MESOP NEWS : Give War a Chance –  Turkish Leader Finesses Political Defeat

By Burak Bekdil July 30, 2021 – BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 2,109, July 30, 2021

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Turks are hungry for fairy tales. Any feel-good news propaganda—including Erdoğan’s “The West, including the Germans, are jealous of us!” tirade—finds millions of receptive listeners in Turkey’s postmodern marketplace of absurdity.

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MESOP NEWS : Shanghai Cooperation Council (China-Russia) Declares Bloc Will Fight Terrorism In Afghanistan To Fill Vacuum After US Departure

by Tsarizm Staff July 28, 2021

Moscow And Beijing Worried About Islamic Radicalism Now That World’s Policeman Is Gone

The Shanghai Cooperation Council is a geopolitical bloc meant to counter Western and especially U.S. hegemony in world power. Essentially, it is Russia and China, and client states.

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MESOP NEWS : Shanghai Cooperation Council (China-Russland) erklärt, dass der Block den Terrorismus in Afghanistan bekämpfen wird, um das Vakuum nach dem Abzug der USA zu füllen

von Tsarizm StaffJ uli 28, 2021

 

Der Shanghai Cooperation Council ist ein geopolitischer Block, der der westlichen und insbesondere der US-Hegemonie in der Weltmacht entgegenwirken soll. Im Wesentlichen sind es Russland und China und die Kundenstaaten. Es sieht so aus, als ob dieser Block jetzt über den islamischen Radikalismus in Zentralasien besorgt ist, da die Vereinigten Staaten Kräfte abziehen. Der islamische Fundamentalismus ist ein Problem in Russland und in China. Die KPCh hält derzeit über 1M Uiguren in Konzentrationslagern fest, im Wesentlichen Umerziehungseinrichtungen.

Die Verteidigungsminister der Mitgliedstaaten der Shanghaier Organisation für Zusammenarbeit (SOZ) betonen die Notwendigkeit, den wachsenden Aktivitäten von Terroristen nach dem Abzug ausländischer Militärkontingente aus Afghanistan entgegenzuwirken, sagten die SOZ-Verteidigungschefs in einer gemeinsamen Erklärung nach ihrem Treffen in Duschanbe am Mittwoch, berichtete die staatliche russische Nachrichtenagentur TASS.

Die Verteidigungschefs der SOZ “stellten fest, dass die Situation im SOZ-Raum nicht destabilisiert wird und die Aktivitäten terroristischer Gruppen in der Region nach dem Abzug der Militärkontingente der NATO und anderer Länder aus Afghanistan erheblich zunehmen”, heißt es in dem Dokument.

Das SOZ-Treffen genehmigte auch einen Plan der Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Verteidigungsministerien des Blocks für 2022-2023, “um die Freundschaft und die gutnachbarschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen den SOZ-Mitgliedstaaten zu stärken, Frieden, Sicherheit und Stabilität in der Region zu wahren, sprachen die Verteidigungschefs für den Aufbau einer praktischen Interaktion der SOZ mit regionalen Partnerorganisationen”, heißt es in der gemeinsamen Erklärung.

MESOP NEWS : EISKREM BEN & JERRYS, ANNETTA KAHANE & DIE STASI DER DDR

Deutsche NGO verurteilt Ben & Jerrys wegen Boykotts von Judäa  + Samaria

Die Amadeu Antonio Stiftung beendet ihre Partnerschaft mit dem Eiscremehersteller und sagt, ihr Boykott fördere Antisemitismus.

MESOP NEWS: DIE NEUEN ÜBERWACHER SIND DIE ALTEN

„Ein Ex-Stasi-Spitzel namens Annetta Kahane (alias IM Victoria) Sie  schwärzte  1976 die beiden ältesten Schriftsteller Brasch-Söhne bei der Stasi an: “Zu den Feinden der DDR gehören in erster Linie Klaus Brasch[wp] und Thomas Brasch[wp].”)“

Wikimania

 

MESOP NEWS : EX-MOSSAD CHEF – Die USA werden dem Iran erlauben, Atomwaffen zu erwerben

Danny Yatom, ehemaliger Mossad-Chef, warnt, dass Israel einen Backup-Plan brauche, “falls das Schlimmste passiert”.

  1. August 2021 – Der frühere Mossad-Chef Danny Yatom glaubt, dass die Biden-Regierung es dem Iran ermöglichen wird, innerhalb kurzer Zeit die Technologie und die operativen Fähigkeiten zu erlangen, um eine Atombombe herzustellen .

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MESOP NEWS : TÜRKEI & IRAN & BAGHDAD GEGEN PKK

 

Bruderzwist im Nordirak: Kurdische Parteien bekämpfen sich

30 Juli 2021 RUSSIA TODAY REPORT – Die Lage in der autonomen Region Kurdistan im Norden Iraks ist angespannt, nachdem in den vergangenen Wochen immer wieder Konflikte zwischen den Kämpfern der KPD und der PKK eskaliert sind. Die Auseinandersetzungen forderten beiderseits bereits mehrere Todesopfer.

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MESOP NEWS : lingua tertii, quatri oder quinti imperii (KLEMPERER) / Stammeln unter der Pride Flag

Sie gendern, um zu herrschen

Der Grund für die Propagierung von Gendersprache ist nicht die Beförderung der Gleichberechtigung sondern die Verfestigung von Herrschaft mit Hilfe der Sprache.

Von Friedrich Lang. Achgut achse

Jedermann weiß, dass die sogenannte Gendersprache aus linguistischer und soziologischer Sicht unsinnig und nicht praktikabel ist. Sogar deren Befürworter.

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MESOP GENERAL OVERVIEW STATISTIC – Middle East economic outlook hinges on vaccinations

 
31 7. 2021 – The headline from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook update this week is that the keystone of any global economic recovery is vaccination rate for the COVID-19 virus — and the prospect is very much divided between advanced and emerging economies.

No surprise, then, that the Middle East also is split, with Israel and most Gulf states faring better than others still struggling with COVID-19 and its rising Delta variant. Being in the lead, of course, does not mean smooth sailing; even in the United States, cases are up. Low vaccination rates in much of the Middle East, however, are amplifying existing governance and economic challenges and slowing otherwise positive economic trends.

Middle East lags global recovery

The IMF is projecting world economic growth of 6% this year and 4.9% in 2022, after a downturn of 3.2% in 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Middle East looks likely to lag, with regional growth projections of 4.1% in 2021 and 3.7% in 2022, following a downturn of 3% in 2020.

The good news for the region continues to be a rise in oil prices, given the surge in demand following the pandemic. Oil is projected to average $64.68 per barrel this year, up more than 56% over the 2020 average of $41.29 per barrel.

Vaccine access divides the globe and the region

Vaccines are a key variable in global forecasts. According to the Johns Hopkins University coronavirus barometer, only 14% of the globe is fully vaccinated against COVID-19. In advanced economies, the number is 40%; in developing countries, it’s much less than half that.

In the Middle East, the highest vaccination rates are in the United Arab Emirates at over 70%; Bahrain at 64%; Qatar at 60%; Israel at 59%; Turkey at over 30%; Kuwait at 22%; Jordan at 21%; and Saudi Arabia and Morocco both at over 20%.

By comparison, the world leaders in vaccination rates in Western countries are the UK at over 56%; Germany at nearly 51%; the United States at about 50% and France at over 45%.

It goes without saying that Syria, Libya and Yemen, three fragile states in conflict, are especially hard hit. Syria’s vaccination rate is estimated at just 0.05%; there are no reliable numbers for Libya and Yemen.

Five countries to watch

Iraq: Iraq’s vaccination rate is about 1%, with a population of approximately 40 million. Iraq was especially hard hit by the pandemic in 2020; its economy contracted by 10.9%. The IMF projection for 1.1% growth this year, followed by 4.4% in 2022, is fragile. Iraq’s prospects are buoyed by higher oil prices and US, international and regional support for Iraq under Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi through greater investment, trade and assistance. Most of the headlines from Kadhimi’s visit to Washington last week focused on the end of the US combat mission in Iraq by year’s end, as Jared Szuba reports, but just as urgent for Iraq is the US donation of 500,000 vaccines through COVAX and related pandemic assistance. Adnan Abu Zeed reports from Baghdad on the Iraqi government’s challenges in dealing with COVID-19, including widespread disregard of public health guidance and reluctance to get vaccinated.

Egypt: With 100 million people, Egypt’s vaccination rate is 1.63%. This number is a potential wild card in Egypt’s otherwise strong economic forecast. The IMF in May praised the Egyptian government’s “resilience” during the pandemic through “swift and balanced” policies. Egypt has been until now a success story of managing the economy during a pandemic, growing by 2.8% last year and projected growth this year of 5.2%. But the low vaccination rate should be a wake-up call. The IMF May report, otherwise mostly positive, warned that “uncertainty remains against the backdrop of lingering pandemic-related risks.”

Iran: Iran, with approximately 80 million people, has a vaccination rate of just under 3%. Although Iran has been hard hit by COVID-19, it nonetheless managed, like Egypt — the only two countries in the region — to see positive economic growth last year (1.5%) and is projected to grow 2.5% this year — perhaps more if there is an agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Iran has instituted another series of lockdowns in response to the latest increase in virus cases, as we report here.

Oman: Oman has a vaccination rate of 6.7% in a country of just over 5 million. Oman has been praised by the IMF for its handling of the pandemic. And despite COVID-19, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said has mostly stuck to a reform program that was just getting started under his predecessor. As we wrote last month, “While Oman’s economy contracted by a sharp 6.4% in 2020, the contraction was less severe than anticipated. This year the economy is expecting modest growth of 1.8%, according to the IMF, and next year it’s on track for a robust 7.4%, the highest IMF projection for the region.”

Tunisia: Tunisia, in the midst of political upheaval, has a vaccination rate just over 8% and a population of 12 million. Its economy was hit hard by COVID-19 in 2020, contracting by over 8.8%. Only Libya (59.7%), Lebanon (25%), the West Bank and Gaza (11%), and Iraq (10.9%) experienced larger contractions. The IMF has projected a turnaround of 3.8% growth this year for Tunisia, but political instability and COVID-19 create uncertainty. An IMF report in February warned that the COVID-19 pandemic was “exacerbating Tunisia’s socio-economic fragilities.” Elizia Volkmann reports from Tunis that “multiple changes of health ministers have been perceived to be a cause of the pandemic spinning out of control in Tunisia, with the WHO declaring it the most infected country in Africa with the highest death rate.” Mohamed Ali Ltifi, also writing from Tunis, reports that Tunisians see their democracy at risk.

Uncertainty going forward

The Delta variant and the slow uptick in vaccination rates in emerging economies, including the Middle East, increases the gap with advanced economies, which seem to have mostly solved the vaccine access and distribution problems. That does not mean, however, the COVID-19 challenge in advanced economies has ended. In the Middle East, the direst COVID-19 crises are of course in the fragile conflict states:  Syria, Libya and Yemen. The West Bank and Gaza are also struggling with the virus, as Mervat Ouf reports from Gaza City. There is encouraging news in Egypt, Oman and Iraq, but COVID-19 and the low rate of vaccinations increase the uncertainty and, at a minimum, create a drag on these economies.

 

 

MESOP NEWS : Wird sich Erdogans afghanischer Schachzug in Washington auszahlen?

Der allgemeine Eindruck ist, dass Ankaras Engagement für den Schutz des Flughafens Kabul nur darauf abzielt, die Gunst Washingtons zu gewinnen.

 

 

Semih Idiz Juli 30, 2021 AL MONITOR  – Viele Türken sind zutiefst besorgt über die Bereitschaft von Präsident Recep Tayyip Erdogan, türkische Streitkräfte nach dem Abzug der US-Streitkräfte aus diesem Land zur Sicherheit am Flughafen von Kabul einzusetzen – trotz der inhärenten Gefahren einer solchen Mission.

Die Frage wird auch mit der frage nach dem dramatischen Anstieg der Zahl der afghanischen Flüchtlinge vermischt, die derzeit in die Türkei reisen, nachdem US-Präsident Joe Biden beschlossen hat, die US-Streitkräfte aus Afghanistan abzuziehen.

Das Thema verursacht eine zunehmend hässliche politische innenpolitische Debatte zwischen der Erdogan-Regierung und der Opposition und schürt auch rassistische Gefühle unter Türken gegen Araber und Afghanen.

Für die meisten erfahrenen türkischen Diplomaten ist Erdogans Bereitschaft, die Aufgabe des Schutzes des Flughafens von Kabul zu übernehmen, einfach eines seiner schlecht durchdachten Projekte.

“Zunächst einmal weiß niemand genau, ob dies Ankaras Angebot oder Washingtons Vorschlag war”, schrieb der pensionierte Botschafter Ali Tuygan in seinem Blog Diplomatic Opinion.

“Aber der allgemeine Eindruck ist, dass dies ein Angebot der türkischen Regierung war, Washington zu einer verständnisvolleren Haltung gegenüber türkisch-amerikanischen Differenzen zu bringen, indem sie türkische Truppen in Gefahr brachte”, fuhr er fort.

Turkish-American ties have been clouded for quite some time with multiple issues, including the question of Ankara’s purchase of Russian-made S-400 anti-missile defense systems that has resulted in US sanctions and other punitive measures being slapped on Turkey.

This has also contributed significantly to the serious downturn of the Turkish economy, as a result of which Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party are said to be losing domestic credibility.

The expectation in government circles appears to be that any improvement in Turkish-US ties will also help the Turkish economy, thus shoring up Erdogan’s domestic support.

Ankara has also been seeking means to improve ties with Israel in order to facilitate better ties with Washington.

Retired Ambassador Suha Umar believes that Erdogan’s decision to take on the security of Kabul airport is a sign of desperation.

“This is an act that is based more on necessity than anything else,” he told Al Monitor, pointing at Turkey’s economic crisis as well as Ankara’s weakened hand on the international stage.

“For a country in this situation to undertake such a mission that is fraught with uncertainty — and which will require resources in every respect — does not appear sensible,” Umar said. “All that is left is a situation that reflects desperation.”

Few believe that Turkey’s involvement in Afghanistan after the departure of US forces will provide any benefits for Ankara. Many recall that Turkey’s involvement in Syria and Libya also fell short of achieving their ultimate objectives.

The end result, it is feared, will be that Turkish forces will be placed at risk while Erdogan’s adventurism drags the country into a quagmire.

“Would this put Turkish troops in harm’s way? Yes, definitely. Because the Taliban does not have to take over Kabul to disrupt the functioning of the airport, it has many other means at its disposal,” Tuygan wrote.

Meanwhile, Erdogan’s approach to the whole question also appears to be deeply confused and riddled with contradictions.

Erdogan is trying to reach out to the Taliban, on the one hand, by using Islamic rhetoric and castigating “imperial powers” that he accuses of having meddled in that country for decades.

On the other hand, he is calling on the principal target of his anti-imperial rhetoric, namely the United States, to provide financial and logistical support for the Turkish military mission at Kabul airport.

How he expects the Taliban not to see through this glaring contradiction is anyone’s guess.

The Taliban clearly sees Turkish forces in Afghanistan as an extension of the US-led NATO mission in that country and has already used threatening language in calling on Turkey to also withdraw its troops.

Erdogan, nevertheless, appears to be relying on Sunni Islam as the lowest common denominator that will facilitate talks between Ankara and the Taliban.

“Turkey and the Taliban should be able to conduct these talks easily since there is nothing out of keeping with Turkey’s beliefs and their beliefs,” Erdogan told reporters recently during a visit to northern Cyprus.

Not surprisingly, these remarks created uproar among secular Turks who are castigating Erdogan for placing Turkey and the Taliban in the same category.

Even some of Erdogan’s staunchest supporters like Hurriyet columnist Ahmet Hakan have rejected the notion of any equivalence between the practice of Islam in Turkey and the radical Islamic outlook of the Taliban.

Hakan nevertheless argued that Turkey’s Islamic character could facilitate a dialogue with the Taliban.

In criticizing Erdogan’s remark, liberal commentator Taha Akyol, however, stressed Turkey’s democratic and secular character as a social state based on the rule of law.

“Are we not going to remain [in Afghanistan] under NATO’s umbrella?” Akyol also asked in his column for Karar daily. “It is wrong to look at the matter from the perspective of faith and to think that there is nothing out of keeping [between Turkey and the outlook of the] Taliban.”

Erdogan’s notion that Islam will bring Turkey and the Arab world closer also turned out to be a fallacy. This is clearly evident in the minimal support Ankara is getting from the Arab world over its involvements in Syria and Libya.

Umar pointed out that Ankara may be expecting the decision to take on the security of Kabul airport to improve ties with Washington, but stressed that the conditions for securing such an improvement are very different.

“If it could fulfill these conditions there would be no need for Turkey to take on any extra risks,” he said. He noted that taking on such extra risks is unlikely to improve ties with the United States.

Trying to appease the Taliban by claiming that Turkey and the Taliban share similar outlooks with regard to faith is also likely to stoke American suspicions regarding Turkish intentions.

“Was das für den Westen bedeutet, ist folgendes: ‘Wir teilen die gleiche Sichtweise wie eure Feinde.’ Es ist sehr schwer zu verstehen, welche Art von Argumentation oder Politik dies darstellt”, sagte Umar.

“Man muss die Zuverlässigkeit eines Verehrten in Frage stellen, der letzte Woche zugegeben hat, dass die Türkei ‘keine widersprüchlichen Probleme mit [den] Überzeugungen [der Taliban] hat'”, schrieb Aykan Erdemir von der Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

“Diese Kommentare sollten als rote Fahnen inmitten der laufenden Verhandlungen zwischen Ankara und Washington über Erdogans Angebot dienen, türkische Truppen zur Bewachung des internationalen Flughafens von Kabul nach dem Abzug der USA einzusetzen”, fuhr Erdemir in einem Meinungsbeitrag für Newsweek fort.

Mit so vielen offenen Fragen, die unbeantwortet bleiben, wird die innenpolitische Debatte in der Türkei – gespickt mit viel Wut und Schuldzuweisungen – in den kommenden Tagen nur noch wachsen und könnte Erdogan viel weniger in der Hand lassen, als er mit seinem afghanischen Schachzug erwartet hatte.

Read more: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/07/will-erdogans-afghan-gambit-pay-washington#ixzz72CCaCUNK

 

MESOP NEWS : Will Erdogan’s Afghan gambit pay off in Washington?

The general impression is that Ankara’s commitment to protect Kabul airport is only aimed at winning favor with Washington.

Semih Idiz – AL MONITOR – July 30, 2021

Many Turks are deeply concerned over President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s readiness to commit Turkish forces to provide the security at Kabul airport — despite the inherent dangers of such a mission — following the departure of US forces from that country.

The question is also being conflated with that of the dramatic increase in the number of Afghan refugees currently heading for Turkey, in the wake of US President Joe Biden’s decision to pull US forces out of Afghanistan.

The issue is causing an increasingly ugly political domestic debate between the Erdogan administration and the opposition, and also stoking racist sentiments among Turks against Arabs and Afghans.

To most seasoned Turkish diplomats, Erdogan’s willingness to take on the task of protecting Kabul airport is simply another one of his ill-conceived projects.

“To start with, nobody knows for sure whether this was Ankara’s offer or Washington’s suggestion,” wrote retired Ambassador Ali Tuygan in his Diplomatic Opinion blog.

“But the general impression is that this was an offer by the Turkish government to cajole Washington into a more understanding attitude on Turkish-American differences by putting Turkish troops in harm’s way,” he continued.

Turkish-American ties have been clouded for quite some time with multiple issues, including the question of Ankara’s purchase of Russian-made S-400 anti-missile defense systems that has resulted in US sanctions and other punitive measures being slapped on Turkey.

This has also contributed significantly to the serious downturn of the Turkish economy, as a result of which Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party are said to be losing domestic credibility.

The expectation in government circles appears to be that any improvement in Turkish-US ties will also help the Turkish economy, thus shoring up Erdogan’s domestic support.

Ankara has also been seeking means to improve ties with Israel in order to facilitate better ties with Washington.

Retired Ambassador Suha Umar believes that Erdogan’s decision to take on the security of Kabul airport is a sign of desperation.

“This is an act that is based more on necessity than anything else,” he told Al Monitor, pointing at Turkey’s economic crisis as well as Ankara’s weakened hand on the international stage.

“For a country in this situation to undertake such a mission that is fraught with uncertainty — and which will require resources in every respect — does not appear sensible,” Umar said. “All that is left is a situation that reflects desperation.”

Few believe that Turkey’s involvement in Afghanistan after the departure of US forces will provide any benefits for Ankara. Many recall that Turkey’s involvement in Syria and Libya also fell short of achieving their ultimate objectives.

The end result, it is feared, will be that Turkish forces will be placed at risk while Erdogan’s adventurism drags the country into a quagmire.

“Would this put Turkish troops in harm’s way? Yes, definitely. Because the Taliban does not have to take over Kabul to disrupt the functioning of the airport, it has many other means at its disposal,” Tuygan wrote.

Meanwhile, Erdogan’s approach to the whole question also appears to be deeply confused and riddled with contradictions.

Erdogan is trying to reach out to the Taliban, on the one hand, by using Islamic rhetoric and castigating “imperial powers” that he accuses of having meddled in that country for decades.

On the other hand, he is calling on the principal target of his anti-imperial rhetoric, namely the United States, to provide financial and logistical support for the Turkish military mission at Kabul airport.

How he expects the Taliban not to see through this glaring contradiction is anyone’s guess.

The Taliban clearly sees Turkish forces in Afghanistan as an extension of the US-led NATO mission in that country and has already used threatening language in calling on Turkey to also withdraw its troops.

Erdogan, nevertheless, appears to be relying on Sunni Islam as the lowest common denominator that will facilitate talks between Ankara and the Taliban.

“Turkey and the Taliban should be able to conduct these talks easily since there is nothing out of keeping with Turkey’s beliefs and their beliefs,” Erdogan told reporters recently during a visit to northern Cyprus.

Not surprisingly, these remarks created uproar among secular Turks who are castigating Erdogan for placing Turkey and the Taliban in the same category.

Even some of Erdogan’s staunchest supporters like Hurriyet columnist Ahmet Hakan have rejected the notion of any equivalence between the practice of Islam in Turkey and the radical Islamic outlook of the Taliban.

Hakan nevertheless argued that Turkey’s Islamic character could facilitate a dialogue with the Taliban.

In criticizing Erdogan’s remark, liberal commentator Taha Akyol, however, stressed Turkey’s democratic and secular character as a social state based on the rule of law.

“Are we not going to remain [in Afghanistan] under NATO’s umbrella?” Akyol also asked in his column for Karar daily. “It is wrong to look at the matter from the perspective of faith and to think that there is nothing out of keeping [between Turkey and the outlook of the] Taliban.”

Erdogan’s notion that Islam will bring Turkey and the Arab world closer also turned out to be a fallacy. This is clearly evident in the minimal support Ankara is getting from the Arab world over its involvements in Syria and Libya.

Umar pointed out that Ankara may be expecting the decision to take on the security of Kabul airport to improve ties with Washington, but stressed that the conditions for securing such an improvement are very different.

“If it could fulfill these conditions there would be no need for Turkey to take on any extra risks,” he said. He noted that taking on such extra risks is unlikely to improve ties with the United States.

Trying to appease the Taliban by claiming that Turkey and the Taliban share similar outlooks with regard to faith is also likely to stoke American suspicions regarding Turkish intentions.

“What this translates into as far as the West is concerned is this: ‘We share the same outlook as your enemies.’ It is very difficult to understand what kind of reasoning or policy this represents,” said Umar.

“One has to question the reliability of an ally who admitted last week that Turkey ‘does not have any conflicting issues with [the Taliban’s] beliefs,’ wrote Aykan Erdemir from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

“These comments ought to serve as red flags amid ongoing negotiations between Ankara and Washington over Erdogan’s offer to deploy Turkish troops to guard Kabul’s international airport after US departure,” Erdemir continued in an opinion piece for Newsweek.

With so many outstanding questions that remain unanswered, the domestic debate in Turkey —laced with much anger and recriminations — will only grow in the coming days and could leave Erdogan with much less in hand than he expected to gain with his Afghan gambit.

Read more: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/07/will-erdogans-afghan-gambit-pay-washington#ixzz72CCTLOo8

 

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