MESOPOTAMIA NEWS FORECAST FOR THE FUTURE : After a Decade of War in Syria, Israel Should Change its Policy

Israel has preferred “the devil it knows” – Bashar al-Assad, who opened the door to Iran – over the chance to change the reality in Syria. Now, however, is the time for a paradigm shift in Israel’s approach – to stop sitting on the sidelines, recognize that Syria will remain divided, and work intensively to obstruct efforts by Iran and its proxies to consolidate their power in the northern arena over time

Udi Dekel Carmit Valensi – INSS Insight No. 1451, April 7, 2021 – ISRAEL

With the help of military aid from Russia and Iran, the regime of Bashar al-Assad has been able to survive and overcome the military setbacks it experienced in the early years of the civil war. Still, after a decade of warfare, the regime is unable to gain control over the entire country, which remains divided and unable to function effectively. As long as Assad controls Syria, no stabilization or recovery seems a viable possibility. Nonetheless, political and military elements in Israel continue to adhere to the idea that Assad, who opened to door to Iran and Hezbollah in Syria and is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of his countrymen, is preferable to any other governmental option in Syria.

Just as Syria has changed in the past decade, however, the Israel’s strategic preference for the Syrian leader should also change. It is recommended that Israel change its policy on Syria from sitting on the fence to increased involvement in three strategic areas of critical importance to Israel: southern Syria, northeastern Syria (the border with Iraq), and the Syrian-Lebanese border.

Following a decade of civil war in Syria, it is clear that Syria as it was in 1963-2011 has ceased to exist. The civil rebellion, which was cruelly suppressed by a dictatorial regime with military and diplomatic backing from Russia and Iran, left Syria divided into spheres of influence and control with support from foreign countries. This reality renders the slogan “preserving the unity and integrity of the Syrian state,” sounded frequently by Syrian officials and some Western countries, utterly meaningless. It appears that for the foreseeable future, Syria will remain a split and dismembered theater.

Map of Control: Syria is divided de facto into a number of enclaves. Bashar al-Assad, with military aid from Russian and Iran and its proxies, ostensibly controls two thirds of the country, mainly the backbone connecting the major cities of Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus, and to a lesser extent, the south. The Idlib area in northwestern Syria is an enclave of rebels under Turkish auspices. Along the Syrian-Turkish border are territories under Turkish control. Most of northeastern Syria, which contains a majority of the country’s natural resources, is under Kurdish control, with US backing. Islamic State (ISIS) cells are active in central and eastern Syria. Control over the borders of Syria is also an indication of “hollow sovereignty”: (1) The Syrian army, which is subject to the Assad regime, controls approximately 15 percent of the country’s international land borders; (2) The Syrian-Lebanese border is under the control of Hezbollah; (3) The Iraqi-Syrian border is controlled on both sides by Shiite militias that are Iranian proxies; (4) The Syrian-Turkish border is controlled by elements that do not include the Assad regime and its patron, Iran.

Humanitarian Situation: Over 500,000 people lost their lives during the ten years of war (at a certain stage, UN agencies stopped counting the victims). Approximately 12 million people lost their homes and are now displaced persons or refugees, and 90 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. Assad controls 12 million of Syria’s estimated population of 17 million, the country is on the verge of a hunger crisis, and the shortage of basic goods, especially bread and fuel, is increasing. It is estimated that 11 million Syrians are in need of humanitarian assistance.

Infrastructure: More than a third of the state’s infrastructure has been destroyed or severely damaged. In their war against the armed opposition, both the regime and its allies, Russia and Iran, attacked urban centers, including with chemical weapons and barrel bombs, as part of a strategy of destruction to eliminate areas held by the rebels. The cost of reconstruction in Syria is estimated at $250-350 billion, and at this stage, there is no party capable of financing such reconstruction, or willing to do so.