MESOP WATCH : BIDEN’S PANDORA – Five Things the United States Can Do to Stop Being a Haven for Dirty Money

JODI VITTORIOCTOBER 07, 2021 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT

Summary:  The Pandora Papers reveal that the United States has much work to do to stop being a haven for the ill-gotten gains of political elites from around the world, but there are steps the Biden administration and Congress can take to reverse this trend.

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MESOP WATCH: USA bleiben in Syrien, sagt kurdischer proPKK Spitzenpolitiker

“Sie sagten, sie werden in Syrien bleiben und sich nicht zurückziehen – sie werden weiterhin gegen den Islamischen Staat kämpfen”, sagte Ahmed. “Vorher waren sie unter Trump und während des afghanischen Rückzugs unklar.” – OKTOBER 7, 2021 JERUSALEM POST

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MESOP WATCH :United States to stay in Syria, top Kurdish pro PKK politician says

“They said they are going to stay in Syria and will not withdraw – they will keep fighting Islamic State,” Ahmed said. “Before they were unclear under Trump and during the Afghan withdrawal.” – OCTOBER 7, 2021 JERUSALEM POST

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MESOP WATCH – Wahl im Irak: Milizenführer beschwert sich über Benachteiligung

Die mit dem Iran verbündeten Volksmobilisierungskräfte sind erzürnt, dass sie wegen verspätet eingereichter Listen nicht an der vorzeitigen Stimmabgabe teilnehmen dürfen.

Dilan Sirwan, Rudaw 7.10.201

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MESOP NEWS : DIE WELTGEFAHR NO. 1 – Chinas gewaltiger neuer nuklearer Aufbau

Wenn “China in Bezug auf militärische Macht ‘unantastbar’ ist”

von Judith Bergman 6. Oktober 2021 GATESTONE INSTITUT- Englischer Originaltext: China’s Vast New Nuclear Build-Up

“Chinas explosives Wachstum und die Modernisierung seiner nuklearen und konventionellen Streitkräfte kann nur das sein, was ich als atemberaubend bezeichne. Ehrlich gesagt, dieses Wort, atemberaubend, reicht möglicherweise nicht aus.” — Admiral Charles Richard, Kommandant des US-Symposiums Strategisches Kommando, Weltraum und Raketenabwehr, 12. August 2021.

§  “Es gab viele Spekulationen darüber, warum sie das alles tun. Ich möchte nur sagen, dass es wirklich egal ist, warum … Wichtig ist, dass sie die Fähigkeit aufbauen, jede plausible nukleare Einsatzstrategie umzusetzen – der letzte Stein in der Mauer eines Militärs, das fähig ist, jedes beliebige Ziel durchzusetzen.” — Admiral Charles Richard, 12. August 2021.

§  Während Chinas offizielle Nuklearpolitik eine “minimale Abschreckung” und eine “Kein Ersteinsatz”-Politik ist, gibt es keinen Grund, warum die internationale Gemeinschaft solchen offiziell kommunizierten Doktrinen vertrauen sollte. China baut seine militärischen Raumfahrtkapazitäten trotz seiner öffentlichen Haltung gegen die Bewaffnung des Weltraums weiter aus. China ist weithin dafür bekannt, seine Zusagen gebrochen zu haben, was unter anderem durch seine Militarisierung künstlicher Inseln im Südchinesischen Meer oder sein Vorgehen gegen Hongkong unter Verstoß gegen den bei der UNO hinterlegten Vertrag über das Territorium belegt wird.

§  “Amerikaner sollten genauso klar wie die Chinesen wissen, welches Niveau an Nuklearmacht China wirklich aufbauen muss. Es wäre eine Nuklearmacht, die stark genug wäre, um die USA – vom Militär bis zur Regierung – fürchten zu lassen…” — Asia Times, die Global Times zitierend, 11. Mai 2020.

§  “Ihre [der KPCh] Handlungen haben lange Zeit über eine Haltung, die aggressiver ist als ihre offizielle Politik, gelogen – man muss sich ansehen, was sie tun, nicht was sie sagen.” — Admiral Charles Richard, 12. August 2021.

 

China baut seine Nuklearwaffenkapazitäten deutlich aus. Die nukleare Aufrüstung muss im Zusammenhang mit den Ambitionen der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas gesehen werden, in den eigenen Worten von Präsident Xi Jinping “ein Militär von Weltklasse” zu haben, sowie mit ihrem Ehrgeiz, die Weltherrschaft zu erlangen.

China baut seine Nuklearwaffenkapazitäten deutlich aus. Mehrere aktuelle Berichte zeigen, dass China 120 Raketensilos für Interkontinentalraketen (ICBMs) in der Nähe von Yumen in Gansu, bis zu 110 Silos in der Nähe von Hami im östlichen Teil der Region Xinjian und bis zu 40 Silos in Ordos in der Inneren Mongolei baut. Interkontinentalraketen sind definiert als Raketen mit einer Mindestreichweite von 5.500 Kilometern und in erster Linie für den Abwurf von Nuklearwaffen ausgelegt.

“Der Silobau in Yumen und Hami stellt die bedeutendste Erweiterung des chinesischen Nukleararsenals aller Zeiten dar”, so Matt Korda und Hans Kristensen in einem Bericht über das Hami-Feld für die Federation of American Scientists. “Alles in allem … deuten Entdeckungen darauf hin, dass China fast 300 neue Raketensilos bauen könnte”, schrieben sie im September.

“Die Zahl der offenbar im Bau befindlichen Raketensilos ist ähnlich der Gesamtzahl der Atomsprengköpfe im aktuellen chinesischen Bestand; sie übersteigt die Zahl der von Russland betriebenen Raketensilos; sie nähert sich der Zahl der von den Vereinigten Staaten betriebenen Silos; und es stellt den größten Bau von Silos dar, seit die USA und Russland während des Kalten Krieges ihre Interkontinentalraketen aufgestellt haben.”

Im Mai zitierte Chinas Global Times, eine staatliche chinesische Zeitung, chinesische Militärexperten, die die Regierung aufforderten, die Zahl der Atomwaffen zu erhöhen. Song Zhongping, ein chinesischer Militärexperte und Fernsehkommentator, sagte der Global Times:

“In Anbetracht der Tatsache, dass die USA China als ihren größten imaginären Feind betrachten, muss China die Quantität und Qualität von Atomwaffen, insbesondere von aus U-Booten abgeschossene ballistische Raketen, erhöhen, um seine nationale Sicherheit, Souveränität und Entwicklungsinteressen wirksam zu schützen.”

Laut Global Times “sagten einige Militärexperten, China sollte die Anzahl seiner fortschrittlichsten ballistischen Interkontinentalraketen (ICBM), der DF-41 Straßenmobile erhöhen…” Diese haben eine Reichweite von bis zu 15.000 km – womit sie die USA erreichen können – und angeblich mit bis zu 10 Atomsprengköpfen bewaffnet werden können.

Ebenfalls wichtig für China, sagte Song Zhongping gegenüber der Global Times, ist die Stärkung der strategischen nuklearen Abschreckung auf See. Er fügte hinzu, dass seine fortschrittlichste von U-Booten gestartete ballistische Rakete (SLBM) der Bedrohung durch die USA effektiv entgegenwirken könnte.

Unnötig zu erwähnen, dass das, was die VR China als “Bedrohung” betrachtet, wie im obigen Wort “imaginär”, sehr subjektiv sein kann.

Chinas neueste SLBM, die JL-3, hat angeblich eine Reichweite von mehr als 10.000 Kilometern, was bedeutet, dass sie je nach Standort des startenden U-Bootes verschiedene Teile des US-Festlandes erreichen könnte. Diese Rakete, ein Upgrade der JL-2, ist noch nicht einsatzbereit, wurde jedoch dreimal getestet. China arbeitet derzeit am U-Boot der nächsten Generation – der 096-Klasse –, die voraussichtlich bis zu 24 JL-3-Raketen tragen wird. China präsentierte im Mai anlässlich des 72-jährigen Jubiläums der PLA Navy sein neuestes Atom-U-Boot, den Typ 094A.

Laut einem aktuellen Bericht des Center for Strategic and International Studies:

“Wenn die JL-2 aus Gewässern in der Nähe Chinas gestartet würde, hätte sie eine ausreichende Reichweite, um Atomstaaten in der Region wie Russland und Indien zu treffen, wäre jedoch nicht in der Lage, die kontinentalen Vereinigten Staaten zu erreichen. Sie könnte jedoch Guam, Hawaii und Alaska bedrohen.”

US-Außenminister Antony Blinken äußerte auf dem kürzlich abgeschlossenen ASEAN-Regionalforum seine Besorgnis über Chinas offensichtliche Nuklearaufrüstung. Der Sprecher des Außenministeriums, Ned Price, sagte nach dem Treffen:

“Der Außenminister … äußerte sich tief besorgt über das schnelle Wachstum des Nukleararsenals der Volksrepublik China, was deutlich macht, wie stark Peking von seiner jahrzehntealten Nuklearstrategie abgewichen ist, die auf minimaler Abschreckung basiert.”

Admiral Charles Richard, Kommandant des Strategischen Kommandos der Vereinigten Staaten, warnte im August:

“Chinas explosives Wachstum und die Modernisierung seiner nuklearen und konventionellen Streitkräfte kann nur das sein, was ich als atemberaubend bezeichne. Ehrlich gesagt, dieses Wort, atemberaubend, reicht möglicherweise nicht aus … Es wurde viel darüber spekuliert, warum sie das alles tun. Ich möchte jetzt nur sagen, dass es wirklich egal ist, warum… Wichtig ist, dass sie die Fähigkeit aufbauen, jede plausible nukleare Einsatzstrategie umzusetzen – der letzte Stein in der Mauer eines Militärs, das fähig ist, jedes beliebige Ziel durchzusetzen.”

Obwohl chinesische Funktionäre nichts zu diesen Behauptungen sagten, hat die Global Times, die dafür bekannt ist, Pekings Linie zu verfolgen, eine Reihe von Artikeln veröffentlicht, in denen sie das Problem anspricht. In einem Ende Juli veröffentlichten Artikel kam die Global Times zum Schluss:

“Amerikaner sollten genauso klar wie die Chinesen wissen, welches Niveau an Nuklearmacht China wirklich aufbauen muss. Es wäre eine Nuklearmacht, die stark genug wäre, um die USA – vom Militär bis zur Regierung – fürchten zu lassen … Das dynamische Gleichgewicht wird dann erreicht sein, wenn die radikalen Eliten in den USA den Mut verlieren, auch nur über den Einsatz von Atomwaffen gegen China nachzudenken, und wenn sich die gesamte US-Gesellschaft voll und ganz bewusst ist, dass China militärisch ‘unantastbar’ ist.”

“Es gibt keine Informationen aus Peking darüber, ob es seine nukleare Aufrüstung angesichts einer realistischen Bedrohung aus Washington verstärkt”, schrieb der Chefredakteur der Global Times, Hu Xijin, in einem neueren Artikel.

“Aber selbst wenn wir das täten, hätte es nichts mit südostasiatischen Ländern oder gar mit Japan und Australien zu tun, denn Chinas Atompolitik beinhaltet auch eine weitere feste Verpflichtung, keine Atomwaffen gegen Nicht-Atomwaffenstaaten einzusetzen oder mit deren Einsatz zu drohen.” Sobald China seine Nuklearstreitkräfte wesentlich verstärkt, wird sein einziger Zweck darin bestehen, die USA abzuschrecken … wir müssen auf die Möglichkeit vorbereitet sein, dass es irgendwann zu einem Krieg in der Straße von Taiwan oder im Südchinesischen Meer kommen könnte.”

Im Mai 2020 forderte Hu Xijin laut der Asia Times in Social-Media-Beiträgen Chinas Militär offen auf, seine Atombomben- und Sprengkopfbestände auf 1.000 mehr als zu verdreifachen.

Chinas nukleare Aufrüstung muss im Kontext des Bestrebens der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas gesehen werden, in den eigenen Worten von Präsident Xi Jinping “ein Militär von Weltklasse” zu haben, sowie im Zusammenhang mit ihrem Bestreben, die Weltherrschaft zu erreichen.

Das Pentagon schrieb in seinem umfassenden Bericht 2020 über Chinas Militärmacht:

“Obwohl die KPCh im Kontext der nationalen Strategie der VR China nicht definiert hat, was ein ‘Weltklasse’-Militär bedeutet, ist es wahrscheinlich, dass Peking bis Mitte des Jahrhunderts versuchen wird, ein Militär zu entwickeln, das dem US-Militär oder dem einer anderen Großmacht, die die VR China als Bedrohung ansieht, gleichwertig oder in einigen Fällen überlegen ist.”

Wie das Center for American Progress 2019 festhielt:

“Im Juni 2018 – unmittelbar nach dem Rückzug der Trump-Regierung aus dem Atomabkommen mit dem Iran und dem UNO-Menschenrechtsrat – hielt Präsident Xi eine große außenpolitische Rede, in der er erklärte, China werde die Reform des Global Governance-Systems anführen’. Diese Rede markierte Pekings erste offizielle Abweichung von dem Grundsatz “Nie die Führung beanspruchen”, den Deng Xiaoping 1989 aufgestellt hatte, als er die Post-Tiananmen Überlebensstrategie des Regimes darlegte. … In Zukunft sollte die internationale Gemeinschaft erwarten, dass Chinas Ambitionen und Aktivitäten erheblich zunehmen werden, vor allem, wenn sich die Vereinigten Staaten weiterhin von der multilateralen Arena zurückziehen und maximalen Handlungsspielraum bieten.”

Solche Ambitionen machen in der Praxis wenig Sinn, es sei denn, China erreicht eine minimale nukleare Parität mit den USA. Während Chinas offizielle Nuklearpolitik eine “minimale Abschreckung” und eine “Kein-Ersteinsatz”-Politik ist, gibt es keinen Grund, warum die internationale Gemeinschaft solchen offiziell kommunizierten Doktrinen vertrauen sollte. China baut seine militärischen Weltraumkapazitäten weiter aus, trotz seiner öffentlichen Haltung gegen die Bewaffnung des Weltraums. China ist weithin dafür bekannt, seine Versprechen zu brechen, was unter anderem durch seine Militarisierung künstlicher Inseln im Südchinesischen Meer oder sein hartes Vorgehen gegen Hongkong unter Verstoß gegen den bei der UNO hinterlegten Vertrag über das Territorium belegt wird. Wenn man alle Modernisierungsbemühungen Chinas zusammenzählt, so Admiral Charles Richard, “ist das, was man bekommt, etwas, das mit einer Haltung der minimalen Abschreckung nicht vereinbar ist”.

“Ihre Handlungen haben lange Zeit über eine Haltung, die aggressiver ist als ihre offizielle Politik, gelogen – man muss sich ansehen, was sie tun, nicht was sie sagen. … China hat korrekt herausgefunden, dass man einen [gleich starken] Kollegen – mit anderen Worten, uns – aus einer minimal abschreckenden Haltung heraus nicht nötigen kann.”

Judith Bergman, Kolumnistin, Anwältin und Politologin, ist Distinguished Senior Fellow am Gatestone Institute.

 
 

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MESOP NEWS : ELECTIONS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ?

by Bilal Wahab and Calvin Wilder PolicyWatch 3536October 6, 2021

The often-hazardous two-year struggle that led to this vote has left many of the youth movement’s most ardent supporters disillusioned with the electoral process entirely, so Washington will have to narrow its focus.

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MESOP NEWS INTEL BY MEIR AMIT CENTER / ISRAELSpotlight on Global Jihad (September 14 – October 6, 2021)

Published:

Main events of the past week

  • Afghanistan: ISIS’s Khorasan Province significantly increased its activity against the Taliban in Afghanistan over the past three weeks. The province expanded its activity and also acted against the Pakistani security forces on the eastern side of the border. One noteworthy attack was carried out on October 3, 2021, when a suicide bomber detonated his explosive belt among senior Taliban operatives taking part in a mourning ceremony at a mosque in Kabul.
  • During the period under review, there was a relative decrease in ISIS’s activity in most of the provinces, apart from Iraq:
    • Syria: ISIS’s activity focused on the Syrian Desert region, mainly against the Syrian army and the forces supporting it. Russian Air Force planes repeatedly attacked ISIS targets in the area. ISIS claimed responsibility for damage to the electricity grid in Damascus, causing prolonged power outages in the city.
    • Iraq: ISIS’s activity continued, mainly against the Iraqi security forces and the forces supporting them. Most of the activity focused on the Diyala Province. ISIS released a video calling on its operatives to continue to carry out terrorist attacks against the Iraqi authorities.
  • The Sinai Peninsula: The head of ISIS’s Sharia activity in the Sinai Peninsula and his family turned themselves in to the tribal militias in Sinai, which support the Egyptian army. This is the most senior official in ISIS’s Sinai Province who has surrendered to the Egyptian authorities. At the same time, ISIS continued its activity against the Egyptian security forces and the forces supporting them, albeit on a small scale.
  • Africa: ISIS’s West Africa and Central Africa provinces continued their intensive activity against the security forces and Christian residents, mainly in Nigeria and the Congo. French President Emmanuel Macron has confirmed that ISIS’s leader in the Sahara was killed by French forces.
  • Asia: India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA) has released a report indicating that ISIS has recently been attempting to recruit operatives in India. According to the report, up to now 37 terrorist attacks in India have been thwarted, the last of which was in June 2021. Indonesia’s security forces killed Ali Kalora, leader of the East Indonesia Mujahideen (MIT), a jihadi organization that pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2014.
  • German police thwarted an attack that was about to be carried out at a synagogue on Yom Kippur in the West German city of Hagen.
  • The battle for hearts and minds: An article in ISIS’s Al-Naba’ weekly addressed the importance of propaganda and media activity to promote jihad.
Afghanistan
  •  ISIS’s Al-Naba’ weekly published an infographic summing up the activity of ISIS’s Khorasan Province (Afghanistan) on September 18-22, 2021. According to the infographic, during this time, ISIS operatives carried out 20 attacks in various forms (15 IED attacks, four targeted killings, and one shooting attack). According to ISIS, 85 people were killed in the attacks, including a commander in the Taliban movement (Al-Naba’ weekly, Telegram, September 23, 2021).
The infographic as it appeared in Al-Naba' weekly (Al-Naba' weekly, Telegram, September 23, 2021)
The infographic as it appeared in Al-Naba’ weekly
(Al-Naba’ weekly, Telegram, September 23, 2021)
  • After a period of relative quiet, during the past three weeks there has been a significant increase in the activity of ISIS’s Khorasan Province. It was mainly targeted against members of the Taliban, who took over Afghanistan. Most of the attacks were in Jalalabad and took the form of detonating IEDs. A prominent attack was carried out on October 3, 2021: there was an explosion at the entrance of a mosque where a commemoration ceremony was held for the mother of the deputy information minister in the Taliban government. Five people were killed (WION, October 3, 2021; AFP, October 3, 2021). ISIS claimed that its operative who was wearing an explosive belt had blown himself up amongst a crowd of commanders and Taliban operatives during a mourning ceremony in Kabul. Dozens of people were killed and wounded (Telegram, October 4, 2021). Immediately after the incident, Taliban fighters raided a building which had been used by ISIS in north Kabul.  Several ISIS operatives were killed.

The suicide bomber Misbah al-Kunari (from the Kunar Province in Afghanistan) who carried out the attack (Telegram, October 4, 2021)
The suicide bomber Misbah al-Kunari (from the Kunar Province in Afghanistan) who carried out the attack (Telegram, October 4, 2021)

  • Following are the main attacks (according to ISIS’s claims of responsibility on Telegram):
    • On October 2, 2021, an IED was activated against a foot patrol of Taliban fighters in Jalalabad. Two Taliban operatives were killed and another was wounded (Telegram, October 5, 2021). On the same day, a Taliban vehicle was targeted by gunfire. Four passengers were killed and one was wounded.
    • On October 1, 2021, an IED was activated against two Taliban vehicles in Sharikar, in Parwan, in north Kabul. Ten Taliban operatives were wounded.
    • On September 29, 2021, an IED was activated against a Taliban vehicle in Jalalabad. Three of the passengers were killed and four others were wounded.
    • On September 29, 2021, an IED was activated against a Taliban vehicle in Parwan. The four passengers were killed or wounded.
    • On September 29, 2021, an IED was activated against a Taliban vehicle in the Biruni region in the Kunar Province, near the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Five passengers were wounded.
    • On September 27, 2021, a Taliban roadblock was targeted by gunfire in the Soki region, in the Kunar Province. Three Taliban members were killed and two others were wounded.
    • On September 26, 2021, two IEDs were activated against two tankers carrying oil for the Taliban in north Kabul. The two tankers went up in flames.
    • On September 26, 2021, a Taliban vehicle was ambushed and fired at in the Parwan region. The four passengers were killed.
    • On September 25, 2021, an IED was activated against a Taliban vehicle in Jalalabad. Five Taliban members were killed or wounded. The following day, a vehicle was targeted by gunfire. Six Taliban members were killed.
    • On September 23, 2021, an IED was activated against a Taliban vehicle in Jalalabad. Five Taliban members were killed or wounded. On that same day, a Taliban member was shot in the city.
    • On September 22, 2021, an IED was activated against a crowd of Taliban members in Jalalabad. Two Taliban members were killed and two others were wounded. On the same day, an IED was activated against a Taliban vehicle. Two people were wounded. Another IED was activated against additional Taliban members who arrived on the scene. Two people were killed and two others were wounded. Yet another IED was detonated, killing two Taliban members and wounding four others.
    • On September 22, 2021, an IED was activated against a Taliban vehicle in Kabul. Six Taliban members were killed or wounded. On the same day, two Taliban members were targeted by gunfire in the city and were killed.
    • On September 20, 2021, an IED was activated against a Taliban vehicle in the Nangarhar Province. Four Taliban members were killed and three others were wounded. Another IED was activated against a group of Taliban members and two others were killed.
    • On September 20, 2021, an IED was activated against a Taliban vehicle in the Mazar Dara region, in the north of the country, near the Afghanistan-Uzbekistan border. Two Taliban members were wounded.
    • On September 19, 2021, an IED was activated against a Taliban vehicle in Jalalabad. Three Taliban members were killed and two were wounded.
    • On September 18, 2021, several IEDs were activated against Taliban vehicles in various regions in the city of Jalalabad, killing and wounding at least 30 Taliban members. That same day, a Taliban member was targeted by gunfire.
Counterterrorism measures
  • In response to the increase in the attacks, senior Taliban officials announced that the organization forces had launched an operation against ISIS in the Nangarhar Province and in Kabul (Twitter account of the Afghan News Agency, September 29, 2021).
  • Taliban sources reported the killing of Ziya al-Haq Abu Omar al-Khorasani, governor of ISIS’s Khorasan Province (Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan Twitter account, September 25, 2021). According to the announcement, he was killed on August 15, 2021, two days after the takeover of Kabul by the Taliban (Taliban’s Twitter account, September 25, 2021). It should be noted that his death was reported about a month ago, but so far no official source has confirmed it.
 The Syrian arena
Syrian governorates (freeworldmaps.net)
Syrian governorates (freeworldmaps.net)
The Idlib region
  • This week, exchanges of artillery fire continued between the Syrian army and the forces supporting it, and the rebel forces in the rebel enclave in Idlib. At the same time, Russian fighter jets carried out airstrikes (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, September 14 – October 3, 2021).
Hurras al-Din Organization activity
  • A US aircraft of the US-led Global Coalition attacked a vehicle in the Idlib region, killing two senior leaders of the Hurras al-Din Organization, the Al-Qaeda branch in Syria (US Army CENTCOM, September 20, 2021; the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, September 19, 2021; Enab Baladi, September 20, 2021).
  • Hurras al-Din Organization leader Abu Humam al-Shami released a statement accusing HTS, the leading organization in Idlib, of detaining of his organization operatives during the American attack (“the Zionist Crusader Coalition”), instead of fighting alongside the “jihad fighters” (Telegram, September 23, 2021). It should be noted that on September 12, 2021, Al-Shami released a statement calling on HTS to reconcile with his organization (Telegram, September 12, 2021).
The desert region (Al-Badia)
  • ISIS continued its attacks against the Syrian army and the forces supporting it. Following are the main incidents:
    • A brigadier general and five soldiers were killed and 11 others were wounded in an attack carried out by ISIS in the region east of Hama (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, October 2, 2021).
    • ISIS operatives activated an IED against a Syrian army vehicle on the Deir ez-Zor-Al-Raqqah highway. Two soldiers were killed (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, September 26, 2021).
    • Four (or six) fighters of Liwa al-Quds, a Palestinian militia supporting the Syrian regime which is guided by Russian officers, were killed in ISIS attacks in the region east of Homs (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, September 26, 2021; Shabakat Ayn al-Furat, September 26, 2021). Several days earlier, five militia fighters were killed in an attack carried out by ISIS on the outskirts of Palmyra (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, September 19, 2021).
    • Two Syrian soldiers and a National Guard commander were killed and six fighters of militias supporting the Syrian regime were wounded by the explosion of an IED in the Al-Sukhnah Desert, about 120 km southwest of Deir ez-Zor (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, September 23, 2021). Several days earlier, two soldiers were killed and seven were wounded, some of them severely, in the same area (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, September 18, 2021).
    • On September 13, 2021, ISIS operatives attacked positions of the Fatemiyoun Brigade, a pro-Iranian militia of Afghan soldiers supporting the Syrian regime, in the Al-Sukhnah region. Reportedly, many ISIS operatives, equipped with light arms, mortars, RPG rockets and machine guns arrived at the area and carried out a sudden attack against the militia positions. Heavy exchanges of fire took place in the area for several hours. Eight militiamen were killed and nine others were wounded. Iranian Revolutionary Guards operatives evacuated the wounded to a field hospital in Palmyra (Asharq Al-Awsat, September 15, 2021).
  • The Russian Air Force continued to attack ISIS targets in the desert region. On September 17, 2021, aircraft attacked caves used by ISIS, weapons, equipment and ISIS operatives. Six operatives were reportedly killed (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, September 17, 2021). On October 2, 2021, nine ISIS operatives were killed and 12 others were wounded in attacks carried out in various areas in the region (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, October 2, 2021).
Al-Raqqah region
  • A US army helicopter landed forces in the Al-Raqqah region. The troops, with SDF support, raided buildings in the area and abducted two civilians (SANA, September 14, 2021).
  • An SDF force detained three senior ISIS operatives in Al-Raqqah. The three had hidden ISIS operatives and planned to carry out attacks against SDF fighters in the city (ANHA, September 26, 2021).
Deir ez-Zor-Al-Mayadeen region[1]
  • On September 28, 2021, two SDF fighters were targeted by gunfire in the Basira region, about 15 km north of Al-Mayadeen. Several days before, an SDF intelligence operative was targeted by gunfire in the same area.
  • On September 17, 2021, the body of a Syrian soldier was found in the Al-Mayadeen Desert, about 14 km southeast of Deir ez-Zor, in an area where there is a high presence of pro-Iranian militias. It is unknown how he was killed. He may have been killed by ISIS operatives (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, September 17, 2021).
  • On September 13, 2021, an SDF fighter was targeted by gunfire in the Sabha region, about 25 km southeast of Deir ez-Zor. He was killed and his weapon was seized (Telegram, September 14, 2021).
Al-Hasakah region
  • ISIS reported that seven of its operatives had escaped from the Al-Hasakah Prison. The operatives include a Tunisian, a Moroccan, two Turkish nationals, a Chechen, a Russian and a Dutch national. The report has not been confirmed by any official Kurdish source (Telegram, September 21-22, 2021).
  • An SDF force detained 27 ISIS operatives near Al-Hasakah (SDF website, September 18, 2021). The day before, a force of the SDF commando unit detained 20 ISIS operatives in the area (SDF website, September 17, 2021). In addition, two operatives, members of an ISIS sleeper cell, were detained on the outskirts of Al-Hasakah (SDF website, September 13, 2021).
Damascus region
  • ISIS’s al-Sham Province claimed responsibility for attacking the Damascus electricity grid. According to the statement, as part of the “economic war” waged by ISIS against the Syrian regime, ISIS operatives used IEDs to blow up the pipe carrying gas for the production of electricity between the Tishreen power plant (in north Damascus) and Deir Ali (about 20 km south of Damascus), and also blew up two high-voltage pylons of the Deir Ali power plant, which caused a power outage in Damascus and its suburbs for several hours (Sky News, September 18, 2021; Syrian TV, September 18, 2021).
The gas pipe blown up by ISIS in the Damascus region (Al-Naba' weekly, Telegram, September 23, 2021)
The gas pipe blown up by ISIS in the Damascus region
(Al-Naba’ weekly, Telegram, September 23, 2021)
  •    Syrian Electricity Minister Ghassan al-Zamel confirmed that the gas pipe and two high-voltage pylons had indeed been hit by the explosion of IEDs, which shut down the Deir Ali power plant and caused a power outage in Damascus and its suburbs for several hours (Sky News, September 18, 2021; Syrian TV, September 18, 2021).
The Iraqi arena
Provinces of Iraq (Wikipedia)
Provinces of Iraq (Wikipedia)
  • ISIS’s Iraq Province released a 50-minute video documenting attacks carried out by its operatives in Iraq and encouraging ISIS operatives to carry on their attacks against the Iraqi authorities as part of “jihad against the infidels.” The video features, among other things, a masked ISIS operative claiming that the Iraqi government announcements on its strikes against ISIS are untrue. According to the operative, contrary to their statements, the Iraqi security forces have no achievements against ISIS and it is a media campaign. He further notes that the democratic government runs counter to the rule of Allah. He then goes on to attack the Shiites, who take over the country, according to him, at the expense of the Sunnites (Telegram, October 5, 2021). The video was apparently released on the occasion of the parliamentary elections which are due to take place on October 10, 2021.
 ISIS operatives in the video (Telegram, October 5, 2021)    ISIS operatives in the video (Telegram, October 5, 2021)
ISIS operatives in the video (Telegram, October 5, 2021)

Attacks by province[2]

Kirkuk Province
  • On October 5, 2021, an Iraqi police headquarters was targeted by gunfire in the Riyad region, about 50 km southwest of Kirkuk. Two policemen were killed. A day earlier, a Popular Mobilization force was targeted by gunfire. A force arriving on the scene to provide assistance was also fired at. Four Popular Mobilization fighters were killed or wounded.
  • On October 3, 2021, an Iraqi police post was targeted by gunfire in the Rashad region, about 40 km southwest of Kirkuk. One policeman was killed.
  • On October 1, 2021, an IED was activated against an Iraqi police vehicle in the Rashad region. The passengers were killed or wounded.
  • On October 1, 2021, an Iraqi army camp was targeted by gunfire in the Daquq region, in south Kirkuk. A soldier was wounded and the camp was damaged. That same day, a joint post of the Tribal Mobilization and Iraqi police was targeted by gunfire. Two fighters were wounded.
  • On September 29, 2021, an IED was activated against an Iraqi police vehicle in the Tel Khadija region, on the outskirts of Kirkuk. The passengers were wounded.
  • On September 27, 2021, an Iraqi police post was targeted by gunfire in the Rashad region. A policeman was wounded.
  • On September 26, 2021, positions of the Tribal Mobilization were targeted by mortar shells in the Dakshaman region, in south Kirkuk. No hits or casualties were reported.
  • On September 12, 2021, an IED was activated against an Iraqi police vehicle in the Daquq region. Three of the passengers were killed or wounded (Telegram, September 14, 2021).
Al-Anbar Province
  • On October 3, 2021, ISIS claimed responsibility for detonating a car bomb at the Iraqi police headquarters in Ramadi. According to ISIS, eight people were killed or wounded, about eight cars were destroyed and the building was damaged (Telegram, October 3, 2021). On the other hand, official Iraqi sources noted that the car exploded as a result of a security operative firing at it and that no casualties or damage were caused (Al-Ikhbariya al-Suriya, October 3, 2021).

Moment of the car bomb detonation as documented by surveillance cameras in the area (www.ultrairaq.ultrasawt.com, October 3, 2021)
Moment of the car bomb detonation as documented by surveillance cameras in the area (www.ultrairaq.ultrasawt.com, October 3, 2021)

On September 27, 2021, an Iraqi army camp was targeted by gunfire east of Al-Rutba. One soldier was killed and another was wounded.

  • On September 15, 2021, an IED was activated against a Tribal Mobilization convoy near Al-Al-Rutba, in western Iraq. Three fighters were wounded.
Diyala Province
  • On October 3, 2021, two Iraqi army posts were targeted by gunfire in the northern Al-Azim region, about 60 km north of Baqubah. One soldier was killed and three others were wounded. A force arriving on the scene to provide assistance was targeted by gunfire, causing one vehicle to go up in flames and putting three other vehicles out of commission.
  • On October 3, 2021, the home of Abdullah Jabouri, a former Iraqi MP, was targeted by gunfire. The house is situated in eastern Al-Miqdadiya, about 40 km northeast of Baqubah. One of his bodyguards was killed and three others were wounded.
  • On September 26, 2021, an Iraqi police roadblock was targeted by gunfire in central Al-Miqdadiya. Three policemen, two of them officers, were killed, and two other policemen were wounded.
  • On September 25, 2021, an IED was activated against a truck of a Shiite civilian in the Al-Waqf region, about 15 km northeast of Baqubah. The truck was destroyed. A Tribal Mobilization force and a police force arriving on the scene to provide assistance were targeted by gunfire. Four of the force members were killed. Five others, including a colonel, were wounded.
  • On September 25, 2021, mortar shells were fired at an Iraqi army headquarters in the Bahraz region, south of Baqubah. According to ISIS, definite hits were detected.
  • On September 21, 2021, a policeman and a civilian were shot dead from a roadblock placed by ISIS on the Kifri-Garmiyan highway, about 100 km north of Baqubah (Kurdistan24, September 21, 2021).
  • On September 21, 2021, IEDs were activated against a house where policemen were staying in the Al-Waqf region. One policeman was killed and two others were wounded.
  • On September 15, 2021, an IED was activated against an Iraqi army convoy east of Qara Tapa. Four soldiers were wounded. Another soldier was wounded when another vehicle was targeted by gunfire.
  • On September 12, 2021, an Iraqi army camp was targeted by gunfire about 60 km north of Baqubah. Two soldiers were wounded.
Nineveh Province
  • On September 13, 2021, an IED was activated against an Iraqi army foot patrol in the village of Abu Yousef, south of Mosul. One soldier was killed and several others were wounded.
Salah al-Din Province
  • On October 4, 2021, mortar shells were fired at an Iraqi Military Intelligence headquarters west of Tuz Khormato, about 100 km northeast of Samarra. According to ISIS, definite hits were detected. An Iraqi army post at the site was targeted by gunfire and a soldier was killed.
  • On October 3, 2021, a National Security Apparatus “spy” was abducted in the Tarmiyah region, about 30 km north of Baghdad. He was interrogated and then executed.
  • On October 3, 2021, an Iraqi army post was targeted by gunfire in the Hamrin Mountains, about 50 km north of Tikrit. One soldier was killed and another was wounded.
  • On September 30, 2021, ISIS operatives broke into a house of three Iraqi police “spies” northwest of Samarra and killed them.
  • On September 29, 2021, an attack was carried out against a joint force of the Iraqi army, the Popular Mobilization and the National Security Apparatus, which ambushed ISIS operatives in the Tarmiyah region. One of the force fighters was killed.
  • On September 27, 2021, two mortar shells were fired at a Tribal Mobilization camp in the Jalloum al-Dour region, about 30 km north of Samarra. According to ISIS, definite hits were detected.
  • On September 27, 2021, an Iraqi army camp was targeted by gunfire west of Tuz Khormato. One soldier was killed.
Counterterrorism measures in Iraq
  • Iraqi Military Spokesman Yahya Rasool published details about the achievements of the Iraqi security forces in the past year and a half (between May 1, 2020, and September 25, 2021) in the fighting against ISIS. According to the details published, in the period in question, 257 terrorist operatives were killed, 472 operatives were detained, 377 hiding places used by ISIS were destroyed, and 211 explosive belts of ISIS were found throughout Iraq (Yahya Rasoul’s Twitter account, September 26, 2021).
Kirkuk Province
  • On October 1, 2021, forces of the counterterrorism unit with Iraqi army air support killed eight ISIS operatives in the Kirkuk Province (Yahya Rasoul’s Twitter account, September 26, 2021).
  • On September 22, 2021, the Iraqi Air Force attacked ISIS positions in the Kirkuk Province. According to the report, secondary explosions occurred in some of the targets attacked, indicating the presence of a weapons cache at the site (Iraqi News Agency, September 22, 2021).
Al-Anbar Province
  • On September 28, 2021, the Iraqi security forces announced that they had thwarted an attempt to smuggle about half a ton of TNT explosives from Syria to Iraq (Khaliyat al-I’lam al-Amni Facebook page, September 28, 2021).
  • On September 22, 2021, the Iraqi security forces announced the detention of ISIS’s “minister of agriculture” in the Al-Anbar Province (Khaliyat al-I’lam al-Amni Facebook page, September 22, 2021).
  • On September 16, 2021, the Iraqi security forces killed three ISIS operatives in the Wadi Zghaitoun region, about 50 km southwest of Kirkuk (Al-Sumaria, September 16, 2021).
Salah al-Din Province
  • On September 29, 2021, the Iraqi security forces killed two ISIS operatives in the Tarmiyah region. One of the operatives had reportedly planned to carry out a suicide bombing attack in Baghdad (Popular Mobilization website, September 29, 2021).
  • On September 28, 2021, the Iraqi security forces killed an ISIS commander near Samarra (Facebook page of Iraqi Armed Forces Spokesman Yahya Rasoul, September 28, 2021).
The Sina

MESOP WATCH MIDEAST: Israel runs last-minute diplomatic blitz against nuclear deal with Iran

October 7, 2021AL MONITOR – Reports Oct. 6 said that a meeting between Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and Russian President Vladimir Putin could take place Oct. 22.

 

The reports said that the meeting would focus on Iran and on other strategic regional issues. Still, it seems that the date has not been finalized yet for a Bennett visit to Moscow, and could be postponed. Foreign Minister Yair Lapid visited Moscow Sept. 9 and met there with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov. The possibility of a Bennett-Putin meeting was discussed on that occasion, but without naming a date.

At his September meeting with Lavrov, Lapid referred to recent reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about Iran, saying, “The two [IAEA] reports are damning. They include serious violations. Fraud, deception and outright lies. The picture is clear and very worrying. A rapidly advancing nuclear program without any effective supervision. The message to Iran must be loud and it must be clear. Iran’s march toward a nuclear weapon is not only an Israeli problem. It’s a problem for the entire world.”

Lapid himself is scheduled to visit the United States on Oct. 12-14, at the invitation of Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Lapid and Blinken last met in Rome June 27, shortly after Lapid assumed office. Since then, they have spoken on the phone a number of times. Reports say that apart from Blinken, Lapid is expected to meet in Washington with other American senior officials, including US national security adviser Jake Sullivan and Vice President Kamala Harris.

Walla news site said that Lapid’s visit to Washington will focus on Iran. Jerusalem has been pressuring Washington lately to consider other options on the Iran talks. Such options would be needed, argues Jerusalem, in case the talks are not renewed soon or in the case that Tehran refuses to take up the constraints that were included at the time in the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement. This message about the necessity of formulating other options is reportedly the message Lapid would relay to his American interlocutors next week.

But what could these options be? One option could be a new set of American economic and other sanctions against Iran and Iranian officials. A second option could be gestures demonstrating to Tehran that there is indeed an American military threat against them.

The issue of the Iranian talks was also discussed this week, at an Oct. 5 meeting in Washington of the US-Israel Strategic Consultative Group. Sullivan hosted his Israeli counterpart, Eyal Hulata, and a senior Israeli interagency delegation at the White House, to exchange views on the different regional threats Israel is facing. The Israeli delegation included senior defense, military, intelligence and diplomatic officials. For the Israeli side, the No. 1 issue was certainly Jerusalem’s concerns over a resumption of nuclear talks with Tehran, but also Iranian terror activities in the region. Jerusalem fears that Iranian-made attack drones will reach the hands of terror groups to be used against Israel.

A White House readout of the Oct. 5 meeting said, “Mr. Sullivan emphasized President Biden’s fundamental commitment to Israel’s security and to ensuring that Iran never gets a nuclear weapon. Mr. Sullivan explained that this administration believes diplomacy is the best path to achieve that goal, while also noting that the President has made clear that if diplomacy fails, the United States is prepared to turn to other options.”

The upcoming trips of Bennett and Lapid suggest that Sullivan’s words did not reassure Israel, especially on the backdrop of a meeting Oct. 6 in Moscow, between Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and Lavrov. After the meeting, Amir-Abdollahian said that talks on reviving Iran’s nuclear deal will resume soon in Vienna.

To this Israeli diplomatic blitz, we can also add the upcoming visit, on Oct. 10, in Israel of outgoing German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Merkel is paying Israel a farewell visit, ahead of leaving office. Among the many events planned for her visit, Merkel is scheduled to meet with Bennett and with Lapid. And while Merkel allegedly carries now little political clout in Europe and on the international arena, the meetings will offer Bennett and Lapid an opportunity to reiterate their message on Iran. They can be sure that Merkel will forward their message to her colleagues in Europe. With France pushing for the resumption of talks with Iran, this could be for Israel no less important than the trips already scheduled.

Read more: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/10/israel-runs-last-minute-diplomatic-blitz-against-nuclear-deal-iran#ixzz78dBZsBWu
 

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MESOP WATCH ANALYSIS: IMPLICATIONS OF IRAN’S FULL MEMBERSHIP IN THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION
7.10.2021 THE SOUFAN CENTER

 

  • The security-oriented Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)’s September decision to promote Iran to full membership will yield Tehran strategic and economic benefits.
  • Fulltext http://www.mesop.de/?p=120907
 

 

Special Live Event: Germany’s Chancellor Meets with INSS Researchers in Israel
Monday | October 11| 09:20 IL time | Livestream on INSS website and social media 

 

You are invited to watch the meeting that will take place during the forthcoming visit to Israel by Dr. Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany. At the meeting, Chancellor Merkel will speak to the Israeli public and answer questions from senior researchers at INSS, headed by Prof. Manuel Trajtenberg. The event will be broadcast live on the INSS website and the INSS Facebook and YouTube pages.

*The event will be held in Hebrew and German (with simultaneous translation into Hebrew)*

 

 

MESOP WATCH ANALYSIS: IMPLICATIONS OF IRAN’S FULL MEMBERSHIP IN THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

 

7.10.2021 THE SOUFAN CENTER

 

  • The security-oriented Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)’s September decision to promote Iran to full membership will yield Tehran strategic and economic benefits.
  • The regional relationships that will be strengthened by Iran’s full membership in the group could prove useful in exerting leverage against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
  • The security focus of the SCO could enable Russia and China to justify moving forward with new arms sales to Tehran and project greater influence.
  • Iran’s SCO promotion will further Iran’s efforts to mitigate the effects of comprehensive U.S. economic sanctions, and boost the organization’s status.
At a September summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a security-focused grouping of Russia, China, and several Central and South Asian states, Iran’s application for a promotion from observer status to full membership of the grouping was approved. Iran’s status as a full SCO member will require approximately two more years of legal and technical procedures. Iran has had observer status in the organization since 2005, but its application for full membership was stalled because Iran was under U.N.-authorized economic sanctions after 2010. This roadblock was removed upon Iran’s acceptance of the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear deal and the related lifting of U.N. sanctions.

The SCO was formed in 2001 by Russia, China, and four Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), in part as a response to the radical Islamist Taliban regime then in control in Afghanistan. India and Pakistan attained full membership in 2016. The SCO is an expanded successor to the “Shanghai Five” grouping formed in April 1996 to counter U.S. influence in Eurasia as well as the threat from the Taliban’s advance toward Kabul. The SCO has come full circle with the Taliban’s August 2021 return to power in Kabul – a group of which all SCO members, perhaps except Pakistan, are wary. The Dushanbe SCO summit represented an early diplomatic success for Iran’s Ibrahim Raisi on his first trip outside the country since being sworn in as president in August.  Moreover, it gives the organization, which has sometimes been considered “toothless” outside the region, greater opportunities to project influence in a strategic region where the U.S. and its allies will have little or no ground presence.

Aside from joining its members in an alliance, the SCO facilitates closer bilateral relationships among its members, enabling them to pursue mutual strategic interests. On the sidelines of the September SCO summit, Iran and Tajikistan, which had long been at odds over Tehran’s support for an Islamist Tajik opposition group, agreed to expand their trade exponentially. The rapprochement between the two Persian-speaking neighbors of Afghanistan could represent a mutual attempt to acquire leverage over the Taliban, about which both Iran and Tajikistan are particularly concerned. In contrast to their 1996-2001 rule, Taliban fighters control the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border. That border was vital to efforts by Iran, Tajikistan, India and the United States to supply northern Afghanistan’s anti-Taliban minorities, particularly the Tajiks, before and after the September 11 attacks on the United States. In the current context, Iran and Tajikistan might use their SCO alliance to undertake the SCO-prescribed military exercises and intelligence-sharing crucial to any attempt to reopen a supply corridor to the mostly Tajik anti-Taliban forces still militarily active in parts of the Panjshir Valley and elsewhere in Afghanistan.

Whereas Afghanistan was a prominent issue at the Dushanbe meeting, it is Iran’s relations with Russia and China – the two dominant actors within the SCO – that will benefit most from Iran’s full participation in the organization. Over the past several years, Iran has been discussing major conventional arms purchases from both suppliers, and the talks have reportedly accelerated since a United Nations embargo on the sale of major combat systems to Tehran expired in October 2020, as provided for by Security Council Resolution 2231. The expiration of the embargo leaves U.S. unilateral sanctions on Iranian arms buys as the most significant restraint on such sales, aside from Iran’s ability to pay for major new weapons. The security focus of the SCO will provide additional public justification for Russia and China to proceed with new arms sales to Iran, should purchase agreements be reached with Tehran.

The accession to full SCO membership is also certain to advance a core Iranian goal: blunting U.S. efforts to isolate Iran economically and diplomatically. Even though broadening economic relationships is not the core mission of the SCO, all SCO members could cite Iran’s accession as justification for defying U.S. sanctions to expand trade and investment ties to the Islamic Republic. Moreover, the SCO has observer status in the UN General Assembly and works closely with a number of security related entities engaged in the region, including the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism and the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED). China has already been defying U.S. sanctions policy by engaging in energy transactions with Iran – it is buying approximately 550,000 barrels per day of Iranian oil, about as much as it was buying in 2011 before U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil sales were enacted. China also has been a major investor in Iranian light industry as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative that incorporates Iran as a major trade and transportation hub. The Biden administration was reported in September to have asked China to reduce its importation of Iranian oil. However, China’s continued defiance of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s energy sector, as well as any U.S. sanctions that would apply to the 25-year China-Iran economic partnership finalized in June 2020, are more likely now that Iran has been accepted for full SCO membership. Similarly, Russia might use Iran’s SCO accession to justify finally moving to implement a November 2017 memorandum of understanding for broad energy cooperation, valued at about $30 billion. Whether full membership in the SCO fulfills all of Tehran’s goals, it is certain that doing so will strengthen Iran’s resilience against any option the Biden administration might exercise to pressure Tehran to alter its behavior.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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