MESOP MIDEAST WATCH : The missing peace between Syria and Turkey

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is in no rush to bury the hatchet with his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

In an interview with Sky News last week, Assad dismissed a meeting with Erdogan, saying it would legitimize Turkey’s occupation of northern Syria.

Turkey maintains an estimated 5,000-10,000 troops in northern Syria and administers via its political and armed Syrian proxy forces about 3,400 square miles of Syrian territory.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has been trying for years to get Syria and Turkey to reconcile. In May, the foreign ministers of Russia, Turkey, Syria and Iran met in Moscow and agreed to move ahead on a road map for rapprochement, but that process seems to have stalled.

As Danny Makki reports from Damascus in an upcoming piece, don’t expect Syria-Turkey rapprochement to run parallel with Syria’s normalization with Arab states.

While reconciliation with Turkey would be the most consequential of Syria’s “normalizations,” Assad may have his reasons for maintaining an uneasy state of neither peace nor war — a grey zone-style stalemate in northern Syria — at least for now.

Although Erdogan has said he is in principle willing to meet, Assad is the one holding back.

He told Sky News that “terrorism in Syria is made in Turkey.” He blames Erdogan, among others, for backing Salafi and armed groups during the Syrian uprising. Assad appears unmoved by the Arab League rapprochement, saying that ties recently restored with some Arab states will likely remain “formal.” He considers the normalization trend less of a lifeline and more vindication of his resilience and staying power.

Syrian refugees caught in stalemate

Among Erdogan’s priorities in negotiations with Syria is the return of 3.6 million Syrian refugees, given their strain on Turkey’s economy.

While Assad claims to seek the return of all 5.8 million Syrian refugees living in neighboring countries, his preference may be to reduce the numbers over a longer time span. Syria’s government institutions are a shambles. The economy is reeling from US and international sanctions, the toll of the civil war and the consequences of both the earthquake earlier this year and the Russia-Ukraine war. GDP growth is projected to decline this year by 3.5% following a similar contraction last year.

Assad could also be suspicious of many of the returning refugees, especially those who may have been part of the uprising or opposition or their family members.

Some Syrians are nonetheless returning home, if at a trickle. UNHCR reported 51,300 returns in 2022, up from 38,000 in 2021. A survey by UNHCR last year found that while 58% of Syrian refugees hoped to return, only 1.7% planned to do so in the next year because of concerns about safety, security and the lack of jobs, housing and basic services.

Syria, Turkey and the Kurds in grey zone

For Erdogan, the occupation of northern Syria is central to his overriding goal of the “complete elimination” of the armed wings of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) based in Syria and Iraq. In Turkey’s score, the primarily Kurdish US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are also lumped in with the PKK.

Six Turkish soldiers were killed in clashes with PKK militants in Iraqi Kurdistan this week.

In a major foreign policy address last week, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said that Turkey will “give no respite to the terrorist organizations and the forces behind them” and asked “some NATO countries to immediately end their overt or covert cooperation with the PKK in Syria and Iraq” as the alliance awaits Turkey’s parliament to ratify Sweden’s membership, as Ezgi Akin reports.

The essence of the elusive Russian “deal” would be to broker an agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF Kurds, on terms acceptable to Ankara. But Moscow, even before its invasion of Ukraine and especially now, can hardly pitch itself as a reliable guarantor of such an arrangement.

Assad therefore sees little advantage, for now, in an agreement with Erdogan. He may not mind Turkey’s open-ended Syria quagmire, with no way out except via Damascus. He also doesn’t mind Turkish attacks on SDF-controlled areas, within limits. Turkish attacks by occupation forces reinforce the regime’s sense of siege, as do the hard-hitting US sanctions and the regular Israeli attacks on Iranian armed groups and bases in Syria. So Assad can wait for a better offer or until conditions change.

There also appears to be no military option for either side. The Syrian military is in no position to take Turkey and its proxy forces head on. And Turkey would be loath to launch any major military operation in areas such as “rebel-held” Idlib in northwest Syria, which could spark another wave of refugees into Turkey.

There are costs to the status quo. In addition to the substantial humanitarian toll, a fragile and divided Syria remains vulnerable to terrorist groups. Syria has suffered three deadly attacks this month by Islamic State terrorists, including one today that killed at least 26 Syrian soldiers and injured 11 in Deir ez-Zor province, as Adam Lucente reports.

No way out in Idlib

Also this week, Syria signed off on UN-administered humanitarian aid to be delivered into areas outside of its control from crossings in Turkey. Syria had previously opposed assistance entering from Turkey, claiming it was a violation of Syrian sovereignty. The agreement this week should increase Damascus’s influence over subsequent aid deliveries, as Amberin Zaman reports.

The decision to allow the UN aid is of a piece with Assad’s calibrated normalization drive and the grey zone standoff with Turkey. The Syrian government, which is recognized by the UN, has dealt itself back into negotiations over aid entering the country and will likely continue to push for assistance to be delivered through government-administered areas.

“Sovereignty and time are on Assad’s side,” said Joshua Landis, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma. “He is, by the basis of international law, getting the upper hand with the UN and international organizations and aid agencies, who increasingly will be forced to work with the Syrian government.”

Idlib, by the way, underscores the grey zone dilemma for Damascus, Ankara and even the West. The province’s population, swollen by waves of internally displaced Syrians, is estimated at 4.5 million. They live in miserable conditions. Idlib is also primarily controlled by the Organization of the Liberation of the Levant (Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham), which has been designated a terrorist group by both the United States and the United Nations. Idlib’s rebel groups represent no significant threat to the Syrian government at this time. Ankara and Damascus aren’t looking to force a showdown. The United States is not actively seeking Assad’s overthrow and even if it was, it would likely not be backing Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, given its al-Qaeda roots.

Idlib and its people therefore remain in a kind of no-man’s land, locked in grey zone conflict between Ankara and Damascus and subject to a broader conflict and tragedy for Syrians that seems without end.