On Syria’s Chemical Weapons Usage, Listen to the Scientists
September 12, 2013 – By Noam Raidan
Scientific facts and evidence cannot be shelved in politics. This is particularly true when political authorities are attempting to embrace a course of action to address a science-related problem, as we have witnessed recently due to Syria’s chemical weapons crisis. Scientists and science journalists must be given a platform to clarify the many ambiguities surrounding the reported chemical weapons attacks in Damascus suburb Ghouta and earlier this year in Aleppo neighborhood Khan al-Assal.
They are the experts who understand the facts at hand, and they are capable of addressing central questions such as: What is the difference between homemade and military grade sarin? What is the difference between the chemical byproducts present in homemade versus military grade sarin and what materials should be examined in order to identify the type of sarin used? Is it difficult to find the byproducts? Can they disappear after a certain amount of time? What are the challenges that the UN inspection team, in probing the recent Ghouta attack and other incidents, is likely to encounter? Can any group (Syrian regime or other armed forces on the ground) be blamed for the crimes that have been reportedly committed before conclusive evidence is provided?
Dina Fine Maron, a Washington, D.C.-based associate editor at Scientific American (SciAm), answers some of these questions in a must-read article published on September 3, 2013. Similarly, Charles P. Blair, a senior fellow on state and nonstate terrorist threats with the Federation of American Scientists, provides insightful answers in a SciAm interview on August 28. In addition, science correspondent with The Guardian, Ian Sample, sheds light in his article titled “Syrian chemical weapons: How lab tests uncover evidence of sarin gas” by explaining the traces that can prove whether nerve agents such as Sarin were used in Syria. He also explains how the material gathered by UN inspectors in Syria will be tested in labs at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
It is very likely that the answers provided by scientists will disappoint some politicians and impede their political agendas, and scientific reports based on evidence and well-founded claims will be overshadowed by media outlets favoring reports that appeal to the audience’s sentiments. In the mainstream media and the political realm, the scientist’s voice is rarely heard and is often marginalized by louder, opinionated politicians with an agenda. But once that voice travels and resonates, its effects will help shape a better way of thinking that questions every single piece of information regardless of the source, and refrains from making unfounded allegations no matter how horrendous the crimes are.
Charles P. Blair writes in his article “Unlearned Lessons” that “to get the WMD assessment in Syria right, U.S. and world leaders will have to break free of the past habits of obfuscation, unsound scientific forensics, and the withholding of conflicting data.” He adds, “Unfortunately, as of now, the United States appears to be reprising its history of opaque and questionable WMD decision-making by claiming chemical weapons use on the basis of insufficient evidence.” Blair was mainly referring to a statement issued by the U.S. administration in early June 2013: “Following a deliberative review, our intelligence community assesses that the Assad regime has used chemical weapons, including the nerve agent sarin, on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year. Our intelligence community has high confidence in that assessment given multiple, independent streams of information.”
However, Blair quotes Matthew Meselson, co-director of the Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons, as saying: “High confidence requires that the chain of custody and the treatment of samples before they reach the participating analytical laboratories be accurately known and without possibility of tampering, contamination, or influences that might interfere with subsequent chemical analysis.”A similar mistake was made by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry when he told Senators earlier this month: “…We are certain that none of the opposition has the weapons or capacity to effect a strike of this scale, particularly from the heart of regime territory. Just think about it in logical terms, common sense.” But as Maron argues in her piece, the act of distinguishing refined military grade sarin from homemade sarin through examining trails in the area that was hit on August 21 “is not easy.” So, how can the administration have high confidence and be certain about something which has yet to be clarified? Where are their scientific methods?
The U.S. administration and politicians are rushing to conclusions without a transparent disclosure of scientific proof. This way of addressing the Syrian crisis will yield negative repercussions in the same way it has elsewhere. Ask the scientists.
Noam Raidan is a research assistant at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.