| As Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu began his visit to Washington last week, including meeting with President Trump in the Oval Office on February 4, global experts expected the meeting to produce an unequivocal commitment by Trump to use––or support Israel’s use of––military action to destroy Iran’s nuclear program. President Trump and all of his national security appointees and aides have routinely echoed assertions by Israeli leaders of all political stripes that an Iranian nuclear weapon would constitute an “existential threat” to Israel. Iran’s program has advanced significantly since Trump withdrew the U.S. from the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) in 2018, claiming the agreement did not sufficiently constrain Iran’s strategic programs and regional influence. Many proliferation experts now characterize Iran as a “threshold” nuclear state, requiring perhaps only a few months to produce a nuclear weapon, if Iran’s leaders took a decision to do so.
Just hours before meeting with Netanyahu, Trump issued a “National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-2,” which clearly aligns U.S. policy with Israeli officials’ insistence that Iran’s nuclear program be dismantled. The memorandum states: “Iran’s nuclear program, including its enrichment- and reprocessing-related capabilities and nuclear-capable missiles, poses an existential danger to the United States and the entire civilized world. A radical regime like this can never be allowed to acquire or develop nuclear weapons, or to extort the United States or its allies through the threat of nuclear weapons acquisition, development, or use.” During the Netanyahu visit, Trump indicated he would take U.S. military action, or support Israeli action, if doing so were the only means possible to prevent Iran from acquiring a working nuclear device.
The official directive also formally affirmed Trump’s intent to reimpose his economic sanctions-based “maximum pressure” strategy employed during his first term, as a means of building leverage against Tehran. According to the document: “It is therefore in the national interest to impose maximum pressure on the Iranian regime to end its nuclear threat, curtail its ballistic missile program, and stop its support for terrorist groups.” Among other measures, the document stresses that the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, a post to which New York congresswoman and Trump ally, Elise Stefanik has been nominated, will work with U.S. partners to “snap back” all UN sanctions that were lifted when the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear agreement (JCPOA) went into effect. A sanctions snap back is provided for under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA, if any of the remaining parties to the accord (United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, or China) asserts that Iran has violated it. The deadline for evoking that provision is October 18, 2025 – ten years after the ratification of the JCPOA by all parties. On Thursday, the Treasury Department, which is the lead agency in enforcing financial sanctions on foreign countries, began to implement the memorandum’s instructions by targeting Iran’s crucial energy sector. The agency imposed sanctions on an international network it said facilitates the shipment of “millions of barrels of Iranian crude oil worth hundreds of millions of dollars” to China, Iran’s top oil customer that buys about 90 percent of Iran’s crude oil exports.
Yet, if Netanyahu had hoped to obtain an explicit U.S. commitment to undertake early military action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, or delegate to Israel a decision whether to undertake such a strike from Trump, he likely returned to Israel somewhat disappointed. During the visit, Trump and his team clearly signaled they prefer to pursue negotiations with Iranian leaders to achieve a new accord that addresses all aspects of Iranian behavior the U.S. finds objectionable. On February 5, Trump posted on his Truth Social media account: “I want Iran to be a great and successful Country, but one that cannot have a Nuclear Weapon. Reports that the United States, working in conjunction with Israel, is going to blow Iran into smithereens, ARE GREATLY EXAGGERATED.” On Saturday, as Netanyahu was returning to Israel, Trump told The New York Post: “I would like a deal done with Iran on non-nuclear. I would prefer that to bombing the hell out of it…They don’t want to die. Nobody wants to die.” Trump’s intent to explore a revised agreement with Iran while retaining the option of a strike on Iran, if talks fail, is consistent with his statements during the 2024 U.S. presidential election campaign that he seeks to end wars in the Middle East and elsewhere rather than initiate new conflicts.
Still, Netanyahu and other Israeli officials likely assess, as do many outside experts, that reaching a revised agreement with Iran will be far more difficult and frustrating than Trump appears to forecast. The National Security Memorandum and statements by Trump and his foreign policy team indicate that they will insist that any new agreement not only restrain Iran, but go further and completely dismantle Iran’s program to enrich uranium. The 2015 JCPOA allowed Iran to continue enriching uranium to low levels of purity, a provision that enabled Iran to expand its enrichment to near weapons-grade in the years following the U.S. withdrawal from the accord in 2018. Trump officials have also consistently denounced the original JCPOA for “sunsetting” in October 2025, after which time Iran would only be bound by its pre-existing Safeguards Agreement as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. If talks occur, Iranian leaders are sure to insist the country be held to nuclear constraints no stricter than the JCPOA. Based on the commitment of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to rebuilding Iran’s Axis of Resistance and continuing an Iran-led regional campaign against Israel, few experts expect Iranian negotiators to accept U.S.-demanded restraints on Iran’s regional activities. Negotiations with the Biden Administration on a revised nuclear agreement faltered over these same issues, as well as Iranian demands for a greater degree of sanctions relief than was provided in the 2015 deal. Trump officials have, to date, indicated no inclination to extend sanctions relief beyond that of the JCPOA.
Perhaps assessing that the Trump administration’s approach to an agreement and its alignment with Netanyahu likely precludes reaching an agreement, Khamenei has added uncertainty by expressing opposition to new talks. In a Friday speech to Air Force officers, he stated that experience had shown it was “not rational, intelligent, or honorable” to do so. Directly referencing Iranian distrust stemming from the Trump withdrawal from the JCPOA, Khamenei added: “Our government at the time engaged in negotiations, held meetings, had discussions, smiled, shook hands, and built relationships…The very person who is now in power tore up the agreement.” Yet, some experts suggest that Khamenei’s comments––which directly contradict the support for talks with Trump expressed by elected President Masoud Pezeshkian and his foreign affairs team––do not necessarily rule out the possibility of U.S.-Iran talks.
The various statements and actions by Trump, Netanyahu, and Khamenei during the past week leave the outlook for U.S. and Israeli policy toward Iran less clear than was anticipated. The future course of policy might depend on observed events and decisions on the ground in the region. Trump and Netanyahu’s decisions might depend on their governments’ observations of Iranian actions. Intelligence experts will be watching, for example, whether Iran decides to continue, or conversely slow or reverse, its stockpiling of highly enriched (60 percent purity) uranium. Others will try to ascertain whether Iran is producing any weapons-grade uranium (90 percent purity). Some will focus on whether any intelligence emerges that Iran is researching or experimenting with an explosive device or missile warhead that would be needed to develop a deliverable nuclear weapon. Still, Israel has sometimes undertaken military action against regional nuclear efforts that were not notified to or approved in advance by the United States. Netanyahu and his allies have been clear that they would not necessarily seek explicit U.S. backing before taking action to blunt what they consider a potential existential threat to the state. |