MESOPOTAMIA NEWS : PUTIN’S OFFSET
Nataliya Bugayova, Institute for the Study of War – THE KREMLIN’S GEOPOLITICAL ADAPTIONS SINCE 2014
MILITARY LEARNING AND THE FUTURE OF WAR SERIES
ABOUT THE AUTHOR Nataliya Bugayova is a non-resident National Security Research Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War’s (ISW). She led ISW’s Russia and Ukraine research team from 2019-2020 and has been ISW’s Russia Research Fellow since 2018. Her work focuses on the Kremlin’s foreign policy decision-making, information operations, and ongoing global campaigns – including in the former Soviet Union and Africa. She is the author of “How We Got Here with Russia: The Kremlin’s Worldview.” Her written work and interviews have been featured in media outlets including The Hill, BBC, VOA, and others. As ISW’s Development Director from 2016-2019, she also led growth efforts and planning for major events, including the ISW Security Conference.
Nataliya currently serves as Director of Intelligence at Tecsonomy, a new tech-enabled intelligence firm specializing in supply chain analysis. Prior to ISW, she was the Chief Executive Officer of the Kyiv Post, Ukraine’s independent English-language publication. She also served as Chief of Staff and Adviser on cooperation with international financial institutions to former Ukrainian Economy Minister Pavlo Sheremeta, who was appointed after the pro-democracy Euromaidan Revolution in February 2014. She holds a Master’s in Public Policy from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, where she was a student fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author would like to thank the members of the ISW research team and their counterparts at the Critical Threats Project (CTP) for their support of this report. She is grateful to ISW President Kim Kagan for launching this visionary project on the future of war. This paper would not have been possible without Dr. Frederick W. Kagan’s indispensable mentorship, analytical feedback, and encouragement throughout the process of researching and writing this paper. The author would also like to thank ISW Russia-Ukraine Team members Mason Clark and George Barros for their tireless analytical support and contributions of key insights. Mason Clark’s paper on Russian Military Learning, in particular, inspired numerous insights for this report. ISW National Security Fellow Jennifer Cafarella provided valuable analytical feedback that helped shape the author’s thinking. The author would like to thank former ISW research assistant Darina Regio for helping lay the groundwork for this paper. ISW Russia team interns Michaela Walker, Anthony Yanchuk, Kayla Gross, Cian Stryker, Edem Isliamov, and Paisley Turner contributed to the graphics and references presented in the paper. Finally, the author would like to thank the ISW-CTP Operations Team, Lisa Suchy—for her incredible support on graphics, Jacob Taylor—for his outstanding and tireless editorial mentorship, and Caitlin Forrest—for her hard work carrying this piece to publication.
. PUTIN’S OFFSET The Kremlin’s Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014 ISW and CTP believe that superior strategic insight derives from a fusion of traditional social science research and innovative technological methods. ISW and CTP recognize that the analyst of the future must process a wide variety of information ranging from interviews and historical artifacts to high-volume structured data. ISW and CTP thank their technology partners for their support in this innovative endeavor. Neo4j: Neo4j is a highly scalable native graph database that helps organizations build intelligent applications to meet evolving connected data challenges including fraud detection, tax evasion, situational awareness, real-time recommendations, master data management, network security, and information technology operations. Global organizations like MITRE, Walmart, the World Economic Forum, UBS, Cisco, HP, Adidas, and Lufthansa rely on Neo4j to harness the connections in their data. Ntrepid: Ntrepid enables organizations to conduct their online activities safely. Ntrepid’s Passages leverages the company’s platform and fifteen-year history protecting the national security community from their most sophisticated global opponents. From corporate identity management to secure browsing, Ntrepid products facilitate online research and data collection and eliminate the threats that come with having a workforce connected to the Internet. Linkurious: Linkurious provides graph visualization software that helps organizations detect and investigate insights hidden in graph data. Linkurious supports government agencies and global companies in a range of applications from anti-money laundering and cyber-security to medical research. Linkurious makes complex connected data easy to understand for analysts. Microsoft: Microsoft helps empower defense and intelligence agencies with its deep commitments to national security, trust, innovation, and compliance. With world-class security and a wide array of cloud services designed for mission success, the Microsoft Cloud offers a cloud platform designed for flexibility and scale to strengthen partnerships and alliances, create smart work environments and installations, and optimize operations to better meet mission needs and help foster a safer, more secure world.
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UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 7 SEPTEMBER 2020 Table of Contents 8 Executive Summary 13 Introduction 14 The US is Not Well-positioned to Counter the Russian Challenge 16 Methodology 16 Chapter 1: How Does Putin Succeed or Fail at Achieving His Goals? 16 Putin’s Strengths: Limited, but Not to Be Underestimated 18 How Does Putin Gain? 25 Limitations of Putin’s Power 27 How Does Putin Lose? 28 Putin’s Assessment of Russia’s Vulnerabilities: Erosion of Russia’s Sovereignty through Hybrid Means 31 Chapter 2: Putin’s Efforts and Adaptations post-2014: Shaping the International Environment to Offset the Limits of Russia’s Power 32 Putin’s Key Fight is about Shaping Perceptions 38 The Kremlin is Expanding Russia’s Military Footprint and Security Coalitions – Bases of Russia’s Power Projection 41 The Kremlin is Cocooning Russia in a Web of Coalitions to Amplify Russia’s Limited Real Power 44 The Kremlin is Evolving Russia’s Foreign Policy Tools and Means to Build Coalitions 47 The Kremlin has Evolved the Kremlin’s Approach to the “Russian World” – One of His Key Cohering Efforts 48 Putin is Investing in Anchor Relationships while Expanding Russia’s Influence in Peripheral Theaters 50 Putin’s Domestic Consolidation 51 Military Learning vs. Geopolitical Adaptation: Points of Overlap 52 Chapter 3: Effects 55 Chapter 4: Prospects and Recommendations 61 Endnotes 8
UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The West has had some success in countering the Kremlin since Russia’s illegal occupation of Crimea, but Russian President Vladimir Putin has found ways to offset external pressures on Russia without relinquishing his gains and goals. Putin’s center of gravity is increasingly his ability to shape others’ perceptions and create the image of a powerful Russia based on limited real power. Putin’s efforts since 2014 to offset the weaknesses of Russia’s position and advance his goals have focused on creating a Russia-favorable global information space; growing Russia’s military footprint in a targeted way that provides asymmetric opportunities to influence decision making; cocooning Russia in a network of coalitions and international organizations to amplify Russia’s limited power; diversifying the tools and means of Russia’s influence and subversion; expanding Russia’s influence in peripheral theaters; and consolidating power inside Russia. Putin’s evolving approaches enable him to play a bad hand well, but his hand remains weak. Putin’s dependency on asymmetrical approaches will grow as the gap between his means and aims likely increases. This gap will not necessarily threaten the survival of Putin’s regime, but it will provide opportunities for the US to counter the Russian challenge. The West should cut oxygen to two key amplifiers of Putin’s power—narratives and coalitions. The long-term solution versus Russia would be building collective immunity to the Russian challenge, including strategic intelligence capabilities in the US and its partners to recognize Putin’s slow tactical creep before it becomes his strategic advantage.
PUTIN’S OFFSET THE KREMLIN’S GEOPOLITICAL ADAPTATIONS SINCE 2014
How Does Putin Succeed or Fail at Achieving His Goals? Several sources of resilience have allowed Putin to retain power for 20 years. Putin understands Russia. He offers a limited and periodically changing but nevertheless real value proposition to the Russian people and other countries. He has several sources of real power, including nuclear weapons, a global military footprint, and veto power on the UN Security Council. Putin’s grip on Russia’s domestic narrative and the capabilities he has developed to influence the global narrative are other major sources of strength. Putin adapts to the changing geostrategic environment. He has dynamically updated his value proposition to his constituencies in Russia over the past two decades. Putin recalibrated the methods he uses to achieve his foreign policy objectives after 2014 without fundamentally altering those objectives. Most recently, Putin has shown he is willing to experiment with less oppressive tactics for taming public discontent in Russia. He has allowed the 2020 anti-Kremlin protests in Russia’s Far East to simmer without suppressing them for far longer than he would have done in the past, for example. He is evolving Russia’s hybrid warfare approaches as he is exploiting anti-government protests in Belarus to regain control over that former Soviet state. Putin’s power has real and growing limits, however. Putin is accumulating risk on fundamentals such as Russia’s economy and human capital, as both deteriorate. What Putin can offer Russia and its foreign partners is also limited, and in some cases harmful.
UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 9 SEPTEMBER 2020 Putin recognizes these problems but is unlikely to be able to significantly expand Russia’s resources and capabilities. His kleptocratic regime is incompatible with the reform required to meaningfully grow Russia’s economy. Additionally, Putin’s efforts post-2014 have skewed toward damage control and constraint mitigation, not toward improving Russia’s fundamentals. He has focused, for example, on controlling Russian society more effectively and pressuring other countries in a more lasting way rather than reforming Russia or becoming a more appealing international partner. Putin must increasingly sustain the perception that an alternative to his rule in Russia is either worse or too costly to fight for. Putin’s reliance on his ability to shape the narrative is thus an existential requirement. Putin no longer has the luxury of covering his actions in Russia in legalisms. For two decades, Putin tried to maintain a façade of democracy in Russia and repeatedly stated he would not change the constitution to suit his political agenda.1 Putin, however, openly did just that in 2020 to give himself effectively the opportunity to rule for life. The façade of legitimacy, which Putin has generally seen as important to the effectiveness of his approach, is also a limit on the Kremlin’s actions globally.
The Kremlin stopped its offensive in eastern Ukraine in 2014 at the limit of its “information frontier”—the point at which Russia ran out of information cover to advance its campaign in a hybrid manner—without openly committing to a full-fledged military offensive on Ukraine. The Kremlin planned to capture six regions in Ukraine but was only able to secure portions of two regions in part because the Kremlin greatly overestimated support for the idea of the “Russian World”i among the population in Ukraine. That lack of support stripped the Kremlin of the information cover it required to seize additional areas. As a result, Putin had to accept a lesser objective, at least for a while, than he initially planned to accomplish. Some of Putin’s post-2014 efforts exposed Russia to additional vulnerabilities. For example, Putin’s pivot to non-Western powers, especially China, to offset losses resulting from deteriorating relationships with the West may backfire in the long run. The economic power imbalance between Beijing and Moscow is so great that Putin cannot be confident in his ability to prevent China from imposing costs and limitations on him over time that he is in principle unwilling to accept.
The Kremlin has experienced numerous setbacks as the result of its limitations, such as failing to prevent the expansion of NATO in the Balkans in 2017 (when Montenegro joined) and again in 2020 (with the admission of North Macedonia) despite Kremlin efforts. The effectiveness of several key Russian foreign policy pressure tools, such as the Russian Orthodox Church and Russia’s energy exports, is also falling as many countries are trying to limit their exposure to Russia’s influence. Putin nevertheless continues to make gains —often in the West’s blind spots. Putin is still securing additional influence in former Soviet Union countries, as well as expanding Russia’s military footprint and information influence globally. Putin exploits the forces that drive the West toward accepting his gains and dropping pressures on him. He accelerates the erosion of memory of Russian aggression. He uses legitimate causes such as counterterrorism cooperation to pull countries into Russian initiatives and legitimize his malign activities. He refocuses his opponents away from their long-term interests and from the leverage they hold vis-à-vis Russia towards the short-term benefits or costs the Kremlin can inflict on them. He benefits from the desire for normalcy in the West and the ingrained reluctance to engage in confrontational policies toward Russia. The West’s tendency to ignore Russia’s trivial activities is another major opportunity for Putin. Slow, under the radar creep, often at the tactical level, is i. Putin defined the “Russian World” as “uniting all those spiritually connected to Russia and who consider themselves carriers of Russian language, culture, and history.” Putin’s Offset—The Kremlin’s Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014 10
UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG generally how the Kremlin sets conditions for strategic gains. Another Western vulnerability is the inclination to mistake the Kremlin’s sloppiness and adaptability for opportunism. This inclination results in part from the fact that Putin does move rapidly when he sees opportunities and often jumps from one theater to another in a way that appears to lack coherence to a Western audience that regards, say, the Middle East and the Baltics as entirely separate issues. In reality, Putin has pursued the same goals consistently for years. He has shown a willingness to accept losses to advance his larger efforts. The Kremlin’s means of pursuing these goals are being designed and improved to support them, even though their execution is often ineffective, poorly coordinated, and even counterproductive. The West must also understand that when the West legitimizes the Kremlin’s narratives and joins its international frameworks is provides oxygen to two major amplifiers of Putin’s power. Without this oxygen, Putin would likely be brought down closer to his actual size. Putin’s Efforts and Adaptations post-2014 Putin’s efforts since 2014 have been increasingly focused on shaping, not just disrupting, an international environment that will foster Russian interests and provide the Kremlin with resources and legitimacy. Putin likely has assessed that the long-term solution to deflect international pressure is to create an environment that will accept Russian principles and narratives and limit the need for it to use coercive measures against Russia. Putin’s core lines of effort that support this aim:
- Creating a Russia-favorable global information space and expanding the Kremlin’s information capabilities. The battle for minds is Putin’s key battle. Russia’s national security paradigm shifted toward the information space around 2014 likely in response to the informational successes and failures of its hybrid offensive on Ukraine as well as recognition of the increasing requirement to shape the narrative internationally to advance Russia’s foreign policy. The Kremlin also assesses that the chief threat to Russia’s sovereignty will emerge in the information space—from the West’s attempts to destabilize Russia from within by turning Russians against their government, as well as eroding Russia’s power in the world. The Kremlin has overhauled its information policies and increased its information operation capabilities and the area of its information impact globally. This area of impact is vast and goes beyond media and troll farms. Its purpose is strategic. It is no longer a supporting effort, but the principal focus. It is supported with both physical and information tools. It would thus be more accurate to define it as a perception space—the Kremlin’s efforts to promote specific narratives and create specific perceptions in support of its objectives or as an end in themselves.
- Expanding the security space around Russia without engaging in a costly arms race. Putin is expanding Russia’s military footprint in a targeted fashion, reflecting the Kremlin’s assessment that Russia should rebuild its power without falling into an expensive arms race trap. The Kremlin has thus prioritized building security coalitions to offset the limits of Russia’s growing but still limited military footprint. The Kremlin is using these security partnerships with other countries to source forces for the Kremlin’s military campaigns, legitimize Russia’s interventions under the umbrella of international cooperation, and advance the Kremlin’s broader goals—such as regaining influence over the former Soviet states. 3. Cocooning Russia in a web of coalitions and international organizations. Putin is expanding and interlinking Russia’s formal and informal partnerships to shape the international agenda, withstand Western pressure, as well as to gain access to sources of cash and legitimacy. Russia has signed hundreds of agreements in areas from media to military cooperation since 2014.
UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 11 SEPTEMBER 2020 Putin is also trying to engage the US. It is not a contradiction for Putin to want to partner with the US while trying to undermine US influence. US-granted legitimacy is a major power amplifier for Putin in the short-term, while diminishing America’s overall influence remains Putin’s long-term goal. 4. Reinforcing the primacy of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The postWWII order and Russia’s status as one of the the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (the G5) is a key base of Russia’s real and perceived power. The Kremlin aims to both revive G5 cooperation and reinforce the primacy of the UN, where Russia holds veto power on the Security Council, as a key international arbiter. Preserving these powers is vital to Putin.
- Diversifying foreign policy tools and means of building coalitions. The Kremlin has evolved its set of “nodes”—legitimate causes such as counterterrorism efforts—that it uses to pull countries into Russian initiatives. These causes are often not the primarily goals of the Kremlin’s outreach, but rather ways to build influence. Putin has expanded on the umbrella notion of sovereignty and has been engaging countries via an expanded set of “sovereignty”-related offerings, such as financial or digital independence from the systems of the “hegemonic” West. Putin has evolved his approach toward the “Russian World”—one of Putin’s core geopolitical constructs. He adjusted its rhetoric and tactics after Russia’s war in Ukraine resulted in pushback against the “Russian World.” Putin has also adapted how he uses armed forces in the FSU; they are not his first resort, nor his last resort. The Kremlin can leverage a credible threat of military intervention, given the precedent it set in Ukraine, to shape FSU politics without the use of force. 6. Investing in new bilateral relationships while expanding Russia’s influence in peripheral theaters. The Kremlin launched outreach campaigns into the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and South America in search of influence, legitimacy, and resources after 2014. 7. Consolidating power inside Russia and pushing for the “sovereignization”ii of Russia.
Putin has been offsetting his declining value proposition to the Russian people by tightening his grip on Russia, increasingly isolating Russia—especially from the global information space, as well as pushing Russian identity toward militaristic patriotism. Recommendations Putin’s sources of resilience and his adaptations will allow him to maintain his regime and his international campaigns on the current trajectory for a while. Putin’s offsetting efforts do not fundamentally change Russia’s strengths, but they help Putin buy time while he attempts to erode anti-Russia efforts globally and gradually build influence in multiple theaters. Putin’s future gains are not a given, however. Putin’s hand remains weak. The cost of maintaining Putin’s power will only grow, as will the cost of his foreign adventures. The US can take several steps to halt the Kremlin’s malign activities and gains: 1. Embrace complexity. Simplifying Putin’s regime to a ‘third-world dictatorship, a mafiarun gas station with nuclear weapons’ as some US officials have done hides nuanced ways in which Russia poses a challenge to the US and its allies. Putin gains a lot by perception—in the blind spots the West often does not realize exist. Information operations, especially their cumulative effects over time, pose a real threat to Western societies. But it is not all ii. Putin’s framing of his policies increasingly focuses on making Russia independent from Western influence, including creating Russia’s “sovereign internet,” decreasing the use of the dollar, and solidifying the priority of Russian laws over international laws in the constitution. These efforts isolate Russia from the international community. Putin’s Offset—The Kremlin’s Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014 12
UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG perception—we should not forget about the real power Putin holds. The Kremlin treats its varied efforts as a comprehensive undertaking, and the West needs to confront them the same way. The US should focus not only on Russia’s tools of malign influence, but also on the strategic campaigns they support.
The US should avoid bifurcated frameworks of military and civilian, state and non-state tools but rather apply the Kremlin’s lens of a consolidated national security space that dynamically draws on whatever resources it deems necessarily to achieve its goals. 2. Build immunity against the Kremlin’s malign activity. Develop strategic intelligence capabilities in the US and within US partners to recognize the Kremlin’s campaigns and perception manipulations early—before they amount to strategic gains. Monitor, prevent, and counter the Kremlin’s efforts to destroy antibodies to its influence. 3. Retain dampeners. • Keep sanctions and legitimacy restrictions, such as access to international organizations, on Russia unless the Kremlin stops and reverses its belligerent acts. • Prevent Putin from offloading his problems on someone else’s balance sheet, such as transferring financial responsibility for Russia-created illegal republics in Ukraine without restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty; or offloading the financial struggles of Assad onto the balance sheet of the international community. 4. Prevent Putin’s false narratives from becoming accepted as truth. • Constantly debunk the Kremlin’s false narratives and perception-altering activities that are malign. Enhance international mechanisms to keep the ‘truth’ in place. • Build a broad international coalition to investigate Russia’s violations of international law and the law of armed conflict. 5. Do not empower Putin by legitimizing his actions. Do not fall for the Kremlin’s cooperation frameworks. Watch for and when possible disrupt early Russia’s emerging cooperation frameworks. Recognize the vital importance of the Kremlin’s web of partnerships to Putin’s ability to amplify Russia’s power.
Contest Putin through these international platforms, especially at the UN. 6. Help Ukraine win its fight against Russia’s efforts to regain dominant influence over Ukraine’s decision-making. Recognize that Ukraine is the major dampener on Putin’s ambitions globally by tying down limited highend resources Putin would use elsewhere if he could. Work with European partners to prevent Putin from manipulating Ukraine into a peace deal on Russia’s terms, in particular; counter the Kremlin’s false narratives about Ukraine; empower Ukraine’s reform efforts. 7. Test Putin’s commitment to his aggressive foreign policy by challenging him across multiple theaters. 8. Build coalitions to achieve all of the above. • Prioritize Europe as it can significantly affect the international balance and momentum on Russia’s issue. • Broaden the coalition. Russia derives a lot of legitimacy from the non-Western world. 9. Keep the information exchange with Russia open. Understanding why Putin exists as a phenomenon is equally important to understanding the threat he poses to the US and its allies.
UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 13 SEPTEMBER 2020 Introduction Russian President Vladimir Putin’s center of gravity is increasingly his ability to shape perceptions and create the projection of a powerful Russia based on limited real power. Putin launched a military intervention into Ukraine six years ago. That action was part of a long-term effort to retain and then regain control over Ukraine and other parts of the former Soviet Union, among other objectives. Putin’s goals have not changed in the intervening years but his approaches to achieving them have evolved. Putin’s campaigns in Ukraine, Syria, and beyond expanded Russia’s influence and allowed Putin to project increasing Russian power, but at a price.
The cumulative effects of sanctions and wariness of and pushback against the Kremlin’s aggression globally have combined with Russia’s technological, economic and demographic limitations to weaken other pillars of Putin’s power and diminish his value proposition to Russia’s people and its international partners. Putin’s resources thus remain insufficient to achieve his goals if used in a straightforward manner. Putin is instead exploiting asymmetrical approaches to project greater Russian strength than actually exists and offset the limits of his real power. He has increasingly focused on shaping, not just disrupting, an international environment that will foster Russian interests and give Moscow resources and legitimacy. The Kremlin’s chief effort is shaping the perceptions of other actors by creating a global Russia-amenable information space. The Kremlin is using informational and physical tools, including military pressure, to shape the perceptions. If Putin wins the narrative, he can translate perceptional gains into reality. For example, if he can persuade Kyiv to voluntarily accept the Kremlin’s principle of Ukraine’s truncated sovereignty then parts of the international sanctions regime would likely collapse, solidifying the success of his narrative efforts. Putin’s power has limited but real bases and transcends his ability to manipulate perceptions. The US cannot lose sight of these bases of power that include a global military footprint that Putin continues to expand, albeit in a limited and targeted fashion; a large nuclear arsenal; asymmetric military capabilities, particularly in the realm of anti-access, area-denial systems; and a veto on the United Nations Security Council. The creation of a web of overlapping coalitions around Russia to amplify Russia’s limited real power is another key element of Putin’s offset approach. Posing as the defender of the post-WWII order and cooperation among the permanent members of the UN Security Council (the G5) is another increasingly critical effort for Putin because of the importance of Russia’s UN veto in Moscow’s limited toolset. Putin has also expanded Russia’s influence into peripheral theaters to offset losses of legitimacy and resources that have resulted from his deteriorating relationship with the West. Domestically, Putin has tightened his grip on Russia and consolidated power to offset his declining value proposition as his popular support—once bolstered by Russia’s occupation of Crimea—has started to wane and economic pressures have grown. Putin’s offset efforts in Russia and globally allowed the Kremlin to continue to secure gains without changing what Russia offers its partners and without curbing its malign behavior. However, most of these Putin seeks to avoid being forced into a defensive information posture that could call into question narratives about his value and strength. Putin’s Offset—The Kremlin’s Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014 14
UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG offset efforts do not significantly improve Russia’s fundamental capabilities. Putin’s real power limits remain and will likely tighten. Putin’s reliance on his ability to shape perceptions combined with his inability to meaningfully expand sources of conventional strength means that even his hybrid wars can go only so far. For example, in 2014 the Kremlin stopped an offensive aimed at securing six regions of Ukraine after taking only two in part because the optics on the ground no longer allowed Putin to pursue Russia’s military campaign in a hybrid manner. Putin seeks to avoid being forced into a defensive information posture that could call into question narratives about his value and strength. Therein lies one of the key and least-exploited vulnerabilities in Putin’s offset approach. The US is Not Well-positioned to Counter the Russian Challenge The US has been catching up to the Russian challenge, but Putin has evolved. The US has intensified its analysis of Russia’s ways of war since Russia illegally occupied Crimea in 2014. The 2018 US National Defense Strategy elevated strategic competition with Russia and China to the level of key national security challenges.2 The US countered Putin’s malign behavior through sanctions, building military and governance capacity among partner states, and creating new capabilities within the US.3 The Kremlin has gone through a phase of major geopolitical and military adaptation since 2014, however. • Theory: The Kremlin overhauled all key doctrines and concepts that determine Russia’s foreign policy and national security priorities and approaches.4 The Russian Armed Forces also carried out extensive internal debates on the character of future conflicts and necessary Russian military development to counter the US.5 The Kremlin adjusted Russian capabilities based on these revisions. • Practice: The Kremlin had to adapt its approaches on the ground for several reasons: new constraints, including sanctions and legitimacy setbacks such as the exclusion of Russia from international organizations; experience from military campaigns in Ukraine and Syria, including failures in those campaigns; increasing global wariness of the Kremlin’s subversion; and emerging opportunities, such as the growing inward focus of the US and Europe. The West has had some success curbing Putin’s aggression. Sanctions have dampened Putin’s military modernization, increased the costs of keeping his inner circle and the wider population content, slowed Putin’s geopolitical projects, such as the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Europe, and undermined Putin’s plans to turn Crimea into an economically vibrant area.6 Western military aid and defense-capacity building in Ukraine played a major role in deescalating the conflict by increasing the costs of Russian military action. Putin nonetheless continues to make gains and reverse setbacks. He has maintained power for 20 years and will be able to run for president again in 2024. Putin preserved and, in some cases, expanded his gains in the former Soviet space since 2014. 7 He gained strategic positions in Syria and expanded Russian influence in Libya and throughout Africa.8 Putin’s cooptation of Turkey increased friction within NATO. (See the “Effects” chapter on page 52 for the overview of Putin’s gains). The Kremlin’s aggression also persists. Russia’s targeting of civilians in Syria continues; Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine has resulted in over 13,000 deaths.9 The West inadvertently empowers Putin. Putin benefits from the West’s conflicting efforts to engage the Kremlin on some issues, while trying to counter it on others. Western leaders have expressed openness
UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 15 SEPTEMBER 2020 to returning Russia back into international organizations. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe reinstated Russia’s voting rights in 2019 despite Russia’s continued illegal occupation of Crimea, the action that had led to the revocation of the rights in the first place.10 Europe is proceeding with Russia’s Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline despite the likelihood that Russia will use this pipeline to pressure Europe in the future. European endorsement of the Russia-driven peace process in Ukraine reinforces the Kremlin’s efforts to cast itself falsely as a mediator in a conflict where Russia is a belligerent. It is critical for the West to remember why it took issue with Putin in the first place. Putin’s ambition to reinstate Russia as a great power has not been the issue; his means of pursuing this goal have. Putin illegally occupied portions of countries whose sovereignty Russia had formally recognized, such as Georgia and Ukraine; his forces target civilians in Syria in support of a campaign to secure military basing; he continues to attack democracies through disinformation and interference in their elections. The West misses Putin’s advances and often does not act on opportunities to counter him. The Kremlin’s gradual reversal of its political setbacks in Moldova attracts less attention in the West than Russian force posturing, but this slow creep of influence is how Putin advances efforts that, if successful, will have implications for NATO members that border Moldova and thereby for US national security.11 Europe missed an opportunity to counter Russia in 2019 by allowing the Kremlin to pressure Ukraine into a gas deal that provided Ukraine with shortterm benefits but stripped Ukraine’s long-term leverage, even though the Kremlin had a weaker hand in those negotiations.12 The Kremlin would have incurred losses had it not secured the energy deal with Ukraine, which came at the last minute before its expiration in December 2019. Allowing the deal to expire would have limited Russia’s ability to export gas to Europe. The Kremlin was vulnerable at this time due to construction delays on the Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream gas pipelines, which the Kremlin is building to diversify its energy transit options to Europe. A gas shutoff would have challenged Russia’s promise to deliver discounted gas to Moldova—one of the Kremlin’s enticements for the Moldovan government. Europe could have used this leverage to pressure Russia on either the energy deal itself or on issues beyond energy, such as the Ukrainian peace process. Doing so would have required seeing an opportunity to constrain Russia’s policies overall—an approach thwarted by the constant compartmentalization of Russia-related issues in Western policy discourse. The West’s partial effectiveness in countering the Kremlin reflects blind spots in the West’s conception of the Russian challenge — rather than Putin’s strengths.
Putin is resilient in a number of ways, but weak in others. The converging global crises of 2020 have worsened Putin’s weaknesses. He often achieves gains by slim margins. His behavior is sometimes counterproductive to his own objectives. He nevertheless remains on a trajectory to gain more influence in his core theater and beyond. The West misperceives Putin’s areas of strength and weakness, as well as his threat perceptions. As a result, Western states periodically and inadvertently empower Putin or miss opportunities to counter him. Putin is thus gradually winning a war of wills that many in the West do not even recognize is occurring. Putin’s Offset—The Kremlin’s Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014 16
UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Methodology This paper assesses how Putin has evolved his geopolitical thinking and approaches since 2014 and the ways in which he has worked to offset growing international pressures without relinquishing his gains or goals. The paper unpacks the Kremlin’s evolved assessment of threats to Russia and the future of conflict. It assesses Putin’s sources of resilience and the limits of his power. This paper assesses how Putin advances his goals and why he faces setbacks. Finally, this paper analyses the effects of Putin’s adaptations since the illegal occupation of Crimea in 2014, presents a forecast of trajectory of Putin’s efforts, and recommends a set of actions the US can take to counter the Russian challenge. This paper’s arguments are founded on analysis of what the Kremlin says and what the Kremlin does. The author has analyzed dozens of Russian doctrinal documents as well as interviews with Kremlin national security and foreign policy officials throughout Putin’s tenure with specific focus on the period from 2014 through 2020. The paper builds upon the insights of ISW’s two 2019 foundational reports: “The Kremlin’s Worldview” tracked the evolution of Putin’s thinking since 2000 and “Confronting the Russian Challenge” defined the nature of the Russian threat.13 This paper is also informed by ISW’s extensive analysis of the Kremlin’s campaigns, including in its core theater—Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, as well as the Kremlin’s efforts in the Balkans, in the Middle East and Africa, and Putin’s cross-theater efforts, such as campaigns to expand Russia’s military footprint, information space, and global coalitions.14 This paper presents meta-analysis of these campaign assessments without repeating their argumentation and evidence. The reader can find added granularity in the footnotes. Finally, the paper highlights and synthesizes parallels with ISW’s upcoming analysis of Russian military learning since 2014. How Does Putin Succeed or Fail at Achieving His Goals? Putin has several sources of resilience that have allowed him to endure in power for 20 years, but his power has real limits. The value Putin can offer Russia and its foreign partners is even more limited. This chapter analyzes the ways in which Putin advances his goals and the reasons he faces setbacks. This chapter also provides an assessment of Putin’s sources of resilience and vulnerabilities, including his own evaluations of Russia’s weaknesses and the threats it faces, which differ from the West’s perceptions. 1. Putin’s Strengths: Limited, but Not to Be Underestimated Putin understands Russia and has dynamically updated his value proposition to his constituencies over the past two decades. The essence of Putin’s first social contract in the 2000s was providing order and stability to the Russian people in exchange for their liberties. Putin’s next iteration in the 2010s offered to restore Russia’s national greatness and make the West respect Russia again.15 Putin proposed a revised social contract in 2020 as his popular support—previously bolstered by Russia’s Chapter 1:
UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 17 SEPTEMBER 2020 illegal occupation of Crimea in 2014—started to wane. 16 He pledged increased social spending and promised to enshrine core Russian values in the constitution along with measures that further strengthen the Kremlin’s powers and allow Putin to run for president in 2024. 17 His hold on power is not invulnerable, but so far Putin has been able to accurately assess how far he can push the Russian people during each ebbing and flowing of his popularity. He has not yet faced major backlash against his power retention efforts in 2020, which included reportedly unprecedented fraud during the national vote on the constitutional amendments. His societal control measures are strong and some of his constituencies are accepting of his continued rule.18 Putin has managed steadily to reduce civil liberties in Russia over the past 20 years, solidifying the powers of the security services and increasing governmental control over Russia’s information space.19 He has effectively suppressed all anti-government protests during his tenure. However, Putin has shown that he is willing to change his tactics of taming public discontent. Putin has chosen not to crack down on the anti-Kremlin protests in Russia’s Far East Khabarovsk region that emerged in July 2020—at least as of the publication of this report.20 Instead, Putin has allowed the protests to continue and sent Kremlin officials to engage the protesters—likely betting that rallies will eventually die out naturally.21 Only an extraordinary confluence of crises, namely the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic and low energy prices, has meaningfully increased the costs of Putin’s efforts to maintain power and highlighted the limits of his value proposition. He will face growing challenges to his rule, as we discuss in the sections on Putin’s limitations and prospects, but he likely has enough resilience to carry him on his current trajectory for a while. Putin offers some credible domestic value. There is substance to the narrative that Putin made Russia stronger—especially during the first decade of his rule. He did bring order and stability to Russia after the devasting aftermath of the USSR’s collapse. He stopped the war in Chechnya through a brutal military campaign. He restored the prestige of Russia’s military and security services within Russia by expanding their funding, power and capabilities. Putin created an incentive structure that has sustained his regime for over 20 years. He maintains a small core circle of advisors— most of whom came from Russia’s security services, subscribe to Putin’s narrative, and have worked with Putin for two decades.22 Putin’s incentive model combines: • Credible threats, such as losing one’s job, freedom, or being expelled from Russia.23 • Benefits, including key roles in Russia’s stateowned enterprises and lucrative deals at home and abroad for his associates as well as prestige and benefits for those joining Russia’s security services.24 • Denying alternatives, such as restricting foreign travel even for former members of Russian security services,25 limiting the ability of those with experience living abroad to occupy high government positions,26 allowing sanctions to erode the wealth and freedom of movement of his associates.27 Putin maintains a perception that his continued presidency provides value and that an alternative to him would be worse or too costly to fight for. In addition to appealing to some in Russia with economic benefits and promise of Russia’s greatness and stability, Putin has forced out or marginalized his opponents, keeping Russia’s civil society in a nascent state. He also pushed some Russian young people into political apathy and others into patriotic activism by launching numerous Kremlinsponsored patriotic youth movements.28 Putin’s control over the domestic narrative through his dominant influence over Russian media and the broader information space is one of his core strengths. The Kremlin uses this influence to push the narrative that, without Putin, Russia risks major internal destabilization and loss of sovereignty.29 Putin’s grip on his narrative makes him resilient to developments that would have threatened the power of other leaders. Russia has several sources of real power globally. Russia is a nuclear power. Putin expanded Russia’s Putin’s Offset—The Kremlin’s Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014
18 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG military footprint and strategic basing in the Middle East, Crimea, and the Arctic. He modernized the Russian armed forces and developed niche military capabilities, such as advanced air defense systems, naval capabilities, electronic, and cyber warfare. These capabilities give Putin meaningful, if limited, power as they pose challenges for the US and even more for its allies.30 For example, the expansion of Russian anti-access/area-denial (A2/ AD) systems in Syria and the MENA region could complicate American freedom of navigation and future counterterrorism efforts. Putin’s aggressive posture versus the Baltics and increasingly so versus Scandinavian countries, even if limited, poses a threat to these weaker NATO states and partners.31 The Kremlin has the means to offer niche political and economic benefits to would-be partners. These benefits include items such as security services training, the construction of nuclear power plants, a veto on the UN Security Council, and the ability to provide a global outreach platform. Putin uses these offerings in a highly targeted way to build influence. Putin is able to pivot. Putin has shown he is willing to live with some failures and setbacks to advance an overall narrative and his larger efforts. Putin is able to step back, recalibrate, and buy time to get his influence and military campaigns back on track, as we explore in the next section on “How Putin Makes Gains.” Putin takes care to preserve his ability to pivot. For example, he rolled out the 2020 constitutional changes in a highly controlled manner. He presented the general contours of the amendments in January 2020. Two months later, he inserted the key amendment that would allow him to run for president in 2024.32 Putin likely phased the roll-out to muddy the information space and to disarm potential opposition to the prospect of 12 more years of his rule while preserving his ability to shift course—maneuvering space that turned out to be very important as the COVID-19 pandemic emerged.33 Putin has a big picture view across time and space. Putin has the benefit of a two-decade tenure leading a country that has engaged in numerous campaigns globally. Additionally, his long time in power provides Putin and his associates—many of whom worked in intelligence services—continuity of knowledge about the Kremlin’s subversive tradecraft across the world. These two factors provide Putin with an advantage over nations whose leadership changes more frequently. This advantage is particularly pronounced over emerging democracies in the former Soviet Union (FSU), where leaders often change, and strategic intelligence capabilities are nascent and often intentionally undermined by the Kremlin.34 Putin is willing to use force and ignore international law. This willingness provides Putin with an advantage over other actors who are constrained by international law. His willingness to crack down on the Russian people helps preserve his regime when his softer efforts of maintaining popularity falter. 2.How Does Putin Gain? The Kremlin often generates gains based on perception without changing Russia’s capabilities. These gains emerge at the nexus of the Kremlin’s efforts to manipulate perceptions and the West’s inherent blind spots about Russia’s intent and capabilities. Minimizing the West’s perception of its own leverage over Russia is a core component of this effort. The Kremlin generates perceptions by using both informational and physical tools to manipulate the behavioral forces that drive governments and individuals. Coopting aspirations for peace. Putin secured several concessions from Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky by exploiting Zelensky’s desire and election promise to achieve peace, as well as the European urge to reach a deal on Ukraine and restore economic relations with Russia.35 The Kremlin secured concessions, such as the disengagement of Ukrainian forces from several areas on the frontlines, without changing the reality of Russia’s aggression.36 Russia-controlled forces continued to regularly kill Ukrainian servicemen, and the Kremlin’s proxies violated the very disengagement zones the Kremlin pressured Kyiv to agree to.37
UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 19 SEPTEMBER 2020 Putin is exploiting forces driving the West toward normalization with Russia. One such force is the uncomfortable reality that standing up to Russia imposes costs—direct costs such as military aid to partners, opportunity costs of not doing business with Russia, and psychological costs of being in a confrontation with Russia. The fear that a minor confrontation with Russia even in Putin’s non-core theaters could lead to a major military escalation influences Western actions versus Russia. ISW has refuted this assumption in its previous report but it remains, of course, widespread.38 Putin has shown himself to be a rational actor who has backed down, rather than escalated, on many occasions when the campaign did not go his way.39 Russian officers also often stress the importance of containing escalation until the right moment in a hybrid offensive.40 This approach reduces the possibility of uncontrolled retaliation in response to escalations by the West. But the risk of miscalculation always remains, and Putin uses rhetoric to amplify that small risk into a seemingly unacceptable danger that often paralyzes Western action. Putin uses these fears and misperceptions to distract his opponents from their long-term interests and the leverage they hold vis-à-vis Russia. The Kremlin, The Kremlin’s Projection of Russia 2020 © Institute for the Study of War Graphics by Nataliya Bugayova Bases Projection Plane Perceptions and Narratives Bases of Putin’s real power: • Nuclear weapons • Niche military capabilities • Limited global military footprint • Energy sales and pipelines • Veto power in the UNSC • Societal control tools • Resources of the former Soviet states Blind spots and preexisting perceptions of other countries: • Perceiving Putin as a purely an opportunist or a strategist • Ignoring the Kremlin’s trivial activities • Fearing the psychological cost of being in a confrontation with Russia Amplifiers and offsetting factors: • Russia-driven •Ideas and narratives •Partnerships and coalitions •Human networks •Foreign policy tools • External/Exogenous •Forces that drive others toward normalization of ties with Russia •Time Perceptions the Kremlin seeks to generate: • Russia is a great power • Russia deserves its sphere of influence • The West can partner with Russia on global issues • Sanctions against Russia do not work Putin’s Offset—
The Kremlin’s Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014 20 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG for example, pushed Ukraine and Europe into an energy deal that provided short-term benefits for both Europe and Ukraine, but forced Ukraine to give up multibillion dollar claims against Russia’s stateowned energy giant Gazprom—as discussed previously.41 Putin is also hijacking the notion of peace. The Kremlin is pushing for seemingly normal steps toward peace in Ukraine, such as additional disengagement zones or platforms to facilitate discussions between the Ukrainian government and representatives of the Kremlin proxies. These initiatives, however, help legitimize Russia’s illegal invasion and undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty because they are unaccompanied by any admission of Russia’s own direct role in the conflict or any commitment to reduce that unacknowledged role.42 The Kremlin has also attempted to hijack the Syrian peace process via its parallel Astana talks.43 Coopting fears. The Kremlin’s hybrid offensive in Ukraine in 2014 relied on Russia’s preceding, decade-long campaign to create negative sentiment about the Ukrainian government and the West in Ukraine’s eastern region of Donbas. Fueling fear was at the heart of this effort. Around the time of the 2004 Orange Revolution, when the Kremlinpreferred presidential candidate in Ukraine lost the election, the Kremlin intensified efforts to spread false narratives about Donbas being exploited by the US, Kyiv, and Ukrainian nationalists in order to cultivate separatist sentiments.44 The Kremlin tapped into these perceptions to set up and control its proxy force in Donbas in 2014.45 Kremlin disinformation networks employ fearbased tactics globally; these include trying to frame the US as being behind the COVID-19 pandemic through alleged bioweapon-producing biolabs in the former Soviet states and accusing British forces of planning to stage chemical accidents in Ukraine.46 In the FSU, the Kremlin can leverage a credible threat of military intervention, given the precedent it set in Ukraine, to shape FSU politics without the use of force. The Kremlin has likely been leveraging the expectations others have about the Kremlin using force overtly or covertly to shape the behavior of political actors in Belarus, as well as the West, during the 2020 anti-government protests in Belarus.47 Exploiting the West’s blind spots. The West has two key blind spots with regard to Russia. First, the West sometimes ignores Putin’s activities that appear trivial. However, these trivial activities are essential to Putin’s gains. Slow, under the radar creep, often at the tactical level, is how the Kremlin sets conditions for strategic gains. A decade of information and subversion operations in Ukraine enabled the Kremlin’s hybrid operation in Donbas in 2014. The Kremlin started to set up separatist structures in Donbas as early as 2005—the process that went largely unnoticed in the West.48 Seemingly minor advances in Moldova enabled the Kremlin to gradually reverse its influence setbacks in 2019—and the West was largely unaware of its loss.49 The second blind spot is the tendency to mistake Putin’s adaptability, deliberate or forced pauses, and sloppy execution for opportunism. Putin stays on the same goal for years. The Kremlin’s means—despite being often ineffective, poorly coordinated, and even counterproductive—largely support Putin’s strategic intent. The Kremlin’s campaigns in Ukraine and Moldova, for example, take advantage of opportunities, but they are not primarily opportunistic. They are multi-domain, coordinated, and phased. They support a clear set of Putin’s objectives centered on regaining dominant influence of the decision-making in both countries. The Kremlin faced numerous setbacks in Moldova in 2016–2018, when Moldova paused key bilateral cooperation mechanisms with Russia and expelled numerous Russian officials. However, the Kremlin never stopped working to The Kremlin’s means —despite being often ineffective, poorly coordinated, and even counterproductive— largely support Putin’s strategic intent. Phase 1: Courting President Zelensky Pressure campaign against Zelensky Kremlin-controlled proxies continue attacks on Ukrainian forces on the frontline JAN-FEB: Kremlin proxies launch regular and false flag attacks on disengagement points Forcing Concessions from Zelensky OCT: Russian forces delay their disengagement from the frontlines SEP – JUL: Putin launches disinformation campaign accusing Zelensky of stalling the peace process December 2019 DEC: The Kremlin reportedly increases cyber operations against Ukraine March 2019 – August 2019 January 2020 – August 2020 APR – present: Intensified campaign to grant Russian citizenship to Ukrainians in Donbas AUG: Kremlin increases control over DNR/LNR infrastructure JUL: Ukraine disengages from Stanitsa Luhanska SEP: Russia receives MH-17 witness as a part of the prisoner exchange OCT: Ukraine agrees to Steinmeier Formula NOV: Ukraine disengages from Zolote and Petrivske NOV: Putin demands Ukraine disengage from the entire frontline DEC: Kremlin secures gas deal DEC: Russia gets 5 members of disbanded Berkut service in the prisoner exchange MAR: Ukraine officials agree to March 11 Protocols in Minsk (though the Kremlin’s efforts to force Kyiv into direct talks with Russian proxies have stalled as of August 2020) FEB: Likely Kremlin actors launch COVID19 disinformation campaign Superficial Kremlin concessions & posturing Kremlin and loyal media deploy optimistic rhetoric and refrain from criticizing Zelensky SEP: Prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine DEC: Prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine NOV: Kremlin agrees to the Normandy talks September 2019 – November 2019 Coopting Europe into the Russia-preferred peace process Snapshot of the Kremlin’s Campaign to Advance a KremlinFavorable Peace Process in Ukraine March 2019-August 2020 JUL: Kremlin agrees to a new ceasefire, postures as a responsible actor and softens the rhetoric about Ukraine again JUN: Kremlin threatens to break off peace process after Kyiv declines to include parts in Donbas in Oct 2020 local elections Phase 2: Pressure Campaign ahead of the Normandy Talks Phase 3: Normandy Talks and Gas Talks Phase 4: Advancing Objectives Further Snapshot of the Kremlin’s Campaign to Advance a KremlinFavorable Peace Process in Ukraine March 2019–August 2020 © 2020 by the Institute for the Study of War Graphic by Nataliya Bugayova Originally published in: “Russia in Review: Putin Accelerates Ukraine Campaign Amid Converging Crisis,” by Nataliya Bugayova, Mason Clark, and George Barros, ISW, March 24, 2020 Putin’s Offset—The Kremlin’s Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014 22 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG empower its preferred political forces and sideline their opponents, and eventually managed to regain some of its lost influence in Moldova by 2020. The Kremlin’s political proxies in Ukraine are similarly relentless in their efforts to regain power six years after the 2014 EuroMaidan Revolution.50 Putin is also persistently pursuing several global efforts, such as expanding Russia’s strategic basing, despite setbacks. The West should recognize that, while Putin can be opportunistic and while the Kremlin’s campaigns can seize on opportunities, the Kremlin has a clear set of interests and goals it has been consistently pursuing and that many of Putin’s gains have stemmed precisely from his persistent push. (See chapter 2 on pg. 31 for analysis of Putin’s priority efforts post-2014). Using time. Putin succeeds when the world forgets his transgressions. The West’s will to resist naturally erodes over time, especially as a generation of politicians emerges for whom a “counter-Russia policy” is an inherited stance. The West has some mechanisms to hold the truth in place, but its political structures struggle to maintain awareness of even Russia’s major atrocities, such as the massacre of several hundred Ukrainian servicemen retreating through a Kremlin-approved “humanitarian corridor” in Ukraine’s city of Illovaisk in 2014.51 Putin is working to accelerate this erosion of memory by diverting the West’s attention from the Kremlin’s malign behavior to Russia’s potential as a partner. The Kremlin is similarly working to normalize his aggression in Ukraine by continuing to push the narrative of Ukraine a brotherly nation and falsely frame the current setback in the relationships between Russia and Ukraine as merely driven by Ukrainian radical nationalists and not Russia’s war against Ukraine.52 Keeping opponents on the defensive through multiple pressure points. The Kremlin also advances its goals by pressuring its opponents from multiple angles to overwhelm and shrink their perceived room to maneuver. In Ukraine, the Kremlin is able to press on several pain points using military force in Donbas and the Black and Azov seas, cyber and disinformation attacks, and low-burning subversion in western Ukraine.53 The Kremlin can scale its pressure up or down depending on interim objectives. In March 2020 for example, the Kremlin escalated militarily in Donbas, likely Kremlin actors helped fuel protests around COVID-19 in Ukraine through disinformation, and the Kremlin ramped up its efforts to isolate Ukraine internationally by promoting a false narrative that Ukraine is intentionally delaying the peace process—as the Kremlin was trying to extract additional concessions from Zelensky.54 The Kremlin then reduced the pressure on Zelensky in July 2020 by agreeing to a new ceasefire and softening the rhetoric about Ukraine.55 Putin has been expanding his available pressure points on Europe. The Kremlin is growing its military influence in the Balkans by supplying weapon systems to Serbia and supporting secessionist forces in the Republika Srpska.56 Russia has increased military pressure on the Baltics and the Scandinavian countries through additional military buildup.57 Putin is also investing in sources of economic power in Europe, such as energy pipelines Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream. Diversifying political investments. Russia likely invested in several political entities to increase the likelihood of an outcome favorable to Russia in Ukraine’s 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections.58 This diversification marks a shift from the Kremlin’s previously overt support to its favored political forces in Ukraine, as Russia did with Ukraine’s former President Victor Yanukovych, who was ousted by the 2014 EuroMaidan Revolution. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov also openly talks about building relationships with all sides in other theaters and countries, such as Libya, as part of Russia’s strategy.59 Bundling and cooperation model. Putin bundles negotiation on unrelated issues to dilute his opponents’ leverage. Putin diluted Ukraine’s leverage on energy by bundling energy and peace talks with Ukraine at the Normandy Four meeting in December 2019 and, as a result, secured the deal by the deadline.60 The Kremlin likely achieved this bundling by exploiting Zelensky’s urgency to advance the peace talks with Russia. UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 23 SEPTEMBER 2020 The Kremlin also uses legitimate causes such as counterterrorism to pull countries into Russian initiatives (see section 4 of chapter 2 on pg. 44 for more on how Putin is evolving Russia’s foreign policy tools). These causes are often not the primary goals of the Kremlin’s outreach, but ways to build influence. The Kremlin sought to coopt the US into a diplomatic counterterrorism-focused alignment in Syria.61 In 2015, the UK pledged to work with Russia to combat ISIS, while the US praised Putin for his “constructive” role in international efforts to achieve a political settlement in Syria.62 The West eventually learned that supporting a Russia-friendly regime in Damascus and gaining military basing, not counterterrorism, were Putin’s primary goals. The international community continues to occasionally fall for Putin’s cooperation models—even on the issues where Russia is a malign actor, such as cybersecurity.63 Russia has also signed hundreds of partnership agreements with dozens of nations since 2014.64 These partnerships include media, information security and military cooperation deals. The Kremlin also turns on its collegial mode to achieve its goals. A nominal alignment with the West on the formation of a Moldovan parliamentary coalition in June 2019 likely helped Russia reverse its failing position in Moldova. The Kremlin helped facilitate a coalition between pro-Russian and pro-European parties in 2019—in part likely by exploiting the West’s urge to end the political deadlock in Moldova. This coalition sidelined a key opponent of Russian interests, oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc, and preserved the power of the Kremlin-favored political actor, Moldovan President Igor Dodon. The Kremlin regained some of Russia’s lost influence as a result.65 The Kremlin changed its Ukraine campaign manager in 2020 in part to posture for diplomacy. The Kremlin appointed Dmitry Kozak, who was likely perceived by the Ukrainian government as