MESOP MIDEAST WATCH IDENTITÄR  : „AUSERWÄHLTES VOLK!“ ? GODS OWN COUNTRY ISRAEL !

Die Handwerker Gottes: Wie denken die radikalen Siedler, die die Ankunft des Messias in Israel herbeizwingen wollen?

Die nationalreligiöse Siedlerbewegung befindet sich im Aufschwung. Inzwischen stellt sie mehrere Minister in der israelischen Regierung. Für die Erfüllung ihrer Erlösungsideologie setzen die religiösen Zionisten viel aufs Spiel.

Richard C. Schneider30.07.2023, 14.46 Uhr  7 min NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG

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MESOP MIDEAST WATCH: Biden sagt, dass die Normalisierung zwischen Israel und Saudi-Arabien “vielleicht im Gange” ist

Bidens Äußerungen erfolgten, als der nationale Sicherheitsberater der USA in Dschidda darauf drängte, dass Saudi-Arabien dem Abraham-Abkommen beitritt.

(30. Juli 2023 / JNS) JEWISH NEWS SYNDICATE

US-Präsident Joe Biden sagte laut Reuters am Freitag, dass ein Normalisierungsabkommen zwischen Israel und Saudi-Arabien kommen könnte.

“Es ist vielleicht eine Annäherung im Gange”, sagte Biden bei einer Veranstaltung in Freeport, Maine, vor den Spendern der Wiederwahlkampagne 2024.

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MESOP MIDEAST WATCH  SPECIAL: DIE (Iranisch-Russisch-Türkische) ELIMINIERUNG DER KURDISCHEN SDF/PKK – Internationaler Konflikt im Nordosten Syriens verschärft sich Mobilisierung an beiden Euphrat-Ufern; Wer zündet die Lunte an?

 

Enab Baladi 28-7-23  – Khaled al-Jeratli | Hassan Ibrahim

Seit der Vertreibung des Islamischen Staates aus dem Nordosten Syriens nach einer massiven, von den USA unterstützten Militärkampagne im Jahr 2017 hat sich die strategisch wichtige und ölreiche Region zu einem Mikrokosmos des internationalen Zusammenwirkens der widerstreitenden Kräfte mit verschiedenen lokalen Instrumenten entwickelt, darunter vom Iran unterstützte Fraktionen westlich des Euphrat und von den USA unterstützte östlich des Flusses.

Während die Region aufgrund von Verstößen gegen die Luftkonfliktprotokolle zwischen den beiden Parteien ständige Spannungen zwischen Russland und den Vereinigten Staaten erlebt, findet eine militärische Aufrüstung für Amerikas Verbündete am Ostufer des Euphrat und für Irans Verbündete am Westufer statt.

Alles geschieht inmitten lokaler Berichte über eine mögliche Militäroperation, die nicht bestätigt wurde, wobei westliche Presselecks auf iranische Vorbereitungen für einen Angriff auf US-Stützpunkte in der Region hindeuten.

Auf der anderen Seite und im Zusammenhang mit den Spannungen im Verhältnis zwischen den lokalen Kräften in der US-Einflusssphäre ist die Rede vom Projekt des “Tribal Belt” wieder in den Vordergrund gerückt, und Analysten haben unterschiedliche Meinungen über seine Anwendbarkeit.

In diesem Dossier erörtert Enab Baladi mit Forschern und Analysten die Auswirkungen der militärischen Aufrüstung auf beiden Seiten des Euphrat und die Möglichkeit eines Zusammenstoßes der Parteien, während über Veränderungen der US-Militärstruktur in der Region gesprochen wird.

Mobilisierung, erwartete Eskalation

 

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MESOP MIDEAST WATCH : Der Iran in Washingtons Gedanken, während die Besorgnis über die Risse der israelischen Armee wächst

Die gemeinsamen Militärübungen, der fortgesetzte Sicherheitsdialog und der Besuch des CENTCOM-Kommandeurs in Israel spiegeln die wachsende Besorgnis in den Vereinigten Staaten über die Bereitschaft der IDF wider.  Ben Caspit AL MONITOR – 28. Juli 2023

TEL AVIV — Die Flut von Warnungen durch die Sicherheitskräfte übertrifft den Schaden, den der Plan der Regierung zur Überarbeitung der Justiz für die Bereitschaft und die Fähigkeiten der israelischen Verteidigungskräfte (IDF) zugefügt hat, könnte die jüngsten Bemühungen des US-Zentralkommandos (CENTCOM) und der amerikanischen Sicherheitsführung erklären, die Beziehungen und die Zusammenarbeit mit der israelischen Armee zu vertiefen.

Die Fünfte US-Flotte und israelische Elite-Marinekommandos hielten diese Woche eine gemeinsame Übung mit dem Codenamen “Juniper Spartan” ab, die jüngste in einer Reihe von Übungen, bei denen die Interoperabilität der beiden alliierten Streitkräfte untersucht wurde. Die Übung zeigte ein scharfes Paradoxon: Während sich die Beziehungen zwischen Präsident Joe Biden und Premierminister Benjamin Netanjahu verschlechtern, gedeihen und vertiefen sich die Sicherheitsbeziehungen zwischen den Armeen.

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Seth Frantzman posted: ” (Photo courtesy IDF) By SETH J. FRANTZMAN The important visit of US CENTCOM head General Erik Kurilla to Israel in late July follows increasing joint training between Israel and US Central Command. On July 27 Israel’s IDF put out the follo”

MESOP MIDEAST SPECIAL: Visit of US CENTCOM head Gen. Kurilla to Israel, July 26

Seth Frantzman JERUSALEM POST Jul 28

 

The important visit of US CENTCOM head General Erik Kurilla to Israel in late July follows increasing joint training between Israel and US Central Command.

On July 27 Israel’s IDF put out the following statement. “The Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) visited the IDF. The main goal of the visit: Continued joint coordination in the face of the security challenges in the region, among them the Iranian Threat.”

He landed on Wednesday July 25 and the next day he met with the Chief of the General Staff, LTG Herzi Halevi, and visited the Intelligence Directorate (J2).

It went on to note that on Wednesday “the Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), General (* * * *) Michael “Erik” Kurilla visited the IDF as an official guest of the Chief of the General Staff, LTG Herzi Halevi. As part of the visit, the regional security issues and the continuation of planning shared by the militaries was discussed with members of the General Staff and senior officials of the Strategic Planning and Cooperation Directorate (J5), the Intelligence Directorate (J2) and the Operations Directorate (J3).”

Chief of the General Staff, LTG Herzi Halevi said, “the cooperation is continuous and deepening. Operational coordination is the basis for regional stability and the required readiness of the IDF.” Kurilla said “significant progress has been made in interoperability between the IDF and U.S. Central Command in the short time Israel has been part of the CENTCOM area of responsibility. The ability for our forces to work together is a key aspect of our combined efforts to support regional stability.”

 

It came the same day that the IDF noted that exercise Juniper Spartan has come to an end. A statement noted; “a Joint Exercise of Flotilla 13 Alongside US Armed Force. Today (Thursday July 27) exercise ‘JS’ has come to an end, JS is a joint exercise of Flotilla 13 ,the Israeli Naval Commando Unit and the US Armed Forces, led by the IDF Depth Corps. The forces held different maritime security training scenarios. The purpose of the “JS” exercise is to strengthen the cooperation and the professional dialogue, between the Israeli Navy, US 5 Fleet forces and the Depth Corps that took place as part of the joint annual training plan. Collaborations with foreign partners around the world, namely with the US Armed Force, lead us to mutual learning and the strengthening of professional ties, as well as professional improvements. This exercise is yet another sign of the deep and operational cooperation between the IDF and the United States Armed Forces.”

US Central Command also put out a statement about the Kurilla visit noting the visit took place from July 25-27 and that “commander of U.S. Central Command, traveled to Israel to visit the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations, the IDF Intelligence Directorate, and other specialized units. General Kurilla met with the Israel Minister of Defense, Yoav Gallant, and the Israel Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi to discuss shared commitment to address regional security concerns and the progress being made in cooperation between the IDF and CENTCOM. The CENTCOM Directors of Intelligence, Operations, and Plans and Policy attended the engagements. General Kurilla also visited several other specialized units while in Israel.”

“Significant progress has been made in interoperability between the IDF and U.S. Central Command in the short time Israel has been part of the CENTCOM area of responsibility,” said Kurilla. “The ability for our forces to work together is a key aspect of our combined efforts to support regional stability.”

The visit, which CENTCOM also noted on social media comes in the context of important joint operations and events in the region. The US has sent F-22s, F-16s, ships and other forces to the region in recent months amid tensions with Russia and Iran. For instance Russia has harassed US drones in Syria and recently damaged one of the drones.

@Armee_de_lair @RoyalAirForcehttps://t.co/0wLHX03Nda https://t.co/3zDSwcehNm

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) July 27, 2023

On July 25 US NAVCENT showed off new unmanned capabilities, noting “an Aerovel Flexrotor unmanned aerial vehicle launches from guided-missile destroyer USS McFaul (DDG 74) in the Gulf of Oman, July 23. US 5th Fleet continues to innovate & integrate advanced unmanned tech into daily missions across the Middle East region.” The US also recently did a “counter-UAS exercise [that] brought together air forces from France, United Kingdom, U.S., and three other regional air forces, fostering collaboration and strengthening capacity in countering the UAS threat.” French officers also visited a US Coast Guard Cutter in Bahrain.

FDD put out a tweet about the visit as well. Kurilla then went to Egypt and met his Egyptian colleague, the Egyptian Armed Forces Chief of Staff. The important meetings are one of several trips Kurilla has made to Israel.

Previous visits.

In November 2022 Kurilla came to Israel and the IDF put out the following; “”Commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), General ( * * * * ) Michael “Erik” Kurilla, visited the IDF. This is General Kurilla’s fourth visit since entering the position in April of 2022. The visit began with a tour of the Rosh HaNikra post, located near the Blue Line. The General was accompanied by the Commanding Officer of the Northern Command, MG Ori Gordin, who held a briefing on the challenges of the Lebanese front, the Hezbollah terrorist army’s activities and its cynical exploitation of Lebanese civilians, and the strategic importance of maintaining the security along Israel’s maritime border with Lebanon. From there, the commanders toured the Blue Line and visited the Mitzpe Shlagim post, located on the Alpha Line. There, the Commanding Officer of the Northern Command held a briefing on the IDF’s efforts to prevent the entrenchment of Iranian terrorist proxies in Syria and the recruitment of local residents to carry out hostile actions.  Following the visit, an operational and intelligence panel was held by the IDF Chief of the General Staff, LTG Aviv Kohavi, on the IDF’s activity to prevent harmful activities on the Syrian front. Participating in the panel were the Head of the Operations Directorate (J3), MG Oded Basiuk, the Commanding Officer of the Northern Command, MG Ori Gordin, the Head of the Strategic Planning and Cooperation Directorate (J5), Maj. Gen. Tal Kelman, and the Defense Attaché to the U.S., MG Hidai Zilberman. Afterwards, the Commanding Officer of the Israeli Air Force, Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar, accompanied General Kurilla on a visit to the Nevatim Air Force Base. There, General Kurilla visited the 116th “Lions of the South” Squadron, which operates F-35i “Adir” aircraft. The General was presented with past operations and future joint activities planned in the various arenas in an extended briefing with the Commanding Officer of the Nevatim Air Force Base, Brig. Gen. Gilad Keinan, and the Commander of the 116th Squadron, Col. N. The visit to the Nevatim Air Force Base concluded with an additional operational panel led by the IDF Chief of the General Staff, LTG Aviv Kohavi, and the Commander of CENTCOM, General ( * * * * ) Michael “Erik” Kurilla, in which the overall Middle Eastern threat assessment and the central points of the future joint force operation plan were presented. In addition, the incoming Chief of the General Staff, MG Herzi Halevi, hosted General ( * * * * ) Kurilla for an official dinner. ”

Chief of the General Staff, LTG Aviv Kohavi: “I would like to express my great appreciation for our close cooperation with the U.S. Armed Forces. Our mutual commitment is demonstrated on a weekly basis. We are operating together on all fronts to gather intelligence, neutralize threats, and prepare for various scenarios in either one or multiple arenas. We are training and developing joint military capabilities at an accelerated rate in the face of the developing threats in the Middle East, and against the Iranian regime in particular.”

 

 

 

 

 

 

MESOP MIDEAST WATCH : US aid to Israel: A response to the ‘Tablet’ article and claims it should be ended

 

Israel’s defense industry is now a key partner of the US and this is good for Israel and America; A response to claims that there should be an end to US aid

By SETH J. FRANTZMAN 28. July 23 v- JERUSALEM POST

A new article at Tablet has argued it is time to End U.S. Aid to Israel: America’s manipulation of the Jewish state is endangering Israel and American Jews.

The article makes several key points, among them;

 

·        “Israel ends up sacrificing far more value in return for the nearly $4 billion it annually receives from Washington. That’s because nearly all military aid to Israel—other than loan guarantees, which cost Washington nothing, the U.S. gives Israel no other kind of aid—consists of credits that go directly from the Pentagon to U.S. weapons manufacturers. In return, American payouts undermine Israel’s domestic defense industry, weaken its economy, and compromise the country’s autonomy—giving Washington veto power over everything from Israeli weapons sales to diplomatic and military strategy.”

·        “Controlling access to the output of Israel’s powerful high-tech sector is a strategic advantage for the U.S.”

·        “[The alternative to] an unequal relationship based on dependence is a more forthrightly transactional relationship, which would allow Israel to benefit economically, diplomatically, and strategically.”

·        “Israel has now become dangerously reliant on U.S. military technology.”

·        “Many American foreign aid arrangements are ultimately rooted in enriching a morally profligate arms industry that is financially headquartered in the U.S. but invested in conflict on a global scale.”

·        “As the price of its dependency, Israel is now being forced to downgrade its own defense industries. Whereas the previous MOU contained a special provision for Off-Shore Procurement (OSP) that allowed Israel to spend around 26% of the aid it received on domestic products, the new terms require that all aid received from Washington be spent inside the U.S.”

·        “Off-Shore Procurement (OSP) is to decrease slowly until FY2024, and then phase out more dramatically over the MOU’s last five years, ending entirely in FY2028.” As a consequence, the report notes “some Israeli defense contractors are merging with U.S. companies or opening U.S. subsidiaries”—in other words, transferring their personnel and capacities from Israel to the U.S.”

·        “Israel gets preferential access to the F-35, but is then locked into a fleet of aircraft both riddled with technical problems and a poor fit for Israel’s strategic air priorities.”

·        “Let America pursue its interests. Let Israel, too, follow its own interests, which sometimes align with those of Washington and sometimes don’t.”

I read this piece with interest but I think it misses some key points. It assumes that the 2018 MOU which continues to provide more than $3 billion a year, is somehow bad for Israel because it began to wean Israel of being able to plow this money into its own Israeli defense industry, instead of basically being $3 billion in “aid” to Israel that has to be spent in the US. While the article understands that the spending goes back to the US, to pay for expensive platforms like F-35s and KC-46A refuelers, it doesn’t provide evidence that this weakens Israel’s economy of compromises the country’s autonomy. It’s also not clear where the US has used leverage over things like F-35 deliveries to have “veto” power over what Israel does.

The opposite appears to be true. As Israel acquires the most advanced fighter aircraft it is well positioned to participate in more joint drills with the US such as Juniper Oak of the Tri-Lightning drills. Israeli F-35s joined the Red Flag exercise in the US for the first time in March 2023. This is a new era in joint training that is unique for Israel. Israel’s integration in CENTCOM has also enabled more discussions about regional air defenses and improved Israel’s ability to have its companies, such as Elbit Systems, send new technology to US-backed initiatives like Digital Horizon in the Gulf.

The fact is that the aid over the years has helped Israel create one of the world’s leading defense industries. Israel’s three largest defense behemoths, Elbit Systems, Rafael, and IAI, are selling arms all over the world and are leading developers of some of the most advanced defense tech. These companies are also now increasing deliveries of defense tech to Europe, such as Arrow sales to Germany, David’s Sling air defense sales to new NATO-member Finland, and a number of new deals in Netherlands, Denmark and countries like Greece and Romania. As countries in Europe move older munitions and platforms to Ukraine, they need to replace them quickly. Israel’s nimble defense industry has been able to help bolster western countries at a time when the US has to focus on its own priorities.

US defense aid didn’t turn Israel into a dependent state, unlike it probably did to some other countries, rather Israel used this aid to plug some gaps (such as buying F-35s, because Israel can’t build its own F-35s) and has otherwise become a massive defense seller in its own right. The $12 billion in record sales Israel recorded in 2022 is just one example of this. Back in the early 2000s, sales were only several billion. There is no evidence that US aid has made Israel dependent or weakened the country. In the opposite, the more the US has made the MOU reduce Israeli spending of the aid locally; the more Israel developed local industry.

The article argues that “Israel has now become dangerously reliant on US military technology.” This is not accurate. Israel may be reliant on some things, like F-35s, which Israel can’t build itself. But Israel is not reliant on US “technology.” I should know, I’ve covered Israel defense tech for a decade for Defense News and Breaking Defense and I’ve covered IDF operations going back to 2009. Israel develops most of its own defense tech. For instance the new Sa’ar 6 ships that Israel acquired (built in Germany), are being filled with Israeli defense tech. Ninety percent are Israeli-made defense systems. Basically all the systems on the ships, from Barak missiles to the naval version of Iron Dome, to the radars and remote weapon stations, are all Israeli tech. In addition, as those systems become operational and combat proven, they help boost Israel’s sales of the same systems abroad. The naval version of Iron Dome is being pitched in Asia, for instance.

Israel doesn’t rely on the US for outfitting its new ships and it doesn’t rely on the US to equip its tanks or its new armored vehicle program (Carmel) or for its rifles or drones. Almost all the new leading Israeli defense technology is created either through massive investment by Israel’s Big Three defense companies (which have record sales), and investment by the Defense Ministry in research and development through special programs tailored to dual-use start-ups. Israeli companies that come out of this investment, like Smart Shooter and Xtend, are supplying the US with technology. Israeli companies make the wings and helmets for F-35s. Israel partners with Raytheon and Lockheed and all the major US defense companies, not because Israel needs them, but because they want Israeli tech.

The article turns this success on its head and portrays the US as “controlling access to the output of Israel’s powerful high-tech sector is a strategic advantage for the U.S.” It argues Israel is forced to downgrade its industries and Israeli defense contractors are transferring their personnel and capacities from Israel to the U.S. This is a misreading of the importance of Israel partnering with US companies and creating subsidiaries in the US. Israel doesn’t have the industrial might to produce Iron Dome interceptors at the scale the US has. If Israel wants to sell Iron Dome abroad, or sell David’s Sling, it needs the capacity of US industry. It can also package the sales with the US industry to pitch these weapons to the US military. The US military doesn’t want to rely on foreign companies for systems, and therefore for Israel the partnerships are the best of both worlds. Israel wants to sell David’s Sling abroad, but David’s Sling was jointly developed with the US and Israel can’t pitch the air defense system on its own and compete with Patriot (the David’s Sling interceptor is a plug-and-play with the Patriot battery, meaning it can fit in it).

The argument that Israel is losing out on these deals is not bolstered by evidence. Israeli defense technology is now prized everywhere from Australia, to the UK and Europe. The fact that it is sometimes marketed with US companies, or through partnerships with large European companies, is a benefit for Israel. This gives Israel access, it doesn’t shut the door to Israel. The evidence for this is clear daily from reports in Israel, such as Rafael showcasing its FireFly loitering munition at the US Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment (AEWE).

If there was evidence for Israel being put at a disadvantage by the partnerships in the US we’d expect to see it manifested in barrier to Israeli sales in the Gulf or Asia. Instead Israel’s ability to enter new markets expands every month.

Where Israel has an issue is in industrial capacity. The US can’t make enough munitions to supply Ukraine, and Israel doesn’t have a huge manufacturing base. This means that Israel often needs to outsource the making of things like Iron Dome interceptors. Israel does this through JVs with companies like Raytheon and the hardware of the systems are then built in the US. This doesn’t make Israel dependent due to aid, even without aid Israel will want to do these partnerships, but it does mean that in a world with supply problems for munitions, Israel has to wait like everyone else. There is no easy solution to this. Israel can’t scale up its manufacturing locally for all the systems it needs. Its defense behemoths already employ tens of thousands of people. Elbit says it supports 40,000 jobs in the country, for instance. Partnerships in India or the Gulf are also not a quick way to increase production because the Gulf is buying defense products, not scaling up making them; and India has its own local commitments. India has its own defense policy called Make in India, but India isn’t a position to make Iron Dome interceptors. Also Israeli companies like IAI already have major investments in India and recently acquired a new company there. There is no other alternative for Israel to buy advanced systems like tanks and planes. There’s no evidence Israel feels “locked in” to platforms like the F-35 or that it would prefer French warplanes. There aren’t a plethora of countries making 5th generation aircraft.

In addition, Israel can’t partner with US defense industry for sales to the US (which helps Israel) and then go and outsource to places like China. Considering the current role of China working with Iran and Russia, why would Israel want Beijing as an alternative, after seeing how Beijing has handled its relationships elsewhere. Building key systems in the US is the best partnership for Israel. This is now a partnership that benefits Israel, it’s not dependency. The US is more dependent on Israel these days in terms of defense tech.

Where the defense aid helps is in programs like supporting Iron Dome, and also the partnerships on Arrow and David’s Sling, which require large investments. When we look back to how exposed Israel was in the Gulf war and truly dependent on hoping the US could suppress Scud launches; or how Israel didn’t have air defenses in 2006 and civilians had to flee to safe rooms in the north; today Israel is one of the most heavily integrated defended airspaces in the world. Countries all over the world look to Israel to learn how to make multi-layered air defenses and defenses to counter drone threats. This is an outcome of the US-Israel partnership on air defense that developed in the 1990s and 2000s.

These are investments that were a benefit for Israel. Unlike the Gulf, which doesn’t make its own air defenses and has to wait on slow procurement from the US and slow approvals, Israel makes its own defense systems. Today those systems are being sold to Germany and Finland. This means that Israel and the US both benefited from the joint development. Israel is most certainly not dependent in this realm. Per capita Israel is probably the largest defense exporter in the world and has the largest partnership with the US in this regard.

The next MOU will be negotiated in the next few years and it’s true that it will likely no longer enable the aid to go into Israel’s industries. In a sense any aid after 2027 will be aid that is US funding its own industries. But this is also a good thing. We want a large US defense industry. The US has to outcompete with China and build new platforms, rather than the slow procurement that the US got used to from 1990 to 2020 as the world’s hegemon. It is in everyone’s interests that the US have a large defense industry and I don’t agree that this fuels foreign wars. The article argues that there is a “profligate arms industry that is financially headquartered in the U.S. but invested in conflict on a global scale.” The opposite is true. Countries like China are spending massively on weapons. Other countries that sought peace and trade are not having to rearm, in Asia and in Europe.

Our adversaries won’t stop building tanks and planes and ships if we decide to scale back our arms industry. Iran didn’t stop building missiles and drones when the US entered the 2015 JCPOA. Russia didn’t stop when the US decided not to invest in air defense in eastern Europe. Evidence shows that adversaries are investing in arms. They have to be met and out gunned.

Our enemies are building more. As such, it’s perfectly normal that the US should increase defense industrial production. Israel also needs to invest more in manufacturing weapons, but overall in terms of defense tech Israel is a global leader and Israel is not dependent on the US. In the opposite, Israel is self-sufficient mostly and the US is dependent on Israel in some ways. That’s a good thing. It’s good to have the industries in Israel and the US knit together.

I welcome anyone who has an interest in Israel’s defense spending, defense tech and its defense industry reaching out. I cover this for Breaking Defense and it’s worth learning more about how the industry and Israeli defense start-ups are actually developing today.

On questions about the F-35s and Israel’s preference for the plane

Regarding the F-35 Israel has decided to purchase more of them. That means it likes the aircraft. Israel had an option to buy more F-15s or F-16s. It chose more F-35s. Israel is not a country that chooses to acquire wasteful gold-plated platforms that don’t work. It doesn’t have the luxury of acquiring things that it doesn’t use.

The F-35 is being used and it is working. Israel was the first to use the plane in combat. Furthermore Israeli industries are making elements of and for the aircraft. The aircraft as a platform is a data sponge, and I think the feedback in Israel is positive. The program may have been overpriced, like most US procurement programs, but Israel was not a partner of the program. Israel agreed to buy the airplanes, rather than be a partner. As such I think Israel got the best of both worlds. It has gotten 75 of the aircraft mostly funded by the US, and it hasn’t had to go through the development or the problems with the aircraft relating to cost.

One can argue that the cost in this aid was overpriced to the US, but that didn’t harm Israel in the long run; it’s a lesson for the US. The problems with the F-35 strike me as similar to other programs, whether the competition for the F-22, or those “Littoral” combat ships, or the Pegasus, or other programs going back to things like the Aquila drone. That’s due to the US having the luxury to spend time working on these projects, especially in the 1980s to the first decade of the 2000s. Now times are changing. The end result F-35 appears to be an aircraft that does what needs to be done. America’s competitors aren’t building aircraft that compete with it. Lockheed instead is building more and more F-35s. By contrast more F-22s aren’t being built or more Global Hawks. Judging by these realities, the plane is a success. There is no alternative. There isn’t some other 5th generation aircraft out there as a competitor.

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MESOP MIDEAST WATCH – Essay von Jossi Klein Halevi – Die verwundete jüdische Psyche und die gespaltene israelische Seele

Israels Moment der Wahrheit verstehen – vom Krieg gegen Start-up Nation über die moralische Krise im orthodoxen Judentum bis hin zum persönlichen Versagen des Autors an Empathie für politische Gegner – Die Art und Weise, wie der Rückzug aus Gaza erfolgte – die Zerstörung des Lebens der Menschen und ihre Verschleppung in interne Flüchtlingslager – war eine Unverschämtheit – THE TIMES OF ISRAEL  28.7.23

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MESOP MIDEAST WATCH : SAUDI-UAE DIFFERENCES CLOUD PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

 
Bottom Line Up Front: THE SOUFAN CENTER USA  – 28-7-23
  • Recent tensions between the key Gulf allies, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have complicated their once closely aligned regional security strategy and unnerved officials in Washington.
  • MBS is seeking to use preponderant Saudi influence in the global oil market and the large size of the Saudi economy to fund Riyadh’s ambitious economic diversification program and attract investment to the Kingdom, partly at the expense of the UAE.
  • UAE-Saudi differences have clouded regional and international diplomacy to end the long-running war in Yemen, which has had catastrophic consequences on the Yemeni population.
  • The two Gulf heavyweights continue to share major geopolitical and regional interests, likely limiting the duration and extent of their rift.
A wide variety of press reports and readouts of meetings with Saudi de-facto leader Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and his erstwhile mentor, UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ), point to strains in a pivotal Gulf relationship that has been closely aligned on virtually every significant regional and global issue. As a more open sign of dissonance, over the past year, both leaders have pointedly declined to attend regional summits and other meetings organized by the other. MBZ did not attend the May Arab League meeting in the Kingdom to allow Syria back into the group, even though the UAE was the vanguard of efforts in the Gulf to rebuild relations with the Assad regime, despite its war crimes and crimes against humanity. The tensions have surprised many experts because of MBZ’s key role in engineering the rise of the much younger MBS to the apex of the Kingdom’s power structure. Jointly, the two engaged in risky and ultimately troubled regional adventures, including sending Saudi, Emirati, and allied Arab forces to fight against the Iran-backed Houthi movement in Yemen, and deciding, in 2017, to isolate and boycott Qatar. The 2017 boycott nearly brought an end to the 42-year-old alliance of six Gulf Arab countries, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman) – a grouping that had survived many regional challenges, including the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. According to observers who have met with him recently, MBS accuses MBZ of steering him to undertake ill-fated regional policies, including the Qatar boycott. MBZ might perceive that MBS’ role in the killing of dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 has, among other actions, disqualified MBS from asserting himself as the paramount Gulf state leader, despite Saudi Arabia’s large area and population relative to those of the other Gulf states.

As MBS’ father, King Salman, withdraws from day-to-day decision-making and the Khashoggi killing seemingly fades into the background, MBS is moving to emerge from MBZ’s shadow and mentorship. Moving to assert his domestic and regional agenda, MBS has cooperated with Russia – in the “OPEC+” forum of OPEC and non-OPEC major oil exporters – to reduce global oil production in an effort to raise global crude oil prices. The cuts, primarily a two million barrel per day production decrease announced in October, blindsided U.S. officials while at the same time representing a roadblock to the UAE’s efforts to raise its production to maximize its revenue stream. The Emiratis have raised their oil production capacity to more than four million barrels a day but are allowed under OPEC policy to pump no more than about three million, forfeiting hundreds of billions of dollars in revenues. UAE leaders acquiesced to the cuts but privately blamed Saudi Arabia for pressuring them to do so. Still, at the OPEC+ meeting in June, the UAE was given a higher oil production target for 2024, whereas several other exporters had their quotas reduced, suggesting that the two powers seek to minimize their differences on the issue. In late July, UAE Energy Minister Suhail al-Mazrouei stated that current actions by OPEC+ to support the oil market are sufficient for now, and the group is “only a phone call away” if any further steps are needed. The UAE’s criticism of MBS’ alignment with Russia on oil production might also signal a potential shift by MBZ away from Russian President Vladimir Putin; MBZ has engaged Putin despite the invasion of Ukraine, but the UAE president might be questioning Putin’s political longevity in the wake of the Wagner Group mutiny in late June.

UAE leaders appear concerned that MBS seeks to undermine the Emirates’ position as the key Gulf hub for global business investment and trade. As part of MBS’ plan to diversify and modernize the Saudi economy through his “Vision 2030” program, MBS is reportedly demanding that foreign companies relocate their regional headquarters from Dubai, the UAE commercial center, to Riyadh, the Saudi capital. MBS is also planning to establish technology centers, draw more tourists, and develop logistical hubs – all of which would siphon business away from the UAE. Still, there are no indications that MBS has the political will or the domestic support to lift restrictions such as the public dress code or the prohibition on alcohol – limitations that reduce the Kingdom’s appeal to tourists and expatriate business executives.

Differences have also widened between the two over the end game for resolving the war in Yemen – a war that MBS and MBZ entered in 2015 to counter Iranian influence, and which both thought would be quickly won. Instead, the war slowly developed into a quagmire for both Gulf states, and Yemen has served as a launching point for the Iran-backed Houthis to fire Iranian-supplied ballistic missiles and armed unmanned aerial systems (UAS) on targets in both countries, but particularly Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials have been meeting with Houthi representatives in a concerted diplomatic effort to end the war on terms at least acceptable to Riyadh, although with mixed success. The UAE, which has been largely excluded from the diplomacy, continues to back a Yemeni separatist movement – the Southern Transitional Council (STC) – that is seeking to restore a Yemeni state in the south. MBZ continues to view southern Yemen as a base from which to project power into East Africa, including Sudan, and opposes any settlement that would reduce the UAE’s ability to operate from south Yemen. Saudi Arabia supports the Republic of Yemen Government, which Houthi forces ousted from the capital, Sanaa, in 2014. The rival objectives of the Yemen Government and the STC are one factor that has frustrated the Saudi-led peace settlement diplomacy to date.

Arguably, the Saudi-UAE rift could be quickly healed on the weight of their many shared interests and objectives. Both MBS and MBZ have, in recent years, questioned the U.S. commitment to Gulf security and to the containment of Iran. To reduce tensions with the Islamic Republic amid the uncertainty about U.S. policy, both have engaged directly with Tehran. Saudi Arabia restored relations with the Islamic Republic in March in a deal finalized by Beijing. In addition to remaining engaged with Russia’s leadership, both MBS and MBZ perceive the value of expanding relations with China, notwithstanding caution from Washington against doing so. The UAE has normalized relations with Israel, and Saudi officials have held talks with U.S. officials, inconclusive to date, about following suit. Perhaps calming fears among some U.S. officials that a wider MBS – MBZ rift would complicate U.S. efforts to deter and counter Iran, both leaders continue to work closely with the United States to develop integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) for the Gulf and to counter Iran’s threats to Gulf security. And officials of both countries have sought to counter Western assessments that their differences will widen into a more open breach. In separate statements to The Wall Street Journal in July, a UAE official speaking for the government said claims of strained relations were “categorically false and lack foundation,” and a Saudi official called the idea “simply not accurate.”

 

 

 

MESOP MIDEAST WATCH : Russlands Bestrebungen im Nahen Osten neu schreiben

In einem Interview untersucht Leonid Nersisyan Moskaus Engagement in der Levante und in Nordafrika vor dem Hintergrund des festgefahrenen Krieges in der Ukraine.  Juli 2023 CARNEGIE MIDDLE EAST CENTER

Leonid Nersisjan ist ein Verteidigungsanalyst, der sich auf die Außen- und Militärpolitik Russlands und der Region der Gemeinschaft Unabhängiger Staaten konzentriert. Er verfolgt auch die Rüstungsindustrie im Allgemeinen sowie bewaffnete Konflikte und Rüstungskontrolle. Nersisyan ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia und Doktorand an der University of Birmingham in Großbritannien. Diwan interviewte Nersisyan im Juli, um zu erfahren, wie sich der Ukraine-Krieg und seine Auswirkungen auf Russlands Verteidigungsposition im Nahen Osten ausgewirkt haben.

Armenak Tokmajyan: Der Ukraine-Konflikt ist seit mehr als einem Jahr vorbei und das Ende scheint nicht in Sicht. Wie hat sich der Konflikt auf die militärische Präsenz Russlands im Ausland, insbesondere im Nahen Osten, ausgewirkt?

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MESOP MIDEAST WATCH : Israel ist von einer Wirtschaftskrise bedroht und seine Führung muss aufpassen – Leitartikel

Investoren, die sich um die Stabilität Israels sorgen, könnten sich massenhaft aus dem Land zurückziehen, was katastrophale Auswirkungen auf das wirtschaftliche Wohlergehen Israels haben könnte. Von JPOST EDITORIAL

 

Veröffentlicht: 27. JULI 2023 01:24 JERUSALEM POST  – Während Israel nach der Verabschiedung des ersten Teils der Justizreform der Regierung in dieser Woche in eine neue Ära eintritt, entwickelt sich seine Wirtschaft zu einem kritischen Bereich, der von den jüngsten Ereignissen zutiefst betroffen ist. Israelische Experten haben davor gewarnt, dass die Abstimmung eine Welle wirtschaftlicher Instabilität ausgelöst hat, die zu negativen Aussichten der großen Ratingagenturen, Inflationssorgen und steigenden Hypothekenzinsen geführt hat.

Am Dienstag, dem Tag nach der Knesset-Abstimmung, stufte Morgan Stanley die Kreditwürdigkeit Israels herab

 

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