Hamas lost many assets in the 11-day campaign in Gaza, but to the “Arab street,” Hamas is the big winner. What the terrorist organization wanted to achieve in the elections that were canceled it succeeded in attaining in its recent aggression. Now, with Sinwar and Haniyeh strong both in Gaza and in the West Bank, can the Palestinian Authority even regain its status as leader of the Palestinian issue, and if so, how?

Yohanan Tzoreff – INSS Insight No. 1475, May 30, 2021 – ISRAEL

Hamas’s cognitive achievements in Operation Guardian of the Walls positions the organization where it hoped to be after the Palestinian Authority elections, enjoying much public sympathy and support from groups that are not identified with it. Hamas is seen by many as the organization that changed the equation with Israel and became a more central element that cannot be ignored in the Palestinian arena. The Palestinian arena itself is undergoing a process of change, and Hamas will have greater input in decision making at the national level. However, Hamas still has to deal with fundamental problems that will hinder its viability as an alternative to Fatah, given Fatah’s status and widespread international contacts, which give it the legitimacy that eludes Hamas due to its current approach to the struggle against Israel.

Operation Guardian of the Walls ended after 11 days of fighting with a ceasefire announced by Egypt and accepted by Israel and Hamas. As in the past, and notwithstanding considerable gaps in terms of loss of life and physical damage in Israel’s favor, Hamas has managed to present a picture of victory. This time, however, it appears that this feeling extends far beyond the borders of the Gaza Strip, and includes the Palestinians in the West Bank, within Israel, and in the Palestinian diaspora. Hamas has gained sympathy among many publics in the Middle East and even globally. Consequently, the picture that has begun to emerge signals a change in the balance of power among leaders in the Palestinian arena and a Palestinian public that is ready to support the strategy outlined by Hamas in this operation, i.e., guarding red lines on the issue of al-Aqsa. This may be the start of a process that will lead to Hamas’s participation in decision making, which will require a review of the paradigms, plans, and ideas that have been long fixtures on the agenda with reference to the Palestinian arena and its leadership.

A few months after the Trump administration entered the White House in January 2017, and as a lesson from Operation Protective Edge in 2014, from which it emerged by the skin of its teeth with no sense of victory, Hamas adopted a strategy of reconciliation with the purpose of integrating into the decision making process. In October 2017 the organization even offered to give the Palestinian Authority full civil control in the Gaza Strip, an idea it had always rejected. In a comprehensive interview with al-Jazeera in May 2018, Yahya Sinwar formally confirmed this policy, but these steps did not bring unity or rapprochement; on the contrary, Palestinian weakness increased. Paradoxically, the severe blows that the Trump administration delivered to the Palestinians when the President tried to impose a political plan he knew they could not accept; the normalization agreements signed with Israel and Arab states, following pressure by the President; and Israel’s threat to annex the West Bank toward the end of his term of office are what spurred an unprecedented rapprochement between all the Palestinian factions.

After lengthy discussions, this led to an agreement to hold elections. Hamas saw the elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council as a central element in its strategy of partnership, and even agreed to hold them separately from elections to other institutions – making it hard for Abu Mazen to maintain his opposition to elections. Abu Mazen issued a presidential order that launched an election process full of hopes for change. However, when on April 30, 2021 Abu Mazen cancelled the elections, Hamas returned to its old strategy of using force. The organization exploited friction at al-Aqsa and in the Sheikh Jarrah district that was whipped up by various elements, including the Northern Islamic Movement in Israel, as fuel to ignite the flames.

After the recent round of fighting, it appears that in cognitive terms, which are extremely important to Hamas and to anyone who sees sumud (perseverance) as a strategy for struggle, the organization scored a major success. In the dialogue that developed in the Palestinian arena and in most of the Arab world, Hamas was heralded, adulated, and exalted. By contrast, Abu Mazen was mocked as irrelevant and on the way out. In effect, Hamas showed its supporters that it was possible – in spite of the military asymmetry – to force the other side to recognize its relevance. The organization also drew encouragement from the criticism of Israel in the international community for the destruction and casualties in the Gaza Strip during the operation, including from a number of Democratic legislators in the US Congress, and from the many anti-Israel demonstrations held in large cities in the US and Europe. For Hamas, these are evidence of a widening crack in support for Israel, which for many years appeared to be unconditional. In the ranks of the European Union there have been calls for talks with Hamas through a third party; Josep Borrell, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, sees an Israeli-Palestinian political process as a condition for the reconstruction of Gaza; and while President Biden seeks to talk with the moderate elements in the Palestinian arena, he also announced that the United States was committed to reconstruction of the Strip. These developments show the rising status on the international agenda of the Palestinian issue, which during the Trump administration was described by some as “a bone stuck in the Arab throat,” against a background of Israel’s growing integration in the Middle East and the integration of Palestinian Israeli citizens in the Israeli civilian space.

Hamas has also presented the destruction in the Strip caused by Israel as relatively minor, compared to the huge cognitive achievement. The Gaza population, which in the previous conflict pointed an accusing finger at Hamas, has not done so this time. The spirit of victory prevails and at present quashes expressions of criticism. The fact that the number of fatalities is relatively small also serves Hamas leaders, who claim it as proof of their improved military performance. Of course they do not attribute this to the caution adopted by Israel, although they often mention that residents of destroyed buildings were given warnings to evacuate before they were attacked.

Until there is another move in the arena with comparable influence to Guardian of the Walls, these developments will cast Hamas as an element that can no longer be ignored, particularly when it is now perceived internally as more legitimate than the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority. Although Abu Mazen was the one who put Jerusalem in the headlines when he claimed, in response to Israel’s refusal to allow the elections to be held in Jerusalem, that there would be no elections without its Palestinian residents, he now anticipates that the city’s residents will prefer Hamas. Criticism of Abu Mazen from East Jerusalem echoes throughout the West Bank, with calls to oust him and his associates, accused of treachery. Hamas leaders have added oil to the fire by presenting their achievements as the start of a “renewed” process of liberation, and urged the people to take to the streets with firearms or knives to attack Israelis.

The Palestinian security apparatuses are still loyal to Abu Mazen and have managed to contain the area and prevent an uncontrolled spread of protests. However it is doubtful whether they will be able to continue to do so for long if there are no signs of political reforms or a process that restores the Palestinian issue to center stage with an updated definition of the balance of internal forces. Now that Abu Mazen’s status has waned and the accusations of corruption are the subject of vociferous public debate, it is harder and harder for the security apparatuses to function. The PA can still count on the foundations that were built during the first seven years of Abu Mazen’s rule, when Salam Fayyad was prime minister, and which so far remain stable. These are assets that Hamas does not have, and will not have in the foreseeable future, unless the organization changes its political approach. One asset, for example, is the PA’s extensive international network under Abu Mazen, which makes them the sole address for all matters in the Palestinian context and brings in the finances needed to manage daily life in the Palestinian space. The second is the relationship between the PA and Israel, as defined by the Oslo Accords, with close security coordination for over 16 years that has contributed enormously to stability and created employment and economic security. The third is the economic contact between the PA and Israel, which employs many Palestinians, provides a market for Palestinian goods, and is the main source for needs in commerce, the economy, and healthcare. Another factor that maintains stability and works in favor of the Palestinian Authority is the difficulty of Hamas and other political Islam groups in the Arab world to gain the trust of the bourgeois, educated, and secular elites, for whom nationalism rather than religion is the basis of their identity and who wield influence on decision making. These elites work to delegitimize Islamic movements that seek to gain power, such as Hamas.

Will this combination of factors serve to maintain the stability of the Palestinian Authority, or will the erosion in the status of the PA and Fatah, spurred further by the support currently enjoyed by Hamas, eventually affect the activity of the Palestinian security apparatuses? It appears that without real reforms and a change in the PA’s leadership, Fatah, the PA, and the Palestinian national movement as a whole will have difficulty retaining their position as the sole representatives and leaders of Palestinian affairs. Today, however, the problem seems to focus on Abu Mazen himself, and not on the organization he leads. The necessary reforms demand an end to his presidency, but it is very doubtful whether he will resign.

In these circumstances, Israel must reassess its policy to the Palestinian Authority and Abu Mazen, and decide whether it is prepared to accept Hamas as an alternative – and if not, how the organization’s continued rise can be prevented. Apparently, there is a need for a broad regional/inter-Arab and international move to support reforms and rehabilitation of the PA and Fatah. The return of Salam Fayyad as prime minister, known as a leader who combats corruption, would relieve some of the criticism of Abu Mazen. Israel’s policy of separating the Gaza Strip from the West Bank also requires re-examination, particularly in view of the connection Hamas has created with the West Bank. Is this connection unavoidable? And if so – what can be done to prevent its becoming a liability for Israel?

In the immediate term, the most desirable move would be a meeting between Israeli and PA leaders, to revive ties rand improve daily life in the Palestinian arena. A joint declaration on the validity of the two states idea and recognition of the other side as a partner for talks would be a step in the right direction. Both sides will then have to deal with the urgent problems, in order to avoid friction and violent flare-ups. Moves that would help reduce the tension, particularly in Jerusalem, include postponing the eviction of the Palestinian families in Sheikh Jarrah, reaching understandings regarding the Temple Mount, and encouraging a dialogue between leaders of the three religions that have a presence in the eastern part of the city.