MESOPOTAMIA NEWS INSIGHT: “Syrian Amirs Don’t Want A Repeat Of The Umar Shishani Problem” — Interview with Syrian War Vet Abu Abdullah Al-Kavkazi

by Joanna Paraszczuk  FROM CECHNYIA TO SYRIA 17 Agust 2020

I have been fortunate enough to interview Abu Abdullah al-Kavkazi, a veteran of the Syrian war. Abu Abdullah has been in Syria almost since the war began, and has served in various jamaats there. A mujahid and an analyst, he has a wide perspective and understanding of events in Syria.

I spoke with him at length on a variety of topics related to the war, and to the participation of Russian-speaking mujahideen in it.

Among other things, Abu Abdullah talked about how Syrian Amirs are now very cautious about not permitting Russian-speaking Amirs to become too powerful, fearing a repeat of the problems caused when Umar Shishani, who had gathered hundreds of men around him, went over to the Islamic State and then played a big role in the “fitna” against Jabhat al-Nusra.

Below is a transcript, translated into English, of our conversation (I will publish the original Russian shortly).

NB the photo in this post is for illustrative purposes, and does not show Abu Abdullah himself. The individual in the photo is no longer alive.

QUESTION 1: Please tell me a little about yourself: have you been in jihad many years? Why did you decide to join the jihad? And why did you decide to participate in the jihad in Syria?

I have been here for quite some time already. I don’t want to disclose precisely how long, but I can say that I have been here since the first years [of the war].

I came to help the Muslims, because we saw a great many videos on YouTube about the events that were happening here, about how the army and police were firing on civilian protesters, and how they were deploying heavy artillery and planes against Sunni towns and villages.

There were frequent calls from ordinary Muslims, who were suffering at the hands of the Assad regime, asking for people to come and help, to come defend them.

That is why I came.

QUESTION 2: Which jamaat do you belong to?

I am not part of any jamaat. I am independent.

QUESTION 3: Recently, a certain group calling itself the Khattab al-Shishani brigade claimed responsibility for an attack in Idlib governorate. I asked several Russian-speaking mujahideen from various brigades, and they all gave me the same response: that they had never heard of this brigade. What is your opinion on this, and what, in your view, happened? Was this some sort of attempt to discredit Russian speaking mujahideen? And who, in  your opinion, might be responsible?

We really have never heard of this brigade before.

There are several explanations that one might put forward:

1. This is some sort of new organization, which may have been named after Khattab, who fought in Chechnya. Some Syrians with whom I have discussed events in the North Caucasus believe that Khattab was a Chechen (as far as I am aware, Khattab was an Arab and was born in Saudi Arabia). In the Arab world, there have been such rumors ever since the war in Chechyna. So we cannot exclude the possibility that this is some sort of new local group, and this is what they named their organization.

There has already been a precedent for this — here in Syria, there used to be a group called the Imam Shamil Brigade, even though this was entirely a Syrian outfit and there were no muhajirs [foreign fighters] in it, as far as I know. So similarly, judging by its name, it’s entirely possible that in this jamaat too, there are no muhajirs.

2. The second version is as follows: this attack was an operation by the kharijites, aimed at discrediting the muhajirs by showing them to be unable to keep agreements, first and foremost with Turkey.

Despite the opinion of several of our media activists, I do not think that Russian agents were behind this attack.

3. The third possible motive: an Islamic State cell was behind the attack, and the goal of the operation was to attract people’s sympathy via revenge on the Russians, by setting themselves up against HTS, which does not prevent the joint patrols by Russia and Turkey. The “brigade” would then give bayah to [the IS] “caliph” and show that, ostensibly, independent Idlib brigades were going over to their side. In other words, a PR exercise for the “caliphate.”

As you will understand, the third explanation dovetails very well with the second.

To summarize, it was either a local brigade named after Khattab, or a Kharijite setup.

Right now it is difficult to say for sure, but time will tell.

QUESTION 4: I would be interested to learn about what has changed in Syria since you first arrived there, from the point of view of the involvement of Russian-speaking mujahideen, not just in the war, but in general.

For example, to what extent have Russian-speakers integrated into society? What is the situation with mixed marriages, i.e. of Russian-speakers with Syrian women?

Do you attend the mosque with Syrians, and do Russian-speaking mujahideen engage with Syrians, i.e. are they part of your social circle, etc?

Do you consider yourselves as part of Syrian society?

Are there special schools for the children of Russian-speaking muhajirs in the liberated territories? If so, which languages do they learn, e.g. Russian, Arabic? Do Russian-speaking children go to Syrian schools?

A lot has changed, of course. Russian-speaking brothers are sufficiently well integrated into society, there are many mixed marriages. Many [Russian-speaking men] have Ansar wives, that is, Syrian wives. There is a community, local friends, brothers-in-arms, business partners, neighbors, acquaintances, traders. We go to the mosque together–there are no separate mosques for muhajirs.

In other words, there is everything here that you would find in any society. If we were to have no social contact with Syrians, we would not be able to conduct with our daily affairs or get on in life.

It is difficult to say to what extent we have become full members of Syrian society. Many muhajirs know the language quite well, they live with their Syrian wives, and so on. But as for total, full integration– that is something for the next generation, for the children of the muhajirs; after all, we are very different from Syrians in terms of mentality, life experience and so on.

However, integration is an unavoidable and necessary process, because this is their country, and the muhajirs must integrate properly and fully coexist with the ansars, respect their traditions, their mentality, and their culture.

Regarding Russian language schools: there are no such schools, unfortunately. Quite a while ago now, there were some projects, but they were short-lived, there were constant problems with security and with financing. There has never been an educational project here that has managed to run for more than six months, maybe for a year.

There are some small groups, with maybe some 8-15 children, who are taught how to read and write. Some parents are able to hire tutors who can teach those children math and reading, but there are no proper schools, including because Russian-speaking muhajirs are dispersed throughout the liberated territories. It would be costly to travel by bus and collect children in order to take them somewhere to study. Another important factor is the issue of security. It’s not easy for parents to send their children somewhere, especially somewhere far from home.

And so, there are no schools for muhajirs, and in most families, it is the parents themselves who teach the children.

Regarding whether the children of muhajirs attend Syrian schools, yes, there are some who attend madrassas, but I have not heard that older children do so. Possibly that is because most muhajir children are still small.

Right now, learning mostly consists of reading and arithmetic.

QUESTION 5: Moving onto military matters: how has the entry of Russia into the conflict changed the situation there on the battlefield? Do you consider that this has somehow led to more Russian-speaking muhajirs making hijra, people who were motivated to travel to Syria to also fight against Russia?

Of course Russia’s entry into the conflict has greatly changed the situation, one could say dramatically so. Not immediately so, but the total aerial advantage and other assistance that the Russian regime started to provide has played a decisive role in moving things in that direction.

Russia has failed to make effective use of its resources and opportunities. Nevertheless, because of Russia’s overwhelming superiority in terms of arms—even if they sometimes used these unwisely, inaccurately, or a way that was not appropriately coordinated— all the same this played a key role in events, and the mujahideen ended up losing most of their territory.

Regarding the sub-question about whether there was any motivation of muhajirs to come specifically to fight against Russia, I cannot speak for everyone. I came here before Russia entered the war, to defend Muslims against a dictatorial regime.

Maybe for some this served as a stimulus to come, to fight Russia, to get revenge for something, etc. In the main, people just wanted to help Syrians, and to live in and Islamic society, to build their own Islamic state, in the correct meaning of that word. To found an Islamic government where one could fully practice one’s religion, and where that religion would be the determining law of people’s lives.

QUESTION 6: Moving on to the role and influence of Russian-speaking muhajirs in the conflict.

Almost from the outset of the war, I noticed that Russian-speaking amirs, in particular and especially Muslim Shishani, but also Salakhuddin Shishani, Abdulhakim Shishani, and now Abdul Malik Shishani, expressed the firm opinion that unity among the Syrian jamaats was essential. Recently, Muslim Shishani and Abdul Malik Shishani (the amir of Ajnad al-Kavkaz) even offered to act as intermediaries in the conflict between HTS and other jamaats, so there would not be arguments.

With that in mind, is it correct to say that Russian-speaking muhajirs have had influence in the conflict between Syrian jamaats? And how do Syrian mujahideen and amirs / leaders view Russian-speaking muhajirs?

Russian-speaking mujahideen, at least those who did not pledge bay’ah to IS, have had an influence over the course of events in certain regions, and on certain fronts. In other words, we have not penetrated deep into the country: in the main, we are talking about influence in Aleppo, Idlib and Latakia governorates.

Undoubtedly, the Russian-speaking amirs had weight, there was influence, and there was some sort of voice that would be listened to, and which would be considered in whatever case. But all the same, this had more weight and was felt much more at the beginning, in the first years of the war, when there were more muhajirs, and we had some sort of unity.

Back then, there were quite large muhajir groups, each of which had tens and even hundreds of fighters. Plus there was respect from the locals, since the muhajirs had come for the sake of Allah to protect and help them.

In general, Syrians are a hospitable people. For that reason, from the very start, there was respect, and even reverence for the muhajirs and their leaders. And even now, the words of our amirs still means something, but more when it comes to solving rather mundane issues.

Syrians do not allow muhajirs to hold any key — and not just key, even influential — positions, that is simply not going happen like it used to.

One of the reasons for this is the Syrians’ fears about what they have already seen happen —many of the kharijites, who came out against the Syrians themselves, against the Muslims here, were muhajirs.

Many muhajirs were deceived and followed the kharijites, and so the local amirs now have no interest in having serious competition from influential muhajirs.

I believe that Syrians treat us well, and they see us as experienced, ideological people, as more professional fighters, with a broader outlook, with a deep understanding of war on a strategic and tactical level.

The ordinary Syrian mujahideen love us, and treat us with respect. As a rule, we enjoy very good relations with them, friendly and brotherly. They are full-fledged comrades, everything is as it should be, we help each other and so on.

As I already said, the locals have certain fears about not letting the muhajirs get out of control. They don’t want a repeat of what happened before with Umar Shishani, whereby some sort of leader emerges who can attract a large number of mujahideen to follow him, some inadequate who would then turn against them, the local people. So it won’t happen again that they elevate one of the Russian-speaking amirs and recognize him as being equal to them in jihad and in leading jihad.

Let me once again emphasize, that in all other respects, relations are good, respectful, they accept us seriously, see us as professionals and as their guests, help us wherever possible, even if, for example, the muhajirs they help are not part of their group. This happens on an individual level and on the level of interaction between jamaats. Not as often or as generously as before, but relations are good and there are no tensions.

QUESTION 7: Is it true to say that Russian-speaking muhajirs have had a strong influence in the field of military training of Syrian jamaats?

For example, I am aware that there are two Russian-speaking jamaats— Malhama Tactical and Liwa Muhajireen wal Ansar — that carry out courses for Syrian muhajideen. And there are several mujahideen who have a lot of experience on the battlefield, in military tactics, and so on, including Muslim Shishani.

Are other Muhajirs, for example from Arab countries, who also teach such courses, or is it just Russian-speaking muhajirs who do so? Why did Russian-speakers start operating in this area?

Yes, Russian-speaking instructors and amirs have had a certain influence on the way in which classes were organized and carried out.

I believe that this experience has been adopted and used by locals. But I would not say that this is because we, Russian-speakers, are super-professional, but rather it is because the locals — local militias and ordinary people — were at a much lower level.

I am not talking about officers and former military personnel, who had themselves also led groups and who once trained recruits in the army, but rather in general, about the local population. It is clear that their level of education, training, and military training was very low, and so of course Russian-speaking mujahideen who had military experience, stood out against this background, and they served as an example.

But I would not exaggerate this influence to much.

Rather, when it happened, the influence occurred directly i.e. on those ansars, those Syrians, who worked  directly with us, i.e. those who were in muhajir brigades. It is these people who learned a lot from the muhajirs.

The creation of the Malhama Tactical project also played a role, in the sense that training became more systematized, they introduced new methods into the learning process. Things became ordered. People, especially in the final years of Abu Rofik’s life, may Allah accept him, began to realize that military training needs to be closer to reality.

And we are still a long way from this reality, from how things need to be, I think. There is a lot that still needs to be worked on here.

As for instructors from other countries, Arab countries and so on, I have heard that there were some, but I have not been in close contact with them, and so I cannot say anything concrete. I think that in any country, in any front, foreign military instructors matter, because they can transfer their experience, their knowledge.

But in terms of the Syrian war, I would not exaggerate the influence of foreign military instructors, because it seems to me that Syrians are not very receptive to anything new. They accept foreign experience  and the methodologies that the Muhajirs bring with difficulty, very slowly. Here, everything gets through very slowly indeed.

There may be psychological reasons for this. It could be that the locals don’t want to admit their deficiencies in certain areas, and they try to develop a system themselves. There is competition at certain points, it’s purely human nature.

I think that muhajir instructors are of greater importance in muhajir brigades. This energy is mainly consumed internally.

QUESTION 8. When we talk about Russian-speaking mujahideen, we usually mean those who are fighting on the battlefield, but are there other roles played by Russian-speaking mujahideen, such as doctors, humanitarian workers, and so on? Are they also considered mujahideen?

Of course, there are those of us who work in the medical field, who provide medical assistance to people. There are also brothers who collect and distribute humanitarian aid for those in need, including for Syrians, not just for muhajirs. This includes food items, winter clothing, money, and so on. There are many areas in which muhajirs are active.

Whether they are considered mujahideen or not depends on the intention of the individual involved. First, is he doing this to help the religion, to help jihad, to strengthen our position, our front, and society in this confrontation.

If the field in which he is active is purely a civilian field, and he is working solely for himself, and if he does not take part in the war any longer, then that is one thing; but if he works in the military field, or adjacent to it, or if his activities are directly or indirectly connected to strengthening our potential, and if he has the intention to work toward doing so, then of course he is a mujahid, even if he does not bear arms.

Before Allah, he is a mujahid, according to his intention and the contribution his actions make.

Again, this could be due to the fact that, for example, this individual is a member of a jamaat and his amir has ordered him to undertake a certain task. That task may not be a military one, but if the amir sees some benefit in it for the jamaat, then in this case, the individual remains a mujahid. There are certain nuances here.

QUESTION 9. When people talk about “Chechen” or “Russian-speaking” brigades, they are really talking about brigades led by Russian-speaking mujahideen, but if I understood correctly, in fact, in most cases these brigades include a significant component of Syrian Ansars. Is this correct?

ANSWER: Yes, in fact, this is the case. Over the years of the war, many Russian-speaking Mujahideen have become martyrs, or one way or another are out of action, and so,  naturally, the brigade’s personnel included more and more Ansars, Syrians, to a large extent.

Therefore, formally, a brigade can be a muhajir brigade, with the name of a muhajir brigade, but half of it could consist of Syrians. In some brigades there are more Syrians, in some there are less, some try to keep muhajirs as the main backbone, the main component, of the brigade.

And these Ansars, by the way, the ones who work with the Muhajirs, are usually more professional, more thoughtful and more competent in terms of military affairs, tactics, discipline, and organization and in terms of understanding weapons and equipment. That is, as a rule, they differ for the better, in terms of these qualities, from Ansars from local groups.

QUESTION 10: As I understand it, many women who had been with the Islamic State and who had been imprisoned, have come to Idlib after being smuggled out of the Al Hawl camp.

Do these women stand out in Idlib, are they clearly recognizable? In other words, is it immediately obvious that they came from the Islamic State?

Do they integrate with the local population, or in the case of Russian-speaking women, do they integrate with Russian-speakers in Idlib? Do they still have a “takfiri” ideology?

Yes, there are [such women]. I cannot say how many of them there are, and also we cannot say that they specifically stand out, because they wear black hijabs, abayas, niqabs — in fact,  many other women here also dress this way too.

I would even say that most of the women here dress exactly this way, i.e. it’s not possible what when you see a woman you can tell where she is from.

It’s definitely not the case that if a woman dresses this way, then she came from IS or that she supports IS. For women to dress completely in black, to have everything covered, that’s normal here, such a woman could be the wife of a local mujahid, she could be the wife of a fighter from some pro-Turkish group, or even of a civilian, not a mujahid.

As far as integration with the local population is concerned, I think that for those women who remain here, who will live here, it’s unavoidable. They are going to interact, get married to someone, if they don’t have a husband already.

So of course, someone could maintain a narrow social circle of their own friends from before, but the majority, I think, do with time integrate into society and get married to other muhajirs or to locals. This is already happening.

It’s all down to the individual. There are those who are closed, they don’t want to get to know anyone and they think that they are on the true path, they have a dislike for other Muslims, who they don’t even consider to be Muslims.

At the same time, many of the former IS women are getting married here to Muhajirs or to Syrians and are living ordinary lives.

They are ordinary people, there is no stigma attached to them, which says they will definitely go off in their own way. They don’t have to. One person might keep their kharijite views, and someone else might change their views.

In general, as with any society, there are different types of people. If someone happened to end up there, man or woman, that does not mean that he is automatically a kharijite and a takfiri, and that he will be that way forever.

People change over time, and they can change for the better. They might not have known where they were going, not understand reality, believe propaganda, and then later everything might turn out to be not what they expected.

Naturally, there is more suspicion toward those who were there [with IS], because they do tend more toward takfirism. Therefore, they are subject to scrutiny, and at first people try to understand what sort of people they are. This applies to men and women.

QUESTION 11: How, in your view, has the participation of Turkey in the conflict affected the situation in the liberated territories?

This year, there was a critical moment, when the enemy got within 6km of Idlib and began to shell the city. The situation was very difficult at that time, because there were advances from several directions at once, and if the offensive from the Assadites and the Russians had continued at this pace, they would have reached several points of the border with Turkey within two weeks.

Turkey actively intervened and positioned itself between us and them, and the offensive came to an end.

Therefore, I view Turkey’s participation as being salutary for the people who live here. It was the reason why the offensive halted. If it had not been halted, things would have been extremely bad here.

In the main, the Turks have played a positive role. They did what they could. Yes, some are of the opinion that they did not do enough, that they could have done more, but we should assess the situation realistically. Turkey is an independent state, with its own interests, with its own internal and external politics, and Ankara cannot enter into open war with Russia for the sake of the Syrians.

Here, the issue is not the Assad regime. If the problem was just with the Assad regime, Turkey could have broken that regime. But the situation is more serious than that. in reality, Assad is just a puppet, and there are people behind him. In reality, in the past few years, the aim of the conflict is to break through to the Turkish border in order to continue this game against Turkey,

The Turks understood this, and they intervened, so that the Assad regime and Russia would not be able to get directly to the Turkish border, so to prevent the border areas from being destabilized, which would have been unavoidable.

Here the interests of the peoples of Sham and Turkey coincided.

Could the Turks have done more and intervened more? This is a separate question altogether, and I do not think that the Muhajirs should get involved in it. Turkey’s politicians know better and its for them to have that discussion,

In any case, this is the only Muslim nation that openly intervened and attacked Assad’s army; the only nation that not only supported the [Syrian] people with money and humanitarian aid, but which also directly intervened and stood between the Russian army and the Sunnis in the north of Syria.

There are those who view Turkey’s politics in a solely negative light, and who accuse Erdogan of failing to enter a war with Russia.

What should be understood is that Turkey has limited options, there is internal opposition, it has few allies, and Russia is a nuclear power. No one wants to go to war directly with Russia. Not Turkey, not the USA, not China — no one wants to fight Russia directly, while Russia is a nuclear power.

At the same time, this war is not just against us, it’s also against Turkey too. The Turks understand that vey well indeed, and if we proceed from the principle that politics is the art of the possible, then they, most likely, did what they could  given the circumstances.

At this stage, they have prevented the annihilation of the Muslims in northern Syria. What will happen next, only time will tell.