Regional Energy Security: Turkey’s Ambition to Become a Regional Energy Hub

Eric R. Eissler –  September 29, 2012Research/Policy Papers / CENTRE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH ON TURKEY

Abstract Turkey aspires to become the new energy hub in the region, despite the fact that it is an energy debtor nation and consumes more energy than it produces. The…


Turkey aspires to become the new energy hub in the region, despite the fact that it is an energy debtor nation and consumes more energy than it produces. The key to becoming an energy hub lies within the transit of other nations’ energy resources, most notable in this case Azerbaijan. However, this task is seemingly more complicated than one may perceive, because of the destabilization of the South Caucasus region by larger neighbouring nations, such as Russia and to some, but a lesser extent Iran. Exerting a sphere of influence is in the post-Soviet backyard of Russia is still a major policy of modern day Russia. To a further extent, the Cold War psychology is still evident between Russia and its former neighbours from the days of the Soviet Union borders, in this case Iran and Turkey. As Turkey is more influential and has the ability to supply energy to Europe, this makes Turkey more of an energy asset threat to Russia than Iran, because it threatens Russia’s dominance in the energy market; specifically natural gas exports to Europe.

In the pipeline game, Georgia is becoming ever more important to the supply side as it is key in the transit of gas and oil, which then passes through Turkey and on to other destinations. Turkey is the energy hub in this context because it is delivering the oil and gas to places further a broad while Georgia is merely supplying it Turkey—a middle man so to speak—but one of the most important factors in this relationship is security. The security of energy assets in Georgia is far superior to that of Turkey, because Georgia has its own dedicated task force, the SPPD (Strategic Pipeline Protection Department). Turkey’s pipelines suffer many terrorist attacks and illegal tapping—taping into a pipeline to steal the oil—costing millions of USD. This angers those on the supply side, who are losing money due to Turkey’s lack of a dedicated security force. The SPPD ensures the safety of the pipelines and the valuable cargo transported therein. Furthermore, this is an added layer of security against any attacks or attempts to steal from the pipelines stemming from Georgia’s volatile northern border with Russia and its perceived permeability.

To solve the problem of the security situation, cross-border security cooperation between the three countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey) is suggested and modeled after Georgia’s SPPD. Furthermore, an active and engaged Turkey in the South Caucasus is beneficial for the region as it offers an alternative to Russia and a doorway to Europe with the possibility of the European Union’s integration and modernization in the South Caucasus further in the future.


Georgia’s strategic location makes its energy sector vital in regards to the transit, production, and supply of oil and natural gas for the global economy. Metaphorically speaking, Georgia is the hydrocarbon bridge between Europe and Asia; yet despite this already established position, Turkey is now also contending for this title and to become the energy bridge between Europe and Asia. However, in order to accomplish this objective Turkey must invest in Georgia and promote deep trade and security relations with Georgia as it is the key connection to the supplier, Azerbaijan. Without Georgia in the supply chain, Turkey loses its connection with Azerbaijan and loses one of its major suppliers of energy.

This article examines the role of Georgia in the geopolitical context of energy transit and production; addresses Georgia’s relationship with Turkey in terms of energy; Turkey’s dependence on Georgia for energy; Georgia’s vulnerability to Russia and Russia’s ambitions to maintain its sphere of influence in South Caucasus. General destabilizing factors from the larger neighbors (Russia and Iran) are also addressed. In general, it also stresses the importance of cross-regional security on energy infrastructure, in particular, pipeline security and illegal tapping into the pipelines and stealing.

In the first section the issue of destabilization in the South Caucasus is examined. This is important to address, because the bigger countries have their own natural recourses that they wish to sell and they also have issues with each other and the countries of the South Caucasus, such as the tensions between Georgia and Russia and the issue of many Azeris living on the other side of the border in Iran.

The second section assesses energy security. Energy security is a prime concern, especially in Turkey, where there is no dedicated security forces to protect energy assets. This is irritating to the producing countries, which are taking substantial profit losses due to terrorism and theft on the Turkish sections of the pipelines. The article addresses, in the third section, Turkey’s lack of a dedicated force and offers the suggestion of a transnational security force in which all the countries involved, based on the Georgian concept of pipeline protection.

Finally, the last section of this article addresses the problem of theft from the pipelines in Turkey and reinforces the need for better security in Turkey increasing partnership throughout the region.

Destabilization in the South Caucasus

Destabilization is primarily tension and pressure stemming from Russia’s geopolitical interest in maintaining its sphere of influence in the region and Georgia’s vulnerability to it.  Iran is also adding pressure, mostly to Azerbaijan. Iran is discussed later in the article. To elaborate further on tension in the region, Einar Wigan at the  Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Insitutt (NUPI) reported that there is further mistrust and vulnerability among the three states, Wigan writes: “This cooperation cuts across the traditional power-blocs of the Cold War era, involving Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, states that do not necessarily trust one another (for example, both Azerbaijan and Georgia, although the former more than the latter is still very exposed to Russian pressure).” (Wigan, 2011:22).

Another Russian expert, Vladimer Papava,  also agrees that destabilization is the key to controlling the Caspian Sea Basin, and Russia is effectively waging an energy war on Georgia and Azerbaijan (Papava 2011:94). This concept of destabilization is also coupled together with Iran’s waxing-waning relations with Azerbaijan and will be discussed later in the article.

The interdependence of countries upon each other through economical means can be beneficial for deterring conflict, based on European Union principals. Take, for instance, France and Germany after WWII and one can see that the interdependence of the European Coal and Steel Coalition paved the way for a peaceful and cooperative neighborhood in the future. (Messenger 1999: 39)  This is, however, not the case of Georgia and Turkey as the investments made by Turkey into Georgia’s energy infrastructure have both advantages and disadvantages.  In an interview with the Turkish Ambassador to Georgia, the author learned the following facts about investment from Turkey into Georgia:

The total direct Turkish investment in Georgia is approximately 1 billion USD. The Paravani HPP project will be one of the biggest post-revolution projects in Georgia, approximately 1 billion dollars and it will be constructed by a Turkish company.  Most of the energy produced will be exported to Turkey. Georgia imports energy during the winter season for a few months from Turkey and exports for most of the year to Turkey. (Burhan 2011).

Turkey is investing in Georgian energy because it is an energy debtor nation and does not produce as much energy as it consumes (Burhan 2011). Georgia, on the other hand, is rich in hydroelectric power and host a plethora of potential hydroelectric dam sites. If Turkey invests capitol into these projects, then Turkey can have access to the energy that is produced for a lower price, but at the same time bringing income and much needed infrastructure to Georgia. In conjunction with these investments from Turkey, Norway is undertaking a hydroelectric project in Georgia as well, called, Clean Energy Invest at the cost of 314 million US dollars. The project is described, by Georgian Update, as “a four-stage cascade hydropower plant with a total capacity of over 128 MW. Clean Energy Invest expects to export most of the electricity to Turkey (Georgia Update 2011). This is just one of many hydroelectric dams planned or currently under construction in Georgia. Turkey must import a large percentage of its energy and if it is to become a hub between East and West, then it relies heavily on Georgia for electricity and pipelines originating in Azerbaijan.

Given that Georgia is priming itself to become a major exporter of energy geared towards quenching the need of Turkish demand that is need of a stable energy supply. “Both countries have concerns about their energy security and know that mutual cooperation is critical.” For example, “Turkey provided electricity to Georgia last month when an explosion on a gas line from Russia lead to and energy crisis in Georgia” (EurasiaNet 2006). In order for Turkey and Georgia to secure their energy supplies, they should become interdependent with each other, rather than being dependent on Russia for their energy needs.  Given that Georgia is the key country in energy production and the main corridor of hydrocarbon transit, having strong links with Georgia contributes positively to Turkey’s energy security. Per Gahrton writes in his book, Georgia: Pawn in the New Political Game, on some questions that are in the back of Turkey’s mind:

The crucial question is of course, if it were to emerge that there is a contradiction between Georgia’s own interests and its role as a transit country for energy in the interest of the West, how would the European Union react? And what conclusion would Georgia draw? It is not unlikely that it will prove to be in Georgia’s interest to not use its position as a transit country as a weapon in the Great Game against Russia. This will not necessitate the closure of any existing route, but it might imply that Georgia should not always give priority to new routes that circumvent Russia (Gahrton 2010:242).

Energy security should be important for Turkey, as it aspires to be a regional energy hub. Turkey will be the key for Azerbaijan in transporting natural gas but the gas must first pass though Georgia to reach Turkey. The Russian gas game should also be a factor, because what is good for Turkey is good for the European Union in terms of hydrocarbon transit, but bad for Russian business, i.e. Russia’s attempt at a monopoly on the European gas market. Because of Turkey’s ever growing need for natural gas and Russia’s ability to supply, Turkey needs natural gas from Russia. Turkey is the third biggest importer of natural gas from Russia (Likhachav 2012: 4-5) and on 28 December 2011, Ankara and Moscow signed an agreement to permit Russia to commence laying pipe in the Turkey’s Exclusive economic zone as part of the South Stream gas pipeline. The South Stream is necessary for ensuring a steady supply of natural gas for Turkey’s growing needs in the future (Likhachav 2012: 4-5). Furthermore, Turkey is planning on being part of a transit route for natural gas from Turkmenistan, Iran, Iraq and from the new finds in the east Mediterranean (Hürriyet 2012).

Energy Security: “Georgia Secure, Turkey Unsecure”

Turkey is dependent on energy imports: 581.000 barrels of oil are imported per day, 737 million kWh of electricity and 38.4 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually (CIA World Fact Book 2012). This constitutes  approximately 65% of Turkey’s energy imports and this figure is projected to increase over the next two decades to approximately 75% due to Turkey’s growing population (Baran 2005:103).   The importance of a secure Georgia is vital to Turkey’s energy sector as well as feeding the global demand for oil supplied via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC). The BTC is estimated to be 25% of the new oil supply for the growing global market (Elkind 2005:39). The integrity of the Georgia’s energy security is vital for all neighboring countries and for the EU, as Georgia is playing a key role in the energy transit corridor. The BTC pipeline is the main oil pipeline in the region.[1] At 1.768 kilometers in length it is the second biggest pipeline in the post-Soviet space and has a maximum discharge of one million barrels a day (British Petroleum 2011). In an interview with Dr. Vusal Gasimli, leading research fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of Azerbaijan, the author learned that:

Georgia receives about 50 million USD per annum from this line. The profits are directed to the state budget as well as receiving provisional oil. The South Pass (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum) natural gas receives tariffs which also support the state budget. Azerbaijan gave up its tariff of 1 billion USD to Georgia. Nabbucco and ITGI (Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy) are some more connections which are in progress. These will further strengthen relations between the three countries and will further benefit Georgia economically.

Trade statistics:

    Turkey and Azerbaijan 1 billion USD in 2010

    Turkey and Georgia in excess of 1 billion USD in 2010

    Azerbaijan is in Georgia’s top five trading partners (Gasimli 2011).

The pipeline is Azerbaijan’s main oil distribution line and represents about 35% of Azerbaijan’s GDP, which is a substantial part of its economy (IMF 2007). The Georgian section of the pipeline was constructed at a cost of twelve billion USD and is approximately 250 kilometers in length (Titsishvili 2011).

The Georgian section of the pipeline has state-of-the-art security and its own special security team, the SPPD (Strategic Pipeline Protection Department). The SPPD is part of the Ministry of Defense of Georgia; with special bases were created in remote regions of the country where the pipeline passes though. The SPPD not only guards the pipeline, but also acts as a local police and medical rescue force for these extremely remote areas. The SPPD was created during the construction of the pipeline and since its creation and installation; there have been zero “hot taps”[2] on the Georgian section of the pipeline. In contrast with the Turkish section of the pipeline, which are prone to “hot taps” and terrorist attacks (Titsishvili 2011).

In order to combat the growing threat of cyber-terrorism, the Georgian section of the pipeline utilizes three independent computer controlled monitoring systems. They are independent of each other to thwart cyber-attacks. If one system is compromised it does not affect the other systems and it subsequently goes offline (Titsishvili 2011). These high level commitments of pipeline security in Georgia demonstrate how it considers the pipelines operation as a vital national interest. Asset protection is high on the list for Georgia and the creation of the SPPD is a milestone in Georgian achievement. However, credit must be given to other states such as the US, EU, and NATO. In the past few years, they have realized many projects in infrastructure, the energy sector, military, technical and transport. Without the outside assistance from these international entities, Russia and Turkey would be the only influences in the South Caucasus. This influence would not allow the South Caucasus to grow and develop as they currently doing so (Grigoryan 2011:51). Georgia, a much smaller nation with limited resources, is able to do a better job at protecting its energy infrastructure because it has a dedicated force, unlike Turkey.

Turkey’s Lack of a Dedicated Energy Asset Security Force

Turkey, unfortunately, sees its fair share of terrorism by dissident groups from within— most notably, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party)—which is a threat to the pipelines in the eastern part of the country. Turkey does not have a special task force such as the SDDP. The Turkish State under the Ministry of Interior undertakes the security and protection of the pipelines (Grigoryan 2011:51). Turkey is a much bigger country, geographically, and has many more pipelines running though it than Georgia does. Hasan Alsancak, Director of Energy Security at BP & BTC Crude Oil Pipeline,  makes note of this in his article that Turkey is one of  few countries that does not have a special security force committed to protecting their pipelines (Alsancak 2010). The fact that Turkey does not have a specific security force for its vast network of pipelines is costly for Turkey. The losses taken in Turkey’s pipeline network have already indirectly affected the countries that are either supplying or receiving the hydrocarbons. In any case, these losses are not good for business and terrorism receives most of the blame. In 2009, BOTAŞ (Turkish Pipeline Petroleum Company) released “hot tap” information from the past five years and there were 72.729 barrels of oil stolen from the pipelines. This amount of oil in 2009 was worth over 5.002.157 USD (Kamuenerji 2009). Furthermore, every time a terrorist blows up a section of pipeline there is always a loss of oil, spilling out of the destroyed pipeline. Unfortunately, these numbers were not reported, but one incident mentioned below cost around 1.5 billion USD.

Without its own special security force, Turkey’s pipelines become a prime target of terrorists. To make matters more complicated there are thousands of kilometers of pipelines. In the following passage from Alsancak’s article, he goes on to describe the terrorism situation against the pipelines in Turkey:


Considering Turkey, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) has declared pipelines as legitimate targets.  It is reported that since 2004, the PKK has attacked the Turkish section of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline at least 20 times and has also attacked the Iran-Turkey gas pipeline several times since 2005 a top PKK member stated in 2006 that they “reserved their option” to attack BTC pipeline in future.  On August 5, 2008, the PKK claimed the responsibility for an explosion at the BTC pipeline that disrupted flow of oil through the BTC pipeline for two weeks (see Koknar, p.25), which resulted in an estimated 1.5 billion USD operational loss. (Alsancak 2010).

Until an agreement or resolution can be reached with the PKK, terrorism against pipelines in Turkey is a major threat and has the potential to disrupt the oil and gas transit from the Caspian Sea basin. The author had suggested to Mr. Alsnacak if wider cooperation between Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan on security matters would be possible, and why not create an international security team based on the already successful SPPD in Georgia. This security force would be used to monitor and protect all pipelines, railways and other projects that originate in Azerbaijan, pass though Georgia and terminate in Turkey. This suggestion posed to Mr. Alsnacak was unfortunately not answered. This type of alliance building and cross-border security force could be a major foundation in integrating interests and economies between Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan. However, in the politically complicated region of the South Caucasus this type of cooperation may produce adverse effects, because of Russian interests in seeing the South Caucasus destabilized and dependant on Russia.

Russia and Iran are two countries against the cooperation between the Caucasus states themselves, and cooperation with western support.  The South Caucasus is a possible opportunity for Iran to establish more foreign relations, as “Iran considered the interests of the West in the region’s energy resources and its willingness to develop relations with the South Caucasus countries as a potential danger for its national security” (Gasimli; Shiriyev; Valiyeva 2011:11). To Russia’s advantage it is important to keep this region destabilized, especially in trying to create a monopoly on the gas and oil pipeline market. “Not only did the Russian side not want to develop a transportation corridor  though Georgia or build pipelines in its territory…The Russian [air force] bombed the pipelines that pass though Georgia located far from South Ossetia,” (Papava 2011:89-90). During the 2008 war, not only does this threaten the security of the Pipelines in Georgia, but may also affect Azerbaijan’s economic independence (Papava 2011:51).  In a report by SAM (Center for Strategic Studies under the President of Azerbaijan) in Baku on relations between Armenia and Iran, Iran wanted to use Armenia as a gas corridor:

By constructing a gas pipeline to Armenia, Iran wanted to transport natural gas through [Armenia] to Georgia, Ukraine and even Europe in the future. However the Iranian regime miscalculated the situation and especially overlooked the fact that Armenia was actually the post of Russia and this led to a total failure of Iran’s intention. The point is that Russia understood Iran’s purpose and immediately took possession of the Razdan Heating Power Station and “ArmRosqazprom”, which controls Armenia’s gas network (80% of [the] shares belong to Russia’s ‘Gazprom’, 20% owned by the Government of Armenia) (Gasimli; Shiriyev; Valiyeva 2011:32).

Iran’s attempts to gain a foothold in the “battle of the pipelines” illustrates that the region of the South Caucasus is still stuck in a historical dilemma of larger nations vying for access and influence in the region. The fact that Iran was denied access though Armenia by Russia, further proves that Russia still exerts a sphere of influence in the region and is not interested in releasing its grasp. Iran’s policy in the South Caucasus, more specifically its direct neighbors (Armenia and Azerbaijan), is premised on security and what suits Iran. Iran, too, enjoys destabilization between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorna-Karabakh dispute. Iran favors Armenia to keep the conflict going to prevent Iranian Azeris going north of the border or stirring up nationalistic feelings. On the other hand, if the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan escalates there is possibility of a spill over into Iran (Shaffer 2003:19). Although it is a topic for another paper, it is worth mentioning here, to prove a point, that because Iran assisted Armenia during the height of the Nagorna-Karabakh war, Armenia was successful at taking control of this region of Azerbaijan’s territory (Shaffer 2003:19-20).

Despite the fact that Georgia wants nothing to do with Russia, Russia is able to exert its influence in Armenia as a sort of protector; effectively encompassing Georgia with military in the north and south This has become more apparent with Russia’s “Caucasus 2012” maneuvers and increasing troop levels at the Russian military base in Gyrumi, Armenia (Eurasianet 2012; ExpertClub 2012). Despite all the investments into energy infrastructure and supply Turkey has made in Georgia, Turkey is not willing to step in an assist in the event of an actual armed conflict between Russia and Georgia (Kogan 2011). To reiterate, no actual military support would come from Turkey. In addition to no military support from Turkey, there is no military support from any of Georgia’s allies, (Kogan 2011) including the United States, which currently still enforces a western arms embargo against Georgia; based on the assumption that Georgia could start a conflict with Russia (Kogan 2011; Kuzio 2010; 2010).  The lack of military support from Turkey infers that if something were to occur at the hands of Russia in Georgia, then Turkey, not wanting to lose face with Russia (or the gas imports) would simply walk away from its investments in Georgia. Thus, doing so would decrease its reliability and could cause the loss of future energy investments from abroad; in this case Russian gas imports.

Turkey would like to implement the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform,[3] however, this really not helpful, as bringing more Russian involvement into the South Caucasus is undesirable (Papava 2011:92). Turkey may want to become a superpower in the wider region but it lacks the resources, and is still fearful of Russia. Nevertheless, it could be a regional leader in the future (Tchkoidze 2011).  Turkey is fearful of Russia because it relies on Russia for natural gas imports and there is also a lingering historical memory of defeat at the hands of Russia. This collective memory lingers in the back of the mind for many, preventing Turkey from taking a stand against Russia and therefore creating vulnerability in Turkey’s aspirations to become an energy hub. As an energy debtor nation, Turkey is also relying on Iran for natural gas imports, this further hampers Turkey’s aspirations.

Terrorism is not only a big threat against the oil and gas economies of Azerbaijan, but also to Turkey and Georgia. What happens to pipelines in either of these countries directly affects Azerbaijan, which is supplying a vast amount of energy (approximately one million barrels per day) (SOCAR: 2012). A very viable and promising solution to this problem is the initiation of a cross-border pipeline security force. This is necessary for the small states of the South Caucasus, as they already work together in commerce; therefore, they should now secure what advancements they have already made with a heightened, cross-border security agreement. Lack of security in Turkey, resulting in profit loss from Azerbaijan may be potentially damaging of their relations over a long-time. Already, there are many illegal “hot taps” in Turkey’s section of the pipeline resulting in economic loss for all countries involved. Furthermore, with the advent of construction on the NABUCCO pipeline with an estimated completion date of 2014, Turkey will have another high-profile pipeline passing though its territory (Pipelines International: 2010). Georgia will be ready to undertake security on its section of the pipeline, but Turkey is still lacking a dedicated security force.

A passage in the 2011 Progress Report on Turkey by the European Union states:

Turkey should be encouraged to deepen its gas market, increasing liquidity and contract flexibility. Such a process would lead to the emergence of an ‘energy hub’, the existence of which would achieve greater energy security. Implementing measures for gas transit in Turkey for Azerbaijan gas would constitute an important step in the opening of the Southern Gas Corridor (European Commission 2011:73).

This Southern Gas Corridor is key for Turkey’s success in becoming the energy hub it so desires to be. Turkey should work hard for more pipeline projects, hydro-electric projects in Georgia, but it should consider a pan regional security initiative with Georgia and Azerbaijan particularly against terrorism and “hot taps.”

Illegal Tapping in Turkey

Turkey has many illegal hot tapping issues with its section of the pipeline because it lacks a dedicated security force to combat tapping. Turkey has the highest rate of incidence of hot taps when compared to Georgia and Azerbaijan. The following passage from Alsancak’s article documents the reasons behind the high number of tapping instances:

According to media reports, between the years 2003-2008, 411 illegal tap incidents, including attempts, have occurred on the BOTAS pipelines (Turkey’s state owned oil and natural gas pipeline and trading company) in Turkey.  In addition, several illegal tap incidents on the BTC pipeline have been also been recorded between 2006 and 2008.  There has been a considerable decrease in the number of these illegal tapping incidents, thanks to proactive efforts by Turkey’s security forces, particularly the Gendarmerie, other related government agencies, the private sector and advanced electronic security systems.  Nevertheless, due to a number of other reasons,  such as the fact that Turkey has the highest refined oil product prices in the world, there is a considerable demand for contraband oil in the market, which makes the risk of illegal tapping [to] remain high (Alsancak 2010).

The above passage clearly demonstrates that a cooperative security measure requires implementation to ensure the protection of the assets for all countries involved in pipeline projects. “Hot taps” in Turkey are indirectly affecting Azerbaijan. Again, another reason for creating a pipeline security network is a benefit to all participating countries. As previously stated, Georgia has not had any hot taps in the pipeline, because of the high-level of security provided by the SPPD. During the NATO conference held in Tbilisi in July 2011, it was inferred that the Georgia side (the SPPD) was becoming irate with the all the hot taps, stoppages and loss of profit from the stolen hydrocarbons in other countries (Titsishvili 2011).


In conclusion, it is very important that Turkey take its relationship with Georgia seriously and work on developing cross-border security to protect its assets. As without them Turkey cannot possibly become the energy hub it so wishes to become without a stable and reliable Georgia or without a strong security force dedicated to protecting energy assets within Turkey and its assets in Georgia and further afield in Azerbaijan. Russia is still trying to keep the South Caucasus within its sphere of influence and this can be dangerous to the countries therein and furthermore damaging to its neighbors, in this case Turkey, which would have much to lose if contact with Georgia would be lost, as it was under the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, for the sake of economic security cooperation in energy security is important for all nations involved and creates stronger trust between those participating countries. A more unified collection of small nations in the South Caucasus is a good measure for maintaining a check on the larger powers, which want to exert their influence in the region. This also unifies the smaller countries and develops stability in the region.

Please cite this article as follows:

Eissler, Eric R. (September, 2012), “Regional Energy Security: Turkey’s Ambition to Become a Regional Energy Hub”, Vol. I, Issue 7,  pp.24-41,  Centre for Policy Analysis and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London: ResearchTurkey ( 1901 )

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Map of Turkey’s Pipelines

Above map from: Alsnacak, Hasan (2010). The Role of Turkey in Global Energy: Bolstering Energy Infrastructure Security. Journal of Energy Security. May Issue.: 1



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[1] See the attached map for Turkey’s pipeline network at the end of the article.

[2] Definition: “The ability to safely tie-in to a pressurized system while under full operating conditions.” In other words a way to siphon oil out of the pipeline. See the following link for further information and diagrams:

[3] The initiative for a “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform” (CSCP) was made public on 13 August 2008 by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Moscow. However, the Turkish proposal is not at all new. It is mainly a revamped version of an older idea proposed by Turkish President Suleyman Demirel on 16 January 2000 for the establishment of a “Stability Pact for the Caucasus” under the aegis of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Fotiou 2009).