MESOP RESPONSES & DEBATE : A Plan for a Regional Solution in Syria / Kamal Al-Labwani -(FIKRA FORUM)
Responses to A Plan for a Regional Solution in Syria / By Matthew Levitt & others
Dr. al-Labwani is right that “It is neither moral nor realistic to hope that Assad and his allies will prevail after all that they have done, and his regime should not be assisted.” He is also right that there is currently a dearth of practical and tangible measures that could change the situation on the ground, and so I applaud his effort to provide a framework for such a discussion. That said, Dr. al-Labwani’s suggestions are either too vague to be useful or too unrealistic to be put into practice.
What, precisely, does Dr. al-Labwani mean when he calls for “active intervention” to support moderate rebels in Southern Syria? I will take at face value his assertion that these moderate rebels are indeed “harmonious, stable, and competent.” But specifically what kind of “active intervention” is he calling for, and by whom? Is he advocating for foreign boots on the ground? Airstrikes? Northern and/or Southern no-fly zones? Training and arming programs?
When Dr. al-Labwani does make specific suggestions, it takes the reader by surprise. The answer to the Syrian crisis, Dr. al-Labwani writes, is not the intervention of a neighbor like Turkey or Jordan. Nor is it the Gulf States, who are funding the full spectrum of moderate and extremist elements on the ground. Rather, he calls on Israel to institute a no-fly zone over Syria and a security buffer zone on the ground in Southern Syria, much like the one it maintained for years in Southern Lebanon. This time, Dr. Labwani calculates, an Israeli security zone on the territory of a bordering Arab country could be done “successfully.” I doubt that very much.
The war in Syria affects Israel in many ways. But I think the Israelis have shown wisdom and tremendous self-restraint by limiting their involvement to air strikes on Hezbollah’s arms convoys and to taking in wounded Syrians and providing them with top notch medical care in Israeli hospitals. To do anything more would galvanize extremists on both sides, who would claim to now be fighting a new Israeli occupation.
But Dr. al-Labwani’s fundamental point, that the international community must do more to degrade the capabilities of both the Assad regime and other radical extremists is a point well-taken. Boots on the ground are not on the table, nor should they be. But could American or other airplanes take out the limited number of runways in Syria that can accommodate the heavy cargo planes delivering massive amounts of weapons and supplies to the Assad regime? Could countries in the region, several of which contributed aircraft to the military operation in Libya, do so now to help enforce a no-fly zone over Syria and deny the regime the air superiority that is making all the difference in the war?
I share Dr. al-Labwani’s frustration over the humanitarian catastrophe of the Syrian war and the international community’s apparent unwillingness to intervene. It is unacceptable for senior U.S. officials to predict that the conflict will last a decade without considering what more can be done to end it. Addressing the symptom of humanitarian need is not enough. Yet the answers will only come with tangible recommendations of what “active intervention” might look like. Let’s have that discussion.
Matthew Levitt is the Fromer-Wexler fellow and director of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy’s Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence.
The Role of Syria’s Druze is Misguided / By Noam Raidan is a research assistant at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Dr. Kamal al-Labwani, a veteran Syrian dissident, offers many original suggestions to resolve the Syrian crisis. A majority of his recommendations, however, are impractical, and if realized, some could even generate perilous consequences, particularly those concerning al-Muwahidun, better known as the Druze.
A quick review of recent history demonstrates the fragile environment in which Druze communities live, requiring them to avoid getting ensnared in any crises that could threaten their unity and existence. Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt has become increasingly aware of this reality. Prior to the May 7, 2008 clashes in Lebanon between Hezbollah and pro-government gunmen, Jumblatt had strongly backed a campaign against Hezbollah’s private telecommunication network and security apparatus at the Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport. However, Jumblatt’s own Druze community paid the price for his courageous yet miscalculated move to undermine Hezbollah, a de facto force willing to turn its weapons against any opposing Lebanese citizens. After the deadly clashes that ensued, Jumblatt had little choice but to reconcile with the militant Shiite group, and he is currently considered a centrist in Lebanese politics.
The Druze cannot afford to break ties with any party. They will maintain integration in their communities, whether in Lebanon, Syria, Israel, or Jordan. Therefore, as long as the Syrian crisis rages on, the Druze will not align themselves with any particular group against other factions in order to keep communication lines open with all sides to ensure their own survival.
Dr. al-Labwani also writes that “Israel could replicate its experience in South Lebanon in South Syria,” adding that this time, Israel “could protect civilians and support the majority rather than play the role of an occupier backing a minority, as was the case in Lebanon.” Israel is unlikely to replicate its bloody experience in South Lebanon in South Syria. As for the Druze living in that region, the community realizes that any attempt to establish such cooperation will backfire. Moreover, there are currently no voices within the Druze community that support such a plan. Even if Syria’s Druze were to accept this proposal, Lebanon’s Druze would definitely oppose it, knowing that they live in a country that is partly controlled by Hezbollah, Israel’s archenemy in the region. If collaboration between residents in Southern Syria and Israel is desperately needed, then it must be done clandestinely.
Furthermore, the notion of cooperation between Sunnis and Israel is highly unlikely, as it is a very controversial topic in the region. How would Palestinians in Syria and the Palestinian territories react? If such collaboration were to take place, it would also backfire on Sunnis. For instance, the Shiite Hezbollah, which leads the so-called “axis of resistance” against Israel in the region, would surely launch a smear campaign against Sunnis, labelling them as traitors in an attempt to influence Arab public opinion.
Regarding the issue of Syrian refugees, Dr. al-Labwani writes, “as many Syrian refugees as possible should be reintroduced to Syria from Jordan, or their residence should be moved to liberated areas with protected skies.” He does not, however, explain why they should be reintroduced to Syria only from Jordan. What about Syrians in Lebanon where the number of refugees has exceeded one million and it is likely to pass 1.5 million by the end of 2014? According to some reports, Syrian refugees, particularly in Lebanese border villages, currently outnumber Lebanese residents. The issue of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has raised great concerns with regards to economic and social stability.
Despite the discouraging circumstances in Syria, oppositionists should not lose touch with reality. They must deal with the situation as it is not the way they want it to be.
Clarifying the Points Raised by Dr. Matthew Levitt
‘Active intervention’ means an adequate quantity of light and medium weapons of a certain quality, as well as other logistical services.
An Israeli-led no-fly zone would be different than one led by NATO. It would not require the destruction of the Syrian regime’s airports and air defenses; rather, it would require taking only the necessary steps to undermine the regime’s air power, extending up to 100 km into Syrian territory. If the regime does not dispatch any planes, no action would be taken.
The situation in the areas secured by revolutionary forces must be regulated, the void in services must be filled, and institutions must be returned to operation. This means that an environment must be secured that enables such regions to restart their economy and revive service organizations. Supporting countries, as well as political and social powers, must help in this regard.
The moderate forces in the revolution are considered to be all revolutionary armed forces that have accepted to work within the limitations and conditions imposed by the political and military leadership that recognized Syrian opposition bodies sanction, support, and whose authority can be assessed.
The lack of support for and lack of organization among moderates has made room for extremists and for a continued outpouring of support for them, in one way or another. We have noticed that the ideology of rebel forces changes quickly and easily, depending on the situation and on the provision of aid. Nothing is fixed, even with extremist groups, who should be encouraged to act more moderately through the development of a plan to integrate them within society so that they do not spread to other countries.
There is a great difference between Israel’s intervention Southern Lebanon from the mid-1970s until 2000 and what we are proposing in Southern Syria: Israel occupied Southern Lebanon and sent troops there, whereas in Syria, it would support the population toward liberation from the regime’s army, which some see as an occupying force. Additionally, Israel would be supporting the landowners and a majority of the population in Southern Syria against outsiders and extremists, thus establishing cooperation and reconciliation between different segments of society there. Furthermore, it could intervene to end the killing and bombing, and also provide humanitarian and economic assistance. This aid would have a positive effect and change the way that millions of people think about Israel.
Currently, Israel is concerned with the security of the land along its borders, and it is missing a chance to achieve peace and normalization with one of its most important neighbors. It is natural for Israel to think of weakening those who want to wage war upon it and strike it from the map, but Israel can take an alternative stance if it realizes that it must live with that other party in the same region. As the classical poet Horace wrote, “Your own safety is at stake when your neighbor’s wall is ablaze.” The Israeli Defense Forces can play a constructive role in the region, making up for decades of war.
Peace between the Druze and all other parties is in danger of falling apart at any moment, especially if the Syrian regime initiates a campaign against the South, seeking to ignite conflict there. This in turn would lead to a long and costly crisis, disrupting the region’s precarious situation. Therefore, in order to establish peace and cooperation, a strong foreign player must be found.
Without active intervention, the civil war in Syria will not end, especially if there are actors outside Syria fueling the conflict. Sooner or later, other nations will be forced to provide assistance, but only after a great price has been paid, and after considerable complications have emerged, such as the possibility of extremism spreading, or the Russian-Iranian axis succeeding. The continuation of the conflict could undermine stability in other neighboring countries; that is a given. Moreover, any kind of division will not lead to stability or peace, as the only way to achieve peace is through unity, not division. We will all pay for every immoral and inhuman position in one way or another, and the absence of a force willing to influence the world order in support of shared values and rights will lead to the eruption of war and conflict in other places.
Dr. Kamal al-Labwani is a Syrian doctor and artist. He has been considered one of the most prominent opposition members since the start of the revolution, and is currently serving as a member of the Syrian Opposition Coalition.