An ISIS operative launches a Grad rocket at a Houthi rebel camp (Telegram, July 30, 2020).

Jabal al-Zawiya: the results of the artillery fired by the forces supporting the Syrian army (Ibaa, July 29, 2020).

Jabal al-Zawiya: the results of the artillery fired by the forces supporting the Syrian army (Ibaa, July 29, 2020).

An Iraqi army force carries out a search west of Hit (Facebook page of the Iraqi defense ministry, August 2, 2020).

An Iraqi army force carries out a search west of Hit (Facebook page of the Iraqi defense ministry, August 2, 2020).

Two ISIS operatives near the mortars and mortar shells launched at the international coalition base during the attack (Telegram, August 3, 2020).

The ISIS operatives who attacked the jail in Jalalabad.

An ISIS operative launches a Grad rocket at a Houthi rebel camp (Telegram, July 30, 2020).

Overview

• The wave of terrorist attacks called “raids of attrition” which began on July 22, 2020, ended on July 31. 2020. During its ten days more than 100 attacks were carried out (similar to the previous wave, between May 14 and 24, 2020). The largest number of attacks was in Iraq, which continues to be ISIS’s main arena of activity.
• Most of the attacks were routine (detonating IEDs, attacking military facilities and camps, sniper fire, executions). However, in Iraq, the Sinai Peninsula and Afghanistan, several were showcase attacks:
  • Iraq: In an ISIS attack on a roadblock in Anbar Province (about 140 kilometers northwest of Baghdad) a brigadier general, the commander of the Iraqi army’s 29^th brigade was killed. He was the army’s second high-ranking officer recently killed in an ISIS attack (the commander of the 59^th brigade was killed in an ambush on a Iraqi army convoy on July 17, 2020, about 30 kilometers north of Baghdad). In addition, an IED was detonated to attack a minibus carrying Shi’ites inside Baghdad. The attacks provide additional indications that ISIS’s operational capabilities in Iraq are improving.
  • The Sinai Peninsula: Operatives of ISIS’s Sinai Province attacked an Egyptian military camp near Rabia’, west of Bir al-‘Abd (about 30 kilometers from the Suez Canal). Dozens of Egyptian soldiers were killed. After the attack ISIS operatives took control of four nearby villages. So far Egyptian security forces with air support have not retaken the area. ISIS continues using guerilla tactics, including IEDs and abducting and executing Egyptian military personnel. The ISIS-affiliated media exaggerated the attack on Rabia’, calling it a symbol of “glory and honor” for jihad. The attack showed the improvement in ISIS’s operational capabilities and the weakness of the Egyptian security forces in the Sinai Peninsula.
  • Afghanistan: On August 2, 2020, ISIS operatives carried out a complex attack on the jail in the city of Jalalabad, the capital of the Nangarhar Province. ISIS operatives detonated a car bomb and IEDs at the entrance to the jail, stormed the site and exchanged fire with the Afghan security forces for several hours. They freed several hundred prisoners and killed dozens of Afghan security force operatives. The attack showed ISIS’s success in recovering its operational capabilities in Afghanistan after the blows it suffered. Apparently ISIS in Afghanistan poses a threat to the peace agreement between the United States and the Taliban, and to the country’s internal stability.

ISIS’s Activity Worldwide

• On July 30, 2020 ISIS’s weekly al-Nabā’ published an infographic with the caption “The harvest of the fighters,” summarizing ISIS’s activities between July 23 and 29, 2020 [i.e., most of the period of the “raids of attrition”]. During that time ISIS carried out 105 attacks around the globe (up from 42 the previous week). Thirty-four attacks were carried out in Iraq, 16 of them in the al-Anbar Province; in Syria, 28; in the Sinai Peninsula, 16; in West Africa, 13 (mostly in Nigeria); in Central Africa, three; in Yemen, three; in Khorasan (i.e. Afghanistan), three; in East Asia, three (mostly in the Philippines); in Somalia, one; in Pakistan, one; and in Bangladesh, one in Yemen (al-Nabā’, Telegram, July 30, 2020).
• More than 325 people were killed in the attacks, up from 95 killed and wounded in the previous week’s “raids of attrition.” The largest number of casualties, 117, was in the Sinai Peninsula. The others were in the provinces of Syria (64), Iraq (59), West Africa (48), Central Africa (8), Yemen (7), Khorasan (i.e., Afghanistan) (6), Central Asia (the Philippines) (6), Bangladesh (5), Somalia (4), Pakistan (1) (al-Nabā’, Telegram, July 30, 2020).

Jihadi Organizations’ Activity in Syria

Idlib region

Exchange of artillery fire

• After a number of days during which the Syrian army and the forces supporting them attacked the towns and villages south and southwest of Idlib with artillery, on August 4, 2020, operatives of the Headquarters for the Liberation of al-Sham fired artillery at forces supporting the Syrian army in the region of Kafr Nubl, about 35 kilometers south of Idlib. According to the Headquarters for the Liberation of al-Sham, artillery was used in reprisal for artillery fired at its forces in Jabal al-Zawiya (Ibaa, August 4, 2020).

Russian aerial attacks

• August 2, 2020: Russian war planes attacked settlements about seven kilometers northeast of Idlib. At the same time, the Syrian army and its supporting forces attacked the settlements with artillery fire (Idlib Plus, August 2, 2020).

Sending reinforcements to the Jabal al-Zawiya area

• The media affiliated with the rebel organizations reported that the rival sides sent reinforcements to the Jabal al-Zawiya area south of Idlib, recently a hot spot for clashes between the Syrian army and the rebel organizations. A convoy that included armed vehicles arrived in Jabal al-Zawiya from Turkey on August 2, 2020. Palestinian and Shi’ite militias reinforced the troops, some of them operating under Iranian sponsorship (Khutwa, Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, August 2, 2020).

ISIS’s activity in the Deir al-Zor-al-Mayadeen-Albukamal region (all claims of responsibility and reports from Telegram unless otherwise noted)

• August 4, 2020: An IED was detonated to attack a vehicle carrying SDF fighters, about five kilometers east of al-Mayadeen. Two fighters were killed and eight were wounded.
• August 4, 2020: A prison guard was shot and killed about ten kilometers north of al-Mayadeen.
• August 4, 2020: An ISIS operative set fire to an SDF vehicle about five kilometers northeast of al-Mayadeen. The vehicle burned to the ground..
• August 2, 2020: ISIS operatives captured an SDF fighter about ten kilometers northeast of Deir al-Zor. The fighter was executed.
• August 2, 2020: ISIS operatives captured an SDF investigator tens of kilometers northwest of Deir al-Zor. He was interrogated and executed.
• August 2, 2020: An SDF vehicle was attacked with machine guns about 20 kilometers southeast of al-Mayadeen. The passengers were killed or wounded.
• August 2, 2020: An IED was detonated to attack an SDF vehicle about 25 kilometers north of Albukamal. The passengers were killed or wounded.
• August 1, 2020: An SDF intelligence agent was attacked with machine guns and killed about 20 kilometers north of al-Mayadeen.
• August 1, 2020: ISIS operatives captured and executed three SDF fighters near the Conoco gas field, about ten kilometers east of Deir al-Zor.
• July 30, 2020: An “infidel” was shot and killed about ten kilometers north of al-Mayadeen.
• July 30, 2020: An SDF roadblock was attacked with machine guns about 20 kilometers southeast of al-Mayadeen. Two SDF fighters were wounded.
• July 29, 2020: An IED was detonated to attack an SDF vehicle about five kilometers east of al-Mayadeen. The passengers were killed or wounded.
• July 29, 2020: A hand grenade was thrown at a tanker bringing crude oil for the Syrian regime about ten kilometers southeast of Deir al-Zor. The tanker belonged to al-Katraji, a member of the Syrian parliament and commander of the National Defense Forces.
• July 29, 2020: SDF fighters were attacked with machine guns about 20 kilometers southeast of al-Mayadeen. One fighter was killed and another was wounded.
• July 28, 2020: Shots were fired at two SDF fighters about 20 kilometers north of al-Mayadeen. One fighter was killed and the other was wounded.

ISIS’s activity in the al-Sukhnah-Palmyra region (the Syrian desert) (all information and claims of responsibility from Telegram)

• August 2, 2020: ISIS operatives attacked Syrian army soldiers in the al-Sukhnah desert about 60 kilometers northeast of Palmyra. Three soldiers were killed, and weapons and ammunition were seized.
• August 1, 2020: An IED was detonated to attack a Syrian army vehicle in the al-Sukhnah desert. The passengers were injured.

ISIS’s activity in northern Syria

• July 30, 2020: An IED was detonated to attack an SDF vehicle at Manbij, northeast of Aleppo. The passengers were killed or wounded (Telegram, July 30, 2020)
• July 28, 2020: An IED was detonated to attack an SDF vehicle on a bridge about 25 kilometers northeast of Manbij. Three passengers were killed or wounded (Telegram, July 28, 2020).

The Iraqi Arena

Attack on Shi’ite civilians in Baghdad

• On July 29, 2020, a minibus was attacked an IED in the region of Bab al-Sharqi in the center of Baghdad. The Iraqi media reported that two people were killed in the attack and five were wounded (al-Sumaria, July 29 and August 2, 2020). ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack. Its announcement said it had detonated an IED to attack a minibus carrying Shi’ite passengers in the region of Bab al-Sharqi, and that five Shi’ites had been killed or wounded (Telegram, July 29, 2018).

• The Iraqi media reported that following intelligence information acquired by the Iraqi national security apparatus, the person responsible for the attack on the minibus had been detained within 24 hours. Equipment was found in his hiding place which had been used to manufacture the IED, as well as other evidence linking him to the attack (al-Sumaria, August 2, 2020).

Other Attacks for Which ISIS Claimed Responsibility

Diyala Province

• July 29, 2020: An Iraqi commando was shot and killed by sniper fire west of Khanaqin (about 100 kilometers northeast of Baqubah). In addition, an IED was detonated to attack an Iraqi army vehicle in the same location. The passengers were killed or wounded (Telegram, July 30, 2020).

Al-Anbar Province

Iraqi army brigade commander killed

• On July 28, 2020 the joint operational headquarters of the Iraqi chief of staff reported the death of Brigadier General Ahmed Abd al-Wahid Muhammad al-Lami, commander of the 29^th brigade in the 7^th infantry division. A lieutenant was also killed and two soldiers were wounded. The attack was carried out in the evening at a roadblock in the region of Hit, about 140 kilometers northwest of Baghdad (al-Sumaria, July 28, 2020).

• According to claim of responsibility, an Iraqi army soldier had been shot and killed by sniper fire at a roadblock near the city of Hit. A supporting force that arrived at the site was also attacked by sniper fire. Four soldiers were killed, among them a brigade commander, and three soldiers were wounded (Telegram, July 29, 2020).

Other ISIS attacks in al-Anbar Province (all claims of responsibility and information from Telegram)

• August 3, 2020: A limpet charge was detonated to attack the vehicle of an intelligence officer of the Popular Mobilization in Fallujah. The officer was killed.
• August 2, 2020: An IED was detonated to attack an Iraqi army armored vehicle west of al-Ramadi, about 90 kilometers west of Baghdad. The passengers were killed or wounded.
• July 30, 2020: An IED was detonated to attack an Iraqi army armored vehicle west of al-Ramadi. The passengers were killed or wounded.
• July 30, 2020: An IED was detonated to attack an Iraqi army armored vehicle near the city of Hit. Three soldiers were wounded.
• July 29, 2020: A limpet charge was detonated to attack the vehicle of a Popular Mobilization fighter about ten kilometers north of Fallujah. The fighter was killed.
• July 28, 2020: ISIS operatives attacked an Iraqi army command post near the Iraqi-Saudi Arabian border, killing one soldier and wounding another. The post was damaged.
• July 28, 2020: ISIS operatives ambushed an Iraqi army vehicle near the Iraqi-Saudi Arabian border, killing an officer and a soldier.
• July 28, 2020: ISIS operatives attacked an Iraqi army command post near the Iraqi-Jordanian border. One soldier was killed and three were wounded. The post was damaged.

Salah al-Din Province (all claims of responsibility and information from Telegram)

• July 31, 2020: ISIS operatives raided an Iraqi federal police compound about ten kilometers northwest of Samara. Six policemen were killed or wounded.
• July 30, 2020: An IED was detonated to attack the Popular Mobilization operative responsible for explosives engineering, about ten kilometers north of the center of Tikrit. The operative was killed
• July 29, 2020: An IED was detonated to attack a Popular Mobilization vehicle north of Baiji, about 200 kilometers northwest of Baghdad. One fighter was killed and others were wounded.
• July 28, 2018: IEDs were detonated inside the home of a Tribal Mobilization fighter about ten kilometers north of the center of Tikrit. The house was completely destroyed.

Kirkuk Province

• July 30, 2020: An IED was detonated to attack a Tribal Mobilization vehicle about 35 kilometers southwest of Kirkuk. Two fighter were wounded (Telegram, July 30, 2020).
• July 27, 2020: ISIS operatives raided a compound of the oil facilities’ police and fired machine guns near the Khabbaz oil field, about 30 kilometers northwest of Kirkuk, killing one policeman (Telegram, July 27, 2020).

Iraqi security forces’ counterterrorism activities

Diyala Province

• August 2, 2020: The Iraqi security forces, along with the counterterrorism unit, invaded a village where an ISIS network operated (about 35 kilometers northwest of Baqubah). Four ISIS operatives were detained. They confessed they were planning to carry out attacks during Eid al-Adha (al-Sumaria, August 2, 2020).

Al-Anbar Province

• August 2, 2020: The Iraqi army carried out a search about 20 kilometers north of Hit. They found five IEDs placed by ISIS operatives (Facebook page of the Iraqi defense ministry, August 2, 2020).
• August 1, 2020: Iraqi security found a weapons warehouse used by ISIS operatives about 20 kilometers east of al-Ramadi. They found 50 artillery shells prepared for turning into IEDs. They were supposed to be used in terrorist attacks during Eid al-Adha (al-Sumaria, August 1, 2020).

Kirkuk Province

• July 31, 2020: The Iraqi security forces, with support from the Iraqi air force, attacked concentrations of ISIS operatives about 30 kilometers south of Kirkuk. They destroyed vehicles used by ISIS operatives in attacks, as well as a tanker that brought oil to ISIS squads (al-Sumaria, July 31, 2020).

The Sinai Peninsula

 Overview

     
Right: Operatives of Kataeb Hezbollah carrying a photo of Ayatollah Khomeini, expressing their loyalty to Iran and the Khomeinist ideology of the Rule of the Jurisprudent (Kataeb Hezbollah website). Left: Operatives of Kataeb Hezbollah carrying the photo of Ayatollah Khomeini in a military parade on “World Jerusalem Day” (Iraqi News Agency, November 13, 2018)

• Iraq was and has remained a very important arena in Iran’s regional policy and a major pillar in its concept of national security^[3]. At the center of Iran’s strategic goals in Iraq are compromising US political influence and putting an end to its military presence and political influence in Iraq; strengthening the Iranian influence on the Iraqi government and transforming Iraq into a state with Iranian orientation; increasing Iranian influence among the Shiite sect in Iraq while reducing the role of the United States and the International Coalition in the campaign against ISIS; additional goals are weakening ISIS by combined action of the Shiite militias and the Iraqi security forces; weakening the national Iraqi Shi’a, which is reluctant to accept Iranian dictates; securing the overland supply route between Iran and Syria, which passes through Iraq (“the overland corridor”); and using the Shiite militias to strengthen the “Axis of Resistance” led by Iran, including by using Iraqi Shiite militias to support the Assad regime.
• Kataeb Hezbollah and the other Shiite militias are perceived by the Iranians as proxies used to promote the above strategic goals while refraining from direct involvement or provoking measures which may implicate Iran and the Shiite militias in a direct confrontation with the United States. Handling Kataeb Hezbollah and other Shiite militias creates inherent tension between Iran and its militias on the one hand, and other elements in the Iraqi government and the Shiite sect in Iraq striving to preserve Iraq’s independence and sovereignty, on the other.

• Kataeb Hezbollah was established by Jamal Ja’far Mohammad Ali Ibrahimi, AKA Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a Shiite Iraqi with an extensive history of terrorist activity (he was involved in a series of terrorist attacks in Kuwait, which were carried out by the Lebanese Hezbollah as part of an Iranian terrorist campaign). Following his terrorist activity in Kuwait, he fled to Iran, where he stayed for 20 years, and then came back to Iraq after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime. During the Iraq War, he established Kataeb Hezbollah with the handling and support of the Qods Force. Kataeb Hezbollah’s “specialty” was planting deadly roadside charges along the roads used by the American forces and firing rockets causing the US army many casualties which precipitated its departure from Iraq (2011). Kataeb Hezbollah was perceived by the Americans as the most dangerous anti-American and pro-Iranian among the Shiite militias operating in Iraq.
• Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis continued to serve as Kataeb Hezbollah’s commander even after the US forces left Iraq on 2011. In June 2014, he was appointed deputy commander of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella framework of dozens of Shiite militias, some operating under Iranian sponsorship, others independent or loyal to Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the supreme religious authority of the Shiites in Iraq (even though formally, the PMF is subordinate to the Iraqi government). The background for the establishment of the PMF was ISIS’s takeover of Mosul and its threat to Baghdad at that time. This led to a religious ruling issued by Ayatollah Ali Sistani, calling on the Iraqi residents to embark on jihad against ISIS. Thus, he actually granted internal Iraqi legitimacy to the establishment of the PMF and the existence of the armed Shiite militias. Until he was killed, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis was the dominant figure in the PMF, while the formal commander, Falih al-Fayyad, served as a figurehead.
• On January 2, 2020, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis met his death in a targeted killing by a US aircraft. His friend (and handler) Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani was killed along with him. Al-Muhandis was replaced as commander of Kataeb Hezbollah by Ahmad al-Mohammadawi (Abu Fadak), one of the founders of Kataeb Hezbollah who had held a series of military and political positions in the organization. On February 26, 2020, he was included in the US terror list and was designated as an international terrorist operative due to his involvement in terrorist attacks against American forces and innocent Iraqi civilians (previously, in 2009, Kataeb Hezbollah was designated as a terrorist organization). It appears that so far, Al-Mohammadawi has not been formally appointed as deputy commander of the PMF due to internal conflicts between the pro-Iranian militias and the followers of Ayatollah Sistani.

• Main characteristics of Kataeb Hezbollah:
  • The military wing of Kataeb Hezbollah includes three brigade frameworks numbering about 9,000-10,000 fighters. Most of the fighters are deployed in Iraq or operate against ISIS as part of the PMF. Some of them are deployed in Syria (mainly in the Albukamal area).
  • The funding for the activity of Kataeb Hezbollah’s military wing comes in part from the Iraqi government, through the PMF. Another part of the funding comes directly from Iran and is estimated at several millions of US dollars per month.
  • Kataeb Hezbollah has an extensive network of civilian foundations, according to the model implemented by Iran in the Lebanese Hezbollah (albeit on a smaller scale). This network includes media infrastructure, religious foundations, women’s foundations, a student wing, and a youth movement.
  • Kataeb Hezbollah has maintained close relations with the Lebanese Hezbollah ever since Kataeb Hezbollah’s establishment (2007). The relations between the two organizations find expression, inter alia, in the assistance provided by operatives of the Lebanese Hezbollah for training operatives of Kataeb Hezbollah (and other Iranian-sponsored Shiite militias).
  • Kataeb Hezbollah adopted the Iranian ideology of the rule of the jurisprudent and nurtures the personality cult of Ayatollah Khomeini and the current Iranian leader Khamenei. At the same time, they also use Iraqi-Shiite trappings in order to rebut allegations that they are an Iranian branch serving Iran’s interests.

   
Right: Kataeb Hezbollah’s flag waving above the US Embassy wall (Baghdad al-Youm, December 31, 2019). Left: US Embassy wall set on fire (YouTube, December 31, 2019)

• After the killing of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, Kataeb Hezbollah (and other Shiite militias handled by Iran) launched a threat campaign against the United States, which was accompanied by sporadic rocket fire at American bases and facilities without formally claiming responsibility. The campaign was intended to prevent Iraqi-American talks on the manner of departure of the US army from Iraq, and bring about a unilateral departure of the US army from Iraq without an American-Iraqi agreement. Kataeb Hezbollah was the main Shiite militia launching rockets at bases of US and International Coalition soldiers and facilities (including the Taji base north of Baghdad, Baghdad’s international airport, and the “Green Zone” in central Baghdad^[3]). The rocket fire forced the Americans to evacuate several bases and divert part of their attention and efforts to cope with Iran and the Shiite militias at the expense of fighting against ISIS.
• In the second half of June 2020, there were several shooting incidents targeting American/Western sites in the Baghdad region and the Taji base. In the ITIC’s assessment, Kataeb Hezbollah was the main Shiite militia behind the rocket fire, acting on orders from Iran, with the purpose of disrupting the strategic dialogue between the US and Iraq, which is to determine the future of American presence in Iraq. These firing incidents with no casualties took place without any claim of responsibility on the part of Kataeb Hezbollah or any other Shiite militia in order not to trigger fierce American responses against either Iran or the Shiite militias in Iraq.
• Following those incidents of rocket fire, on June 25, 2020, a force of the Iraqi government counterterrorism unit raided the Kataeb Hezbollah headquarters in southern Baghdad. Fourteen Kataeb Hezbollah operatives were reportedly detained, to be released four days later. The raid was intended to convey a threatening message to Kataeb Hezbollah, with the purpose of making them stop firing rockets at the American bases or facilities. Kataeb Hezbollah responded with threats against Iraqi Prime Minister Mostafa al-Kazimi and a statement that their armed activity in Iraq “is totally legitimate.” However, the power struggle between Iraqi sovereignty and Kataeb Hezbollah and the other Shiite militias working to promote the Iranian interests is far from over.

The structure of the study

• The study includes the following sections:
  • Overview
  • Historical background: the period of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis
  • Kataeb Hezbollah’s ideology
  • Profile of the Kataeb Hezbollah organization:
    • The military infrastructure
    • Kataeb Hezbollah’s leadership
    • Funding the organization
    • The political support in the internal Iraqi arena
  • The civilian infrastructure:
    • Overview
    • Religious system
    • Women’s institutions
    • Dissemination of studies and articles
    • Student wing
    • Scouts movement
  • Media infrastructure:
    • Overview
    • Al-Ittijah Channel
    • Website
    • Social media
    • Combat Information Unit
    • Other media platforms not directly subordinate to Kataeb Hezbollah
  • Collaboration with the Lebanese Hezbollah
    • Support of the Lebanese Hezbollah
    • Resemblance between the emblems
  • Milestones in Kataeb Hezbollah’s activity in the last decade
    • Fighting in northern Syria against the rebel organizations
    • Fighting against ISIS as part of the PMF
    • Securing the Iraqi-Syrian border region
    • Suppressing Shiite protest against the Iraqi government
    • Violent demonstration in front of the US Embassy
    • Threat campaign against the US and the Iraqi government
    • Rocket fire at American bases and facilities
    • Exerting pressure on the US during the strategic dialogue
  • Preemptive operation of the Iraqi government
    • Overview
    • Kataeb Hezbollah’s response
    • Iranian response