MESOP NEWS : GROSSANGRIFF – Türkei greift PKK-Ziele in der irakischen Region Kurdistan an

Die Türkei hat mutmaßliche Verstecke der verbotenen Arbeiterpartei Kurdistans im irakischen Kurdistan bombardiert und Berichten zufolge Munitionsdepots, Höhlen und andere Verstecke zerstört.

Al-Monitor Mitarbeiter 24. August 2021

weiterlesen / click to continue

MESOP NEWS ANALYSE :  – «Nicht die Taliban, sondern wir haben den afghanischen Staat zerstört»

Der Triumph der Taliban und der Kollaps des afghanischen Staates haben den Afghanistan-Experten Gilles Dorronsoro nicht überrascht. Im Interview erklärt er, warum das State-Building-Projekt des Westens von Anbeginn zum Scheitern verurteilt war.

Ulrich von Schwerin  – 25.08.2021 NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG

Herr Dorronsoro, die Welt war überrascht vom raschen Kollaps des afghanischen Staates. Sie haben diesen Zusammenbruch dagegen seit langem vorhergesagt. Warum?

weiterlesen / click to continue

MESOP NEWS : PKK Recruits Children from Sinjar and Kirkuk to Use in Combat: US

 

ERBIL 24.8.2021 -The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), alongside the Islamic State (IS) and Iran-backed militias of Hashd al-Shaabi, continue to recruit and use children in combat or as human shields in armed conflicts, according to the 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report by the US State Department.

weiterlesen / click to continue

THE TURKISH COUNTERTERRORISM FACTSHEET TWO DECADES AFTER 9/11- THE SOUFAN CENTER

Monday, August 23, 2021
Bottom Line Up Front:

 

  • The events of 9/11 encouraged al-Qaeda attacks in Turkey and led to the rise of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), issues that majorly impacted Ankara’s foreign and security policy.
  • U.S.-Turkey relations suffered in the post-9/11 era as a result of the power vacuum in northern Iraq, which helped the PKK gain a stronger foothold and divergence over the People’s Protection Units (YPG).
  • The gradual advances of militant Wahhabi-Salafi ideology and the lack of comprehensive repatriation plans for foreign fighters in Turkey’s regional proximity are major issues in the country’s future security agenda.
  • For Turkey, the diminishing U.S. military presence in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan may engender security and socioeconomic concerns about new waves of refugees, making the issue a Turkish policy priority.

 

Of the countries most affected by the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, Turkey quite likely makes the top five. The country not only experienced al-Qaeda-linked attacks and arrests in 9/11’s aftermath, but also dealt with the secondary consequences of the attacks with respect to Turkey’s regional policies; domestic terror incidents; local, regional, and global counterterrorism efforts; and the country’s foreign military and diplomatic engagement. Al-Qaeda’s transformation into a decentralized network, combined with jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s move toward Northern Iraq —where he would sow the seeds of the so-called Islamic State and the export of the al-Qaeda brand to Iraq and Syria —deeply impacted Turkey, both inside and outside its borders.

While U.S.-Turkey relations were initially strong following the 9/11 attacks, a series of events later strained relations between the nations. After 9/11, Turkey was one of the first countries to condemn the attacks and support the discourse and implementation of the so-called Global War on Terror. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, Turkey opened its airspace for flights in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, and later took over the command of the United Nations-mandated and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) military mission in Afghanistan twice. The U.S.-Turkey relationship became strained in 2003 and 2004 following Turkey’s rejection of direct involvement in the U.S. invasion of northern Iraq. This rejection came at a time when Turkey was struggling with an economic crisis, and the Iraq invasion became one of the first and most significant tests of the new Turkish government. Relations continued to suffer as the overall power vacuum in Iraq allowed al-Qaeda, ISIS, and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to find safe havens and sanctuary in the region, which was crucial to the PKK’s survival, particularly after its leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in 1999. The public image of the U.S. in Turkey seriously suffered from not only PKK and northern Iraq-related tensions, but also the abuses uncovered from the Abu Ghraib Prison scandal.

The Syrian Civil War provided fertile ground for al-Qaeda and ISIS recruitment and operations. Turkey’s domestic and cross-border engagement with ISIS and the spill-over of People’s Protection Units (YPG) and ISIS fighting in Syria resulted in ISIS attacks on Turkish soil. These attacks included but were not limited to the Ankara Train Station attack of late 2015; the mid-2016 attack at the İstanbul Atatürk Airport; the Gaziantep wedding attack of August 2016; and the mass shooting at an İstanbul nightclub on New Year’s Eve 2017. Additionally, Turkey was forced to deal with hundreds of YPG rocket attacks to its border towns and increased number of PKK attacks. The local, regional, and global dynamics of the Syrian Civil War also had a direct impact on Turkey’s relations with other actors such as Russia and the U.S., as evidenced by the YPG divergence; S-400 purchase and F-35 crisis—of which Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CATSAA) and NATO-related concerns still prevail—and cross-border operations, during which Turkey experienced varying levels of tension with both Moscow and Washington. Additionally, in order to take advantage of the regional instabilities, Iran’s opportunistic moves to empower its proxies in the region also plagued the two countries’ bilateral relationship and inflamed the rivalry over regional superiority.

Turkey’s counterterrorism portfolio has also expanded and improved since 9/11. Over the past two decades, Turkey has combated a myriad of groups, including the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP-C), the PKK, al-Qaeda, and ISIS, among others. Accordingly, Turkey has been forced to re-evaluate and upgrade its counterterrorism toolkit. From this toolkit emerged policies and tactics such as stricter border controls, counter-narrative efforts, effective use of Advance Passenger Information (API) data, entry-bans and risk analysis units, intensified domestic law-enforcement efforts, and cross-border operations—all of which Turkey had to devise and implement quickly as the Syrian Civil War erupted across the border. The country has also been an active player in international efforts as the first co-chair of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and a member of the D-ISIS coalition and its Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group. Lastly, Turkey proved to be one of the most effective NATO allies on the ground with its several cross-border operations, including Euphrates Shield, which cleared ISIS’s presence on the Turkish border and crippled some of the group’s key strongholds.

The prestige afforded to al-Qaeda and its militant Salafi brand after the 9/11 attacks also impacted Turkey’s interests outside of its regional proximity. For example, the militant Salafi brand spread to the African continent where Turkey had deepened its diplomatic and military engagement. Over the past two decades, Turkey has been forced to grapple not only with al-Qaeda, but also its offshoots and affiliates like ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab. Furthermore, Turkey’s ethnic and religious ties with Central Asia adds an additional front where Wahhabi-Salafi interpretations and their violent manifestations need to be monitored, which has been a concern for Turkey in the Caucasus and the Balkans since at least the 1990s. At the same time, the country must keep an eye on its efforts to absorb and manage the massive refugee influx resulting from the civil wars and insurgencies plaguing its neighbors. Additionally, ongoing global hesitancy concerning the repatriation of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) has also become a major issue on Turkey’s security agenda.

The diminishing U.S. military presence in Iraq and Syria raises concerns that power vacuums could grow and benefit various terrorist groups. Additionally, the U.S. troop withdrawal and Taliban takeover in Afghanistan will undoubtedly provide opportunities for al-Qaeda due in no small measure to its close links with the Taliban. And since Turkey has been a key destination for Afghan refugees, new refugee waves resulting from a U.S. withdrawal could also raise security concerns and stoke negative social and economic fallout. However, Turkey should prepare itself for the possible mid- to long-term consequences of the return of FTFs or insurgents currently hiding out in Turkey, who offer continuing logistical support to ISIS and against whom arrests have been made almost on a daily basis in the last several years. Given the challenges of collecting accountable battlefield evidence, prison sentences are relatively short, and repatriation of FTFs seems to be the exception rather than the norm, which might well help the next generation of militant Salafi terrorists to rise.

Overall, due to the Wahhabi-Salafi encirclement risk, the direct threat to its soft and hard power instruments from Africa to the Balkans and Caucasus, the migrant flows from Afghanistan, and the fate of FTFs in Iraq and Syria, Turkey will remain at the forefront of the global fight against terrorism. This reality not only requires Turkey’s security structure to consolidate and deepen its active engagement in and out of its borders, it also highlights the importance of the country’s future posture in the international system. It will be important to watch how key players approach Turkey’s fight against terrorism, and how its relations with NATO, the U.S., Russia, and even China, will play out on the global stage.

 

Guest Author:

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Goktug Sonmez – Director; Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM), Security Studies/ Faculty Member, Necmettin Erbakan University (Turkey) focuses on Radicalization and Terrorism, Non-State Armed Actors, and Turkish Foreign Policy. He publishes, comments, and teaches on those subjects in various national and international outlets and universities. 

weiterlesen / click to continue

MESOP NEWS RECOMMENDATION : A Thorough Explanation of China’s Long-Term Strategy

BY WAR ON THE ROCKS

Peter Mattis August 17, 2021 –  Rush Doshi, The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (Oxford University Press, 2021)If one day China should change her color and turn into a superpower, if she too should play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject others to her bullying, aggression and exploitation the people of the world should identify it as social-imperialism, expose it, oppose it and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow China.

Deng Xiaoping, U.N. General Assembly, April 10, 1974

weiterlesen / click to continue

MESOP NEWS EXCLUSIV : Islamic State Editorial on Taliban Victory in Afghanistan

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi  •  Aug 19, 2021

Over the course of the past few days following the Taliban’s seizure of Kabul, there have been many douchebag takes- amid the scramble to get the most likes and retweets on Twitter- about why events occurred in the way they did and who on the American side has the greatest share of blame. The Islamic State editorial on the matter in this week’s issue of the al-Naba’ newsletter must also surely rank among the douchebag takes. That said, I imagine that if you were to overthink and overanalyse this editorial, you could come to the conclusion that this editorial is really a masterful piece of propaganda as so much Islamic State propaganda supposedly is, requiring more pointless grants and money to be wasted on devising effective ‘counter-narrative’ and ‘combating violent extremism’, whatever that means.

weiterlesen / click to continue

MESOP NEWS SENSATIONAL: CIA’s Former Counterterrorism Chief for the Region: Afghanistan, Not An Intelligence Failure — Something Much Worse

by Douglas London – JUST SECURITY – LONDON – August 18, 2021

While it’s certainly convenient to depict the shock and miscalculation U.S. officials claim over Afghanistan’s tragic, rapid fall to the Taliban as an intelligence failure, the reality is far worse. It’s a convenient deflection of responsibility for decisions taken owing to political and ideological considerations and provides a scapegoat for a policy decision that’s otherwise unable to offer a persuasive defense.

weiterlesen / click to continue

MESOP NEWS : Did ‘gender studies’ lose Afghanistan?

How Ivy League diplomats sought to remake Afghanistan in Harvard’s image

August 19, 2021 | Written by: Cockburn THE SPECTATOR

Twenty years of war in Afghanistan are over. What comes next is twenty years, or even more, of recriminations and blame for why the war ended as it did.

weiterlesen / click to continue

MESOP NEWS : IRAN IS POISED TO EXPLOIT THE UNCERTAINTIES OF THE AFGHAN COLLAPSE

by Farzin Nadimi – PolicyWatch 3522 – August 18, 2021

Since the fall of Kabul—and well beforehand—Iranian officials have signaled how they might use a Taliban victory to further their goals in the Middle East, though they remain concerned about the fate of Afghan Shia.

 

Based on official statements and media coverage so far, the Iranian regime seems pleasantly surprised by the sudden collapse of nascent liberal democracy in Afghanistan, with commentators expressing cautious satisfaction at the Taliban takeover and the chaotic final days of the Western-supported government. In 1998, Iran almost went to war with the Taliban after years of arming and financing the group’s local opponent, the Northern Alliance. And as late as 2015, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was still referring to the Taliban as a “bunch of cruel, fanatical mercenaries who know nothing about Islam or international norms.”

Today, however, senior Iranian figures such as Foreign Ministry official Rasoul Mousavi are readily calling the group the “Islamic Emirate,” the Taliban’s preferred name, and state media are portraying it as a revamped movement. Meanwhile, new president Ebrahim Raisi shed no tears for the ousted government, instead calling the U.S. “military defeat and withdrawal” an opportunity for all Afghans to achieve lasting peace. What is behind this shift, and what implications does it hold for Iran’s near-term policy in Afghanistan and beyond?

Damaging U.S. Interests While Safeguarding Iran’s

Well before the recent public rebranding, Iran was apparently working behind the scenes for months to reap benefits from the final episode of the long war, including assurances about the safety of Shia Muslim co-religionists in Afghanistan. For example, Tehran did not express concern when Herat and its sizable Shia community fell to radical Sunni Taliban fighters on August 15, perhaps indicating that a deal had been struck with the group beforehand. According to Iran’s state-affiliated Tasnim News Agency, Taliban officials recently reassured Tehran that Afghan Shia could pursue their religious activities freely and safely, including the ongoing Muharram ceremonies that culminate in the holy day of Ashura. Yet new social media videos from Herat showed Taliban fighters disrupting such proceedings.

Iran’s tilt toward the Taliban and away from the pro-Western Afghan government is nothing new. For the past two decades, Khamenei has been careful to dismiss America’s role in the group’s original 2001 defeat while calling for the country to establish an independent and deeply Islamist regime—which the Taliban once again seems bent on doing today. Then, after years of dismissing the Taliban’s legitimacy, he suddenly stopped excoriating the group in 2015. Whatever his reasons, he has since focused on promoting resistance against American “evildoing” in Afghanistan, repeatedly making analogies between the Afghan, Syrian, Iraqi, and Yemeni “resistance.”

At the regional level, the emerging situation in Afghanistan is adding a huge element of uncertainty for U.S. policy in the Middle East, and Iran will likely exploit that by encouraging its numerous local proxies to increase their activity in the coming weeks and months. It may even attempt to recruit the Taliban into its “axis of resistance,” which in practical terms could entitle the group to fuel shipments, money, and advanced Iranian-made arms. Tehran has already provided some arms—when Supreme National Security Council secretary Ali Shamkhani visited Kabul in December 2018, he reportedly told the Afghan government that Iran was supplying the Taliban with light arms.

Throughout its cross-country offensive, the group has also been seizing large caches of advanced U.S. weapons worth billions of dollars. Some of those weapons may now end up in the hands of Iranian forces, proxy militias, or terrorist groups. In return, Tehran might offer to help the Taliban maintain its seized arsenal in operational condition.

What Role for Iran’s Afghan Militia?

Before the latest dramatic developments, the Iranian proxy militia Liwa Fatemiyoun—comprising thousands of seasoned Afghan fighters who have helped prop up Syria’s Assad regime since 2012—was expected to take an active part in countering a potential Taliban takeover, at least in the Shia regions of Afghanistan. On August 12, however, the militia denied rumors that any of its forces had been or would be deployed to Afghanistan; the statement also cheered the U.S. withdrawal and derided Afghan liberal democrats.

Yet this denial need not be taken as the gospel truth. Fatemiyoun members would hold immense intelligence collection value for Iran’s Qods Force if Tehran deployed them to Afghanistan, so it seems highly plausible that some of them are operating there amid the current chaos. Notably, though, such activities would still constitute significant restraint compared to the major opposition that Iran organized in Iraq several years ago to counter the Islamic State—a Sunni jihadist group that shares many ideological similarities with the Taliban. Withholding a large-scale Fatemiyoun deployment might also be Iran’s way of preserving the unit as a valued military and political asset for use in future Afghanistan plans.

Conclusion

As the dust settles and the situation on the ground becomes clearer, Iran can be expected to reconfigure its approach to Afghanistan in whatever manner it believes will make the most out of the collapse. In addition to pursuing relations with the Taliban, this will likely mean pressuring the United States and its partners with increased determination and confidence, particularly in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

Tehran will also presumably reexamine its old plans for cross-border military action in Afghanistan, mainly to ensure that its forces are prepared to fight the Taliban if existing arrangements or future accords with the group falter. Iranians will never see the Taliban as a natural ally—anti-American affinities aside, they remain ideological competitors with historical resentments toward each other. Relatedly, Iran will keep a closer eye on its own Sunni population in provinces bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan, especially after top Iranian Sunni cleric Molavi Abdolhamid Ismailzahi openly congratulated the Taliban on August 17. The regime may also be worried about a surge in drug trafficking from Afghanistan given the Taliban’s heavy involvement in such activity in the past.

At the same time, there are logical reasons to expect an Iranian-Taliban alliance, even one limited to the tactical level. After all, Shia-Sunni differences have not stopped Iran from forming close relations with similar groups (e.g., Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad), so long as they share common enemies. Partnering with the Taliban could meet several Iranian interests: keeping even more extreme groups at bay (e.g., the Islamic State); establishing closer economic and political relations with those who run Afghanistan; and, perhaps, enabling Iran to access Shia-majority regions as far away as Gilgit-Baltistan, a strategic portion of Kashmir that connects with Afghanistan and China.

As for al-Qaeda, it remains to be seen whether the regime will allow senior members of the group currently residing in Iran to relocate to Afghanistan. In light of that possibility and other security risks, the United States needs to ensure that sufficient intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities are focusing on Afghanistan and its border with Iran and Pakistan around the clock—a requirement that will place even more importance on existing U.S. bases in the Middle East.

Farzin Nadimi is an associate fellow with The Washington Institute, specializing in the security and defense affairs of Iran and the Gulf region.


THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
1111 19TH STREET NW, SUITE 500
WASHINGTON, DC 20036

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MESOP NEWS : US LEBANON POLICY IS PRO IRAN / BIDEN – OBAMA

Tony Badran

19-8-2021

Leb news channel claims US ambo has told the Lebs that Team Obama-Biden will bypass US law sanctioning Assad to allow for Egyptian gas to reach Lebanon. I wrote about this here: https://fdd.org/analysis/2021/07/28/biden-administration-foreign-policy-tracker-late-july/#lebanon

“Lebanon policy” is, by default, pro-Iran. All the more so with this crew

weiterlesen / click to continue

« neuere Artikel / next articles   ältere Artikel / previous articles »