| Seeking to stabilize its leadership after a series of significant setbacks resulting from Israel’s air and ground campaign, last week, Lebanese Hezbollah’s Shura Council selected the longtime deputy leader of the group, Naim Qassem, as its new Secretary-General. He succeeds the charismatic longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah, as well as his intended successor, Hesham Safieddine, both of whom were killed in successive Israeli airstrikes on the Beirut suburb of Dahiyeh, a Hezbollah stronghold.
Qassem has been known as a hardliner, but he has historically focused on domestic issues and theology and not military strategy. Working closely with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF), Nasrallah envisioned Hezbollah as a regional actor, intervening on behalf of other Axis of Resistance partners in Iraq and Yemen, and helping the Assad regime push back the 2011 armed rebellion in Syria. Qassem’s ties to Iran are considered tenuous, and he is likely to focus more on preserving Hezbollah’s autonomy and decision-making influence within Lebanon than on mentoring and assisting other Axis of Resistance partners.
Qassem’s most immediate challenge is to steer the group’s recovery from the succession of Israeli operations. The attacks include the operation in September to use sabotaged pagers and walkie-talkies to kill at least 30 and injure several hundred Hezbollah members, airstrikes that decimated Hezbollah’s leadership ranks, and a ground offensive in south Lebanon. Although he has publicly pledged to follow the same policies as those of Nasrallah, Qassem has signaled a willingness to drop the condition that any truce with Israel be preceded by an end to the Gaza conflict. His apparent flexibility implies an acknowledgment that the group’s setbacks are severe, even as its military wing is still able to fire rockets and missiles on Israeli targets, causing damage and casualties with regularity. Hezbollah has delegated Lebanon parliament speaker Nabih Berri, a Shia of the more moderate Amal Movement, to negotiate ceasefire terms on its behalf.
As Qassem ascended to the group’s top spot, a succession of U.S. envoys were visiting Beirut and Jerusalem to try to take advantage of Hezbollah’s setbacks and disarray to achieve a 60-day truce that would lead to a permanent settlement implementing and expanding on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. That UNSCR ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, but it has been routinely violated by both sides and failed to prevent Hezbollah from engaging in cross-border rocket attacks on Israel in sympathy with Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attack on Israel. The hostilities have caused 60,000 Israelis and more than 80,000 Lebanese on either side of the border to flee their towns and villages. More than 1 million additional Lebanese civilians have been displaced since Israel escalated its strikes on Hezbollah in mid-September. A Washington Post study found that nearly one-quarter of the structures in 25 Lebanese municipalities along the border with Israel have been destroyed.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said last Thursday that Israel and Lebanon were moving toward an understanding of what is required for implementing 1701 as the basis for ending the current conflict. However, all U.S. mediators returned to the United States at the end of last week, rather than continue their shuttle diplomacy, suggesting an agreement might not be imminent. According to press reports, U.S. officials presented both Israeli and Lebanese leaders with a draft truce agreement that was highly favorable toward Israel and, predictably, met stiff objections from Hezbollah.
Even as talks appeared to make progress, Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu continued to authorize major military operations on key Hezbollah strongholds in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley, likely in an effort to further improve Israel’s negotiation position. Some reports indicate Netanyahu does not want to agree to a truce with Hezbollah until the outcome of the U.S. presidential election is determined. Netanyahu calculates that, presumably, a second Trump administration would put far less pressure on Israel to compromise in settlement talks on the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon than would a Kamala Harris presidency. U.S. officials have denied that the draft agreement discussed in press reports represents a finalized ceasefire proposal but have not identified any specific inaccuracies.
If adopted, the reported U.S. draft ceasefire agreement would significantly alter Lebanon’s political landscape. Some of its provisions, if implemented, would call into question whether Hezbollah could continue to operate as a “resistance” group permitted to wield armed force independently of central government authority. The U.S. draft seems to assume that many Lebanese want to deprive Hezbollah of the capability to provoke destructive wars with Israel. The widespread Lebanese disagreement with Hezbollah’s “resistance” agenda has reportedly prompted discussion within Hezbollah that the group might ultimately want to transition into a purely political movement. However, this seems extremely unlikely, especially in the near-to-medium term. It also likely discounts popular and growing anti-Israeli sentiment throughout Lebanon, considering the humanitarian suffering and devastation resulting from Israel’s military operations.
U.S. officials assert that their mediation efforts are intended to ensure the full implementation of UNSCR 1701. According to the purported draft, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) would be the only armed groups deployed in southern Lebanon – provisions similar to those of 1701. The purported draft agreement would not only ban the sale or supply of weapons and related materials to any entity other than the Lebanese army – a provision similar to that contained in 1701 – but also mandate that the Lebanese government would control all production of arms in Lebanon. The draft accord assigns the LAF to “monitor and enforce these conditions and dismantle any military infrastructure that is not under the control of the Lebanese government.”
Certain to draw objections not only from Hezbollah but from other Axis of Resistance partners are reported U.S. “side commitments” of support for Israeli military action in the event of Hezbollah violations. Under those provisions, the U.S. pledges to share intelligence with Israel regarding suspected violations, including Hezbollah militia members joining the Lebanese military. U.S. officials also would appoint a senior U.S. military officer and a senior U.S. national security official to chair a “monitoring and enforcement mechanism” to solve disputes and deal with alleged violations. And, according to the reported U.S. “side letter,” Israel would be permitted to conduct high-altitude overflights of Lebanon “for the purpose of intelligence only.” Although intelligence gathering will inevitably improve Israeli targeting of high-ranking Hezbollah members. Implementation of the side commitments would draw the U.S. far more deeply into Lebanese affairs than at any time since the direct U.S. military intervention of the early 1980s. At the same time, the U.S. draft and side agreements would seem to place inordinate responsibilities on the LAF as the key implementing organization – a burden that the LAF, which in the past has sometimes fractured along communal lines, might not be able to bear.
Depending on the terms that end the conflict with Israel, Qassem will also face critical decisions on its post-war role in the Lebanese political system.
For much of the past decade, Hezbollah has been the “kingmaker” in Lebanese politics, able to determine which politicians occupy the executive posts of President and Prime Minister. The post of president, which the parliament selects, has been vacant for the past two years since the term of Michel Aoun ended, leaving Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s government in place as a caretaker. Hezbollah has since blocked the selection of any figure who might seek to constrain Hezbollah’s autonomy, deadlocking the selection process.
U.S. and French officials are supporting the commander of the LAF, Gen. Joseph Aoun (not related to Michel Aoun), as a successor. Aoun’s support in the LAF would be instrumental in enforcing a ceasefire agreement heavily dependent on LAF cohesiveness and cooperation. Whether Qassem and his associates acquiesce to the selection of Aoun or another Hezbollah critic will indicate the degree of post-conflict political strength wielded by Hezbollah and its main outside backer, Tehran. |