MESOP MIDEAST WATCH : Three Iran-Backed Militiamen to Face Trial for Assassination Attempt against Iraqi PM

9ERBIL 9-11-2021— The Shia leaders of Iraq have admitted the involvement of Iran-backed militias in the assassination attempt against Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Khadhimi last Sunday.

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MESOP WATCH Analyse : Hat der WDR im Fall von Nemi El-Hassan gegen Arbeitsrecht verstoßen?

Zuletzt verkündete der WDR, nicht mit El-Hassan zu arbeiten. Recherchen zeigen: In Vorgesprächen hat der Sender womöglich unzulässige Fragen gestellt.

Stefan Buchen, 9.11.2021 – BERLINER ZEITUNG –

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MESOP NEWS : WE’LL MEET AGAIN- Regionalwahlen in Amerika : Trump zieht immer noch

  • Von Majid Sattar, Erie FAZ – 9.11.2021 Die Demokraten haben bei den Regionalwahlen in Amerika darauf gesetzt, vor der Wiederkehr des Trumpismus zu warnen. Die Rechnung ging nicht auf. Ein Ortsbesuch im „Rust Belt“.

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MESOP WATCH NEU: MILLIONEN MENSCHEN PLANEN FLUCHT NACH EUROPA / DEUTSCHLAND

UN SCHLÄGT ALARM:Mehr als 45 Millionen Menschen am Rand des Hungertodes

  • 11.2021- faz – Die Zahl der weltweit vom Hunger bedrohten Menschen hat sich nach Angaben der UNin diesem Jahr deutlich erhöht. Wurden zu Beginn des Jahres 42 Millionen Menschen gezählt,
  • die vom Hunger bedroht waren, so sind es nunmehr 45 Millionen, wie das Welternährungsprogramm der Vereinten Nationen (WFP) am Montag in Rom mitteilte.

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MESOP MIDEAST WATCH : THE FUTURE OF PUTIN’S WAR IN SYRIA

Featuring Anna Borshchevskaya, Lester Grau, and Michael McFaul – Policy Forum Report Nov 8, 2021

A former U.S. ambassador to Russia joins two experts for a discussion on what the six-year intervention can tell us about Moscow’s broader foreign policy.

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MESOP MIDEAST WATCH: HOW WILL THE UNITED STATES DEAL WITH THE GROWING THREAT POSED BY ISLAMIC STATE KHORASAN (IS-K)?

 
Bottom Line Up Front: 9-11-2021
  • There are growing concerns that Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) could set its sights on targets outside of Afghanistan, launching attacks throughout the region or possibly even in the West.
  • The recruitment of disenchanted former security force members, coupled with hardened jihadists released from prison, is reminiscent of a pattern that unfolded in Iraq during the early days of the Islamic State insurgency.
  • An errant U.S. drone strike on August 29 in Afghanistan resulted in the death of ten civilians, including seven children, and is emblematic of the challenges and risks of U.S. counterterrorism operations against IS-K militants with an “over-the-horizon” approach.
  • It remains to be seen how regional countries will deal with the growing threat of IS-K, but Iran, China, and Russia are each concerned with the metastasizing threat.
As the Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) continues to wage a bloody insurgency against the de facto Taliban government in Afghanistan, there are growing concerns that IS-K could set its sights on targets elsewhere in the region, or possibly in the West. At a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) in late October, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl suggested that IS-K could potentially develop the capability to launch external attacks within the next six to twelve months. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan set off a chain of events that led to a disastrous and haphazard evacuation and the Taliban takeover of the country. In the midst of the chaotic evacuation, IS-K conducted a devastating attack at Hamid Karzai International Airport that killed 13 U.S. servicemembers and at least 170 Afghan civilians. The attack provided IS-K with significant momentum, which it has carried through in its intensifying rivalry with the Taliban. An IS-K attack last week on a Kabul military hospital resulted in numerous casualties. Reportedly among them was the Taliban’s military chief for Kabul, Qari Hamdullah, a senior Haqqani network commander, former shadow governor for Paktika and Khost provinces, and head of the Badri Brigade, the Taliban’s special forces unit.

Some recent reports suggest that former members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are joining IS-K, either to exact revenge against the Taliban or simply to earn money to survive. The recruitment of disenchanted former security force members, coupled with hardened jihadists released from prison, is reminiscent of a pattern that unfolded in Iraq during the early days of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. There has also been a history of defections and side switching in Afghanistan’s serial civil wars and insurgencies, dating back to the anti-Soviet jihad that began more than four decades ago, in 1979. Perhaps concerned that IS-K will successfully recruit more Pakistani jihadists, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is reportedly working through the Taliban’s Interior Minister, Siraj Haqqani, to mediate an agreement between Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) (also known as the Pakistani Taliban) and the Pakistani state.

If IS-K continues to grow its ranks while refining its operational and organizational capabilities, it could very well pose a direct threat to the immediate region and the West. To counter the threat, the United States has touted the effectiveness of what is known as an “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism approach. This means targeting terrorists and insurgents by relying on intelligence that drives operations that, at least in the case of IS-K, result in drone strikes. With no U.S. military presence on the ground, it will become much harder to recruit human sources, forcing a greater reliance on signals intelligence. An errant drone strike on August 29, 2021, in retaliation for the IS-K attack on the airport days earlier, resulted in the death of ten civilians, including seven children. This catastrophe is emblematic of the anticipated challenges and risks of U.S. counterterrorism operations against IS-K militants.

It remains to be seen how regional countries will deal with the growing threat of IS-K. One pillar of IS-K’s strategy, directly related to its objectives of spreading propaganda and recruiting new members, is a campaign to wage brutal sectarian attacks. IS-K has repeatedly targeted Shia Hazara communities, and if this trend continues, it could drag Iran into the conflict through its proxy, the Liwa Fatemiyoun, an Iranian-trained militia comprised of Afghan Hazaras with experience fighting in Syria. China and Russia are also concerned about the growth of IS-K, as well as the growth of other groups like al-Qaeda, particularly as jihadist groups continue to recruit Uighurs and Chechens into their ranks. China recently agreed with Tajikistan on the establishment of a Chinese military base, a clear indication that Beijing is concerned about the growth of extremism throughout Central Asia. While Russia also remains concerned about the revival of jihadist groups in the region, it is perhaps more focused on limiting a U.S. military presence, and Moscow could play a spoiler role as Washington seeks to establish a military base in either Tajikistan or Uzbekistan.

 

 

 

 

MESOP MIDEAST WATCH:Israel to export border surveillance technology to Cyprus

Israel’s military has extensive experience with border security surveillance in the West Bank. Al-Monitor StaffNovember 8, 2021

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MESOP MIDEAST WATCH: Iran-backed militia behind attack on Iraqi PM – security officials, sources

Iran is unlikely to have sanctioned the attack as Tehran is keen to avoid a spiral of violence on its western border, sources and independent analysts said. JERUSALEM POST STAFF 9-11-2021

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MESOP MIDEAST INTEL BY MEIR AMIT CENTER / ISRAEL – Palestinian reactions to Israel’s decision to outlaw organizations affiliated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Press conference held in Ramallah with the participation of representatives of the six organizations, headed by Shawan Jabarin, secretary general of al-Haq (center). At the right is the aide to the Palestinian foreign minister (QudsN, October 23, 2021).

Overview
  • On October 22, 2021, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz issued an order designating six Palestinian social-civilian organizations (NGOs) as terrorist organizations. The order permits the legal confiscation of the organizations’ assets and the legal sanctions to be imposed on anyone participating in their activities. The order was preceded by Israeli security force activities which exposed the connections of the organizations, some of which receive most of their funding from European countries and international institutions and organizations, with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which has been designated as a terrorist organization by Israel, the United States, the EU and Canada.
  • The Israeli ministry of defense stated that the organizations were controlled by senior PFLP functionaries and employed many PFLP operatives in field and administrative roles, including operatives who participated in terrorist activities against Israel. The organizations concealed their affiliation with the PFLP out of concern measures would be taken against them by security and law-enforcement agencies in Israel and around the globe. They received large amounts of money from European countries and international organizations through fraud and forgery, and thereby helped the PFLP finance its terrorist activities and give money to the families of terrorist prisoners and the shaheeds, pay its operatives, recruit new operatives, promote terrorist activity, engage in military buildup, and disseminate their ideology (Israeli defense minister’s information unit, October 22, 2021).
  • The order led to reactions from the Palestinian Authority (PA), Hamas and other terrorist organizations, as well as from many Palestinian NGOs, including those designated as terrorist organizations. Many called Israel’s action illegal and part of the State of Israel’s ongoing campaign attacking Palestinian NGOs, and especially their sources of income. They called on the international community and global NGOs to fight the order. They also stated they intended to continue to fight Israel in the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague and in other venues.
  • In addition to issuing protests, the PA and the Palestinian NGOs considered a number of practical measures. The Palestinian leadership said it would operate in formal channels to raise the issue of the Palestinian cause wherever possible with international and legal organizations. PA Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh spoke about it with Josep Borrell Fontelles, representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, while visiting Belgium (Wafa, October 27, 2021).
  • NGO representatives met with ambassadors and general consuls, including an EU representative. The organizations also plan to appeal to members of the American Congress, and are examining holding activities in front of Israeli legations abroad. They are also examining making appeals to the relevant legal institutions. On the popular level, they are planning to hold a national protest day and weekly demonstrations in front of Red Cross offices. NGO representatives have already met with 27 general consuls and ambassadors to the PA territories, including the EU representative.
  • The organizations belonging to the PFLP represent themselves as social-civilian-humanitarian NGOs. Most of their funding comes in the form of donations from foreign organizations and countries, with a small number of local donations. The investigation conducted by the Israeli security forces from March to May 2021 exposed significant information about the organizations’ activities and the way the PFLP uses them to raise money for its organizational and military activities.
  • The NGOs serve to increase the PFLP’s hold and influence over the Palestinian population by exploiting their civilian status. They enable the PFLP to locate and recruit new operatives, create obligation towards the organization from the people who receive its services, disseminate its propaganda, etc. In addition, the NGOs serve as a source of employment for PFLP operatives, including terrorist operatives, and their offices serve as bases for organization activities.
The logos of the outlawed organizations
The logos of the outlawed organizations
Palestinian Reactions
  • The order issued by the Israeli defense minister led a series of reactions from the PA, Hamas and other organizations, as well as the many Palestinian NGOs, including those to which the order related. Many claimed the order was illegal and part of a continuing Israeli campaign to attack Palestinian social-civilian organizations,[1] and especially their sources of funding. Many also declared they intended to keep fighting Israel in the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other venues, and called on countries and NGOs around the globe to enlist in fighting the order.
The Palestinian leadership
  • On October 24, 2021, a Palestinian leadership meeting was held in Ramallah where Mahmoud Abbas condemned the Israeli declaration against the NGOs which, he claimed, operated in accordance with Palestinian law. The Palestinian leadership stressed its support for the continuation of the NGOs’ activities and their rejection of the Israeli order (Wafa, October 24, 2021).
  • On October 25, 2021, Mahmoud Abbas met in his office with representatives of the six organizations designated by Israel as terrorist organizations. Other members of the Palestinian leadership attended, including Mahmoud al-‘Alul, deputy Fatah chairman; and Mahmoud al-Habash, both Mahmoud Abbas’ advisor for religious matters and a judge in the Sharia high court. Mahmoud Abbas told them he condemned and rejected the Israeli order and supported the organizations, which fulfilled their duty to expose to the world the crimes committed by Israel (“the occupation”). He promised the PA would conduct formal activities in the international arena to fight the order. He also said Israel did not have the right to intervene in the activities of organizations working within the framework of Palestinian law. He called for more Palestinian efforts to fight Israel over the order. The representatives of the organizations said they would continue their activities to criticize Israel and expose the “crimes the occupation” committed against the Palestinian people. They also said they would operate in full coordination with Mahmoud Abbas’ office and the official Palestinian institutions to fight the order (Mahmoud Abbas’ Facebook page, October 25, 2021).
Mahmoud Abbas meets with representatives of the six outlawed Palestinian organizations (Mahmoud Abbas' Facebook page, October 25, 2018).
Mahmoud Abbas meets with representatives of the six outlawed Palestinian organizations (Mahmoud Abbas’ Facebook page, October 25, 2018).
  • PA Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh said he rejected the designation of the six Palestinian organizations as terrorist organizations and called on the international community and human rights organizations around the globe to reject it as well. He called it a dangerous attack on international law because the “institutions” designated by Israel as terrorist organizations operated in accordance with Palestinian law. They also had ties to international institutions, which had the duty to condemn Israel’s designation and intervene to prevent its implementation (Wafa, October 22, 2021). He posted similar sentiments to his Facebook page (Muhammad Shtayyeh’s Facebook page, October 22, 2021). Muhammad Shtayyeh also raised the issue before Josep Borrell Fontelles, EU representative for foreign affairs, during his visit to Belgium (Wafa, October 27, 2021).
  • At the weekly PA government meeting, Muhammad Shtayyeh said the government would not recognize the Israeli order because the organizations in question were official PA institutions working within the law, received international support and had international cooperation (Wafa, November 23, 2021).
  • Kayed al-Ghoul, a member of the PFLP’s political bureau from the Gaza Strip, claimed the objective of the Israeli order was to tighten the “siege” around the Palestinian people and its institutions. He said accusing the organizations of affiliation with the PFLP was a poor attempt to influence their functioning and their status in international circles, including the BDS movement. He claimed another objective was to prevent the organizations from pursuing their legal actions against Israel in European courts, including the ICC in The Hague, and to prevent them from receiving financial donations. He said the six organizations operated within Palestinian law and they were supervised by the relevant PA agencies (PFLP website, October 23, 2021).
Kayed al-Ghoul (PFLP website, October 23, 2021).
Kayed al-Ghoul (PFLP website, October 23, 2021).
  • The PA foreign ministry condemned the Israeli order, calling it “an insane attack of the occupation regime on Palestinian society and its institutions.” It described the order as “a hostile invention, defamation and an attack on Palestinian society and the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, which resisted [sic] the Israel occupation.” The foreign ministry called the order humiliating, and not the last such measure in the Israel’s extensive, systematic campaign against the more prominent Palestinian civilian-human rights organizations (PA foreign ministry Facebook page, October 24, 2021).
  • Riyad Mansour, the Palestinian delegate to the UN, claimed the order was part of a systematic campaign against Palestinian civilians because they dared to expose the [alleged] “crimes of the occupation.” He called on the international community and UN agencies to oppose the order and defend the right of the Palestinian NGOs to continue functioning without persecution (Dunia al-Watan, October 23, 2021).
  • Saleh Rafat, a Democratic Union (FIDA) member of the PLO’s Executive Committee, said the operation of the organizations in question had been formally authorized by the PA (Wafa, October 22, 2021).
  • Dalal Salama, a member of Fatah’s Central Committee, said the order would not prevent the organizations from carrying out their important legal and social functions. She called on all Palestinian civilians to unite in a struggle in the international arena against the narrative of Israel (“the occupation”) and the imposition of conditions that would designate the Palestinian struggle as terrorism. She also warned against the acceptance of such orders by a number of institutions, which was liable to pave the way for Israel to attack all the Palestinian organizations (QudsN, October 23, 2021).
  • Hamas officially condemned the order, claiming it was one of a series of terrorist maneuvers in Israel’s “fanatic” war against Palestinian existence. Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem claimed the order of the “Israeli minister of war” classifying NGOs and human rights organizations as terrorist was one of the ways Israel was waging war against the Palestinian existence in an effort to weaken it. He called for a national campaign to fight the order and called on the international community to expose what he called “Zionist terrorism” (Hazem Qassem’s Telegram channel, October 23, 2021).
  • Palestinian legal authority Majed al-Arouri claimed the order was part of an Israeli campaign against Palestinian civilian institutions because of the role they play in representing the Palestinian cause as the top legal-political priority of the international community. He said the PA had the responsibility to inform banks to object to the order and not to halt or freeze the accounts of the organizations, as ordered by Israel (Sanad, October 24, 2021).
The Palestinian social-civilian organizations and NGOs
  • Representatives of the organizations designated by Israel as terrorist organizations held a joint press conference where they rejected the designation and said would keep their offices open, adding that no one could silence “the voice of truth.” Al-Haq director general Shawan Jabarin claimed the order had come as a “surprise,” made because of political rather than security considerations. He said its intention had been to defame the Palestinian organizations, hinder their activities in the international arena and reduce their international funding. He said he was certain international institutions would continue to stand with the Palestinians. He said they would continue hounding senior Israeli officials, including Defense Minister Benny Gantz because he was a [so-called] “war criminal” whose had the blood of Palestinians from Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria on his hands. He alleged it was not a coincidence that “punishment” from Israel and similar declarations were issued at the same time it became possible to open an ICC investigation against Israel (Wafa, October 24, 2021).
  • Omar Hijazi, aide to the Palestinian foreign minister for bilateral relations, condemned the Israeli order and stated Israel was responsible for the lives of the employees of the designated NGOs. He stressed the organizations’ importance in the Palestinians’ efforts against Israel, adding that the PA would continue to support them. He called on international organizations not to cooperate with the Israeli order. He also said that in any case, the PA would not cease its activities against Israel in the ICC. He added that the Palestinian foreign minister had demanded the ICC’s new chief prosecutor, when he entered office, open an investigation, informing him the PA was prepared to cooperate with ICC employees. He stated that every month they delivered information about Israel’s activities against the Palestinian NGOs to the chief prosecutor’s office (QudsN website, October 23, 2021).
Press conference held in Ramallah with the participation of representatives of the six organizations, headed by Shawan Jabarin, secretary general of al-Haq (center). At the right is the aide to the Palestinian foreign minister (QudsN, October 23, 2021).
Press conference held in Ramallah with the participation of representatives of the six organizations, headed by Shawan Jabarin, secretary general of al-Haq (center). At the right is the aide to the Palestinian foreign minister (QudsN, October 23, 2021).
  • On October 25, 2021, the Palestinian prisoners’ and human rights organizations held a meeting at the headquarters of the PLO’s prisoners’ commission. The meeting was also attended by lawyers and figures from the PA’s department of prisoners’ affairs. They discussed the need to unite their efforts to oppose the order, both locally and internationally. According to reports, the Palestinian leadership was investing efforts through official channels by discussing the issue with international legal organizations and by organizing a protest petition. They were also trying to put the issue on the agenda of international conferences. In the meantime, they would act through legal channels. A suggestion was made to boycott Israeli military courts for a specified time. At the popular level, a national protest day would be declared, as well as weekly protests in front of Red Cross offices. The representatives of the organizations noted that the campaign was not only for their own sake, it was for the entire Palestinian people (Watan, October 25, 2021).
  • Shawan Jabarin noted the PA’s activities regarding the order, saying the organizations had asked the PA to defend their financial activities and continue funding and supporting them. He reported that the organizations continued their activities against the order through their contacts with partners and other NGOs both locally and globally. He said the representatives of the organizations had already spoken with 27 general consuls and ambassadors to the PA, including the EU representative. The organizations’ representatives asked for continuing support and for practical measures to be taken to revoke the order. They stated they were planning to appeal to the United States Congress and were also examining suggestions to hold activities in front of Israeli legations abroad, with the option of appealing to the relevant legal agencies (al-Araby al-Jadeed, October 25, 2021).
  • Sahar Francis, head of the Addameer Association, noted the importance of the PA’s diplomatic activity with countries and agencies to ensure cooperation with PA organizations would continue (al-Araby, October 25, 2021).
  • Samidoun, an organization outlawed in February 2021, said in an announcement that designating the six organizations as terrorist had come after it and the British-based EuroPal Forum had been designated at the beginning of the year. According to the organization, Israel had adopted the policy of designating as terrorist all organizations which challenged it and exposed its [alleged] “crimes” at the local, regional and international level (Samidoun website, October 22, 2021).
  • Raji Sourani, director of the Gazan Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR), claimed Israel’s objective was to put a stop to Palestinian organizations’ activities with the ICC at a sensitive time, when a serious investigation of Israel’s [alleged] “crimes” had begun. He said Israel was using the same tactic as Trump had when he said he would prosecute anyone who cooperated with an ICC investigation of the United States or Israel. Sourani claimed Israel’s order was intended to destroy the organizations by diminishing their sources of financing by linking them to terrorism. He added that they expected further measures would follow, such as closing bank accounts and preventing organization employees from traveling, and they were raising alerts to possible physical attacks (PCHR website, October 23, 2021).
  • The Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network (PNGO) said it was planning to operate at the international level against the order and to use “all the necessary legal tools and channels.” The PNGO said it would present its files to the EU and international coalitions because in the network’s opinion, the [alleged] Israeli attack was part of a broader program to end the NGOs’ operations (PNGO website, October 23, 2021).
  • The Palestinian Human Rights Organizations Council (PHROC) said the Israeli order had come after years of persecuting the NGOs that were documenting “Israel’s [alleged] crimes” and cooperating with UN agencies and the international community. The Council appealed to all the relevant agencies to take a clear stand on the issue and to exert pressure on Israel to rescind the order (Council website, October 23, 2021).
  • Omar Shakr, holder the Human Rights Watch (HRW) Israeli-Palestinian portfolio, said the order involved the six most prominent and important Palestinian NGOs which monitored not only Israel’s actions but also the actions of the PA and Hamas regarding human rights violations. He said designating the organizations as terrorist organizations put them in danger of being closed, having their equipment confiscated and their operatives detained (al-Tariq, October 23, 2021).

The names of the six organizations with the caption, "All [of them are] terrorist" (al-Hayat al-Jadeeda, October 25, 2021).
The names of the six organizations with the caption, “All [of them are] terrorist”
(al-Hayat al-Jadeeda, October 25, 2021).

  • The PLO’s professional unions and popular associations called the Israeli order “racist, without value and illegal, like all Israel’s other orders against the Palestinian people and its national institutions,” and designated the Israeli organizations Regavim[2] and NGO Monitor[3] “terrorist organizations” operating outside international law. The PLO-affiliated unions and associations called on all the international organizations to which they have ties to end all connections and cooperation with Israeli organizations because they operate by following instructions from the Israeli military and directly from the “fascist occupation government.” They claimed NGO Monitor was expert in falsifying facts and the objective of all its reports was to defame Palestinian activities in every field and define them as terrorist. As to Regavim, they claimed it specialized in supporting settlement activity, and monitoring and supervising Palestinian activity throughout Area C.
  •  The professional unions said they were prepared to use all means available to them, human and financial, to exploit their connections with the Arab-international world. They also announced an international campaign to help the six organizations have the Israeli order revoked to ensure their continued international financing (PNN, October 27, 2021).
Israel needs a tank to combat six Palestinian NGOs (Palestinian cartoonists' Facebook page, October 27, 2021).
Israel needs a tank to combat six Palestinian NGOs
(Palestinian cartoonists’ Facebook page, October 27, 2021).

[1] According to a ruling handed down by the Israeli supreme court and according to the 2016 anti-terrorism law, a human rights organization can be designated as a terrorist organization when it has been proved that over time it has supported a terrorist organization, affiliated with it or operates for it, even when the organization also carries out civilian humanitarian activities (Haaretz, October 25, 2021). 
[2] ”Regavim is a public movement dedicated to the protection of Israel’s national lands and resources.” https://www.regavim.org/about-us/ 
[3] “NGO Monitor is a globally recognized research institute promoting democratic values and good governance.” https://www.ngo-monitor.org 

 

IRAQ PRIME MINISTER SURVIVES ELECTION-RELATED ATTACK – THE SOUFAN CENTER – 8.11.201
  • The November 6 drone strike on Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s home represented a dramatic escalation of violence over the results of Iraq’s October 10 national election.
  • The attack retaliated for the killing and wounding of pro-Iranian protesters by Iraqi security forces.
  • The assassination attempt, likely approved by Iran, illustrates Tehran’s increasing willingness to use military action against its regional adversaries.
  • The attack on the Prime Minister signaled a broad range of Iraqi factions that pro-Iranian groups must be well-represented in the government that will be selected by the new parliament.
On November 6, several armed drones struck the home of Iraq’s Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who, since taking office in 2020, has sought to balance the interests of the two major stakeholders in Iraq’s politics – the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. After the strike, which reportedly wounded several members of his security detail and inflicted some damage on his home in the heavily-fortified Green Zone, Kadhimi appeared on Iraqi television to appeal for calm and national unity. The attack came one day after supporters of Iran-backed militias, that operate independently of the national command structure, clashed with Iraqi security forces at the entrance to the Green Zone. One protester was killed and several were wounded, as were dozens of security officers, and the government has announced an investigation into the use of live fire against the protesters. The killing of a pro-Iranian protester on Friday appeared to represent, at least in part, motivation for the attack on Kadhimi.

The question of Iranian involvement in the assassination attempt is front and center for most analysts—Iran is known to have transferred armed drones to its allies in Iraq, particularly the Kata’ib Hezbollah militia. The militia has used Iran-supplied drones and other weaponry in recent attacks on bases used by U.S. military and intelligence personnel serving in Iraq. It is inconceivable, despite denials of responsibility by some high officials in Iran, that Kata’ib or any other Iran-backed faction would undertake as dramatic a step as a drone strike on the prime minister’s residence without Tehran’s explicit approval.

The assassination attempt and Green Zone clashes represent an escalation of violence produced by frustration among Iran-backed militia leaders over their relatively poor showing in Iraq’s October 10 election for the 329 seat National Assembly. According to Iraq’s political system, the newly-elected National Assembly is tasked with selecting a president, Prime Minister, and parliament speaker, and confirming a council of ministers. In the past, this process has taken several months of negotiations among major political blocs. According to official results, the Iran-backed militia factions, whose candidates banded together in the “Fatah Alliance,” lost more than half the seats they held in the previous Assembly. The Alliance has claimed that the election was fraudulent because the bloc gained more total votes than the faction that will emerge as the largest bloc in the next parliament – that of mercurial, nationalist, Shia cleric Moqtada Al Sadr. The Sadrists ably navigated the electoral district boundaries to engineer their significant victory in the election, despite a lower national vote total than their more pro-Iranian rivals.

Although election audits and reviews have corroborated the announced results, the Iran-backed groups, and their patrons in Tehran, appear to be trying to intimidate other Iraqi factions, including the Sadrists, to accommodate their interests in the upcoming government formation negotiations. First and foremost, Tehran and its Iraqi allies seek to oust Kadhimi from office, primarily for his insistence that U.S. forces retain at least an advisory presence in Iraq. Iran and its allies continue to agitate for the full expulsion of U.S. forces, in large part to avenge the Trump administration’s January 2020 strike that killed the charismatic and revered Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF) commander Qasem Soleimani. The willingness of Iran and its Iraqi partners to use violence – to the point of attempting to assassinate Kadhimi – indicate that Tehran will spare no effort to ensure that a figure more to its liking replaces Kadhimi in negotiations over the prime ministerial selection. The drone attack also appears to confirm recent trends in which Iran has demonstrated a willingness to use armed action against its regional adversaries, as exemplified by the late October Iranian drone attack on a base in Syria used by U.S. forces. Moqtada Al Sadr, an erstwhile Iran ally turned nationalist, and someone who will be decisive in the negotiations on the next government, undoubtedly received the message from his former Iranian patrons that Tehran’s interests must be accommodated. Yet, it is possible that the assassination attempt could cause Iran’s opponents in Iraq, including not only Sadr but also the Sunni Arabs as well as the Kurds, to unite in order to limit Iran’s influence in Iraq going forward. It is also possible that the now violent power struggle could set Iraq back to its darkest days of civil strife in the several years following the 2003 U.S. invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein.

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