MESOP MIDEAST WATCH FIRST SUMMARY: MURDEROUS MULLAHS!

2,000 Kurds arrested, 23 killed in Iranian Kurdistan during Iran protests: Hengaw

“Over the two weeks, more than 2,000 Kurdish citizens have been arrested by the Iranian security agencies.” The death of Amini lead to widespread protests in Iranian Kurdistan

ERBIL (Kurdistan 24) – A total 2,000 Kurdish citizens have been arrested by the Iranian security agencies, and a total death toll has reached 23 during protests over the death of Jina Amini at the hands of Iran’s morality police, the Kurdish human rights group Hengaw reported on Monday.

weiterlesen / click to continue

MESOP MIDEAST INTEL: Reuters-Untersuchung konzentriert sich auf angeblichen Verlust von CIA-Spionagenetzwerken im Iran

OKTOBER 3, 2022 VON JOSEPH FITSANAKIS 

Eine einjährige Untersuchung der Nachrichtenagentur Reuters versucht, Licht in die angeblichen Verhaftungen von mehr als einem Dutzend iranischer Spione zu bringen, die behaupten, für die Central Intelligence Agency der Vereinigten Staaten gearbeitet zu haben. In regelmäßigen Abständen behauptet der Iran, Mitglieder angeblicher CIA-Spionageringe gefangen genommen zu haben, die auf seinem Territorium operieren. So kündigte das iranische Geheimdienstministerium im Jahr 2019 die Verhaftung eines “CIA-Netzwerks” an, das aus 17 Personen bestand, die im privaten Sektor und einer Reihe von Regierungsbehörden arbeiteten.

weiterlesen / click to continue

MESOP MIDEAST WATCH: Iran mobilizes proxies to fight growing protests

BEHIND THE LINES: Protesters accuse regime of using Arab militiamen to suppress mounting demonstrations. By JONATHAN SPYER  SEPT 30, 2022 JERUSALEM POST

Claims have surfaced in recent days that pro-Iranian regime Arab militiamen are to be found among the forces currently being used by the Iranian regime to crush protests.

weiterlesen / click to continue

MESOP MIDEAST WATCH – Demonstrationen in Iran : Die Protestwelle wächst, und Khamenei schweigt

  • Von Rainer Hermann FAZ – 2.10.2022-Demonstranten ziehen am Samstag mit einer iranischen Flagge durch Teheran

In Iran weiten sich die Proteste aus, das Regime bekommt sie nicht unter Kontrolle. Weltweite Solidaritätsbekundungen unterstützen die regierungskritischen Demonstranten.

Die landesweiten Proteste in Iran haben sich in den vergangenen Tagen ausgeweitet. Nach Schätzungen des persischsprachigen Dienstes von BBC ist die Zahl der Demonstranten an den regierungsfeindlichen Protesten, die am 16. September begonnen haben, in Teheran und anderen Städten weiter gewachsen.

weiterlesen / click to continue

MESOP MIDEAST WATCH: Kann das iranische System überleben?

In einem Interview spricht Ali Fathollah-Nejad über die jüngsten Proteste im Iran und die langfristigen Aussichten für die postrevolutionäre politische Ordnung. 29. September 2022

weiterlesen / click to continue

MESOP MIDEAST INTEL BY MEIR AMIT CENTER / ISRAEL – Iran im Rampenlicht

15. September 2022 – 29. September 2022 Herausgeber: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Überblick
  • Iran International Channel, der mit der iranischen Opposition verbunden ist, berichtete, dass der Israel-zugeschriebene Angriff, der in der Nacht zwischen dem 16. September in der Nähe von Damaskus durchgeführt wurde.heit und 17heit zielte auf die iranische Logistikeinheit des Libanonkorps des Korps der Islamischen Revolutionsgarden (IRGC) ab, die für die Koordinierung des Transfers von Ausrüstung und Waffen aus dem Iran nach Syrien verantwortlich ist. Unterdessen berichteten syrische Quellen über die Ankunft von drei iranischen Frachtflugzeugen auf dem internationalen Flughafen Damaskus zwischen dem 19. September.heit und 21St.
  • Ende September wurde in Syrien die “Iran Culture Week” eröffnet, an der prominente kulturelle und künstlerische Persönlichkeiten beider Länder teilnahmen.
  • Der Iran informierte eine offizielle Delegation des libanesischen Energieministeriums über seine Bereitschaft, den Libanon innerhalb von fünf Monaten mit 600.000 Tonnen Kraftstoff zu versorgen. Bei einem Treffen mit den libanesischen Außenministern am Rande der UN-Generalversammlung in New York äußerte der iranische Außenminister die Bereitschaft des Iran, dem Libanon zusätzlichen Treibstoff und andere Arten der Hilfe zur Verfügung zu stellen.
  • Ebenfalls in New York traf sich der iranische Präsident mit dem irakischen Premierminister und äußerte die Hoffnung auf eine schnelle Lösung der politischen Krise im Irak und die Bildung einer stabilen Regierung.
  • Am 20. September traf sich der irakische nationale Sicherheitsberater mit dem stellvertretenden Kommandeur der Geheimdienstorganisation des IRGC und erörterte Möglichkeiten, die nachrichtendienstliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen den beiden Nationen zu stärken.
Iranisches Engagement in Syrien und im Libanon
  • Iran International Channel, der mit der iranischen Opposition verbunden ist und saudische finanzielle Unterstützung genießt, berichtete (20. August), dass der Angriff, der Israel in der Gegend von Damaskus in der Nacht zwischen dem 16. September zugeschrieben wird,heit und 17heit richtete sich an die Logistikeinheit des Libanonkorps, die unter anderem für die Koordinierung des Transfers von Ausrüstung, einschließlich Waffen, vom Iran nach Syrien und in den Libanon zuständig ist. Der Bericht behauptete, dass diese Einheit von jemandem geleitet wird, der als Seyyed Reza identifiziert wurde, der der Leiter des Büros in der Niederlassung in Damaskus der Logistikeinheit ist. Andere hochrangige Beamte dieser Einheit, deren Identität in dem Bericht enthüllt wurde, sind Abdollah Ebadi, der sich mit dem Transfer von Waffen befasst, hauptsächlich durch Gepäck, das auf Passagierflügen vom Iran nach Syrien befördert wird; und Meysam Katbi, verantwortlich für den Transfer von Personal und Waffen aus dem Iran nach Syrien.
  • Die oppositionsnahe syrische Nachrichtenagentur Euphrat Post berichtete (26. September), dass die IRGC kürzlich Ausrüstung und Waffen an Milizen übergeben hat, die sie unterstützt, darunter die irakischen schiitischen Milizen Liwaa’ Abu Fadl al-Abbad und Liwaa’ Dhu al-Fiqar, die in der Region Hama operieren. Diesem Bericht zufolge brachte das IRGC eine Reihe von Lastwagen, die mit Waffen und Ausrüstung, einschließlich Raketen und Maschinengewehren, beladen waren, in das Hauptquartier der pro-iranischen Milizen in Rahbat Khitab und Qomhana auf dem Land von Hama. Zusätzlich erhielten die Milizen 4X4 Pickup-Trucks. Diese Vorräte wurden aus den Lagereinrichtungen der Division 47 geschickt, die sich in der Gegend von Ma’arin südlich der Stadt Hama befanden.
  • Das oppositionelle syrische Outlet Ayn al-Furat berichtete (25. September) über die Ankunft von drei iranischen Frachtflugzeugen auf dem internationalen Flughafen Damaskus zwischen dem 19. und 21. September. Diesem Bericht zufolge landeten die Flugzeuge im Morgengrauen, um israelischen Luftangriffen auszuweichen. Zwei der Flugzeuge entluden einen Teil ihrer Fracht in Damaskus und fuhren dann zum internationalen Flughafen Aleppo, um den Rest zu entladen. Die Entladung erfolgte unter der Aufsicht von Beratern und Kommandeuren der IRGC und der Hisbollah, die die Ausrüstung später in Gebiete außerhalb des Flughafens verlegten, um die Bombardierung der Lagereinrichtungen am Flughafen zu verhindern.
  • Am 21. September trafen sich die Außenminister Irans, Russlands und der Türkei am Rande der UN-Generalversammlung und diskutierten die Entwicklungen in Syrien. An dem Treffen nahm auch Geir Pedersen, der UN-Sondergesandte für Syrien, teil. Während des Gipfels erklärte der iranische Außenminister Amir Abdollahian, dass der Iran glaubt, dass es keine militärische Lösung für die Krise in Syrien gibt, und betonte die Notwendigkeit für Länder, die illegal Teile Syriens besetzen, ihre Streitkräfte abzuziehen. Er rief dazu auf, die Souveränität und territoriale Integrität Syriens zu respektieren, die gegen das Land verhängten Wirtschaftssanktionen aufzuheben und die Bereitstellung humanitärer Hilfe für die Bürger des Landes auszuweiten (Fars, 22. September). Am 25. September traf sich Abdollahian in New York mit dem syrischen Außenminister Faysal Mekdad und erörterte die Entwicklungen in Syrien, die bilateralen Beziehungen sowie die Entwicklungen im regionalen und internationalen Bereich. Abdollahian verurteilte die ausländische Einmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten Syriens und betonte die Unterstützung des Iran für eine politische Lösung der Krise in Syrien (Tasnim, 26. September).
  • Am 19. September traf sich der iranische Botschafter in Damaskus, Mehdi Sobhani, mit dem syrischen Minister für religiöse Stiftungen, Mohmmed Abdul Sattar. Bei dem Treffen diskutierten die beiden die religiöse und kulturelle Zusammenarbeit zwischen den beiden Ländern. Darüber hinaus traf der iranische Botschafter mit Fadi Salti al-Khalil, dem Vorsitzenden des Syrischen Komitees für Planung und internationale Zusammenarbeit, zusammen und erörterte die bilaterale Zusammenarbeit (ISNA, 19. September).
  • Am 28. September wurde in Damaskus die “Iran Culture Week” eröffnet. Am 26. September traf der Leiter der Organisation für islamische Kultur und Beziehungen, Hojjat ul-Islam Mohammad Mehdi Imanipour, in Damaskus ein, um an der Eröffnungszeremonie der Veranstaltung teilzunehmen und sich mit prominenten syrischen Kulturschaffenden zu treffen. An der Iran Culture Week nahmen der syrische Kulturminister Labana Mushawah, der kürzlich Teheran besucht hatte, der iranische Botschafter in Damaskus, Mehdi Sobhani, und iranische Kultur- und Kunstpersönlichkeiten teil (ISNA, 26. September).
  • The al-Manar TV station, which is affiliated with Hezbollah, reported (September 20) that Iran informed an official delegation of the Lebanese Ministry of Energy, which arrived in mid-September for a visit in Tehran, about its willingness to provide 600,000 tons of fuel over the span of five months. During their visit to Tehran, the members of the delegation met with senior officials at the Iranian ministries of petroleum and energy and discussed the provision of Iranian fuel to Lebanon, restoring the Lebanese electrical grid, and establishing Iranian power stations in Lebanon. On September 20, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, met with the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdallah Bou Habib, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, and expressed Iran’s willingness to send additional fuel and assistance to Lebanon.
  • On September 21, the Iranian President, Ebrahim Raisi, met in New York with the Prime Minister of Lebanon, Najib Miqati. The Iranian president proclaimed that Lebanon has demonstrated that only “resistance” can stop the cruelty and aggressiveness of the “Zionist regime.” He remarked that the formation of a strong government in Lebanon is of strategic importance, and that Iran supports any step or process that would bolster Lebanon’s stability and security. The Lebanese prime minister stated in the meeting that his country is interested in maintaining the warmest relations with Iran (Tasnim, September 21).
Iranisches Engagement im Irak
  • Am 20. September traf sich der iranische Präsident Ebrahim Raisi am Rande der UN-Generalversammlung mit dem irakischen Premierminister Mustafa al-Kadhimi. Raisi äußerte seine Hoffnung auf eine rasche Lösung der anhaltenden politischen Krise, die den Irak plagt, und die Bildung einer stabilen Regierung. Darüber hinaus drückte der iranische Präsident seine Wertschätzung für die Bemühungen des Irak aus, die Beziehungen zwischen den Ländern der Region, einschließlich zwischen dem Iran und Saudi-Arabien, zu verbessern. Der irakische Premierminister informierte Präsident Raisi über die politischen Entwicklungen in seinem Land und dankte der iranischen Regierung, die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den beiden Nationen zu stärken (ISNA, 20. September).
  • Am 20. September traf sich der irakische nationale Sicherheitsberater Qasim al-Araji in Bagdad mit dem stellvertretenden Direktor der Geheimdienstorganisation des IRGC, Hassan Mohaqeq, und erörterte Möglichkeiten, die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den beiden Ländern im Geheimdienstbereich zu stärken, die Grenzen besser zu kontrollieren und den Schmuggel von Waren zu verhindern. Der hochrangige iranische Beamte dankte der irakischen Regierung für ihre Rolle bei der Organisation der Pilgerfahrt nach Kerbela anlässlich von Arbaeen. Der irakische nationale Sicherheitsberater betonte, dass sein Land gegen jede Nutzung seines Territoriums durch Gegner des Iran oder der Türkei zur Attacke auf diese Länder sei (Shafqana, 20. September).
  • Die iranische Botschaft in Bagdad dementierte Berichte, die in den sozialen Medien veröffentlicht wurden und behaupteten, dass der iranische Außenminister Hossein Amir Abdollahian angeordnet habe, den Wohnsitz des Führers der Sadristischen Strömung, Muqtada al-Sadr, und seiner Familie im Iran für ungültig zu erklären. Dieser Schritt wurde angeblich unternommen, nachdem sich die Sadrist Current angeblich in die inneren Angelegenheiten des Iran eingemischt hatte, indem sie gefälschte Nachrichten, einschließlich Fotos und Videos, über die Protestwelle verbreitete, die den Iran erschütterte. In einem Tweet auf dem Twitter-Account der Botschaft hieß es, dass der Brief, der dem iranischen Außenminister in dieser Angelegenheit zugeschrieben wird, gefälscht wurde, um die Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Ländern zu schädigen (ISNA, 24. September).

MESOP MIDEAST WATCH COMMENTARY: Seth Frantzman posted: ” Iran’s regime has expanded its campaign against Kurds, using the protests as cover, it has launched numerous attacks over the border in Iraq, targeting the Kurdistan region. Iran’s regime said on Wednesday that it launched 73 ballistic missiles and “doze” Seth J. Frantzman – author – analyst

Iran’s unprecedented missile and drone attack on Kurdistan region of Iraq

 

28-9-22Iran’s regime has expanded its campaign against Kurds, using the protests as cover, it has launched numerous attacks over the border in Iraq, targeting the Kurdistan region. Iran’s regime said on Wednesday that it launched 73 ballistic missiles and “dozens” of drones at targets “deep” inside Iraq. This began with artillery bombardment several days ago along the border striking Sidakan and Galala near Choman. Iran then expanded its attacks to include missile and drone strikes on September 28. Iran has increasingly used drones in the region to attack countries; and also trafficked drones to proxy and allied groups and even shipped them to Russia, Venezuela, Ethiopia and other places; including arming Hamas, the Houthis, Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq and groups in Syria, and Hezbollah.

Why the attacks matter

Iran has used drones and rockets to attack Kurdish opposition groups in the past, particularly in 2018 near Koya when it used the Fateh 110 missiles; it has used drones also to attack US facilities at Erbil airport; and also to target Israel in 2018 from Syria; in 2021 from Iraq and this year from Iran directly; the US Coalition shot down the drones earlier this year; but in August Iranian-backed groups in Iraq targeted US forces in Syria; the US then responded. Iran has also attack Erbil with missiles and drones this year; and attacked shipping in the Gulf of Oman last year and attacked Saudi Arabia in 2019. It also attacked the UAE, apparently from Yemen using the Houthis.

The attacks today targeted PDKI and PAK; and Iran has also targeted Komala, Kurdish opposition groups. PDKI recently reunited with KDP-I, groups with roots in the same party; and Iran has wanted to neutralize these groups for years; expanding the attacks to target PAK and Komala illustrates Iran wants to use the protests as cover for wide-ranging attacks on Kurds; the protests began in the Kurdistan region of Iran and the woman whose death led to the protests is Kurdish. That is all part of Iran’s plan, using the IRGC to target opposition groups because Iran is fearful of these groups and knows it has provoked an uprising in Iran and that the Kurdish groups are organized and will aid their friends in opposing the regime. Iran’s attacks have been condemned by the US, Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government.

My map illustrates the extent of the attacks. The area around Koya has been struck and civilians fear; those attacks apparently targeted PDKI; and the attacks in Prde south of Erbil targeted PAK; while those near Suli struck at Komala and those near Sidikan and Choman it is not clear which groups were targeted. The targeting of PAK is an escalation; PAK played a key role in the war on ISIS and its well known leader Hussein Yazdanpanah always warned for years that when the war on ISIS was over that the Iranian-backed groups in Iraq would turn their guns on Kurds; he was right and his group at Prde helped protect the road to Erbil from Kirkuk during the clashes in 2017 when Kurdish forces were driven from Kirkuk by the Iraqi government in a deal brokered by Qasem Soleimani. PAK forces had been based on the frontline west of Kirkuk overlooking Hawija; they were pulled back to Prde; and Iran has evidently followed this development keenly. Iran has targeted Koya in the past, seeking to destroy KDP-I in 2018; and now hopes to eliminate or send a message to PDKI; Iran has previously warned it could launch a ground incursion into Iraq to target these groups.

It’s worth noting that Iran’s impunity to attack Kurdish groups dovetails with the Hashd based in Nineveh where it uses areas of the Hashd al-Shebek 30 brigade to target Erbil using the 122mm rocket; it has been doing this for two years; and at the same time targeting the Turkish base at Bashiqa and the oil refinery KAR at Kalak; and also from the other side it has targeted the Dana gas plant Khor Mor gas field in the Sulaimaniya region…so this is a wide ranging series of operations. At the same time Turkey has bases in the Kurdistan region where it also carries out attacks often claiming to “fighting terrorism”; these include attacks on Makhmur, Sinjar and areas in the mountains. Turkish forces killed Iraqi tourists earlier this year near Dohuk.

Between the Iranian and Iranian-backed attacks and the Turkish operations there is a clear threat to the stability of the region and this area.

The context of the attacks

The attacks on Kurdish groups in Iraq are unprecedented in their size and also the weapons used. Iran is perfecting a new method of waging war using missiles and drones against targets. It has been conducting these kinds of operations for years. Consider the September 2019 Abqaiq attack where Iran used two dozen drones and cruise missiles. It showcased the precision abilities it had achieved in this attack. Like the attacks on Iraq, the attack on Saudi Arabia went unpunished.

In the 2018 attack Iran had also apparently used drones before or after the attack on Koya. But these drones were there for surveillance. This shows how far Iran has come since 2018 in terms of using kamikaze drones or what are called “loitering munitions.” The full story of Iran’s drone program can be found in my book Drone Wars and other articles on this subject. What matters is that Iran has perfected loitering munitions and is basing them in other countries. In January 2021 reports said that Iran had sent the Shahed-136 to Yemen. It turned out that this foreshadowed the growing use of this drone in attacks. The US warned earlier this year that Iran and Russia were discussing the possibility of Russia using Iran’s drones. Now it’s clear that the Shahed 136 is being widely used by Russia. Video on September 26 showed attacks on Odesa and it is being used in other operations.

Therefore, Iran’s attack on Kurdish groups in Iraq is partly about showing off its capabilities. Iran isn’t shy about bragging about this. The fact it is has described the number of rockets it used shows it doesn’t fear reprisal. Iran has done this before in Iraq; it fired ballistic missiles at US forces in January 2020, targeting the large Asad base. But this attack appears more complex and designed to either send a deadly message to the Kurdish groups, or neutralize them before they can increase operations in support of the protests in Iran.

Another aspect of this could be Iran’s desire to use its Fateh 360 missile, which some reports indicated was used in the recent attacks. So this attack on Kurds in Iraq could be a dry-run for larger attacks in the region. Iran prefers to strike at groups that can’t strike back. This is also an opportunity for Iran to test weapons, methods and tactics. As such both Iran and Turkey carry out attacks in Iraq and both claim to be targeting “terrorists.” Both countries can experiment with the use of drones and combined arms attacks.

Another aspect of the attack is that it comes amidst a background of numerous attacks on the Kurdistan region. This destabilizes the region and also sends a message to the leadership. The goal of Iran is to both blackmail the Kurdistan region, and strike at it because Iran sees the region hosting groups that it fears. For instance, Iran wants to drive the US out of Erbil; drive Turkey out of Bashiqa; and also get rid of Kurdish opposition groups.

Iran’s attack on the Kurdistan region in Iraq include numerous incidents over the last several years. Beginning in 2019 Iran began to strike at US forces in Iraq. This culminated in US retaliation and protests at the US embassy in Baghdad and the US killing IRGC Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani and Kataib Hezbollah leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in January 2020. Then, with the Covid outbreak taking place, the US withdrew from most facilities in Iraq; such as Qayarra’s Q-West; Balad; Taji, K-1 and others. The US consolidated at Union III in Baghdad, Asad and Erbil. The seeming relocation to Erbil, even though the US had operated there to aid in the fight against ISIS over the years, then led Iran to try to target the US there. Attacks began in September 2020. In April 2021 Iran had expanded to target a CIA hangar at Erbil’s airport, according to the Washington Post. But this was only the beginning, a larger attack occurred in March 2022 with differing interpretations. Some argued it related to a gas deal and Israel; others suggested it was in retaliation for Iranian losses in Syria; and others reported Iran’s claim it was targeting “Mossad” in northern Iraq. Another attack occurred in June 2022. Iran shifted from using pro-Iran proxies in Nineveh, to attacking directly from Iran. This showed its sense of impunity.

Then we have the other attacks in the Kurdistan region. There were numerous attacks on Dana Gas at the Khor Mor gas field. Rudaw noted “Operations at Sulaimani’s Khor Mor field operated by UAE-based Dana Gas “continue as normal,” the company said on Tuesday following a rocket attack. At least three rockets hit the vicinity of the key gas field in Chamchamal district on Monday, the latest in a series of rocket strikes that have targeted the field since last month…Three rockets targeted the Khor Mor gas field in a matter of four days in June, which led Dana Gas to temporarily halt the development of one of its expansion projects. At least two contractors were reportedly injured.”

There were attacks on the KAR oil facility near Kalak in April and May 2022 as well. The Kawergosk refinery was targeted by Katyusha rockets.

Iranian-backed groups also targeted the Kurdish base at Bashiqa. This base is sometimes called the Zilikan base. It was created to support people who had fled Mosul in 2014 and Turkey felt it could project influence through the base. Unlike the Kurdish bases in the mountains near Deraluk and other areas, this base is within range of rockets from Nineveh and Iran likely sees the base as focused more on Mosul; an area Turkey covets since the last century; and less on Turkey’s battles with the PKK. Thus the base became a target in April, May and August.

It’s worth noting that Iran also increased its attacks on US forces in Syria since October 2021. Iran began using groups based in Iraq, or moving weapons through Iraq to conduct these operations. Back in August 2018 Iran had moved ballistic missiles to Iraq to bases linked to the Hashd or PMU. But Iran expanded this use of these groups linked to the Hashd in 2019 and more reports said Iran was secretly moving missiles to Iraq. It mobilized Kataib Hezbollah to strike at Saudi Arabia, allegedly using drones. Then it began to use them not only to move weapons to the Imam Ali base near Albukamal on the border, but also to move weapons to groups along the MERV. This coincided with other trends, such as protests in Iraq against Iranian-backed groups that led to the fall of the Prime Minister and eventually elections. There were also airstrikes targeting Kataib Hezbollah in Albukamal. The June 2018 airstrike was the first major type of these, but more occurred after. Israel was waging what is called the campaign between the wars in Syria at this time and the US and Israel were coordinating more, reports said. Iranian-backed groups blamed Israel for attacks in 2019.

The tensions culminated in Iran using groups in Iraq to target US forces in Syria. In August drones were flown from Iraq and the US retaliated in Syria. NBC noted “there were seven attacks in May, as many attacks that month as February, March and April combined, and there have been a total of 29 since October without a kinetic U.S. response.”

Iran also expanded its drone war on Israel in this period. In February 2018 Iran used a drone from T-4 base to fly into Israel. Then in August 2019 it sent Hezbollah members to a safe house near the Golan to try to launch drones. In March 2021 Iran launched drones toward Israel and Israel used F-35s to shoot them down. In May Iran launched a drone from Iraq aimed at Israel. Like the 2018 incident, the drone flew into Israel’s airspace near Beit Shean and was shot down. In September and November 2021 Israel’s Defense Minister highlighted Iran’s growing drone threat and its training of operators. In February 2022 the US-led Coalition shot down Iranian Shahed-136 drones launched from Iran that were heading for Israel. There were also drone and missile attacks on the UAE in February 2022. There was a drone attack on a ship in the Gulf of Oman in July 2021, killing two members of the crew of the ship.

In the spring of 2022 the US revealed that Russia was looking into acquiring Iranian drones. By September the US had sanctioned the Iranian companies involved in manufacturing and shipping drones to Russia. Iran was also expanding its drone footprint with a factory in Tajikistan and also exporting them to Venezuela and Ethiopia. This illustrates that when Iran uses drones to carry out attacks in Iraq it is also showcasing their abilities to potential customers.

The groups under attack

Iran has targeted several Kurdish opposition groups. This includes targeting the PAK near Prde with drones and missiles. Casualties were reported. The PAK played a key role in the war on ISIS on frontlines west of Kirkuk near Hawija and in Bashiqa. The leader of the group, Hussein Yazdanpanah, became well known. Iran now appears to be expanding its areas of operations in Iraq to target the group. The PAK helped fight during the clashes over Kirkuk in October 2017 when Iraq pushed the Kurdish peshmerga out of Kirkuk. Prde became a key city of clashes as it lies on the road to Erbil.

PDKI also said two people had been killed in attacks on its houses near Koya. A portion of this attack was caught on video and journalists were reportedly wounded. The PDKI is led by Mustafa Hijri and it recently reunified with the KDP-I; the two groups had separated 16 years ago. In March 2018 Iran had struck at the KDP-I and PDKI, using assassinations. Back in 1989 Iran had also assassinated PDKI leader Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, and then killed Sadegh Sharafkandi several years later. Clearly Iran hopes that it can weaken the re-united PDKI (or KDPI depending on how you use the acronym).

Iran has also targeted Komala, another Kurdish group. It has been arresting its members over the years, but this appears to be the largest attack on the group so far. The only group apparently not targeted in the September 28 wave of attacks is PJAK.

 

MESOP MID-EAST WATCH – Iranische Regime-U-Boote in Deutschland

29-9-222 – MESOP – Heute debattiert der Bundestag über die Revolution im Iran. Trotz massiver Polizeigewalt gehen die Menschen im Iran seit dem Tod von Mahsa Amini auf die Straße. Zeit, die Unterwanderung deutscher Institutionen durch das Mullahregime unter die Lupe zu nehmen.

weiterlesen / click to continue

MESOP MIDEAST WATCH: Irans Präsident zu Unruhen : „Die Umsetzung der Gesetze könnte reformiert werden“

  • Von Rainer Hermann FAZ – 29.09.2022 – Der iranische Präsident Ebrahim Raisi zieht gegenüber den Protestierenden eine rote Linie: Niemand dürfe das Gesetz brechen und Chaos verursachen. Er stimmt aber auch versöhnlichere Töne an.

weiterlesen / click to continue

MESOP MIDEAST WATCH: Steigende Todesfälle bei Iran-Protesten, da sich der Internet-Blackout hinzieht

Als die Proteste in den 12. Tag gingen, schien das tödliche Vorgehen der Regierung unter schweren Internetstörungen die kochende Wut nicht besänftigt zu haben.Al-Monitor Mitarbeiter27. September 2022

Mindestens 76 Menschen wurden bisher bei Protesten getötet, die den Iran nach dem Tod der 22-jährigen Mahsa Amini in Gewahrsam der Hijab-durchsetzenden Moralpolizei erschüttert haben, berichtete die in Oslo ansässige Iran Human Rights (IHR).

weiterlesen / click to continue

« neuere Artikel / next articles   ältere Artikel / previous articles »