactions to AK Party’s
Electoral Hegemony,” Insight Turkey 12 (Spring 2010): 91-108.
10 Odul Celep, “Turkey’s Radical Right and the Kurdish Issue: The MHP’s Reaction to the ‘Democratic
Opening,’” Insight Turkey 12 (Spring 2010): 136.
11 Rusen Cakir, “Kurdish Political Movement and the ‘Democratic Opening,’” Insight Turkey 12 (Spring
2010): 185.
12 Actually, despite the government’s Kurdish Opening, arrests of Kurdish politicians and notables associated
with the Koma Civaken Kurdistan (KCK), or Kurdistan Communities Union, an umbrella PKK organization
supposedly acting as the urban arm of the PKK, had been occurring since April 14, 2009, in apparent
retaliation for the DTP local election victories at the end of March 2009. These DTP gains were largely at the
expense of the AKP.
13 For further background, see Marlies Casier, Andy Hilton, and Joost Jongerden, “‘Road Maps’ and Roadblocks
in Turkey’s Southeast,” Middle East Report Online, October 30, 2009, http://www.merip.org/mero/
mero103009. The reference to not even a mouse was made by now banned DTP leader Ahmet Turk. Ibid., 6.
14 “Resolution of the Tenth General Assembly Meeting of the Kurdistan National Congress KNK,” (Brussels,
Belgium, May 24, 2010).
15 Ross Wilson, “Turkish Election: An AKP Victory with Limits,” New Atlanticist: Policy and Analysis Blog,
June 13, 2011. http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/turkish-election-akp-victory-limits.
16 “Kurds Make Big Gains in Turkish Election,” Today’s Zaman, June 13, 2011, http://www.todayszaman.
com/news-247215-kurds-make-big-gains.
17 Lale Kemal, “Turkey’s Paradigm Shift on Kurdish Question and KCK Trial,” Today’s Zaman, October 21,
2010, which refers to “state contacts with the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, on supposedly
broader issues,” http:///www.todayszaman.com/columnist-224988-turkeys-paradism-shift-on-kurdish-ques ;
and Hemin Khoshnaw, “Mediator Confirms Turkey Is Negotiating with Ocalan,” Rudaw, August 10, 2011,
http://www.rudaw.net/english/news/turkey/3883.html . More recently, see Hemin Khoshnaw, “North Kurdistan
(Turkey): Secret Talks Reported between Turkey and Imprisoned PKK Leader,” Rudaw, July 11, 2012,
http://www.mesop.de/2012/07/11/north-kurdistan-turkey-secret-talks . This latter article states that “the English are mediating between the PKK and MIT [Turkish National Intelligence Organization],” and also refers
to the intermediary roles of Leyla Zana (see below) and Ilhami Isik (Balikci).
18 For background, see Jake Hess, “The AKP’s ‘New Kurdish Strategy’ Is Nothing of the Sort: An Interview
with Selahattin Demirtas [co-president of the BDP],” Middle East Research and Information Project, May 2,
2012, http://merip.org/mero/mero050212?ip_login_no_cache .
19 See, for example, Abdullah Ocalan, Declaration on the Democratic Solution of the Kurdish Question
(Mesopotamian Publishers, 1999).
20 Abdullah Ocalan, Prison Writings: The PKK and the Kurdish Question in the 21st Century, trans. and edited
by Klaus Happel (Transmedia Publishing Ltd., 2011); and Abdullah Ocalan, Prison Writings III: The Road
Map to Negotiations, trans. Havin Guneser (International Initiative Edition, 2012). Also see Emre Uslu,
“PKK’s Strategy and the European Charter of Local Self-Government,” Today’s Zaman, June 28. 2010, http://
www.todayszaman.com/news-214416-109-pkks-strategy-and-the-european-charter-.
21 Ayse Karabat, “Kurds Expect Gul’s Diyarbakir Visit to Ease Recent Tension,” Today’s Zaman, December
29, 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-230981.
22 Robert Tait, “Turkey’s Military Strikes Could Herald Closure for Kurdish Opening,” RFE/RL, August 24,
2011, http://www.rferl.org/content/turkish_offensive_could_close_kurdish_opening/24307002.ht.
23 “Turkey Prepares for Ground Assault on Kurdish Rebels in Iraq,” Deutsche Welle, August 24, 2011, http://
www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,15342116,00.html. The PKK killed nearly 40 Turkish soldiers beginning in
July 2011, claiming its attacks were in retaliation for earlier government special forces operations that had
killed more than 20 rebels.
24 Suzan Fraser, “Turkey Says It Killed 100 Kurdish Rebels in Iraq,” Associated Press, August 23, 2011,
http://cnsnews.com/news/article.
25 Emre Uslu, “The Daglica Attack: What Does It Tell Us?,” Today’s Zaman, June 20, 2012, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-284160 .
26 The following discussion and citations are taken from Howard Eissenstat, “A War on Dissent in Turkey,”
Human Right Now, November 4, 2011, Http://blog.amnestyusa.org/waronterror.
27 “Leyla Zana Stands by Erdoğan Remarks in Spite of BDP Reaction,” Today’s Zaman, June 15, 2012, http://
www.todayszaman.com/news-283606. On June 30, 2012 she actually met with the Turkish prime minister,
an event that caused bitter debate within in the Kurdish community, but to this author seemed a positive step.
“Zana Reveals Details of Erdoğan Meeting,” Hurriyet Daily News, July 1, 2012, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/zana .
28 “Zana Reveals Details of Erdoğan Meeting,” Hurriyet Daily News, July 1, 2012, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/zana .
29 “Turkey: Arrests Expose Flawed Justice System,” Human Rights Watch, November 1, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/01/turkey-arrests-expose .
30 For background, see Michael M. Gunter, “Turkey: The Politics of a New Democratic Constitution,” Middle East Policy 19 (Spring 2012): 119-25.
31 “Turkey: Arrests Expose Flawed Justice System,” Human Rights Watch. Meral Danis Bestas, the current vice-chair of the BDP, told me on May 16, 2012, when I spoke with her through a translator in London, that more than 6,000 had been detained by the Turkish authorities.
32 This and the following data were garnered from Ahmet Donmez and Aydin Albayrak, “Government to Put Together a New Roadmap on Kurdish Issue,” Today’s Zaman, October 22, 2012, http://www.mesop .
33 This and the following citation as well at the related discussion are taken from Thomas Seibert, “Erdoğan Calls for Unity between Turks and Kurds,” The National, October 24, 2012, http://www.thenational.ae/news/
34 Murat Yetkin, “A Rare Chance in the Kurdish Problem,” Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), January 7, 2013,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/a-rare-chance .
35 Dan Bilefsky and Alan Cowell, “3 Kurds Are Killed in Paris in Locked-Door Mystery,” New York Times,
January 10, 2013. As of this writing (March 1, 2013), the Parisian police had a suspect under arrest, but it still
was not clear if he was guilty and, if so, what his motives were. For further details, see Michael M. Gunter,
“Murder in Paris: Parsing the Murder of Female PKK Leader,” Militant Leadership Monitor 4 (January 2013): 12-13.
36 “100 PKK Militants to Lay Down Arms: Report,” Hurriyet Daily News, January 29, 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews . com/100-pkk-militants; and “PKK: Disarmament & Ceasefire in February?” Hurriyet Daily
News, January 29, 2013, http://www.mesop.de/2013/01/29/pkk-disarmament-ceasefire .
37 The following analysis is largely based on “PKK Leader’s Letter to Kandil Reaches Northern Iraq: Report,”
Hurriyet Daily News, February 28, 2013, http://www/mesop.de.de/2013/02/28/pkk-leaders-letter ; and Ayla Jean Yackley, “Kurdish Rebel Leader Ocalan Airs Frustrations in Turkey Peace Process,” Reuters, March 1,
2013, http;//www.mesop.de/2013/03/01/Kurdish-rebel-leader.
38 “Turkey’s Erdoğan Calls for More Support for Peace Move,” Today’s Zaman, February 26, 2013, http://
www.todayszaman.com/news-308165-turkey’s-Erdoğan.
39 “Leak of Imrali Record Sparks Controversy over Its Source,” Hurriyet Daily News, February 29 [sic],
2013, http://www.mesop.de/2013/02/28/leak-of-imrali-record .
40 Hakan Fidan became the head of the MIT in May 2010. He is in his mid-40s and has had a considerable amount of experience in the military, intelligence, and foreign policy fields. Most recently he was also the head of the Turkish Development and Cooperation Agency (TIKA) which is tasked with implementing development cooperation towards poverty eradication and sustainable development abroad. His undergraduate degree from the University of Maryland University College was in management and political science.
Subsequently he earned an M.A. and Ph.D. from Bilkent University in Ankara. His doctoral dissertation was entitled, “The Role of Information Technologies in Verifying International Agreements in the Age of Information.”
41 Cited in Ian Traynor and Constanze Letsch, “Locked in a Fateful Embrace: Turkey’s PM and His Kurdish Prisoner,” The Guardian, March 1, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/01/turkey-pm-kurdishprisoner-Peace .
42 The following data were taken from Ian Traynor, “Turks and Kurds Look to Good Friday Accords as Template for Peace,” The Guardian, March 1, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/01/turk-kurdgood-friday-accords .
43 This and the following citation were gleaned from Ayhan Simsek, “EU Voices Pro Peace Talks. . . ,” for SES Turkiye, February 14, 2013, http://mesop.de/2013/02/14/eu-voices-pro-peace-talks .
44 Kadri Gursel, “Ocalan Negotiations Impact/Future of Turkish Presidency,” Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse, March 1, 2013, ttp://www.mesop.de/2013/03/02/ocalan-negotiations-impact-future .
45 Cited in Traynor, “Locked in a Fateful Embrace.”
46 Cited in Yackley, “Kurdish Rebel Leader Ocalan Airs Frustrations in Turkey Peace Process.”
47 In recognition of this development, the mainline U.S. weekly magazine Time, in its issue of April 29/May 6, 2013, named the previously obscure Ocalan as one of “the 100 most influential people in the world” and called him a “voice for peace.” Previously, such praise would have been inconceivable.