Sinem Adar –  Rethinking Political Attitudes of Migrants from Turkey and Their Germany-Born Children

Beyond Loyalty and Democratic Culture

SWP Research Paper 2019/RP 07, June 2019, 30 Pages  – doi:10.18449/2019RP07

Dr Sinem Adar was the 2018 IPC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at SWP. The Mercator IPC Fellowship Program at SWP is funded by Stiftung Mercator.

Since the presidential elections in 2014, Turkish voters abroad have cast their votes in three parliamentary elections, one presidential election, and one referendum. The relatively higher vote share that the Justice and Devel­op­ment Party (AKP) and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan garnered in Ger­many and other European states with large Turkish immigration levels, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria, has remained a cause for concern to politicians and the public in these countries. Especially in Germany, the dominant premise in the public debate has been that voting in favor of the AKP and Erdoğan is a sign of “loyalty to Turkey” and an absence of a com­mit­ment to democratic values and norms.

The broad appeal that the AKP and Erdoğan have among migrants from Turkey and their children has both a material and an emotional basis. Socio-economic changes and perceived improvements in the quality of state insti­tutions, both within Turkey and Germany, seem to have created a positive image of the party. In addition, a strong sense of pride arising out of the perception of a “strong Turkey” under the leadership of President Erdoğan seems to drive electoral support. Finally, a fear of losing social and political gains also facilitates electoral support for the AKP.

Given that the interest of the Turkish government in the migrant population is driven by its foreign- and domestic-policy ambitions, it is likely to continue in the future with a strong identitarian focus. Moreover, Turkey’s deepening economic crisis is also likely to accentuate the need for economic remittances. It is vitally important to differentiate between the Turkish gov­ernment’s systematic efforts to instrumentalize migrants and their foreign-born children toward its domestic- and foreign-policy ends and the demands of migrants for political representation and equal recognition.

Table of contents

1 Issues and Recommendations

2 From Leaving Turkey to Settling in Germany

2.1 Diversification of Migration Patterns

2.2 Changes in associational engagements

3 Turkey’s Policies toward Migrants from Turkey and Their Foreign-Born Children

3.1 Temporary Stay: Economic and Social Remittances

3.2 Toward Permanent Stay and Turkey’s Increasing Security Concerns

3.3 Toward Making a Muslim “Diaspora”: Government–Civil Society Partnership

4 Understanding Voting Patterns

4.1 Voting Behavior in Numbers

4.2 Why Are External Votes Important for Political Parties?

4.3 Diversity in Voting Preferences beyond the Numbers

4.4 What Explains the Support and/or Sympathy for the AKP?

4.4.1 Material Benefits and Perceived Improvements in Well-being

4.4.2 The Rhetoric of a Strong Turkey

4.4.3 Fear of Losing Social and Political Gains

5 Going beyond “Loyalty” and “Democratic Culture”

6 Conclusions and Recommendations

7 Abbreviations

Issues and Recommendations

As a result of the changes introduced into existing election law in 2008 and the subsequent measures taken in 2012, all Turkish citizens over the age of 18 gained the right to vote at the ballot boxes stationed in their countries of residence. Even though Turkish citizens have been able to vote in Turkish elections since 1987, this was only possible at the ballot sta­tions installed at Turkish airports and border controls. New changes introduced into the election law thus significantly eased the financial and logistical bur­dens of voting. Since the presidential elections in 2014, when the electorate for the first time cast their votes in their countries of residence, voting has become a frequent practice, as Turkey has had three parliamentary elections, one presidential election, and one referendum.

During the period between 2014 and 2018, the number of registered voters abroad increased from about 2.8 to 3 million. Around half of the registered voters outside of Turkey reside in Germany, where the turnout rate increased during the same period, from 18.93 percent to 45.7 percent. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, garnered the majority of the votes, scoring even higher percentages than in Turkey. Simi­larly, the YES vote in Turkey’s controversial constitutional referendum in 2017 gained a higher share in Germany compared to its share in Turkey. The level of mass support given to the AKP and President Erdo­ğan had a considerable effect on the election out­comes. External votes constituted around 19 percent of the total difference between the YES and the NO votes in the 2017 referendum. Similarly, Presi­dent Erdoğan’s vote share in the 2018 presidential elec­tions amounted to 50.8 percent of the total num­ber of eligible votes, barely giving him a win in the first round. Combined with the 894,585 votes cast for him abroad, he won 52.59 percent of the eligible votes.

The relatively higher vote share that the AKP and President Erdoğan garnered in Germany and other European states with large Turkish immigration levels, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria, has remained a cause for concern to politicians and the public in these countries. Especially in Germany, the dominant premise in the public debate has been that voting in favor of the AKP and Erdoğan is a sign of “loyalty to Turkey” – and thus, of failed integration – and an absence of a commitment to democratic values and norms.

The new regulations in the election law that allowed citizens abroad to vote in their countries of residence came in the context of Turkey’s changing approach since 2010 to migrants from Turkey and their foreign-born children. In the last decade, con­current with a global increase in diaspora policies, the AKP government has systematically designed and implemented policies targeting migrants from Turkey and their foreign-born children. This new phase has seen the creation of new state agencies; an open inter­est in youth mobilization; a transnational penetration by various state and civil society actors into educational, cultural, and, religious arenas; and, last but not least, a broader understanding of the diaspora defined by religious unity. For the first time in the history of modern Turkey, a separate government institution – called the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) – was founded in 2010 under the aegis of the office of the prime minis­ter to, as stated in its mission statement, foster Turk­ish migrants’ participation in the societies they live in without losing their cultural heritage. Improving Turkish language skills and acquiring a good grasp of Sunni Muslim teachings and practices are seen as essential. A broader approach to welfare provision, notably as regards family and education, distinguishes the current policies.

In fact, outside of Turkey, the AKP’s competitive advantage over opposition parties has been derived to a significant extent from its claimed ownership over the policies targeting migrants from Turkey and their foreign-born children. Such a claim owes its power to the increasingly blurred boundaries between the political party and the state institutions.

Increasingly close contact between the party, state institutions, and civil society actors has created a patronage network that includes old and new asso­ciations with close ties to the AKP government, such as the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB) and the Union of European Turkish Democrats (renamed in 2018 as the Union of International Demo­crats, UID), respectively.

Concerted policies targeting the everyday needs of migrants from Turkey and their foreign-born children – together with the discourse of a strong state adopt­ed by, and represented in, the persona of a charismatic leader such as Erdoğan – resonate well with the al­ready existing demands of migrants. Since the 1990s, Turkish migrants have voiced two main con­cerns in meetings with Turkish politicians: better and more representation within Turkey; and a better organized associational realm in Germany that would address and cater to the social, cultural, and political needs of migrants, and thus, contribute to their social standing within Germany. Against this background, the strong and broad appeal that the AKP and Erdo­ğan garner among migrants and their Germany-born children has both a material and an emotional basis. Socio-eco­nomic changes and perceived improvements in the quality of state institutions, both within Turkey and Germany, seem to have created a positive image of the party. In addition, a strong sense of pride aris­ing out of the perception of a “strong Turkey” under the leadership of President Erdoğan seems to drive elec­toral support. Finally, a fear of losing social and po­lit­i­cal gains also facilitates electoral support to the AKP.

Given that the interest of the Turkish government in the migrant population is driven by its foreign- and domestic-policy ambitions, it is likely to continue in the future with a strong identitarian focus. Moreover, Turkey’s deepening economic crisis is also likely to accentuate the need for economic remittances. For policy-makers and politicians, the most essential starting point should be to differentiate between the Turkish government’s systematic efforts to instrumentalize migrants and their foreign-born children toward its domestic- and foreign-policy ends and the demands of migrants. Addressing these demands, which are mainly centered around claims for political representation and equal recognition, is not easy at a time when populist claims and anti-immigrant senti­ments in Germany and elsewhere in Europe are on the rise. However, the challenge should not stop policy-makers from developing policies that address these concerns. Granting migrants from Turkey and their Germany-born children the right to vote in local elections is vital. Furthermore, the question of politi­cal representation should not be confined solely to voting rights. Migrant associations are influential actors in making claims on behalf of migrants. Given the increasing influence of the Turkish state in the associational landscape, institutional autonomy should be highly encouraged. Last, but not least, political actors should also be wary of exclusionary discourses against Islam and against practicing Muslims.

From Leaving Turkey to Settling in Germany

Migration from Turkey to Germany has a long his­tory, going back to the arrival of the “guest workers” in the early 1960s. Even though economic motivation was the primary driver behind this first phase of migration, catalysts have diversified over the decades in parallel to political and socio-economic developments in Turkey. Especially around the 1980 coup d’état and throughout the 1990s, accelerating politi­cal suppression, particularly against leftist and Kurdish dissent, led to an increase in the number of asylum seekers and political exiles from Turkey. Around the same time, there was a broad pattern of “sporadic migration” of highly skilled laborers and students, which continued in the decades to come.¹ Most recently, the unprecedented purge in the after­math of the July 15 putsch in 2016 opened a new chapter in the history of both political and economic migration from Turkey to Germany.

Almost half a century later following the arrival of “guest workers” in Germany, migrants from Turkey and their children make up the country’s largest migrant population today,² amounting to approximately 2.9 million.³ Of this total, 52.2 percent have been born in Germany. The population is relatively young, with those between the ages 20 and 40 con­stituting 48 percent of the total. The male to female ratio is close to 1:1, with males constituting 51.5 per­cent of the total population. With regard to legal status, approximately half of the population has only Turkish citizenship, whereby those with only German citizenship amount to around 800,000 and those with dual citizenship are estimated to be around 530,000.⁴

Diversification of Migration Patterns

Workers from Turkey started arriving in Germany and elsewhere in Europe in the 1960s in the context of the Labor Recruitment Agreements. Labor agree­ments were signed with Germany in 1961; Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands in 1964; France in 1965; and Sweden in 1967.⁵ The global oil crisis in 1973 led to a decrease in the demand for foreign workers, halting the labor agreement with Germany. Nevertheless, Turkish migrants continued to arrive (although in considerably smaller numbers) until the 1980s, mostly in the context of family unification. During this time, a total of 790,289 migrants arrived in various European countries.⁶ Of these, 648,029 came to Germany.⁷

Guest workers from Turkey consisted of ethnic Turks and Kurds who were mostly coming from rural areas in Turkey. Families started arriving in the 1970s following the new provisions introduced in 1969 about family unifications into the Law on European Economic Community Residence. The voluntary return programs implemented by the Helmut Kohl government in 1983–1984 resulted in the return of some economic migrants, but the numbers at the time remained negligible.⁸ Over time, around half of the population who came to Germany between 1961 and the 1990s returned to Turkey.⁹ By the late 1980s, it became clear both to German and Turkish author­ities that a considerable percentage of the economic migrants who initially came on a temporary basis would stay and not go back to Turkey.

In the case of asylum-seekers, the very question of staying was undoubtedly less ambiguous. Asylum-seekers started arriving in Germany as early as the 1970s, at a time of intense political turmoil in Turkey marked by severe ideological clashes. Numerous leftist activists went into exile in Germany during this time. Yet, a mass arrival of asylum-seekers did not take place until the takeover by the military in 1980. Political migration from Turkey continued during the 1990s; yet, this time it was mostly Kurdish citizens who were displaced during the armed conflict be­tween the Turkish army and members of the Kurdish militia, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), seeking refuge in Germany.

Even though Turkish politics entered into a relatively quiet and seemingly stable phase with the rise of the AKP to power as a single-party government in 2002, socio-political conflicts started to resurface in the late 2000s, culminating in what would turn out to be the most suppressive governance in the history of contemporary Turkey. The July 15 putsch in 2016 – and the subsequent purge that was even more ex­pansive and extensive than its predecessor following the 1980 coup – has led to yet another phase of political migration.¹⁰ Besides asylum-seekers, numer­ous academics, artists, and journalists are currently in Germany, mostly on temporary residence permits. Moreover, in line with the current brain drain from Turkey and the rapidly deepening economic crisis,¹¹ many highly skilled workers have also arrived in the last few years. The future predicament of these new­comers – whether they will remain in Germany or not – for the moment remains ambiguous, as does the future of Turkey.

Changes in associational engagements

Along with the diversification of migration patterns and, as a result, an increasingly diverse population, migrants’ associational engagements have also varied and changed. Over the decades, the associational land­scape has witnessed the emergence of myriad organizations with different political orientations and motivations. Moreover, migrants themselves have become more organized around issues that concern their lives in Germany. Most recently, in the last decade, the associational landscape has taken on a noticeably new character with the penetration of various pro-AKP organizations.

Historically, numerous spaces have been active in the socialization of migrants and their children. Among these are coffee shops, mosques, and various forms of organizations including neighborhood, home­town, and migrant associations. Since the 1960s, Turkish politics has been a topic of interest for many, regardless of their political orientations. Events on Turkish politics, such as public talks, lectures, memo­rial events, and demonstrations, are not un­common. Given the ethnically, religiously, and ideologically diverse nature of the population, these events span a wide range of areas and topics: from the celebration of national holidays to genocide commemoration.

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