Introduction

Senior Chinese personalities, from Xi Jinping down through Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commanders, have been reiterating for years that Taiwan must be reunited with mainland China, and that this will happen whether by peaceful means or by way of military action. In recent months, as tensions between Taiwan and China have risen, the MEMRI Chinese Media Studies Project has found that these statements have been increasing in frequency and intensity.

These statements have been backed by military preparations, many of which have been publicized in Chinese media. China has been openly carrying out military drills simulating an invasion of Taiwan. Some assess that the naval fleet that China has been assembling over the past decade, which is larger but less advanced than the U.S. Navy, is meant to enable China to blockade Taiwan by sea.

China is also very confident about its ability to stand up to the U.S. and its allies in the Pacific, as is evident in the way that Chinese experts describe the balance of power between China and the U.S. For example, when prominent Chinese Professor Jin Canrong discussed the possibility of an American reaction to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, he said: “We have complete confidence in our ability to beat any opponent within 1,000 nautical miles, including the United States and its coalition forces… We have superior electronic warfare capabilities [and] China leads the world in medium- and medium-long-range conventional missiles. There is no force on the planet that can compete with us. The United States has fallen far behind us [and] we are the best in hypersonic missiles… The United States has a single 300m dock that can build one aircraft carrier. How many do we have? 49 of them! We have nothing to be afraid of.”

The Chinese statements have been backed by direct provocations, such as the Chinese air force brashly violating Taiwanese airspace.

In light of these consistent threats, provocations, and preparations, which are all being done in the open and which are presented in this article, could a Chinese surprise attack still be possible?

What Constitutes A Surprise: The Example Of The 1973 Egyptian-Syrian Attack On Israel

Israel’s experience in the October 1973 war reveals that even when there are ongoing threats and provocations, including limited war (such as the 1967-1970 War of Attrition), an attack can still come as a surprise.

In the years before the war, the Egyptian leadership had made it clear in diplomatic messages and political declarations that it wanted to attack Israeli forces in the Sinai Peninsula and reunite Sinai with Egypt. The Israeli government and its intelligence agencies were aware of this.

Egypt also made obvious military preparations. In the period leading up to the invasion of the Sinai Peninsula, which was planned for launch during the Islamic month of Ramadhan in conjunction with a Syrian invasion of the Golan Heights, the Egyptian military carried out 20 military drills simulating a crossing of the Suez Canal. In a foreshadowing of the planned attack, these drills were codenamed “Badr” after the historic Battle of Badr, which took place in Ramadhan of 632 C.E. between Muhammad’s companions and the tribe of Quraish. Meanwhile, Syria also carried out military drills in preparation for the joint invasion of Israel.

The knowledge of Egypt’s intentions and preparations did not cause the Israelis to assess that an invasion was imminent. To the contrary, the Israelis believed that the only military goal of these drills was to pressure and threaten Israel. The Israelis assumed that the goal of an Egyptian invasion would be to reoccupy the entire Sinai Peninsula. Since both sides felt that this goal was unattainable due to the strength of Israel’s military , the Israelis concluded that an Egyptian invasion was impossible. Israel did not entertain the possibility of an invasion with a limited goal, such as crossing the Suez Canal and advancing only halfway into the Sinai Peninsula – something that was within the capabilities of the Egyptian military.

In addition, Israel was confident that its air superiority would render any Egyptian attack futile, and Egypt’s poor performance in the June 1967 war was further reason to downplay the likelihood of an attack.

Israel interpreted Egypt’s threats, provocations, and military drills as propaganda aimed at the Egyptian public and the Arab world and at the same time at pressuring Israel to enter into negotiations to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula.

Because it completely overlooked the possibility of a small-scale invasion, Israel did not use emergency assets that could have provided it with valuable intelligence about the upcoming attack. That is, the necessary strategic intelligence could have been available to Israel, but it was too confident about its assessments to use these assets.

In addition, though one Egyptian source did provide Israel with intelligence about the upcoming attack early enough to allow Israel’s air force to carry out a pre-emptive strike, Prime Minister Golda Meir decided against such a strike. She felt that if the report turned out to be mistaken, an Israeli attack on Egypt would be entirely unjustified and would seriously harm Israel’s standing.

Critically, Israel grossly underestimated Egypt’s ideological conviction that reconquering Sinai was absolutely imperative.

At the time, I was serving as a junior officer in the IDF’s Intelligence Corps. Upon receiving early-morning reports that the Syrians were clearing minefields they themselves had planted to prevent an Israeli invasion, a senior commander of mine said the unforgettable words: “Look at those silly Syrians. For a drill, they are actually removing the mines!” That’s how successful Egypt and Syria were in deceiving Israel.

Egypt had held 20 Badr drills without incident. Thus, the Israelis were caught completely off guard when Egypt’s 21st Badr “drill” turned out to be a real invasion of the Sinai Peninsula. On the morning of the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, which coincided that year with Ramadhan, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal into Israeli-held territory. Simultaneously, Syrian forces invaded the Golan Heights.

Israel’s experience in 1973 proves that political statements and military provocations may be misinterpreted, regardless of how clear and public they are, to mean something other than what they truly convey. A surprise attack is possible even when there are clear indications that an attack is imminent.

Pearl Harbor – Another Chronicle Of A Surprise Attack Foretold

A similar lesson can be learned by analyzing the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

In light of World War II and the Sino-Japanese War, the U.S. had plenty of reasons to assess that Japan might strike American targets, and American planners had been aware of Japan’s naval buildup in the period prior to the attack.

The Americans also knew that Pearl Harbor was one of their most vulnerable assets in the Pacific – American forces in Hawaii were even given budgetary priority over other Pacific assets. U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Husband Kimmel, who would months later watch helplessly as the Japanese assaulted Pearl Harbor, had said in February 1941 that an attack on the strategic naval outpost was a possibility. Indeed, many of the ships sunk at Pearl Harbor had been brought to Hawaii as a deterrent to Japanese expansion in Asia.

But even when America’s top leadership, including President Roosevelt himself, had strong indications that a Japanese attack was imminent, the information was not acted upon – and no pre-emptive action was taken – out of concerns about alarming the population and provoking the Japanese.

As a result, even though the Americans had all the indications and evidence necessary and presumed that Japan would attack U.S. targets in the Pacific at some point, the air assault on Pearl Harbor came as a total surprise in terms of its magnitude and in terms of Japan’s boldness and creativity.

Implications For Taiwan – Is A Chinese Surprise Attack Still Possible?

While the American defense establishment is probably discussing internally the possibility of an imminent Chinese surprise attack, not one voice in the U.S. appears to have publicly assessed that an attack on Taiwan could take place in the immediate future. Chinese military expert Wang Yunfei has said that at attack could take place even tomorrow, and Hu Xijin, the former editor-in-chief of the CCP-run Global Times, has gone even further and said that the process of reunifying Taiwan with the mainland has already begun.

The absence of such an assessment may be in part because American analysts underestimate the ideological aspects of Xi Jinping’s need to reunite Taiwan with the mainland. For Xi, reunification with Taiwan is a matter of honor and prestige, of saving face, and of preserving China’s national dignity. In addition, failure to reunite Taiwan with China would put the legitimacy of the CCP at risk. While China’s red line is Taiwanese independence, and while the CCP may be willing to tolerate the status quo in the short term, China’s long-term goal is undoubtedly reunification. This ideological imperative may be powerful enough to overcome many political, economic, domestic, and international deterrents.

Xi Jinping finds himself in the same position as the 17th-century Qing Dynasty emperor Kangxi, to whom Taiwanese independence was also unacceptable, and who also demanded that Taiwan submit itself to the mainland. Emperor Kangxi had said: “Taiwan belongs to China, and the people there are all Chinese. Why should it be treated as a foreign country?” Emperor Kangxi eventually conquered Taiwan by using a gradual strategy that combined limited military action, economic pressure, and pacification, but the situation Xi Jinping faces is different. For Xi, both limited military action and a full-scale invasion might spark a chain of events leading to a full-scale war with the West. Therefore, if he decides to successfully reunify Taiwan with China, Xi might as well opt for a full-scale invasion.

Although the U.S. does not dismiss the possibility of an invasion of Taiwan, the current political and military assessment is that a military invasion will only take place after China succeeds in passing certain critical events in the future, and even then only if the CCP cannot absorb Taiwan by other means.

There have been predictions that a Chinese invasion would not take place before the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, or before the CCP’s 20th Party Congress in October of 2022. Admiral Philip Davidson, the former commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, said in March that China might not invade Taiwan until 2027, a key milestone year for China because it celebrates the 100th anniversary of the PLA. General Mark Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has also dismissed the likelihood of a strike in the near future.

However, a conflict may break out earlier than predicted above, either because of miscalculations, as a result conscious and deliberate policy decisions on the part of the CCP leadership, or even due to precipitous actions by Taiwan. The West is transparent about its assessments regarding Taiwan, and the Chinese know what America is expecting and not expecting. This gives the Chinese leadership an advantage over Taiwan and its Western allies.

What Is China Signaling About Reunifying Taiwan With The Mainland?

The signals that China is sending can be separated into four categories: military preparations, provocations, ideological statements, and political statements.

Military Preparations

Beginning in December 2016, Xi Jinping ordered the PLA to conduct aircraft “patrols” around Taiwan. He also ordered all military branches of the PLA to increase military exercises and preparations for war against Taiwan.

In 2019, China’s State Council Information Office published the 2019 Defense White Paper, which stated: “China’s armed forces strengthen military preparedness with emphasis on the sea. By sailing ships and flying aircraft around Taiwan, the armed forces send a stern warning to the ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces.”

In July 2021, the PLA conducted an amphibious drill on China’s southeast coast that simulated rapidly seizing an island.

Just a month later, in August 2021, the PLA carried out live-fire assault exercises in the region near Taiwan. The drills involved warships, anti-submarine aircraft, and fighter jets. As part of the exercise, Chinese troops were deployed in China’s southeastern and southwestern regions, which the party-run Global Times said is an indication that the PLA is capable of “sealing off the entire territory of Taiwan’s main island and laying siege to it.”

Military affairs expert Wang Yanan, the chief editor of Aerospace Knowledge magazine, also defended the exercises, claiming that they are in response to “provocations” by Taiwanese separatists. He said: “Those who instigate tension and antagonism in our seas had better get used to more exercises by the Chinese military.”