THEO VAN GOGH BACKGROUNDER: Charming Xi: Cause For Optimism Or Cause For Concern?

Xi Jinping with Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman

Notwithstanding some unfortunate public encounters, such as with Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau in Bali, it appears that Xi’s international charm offensive is being well received. Xi’s foreign engagements have elicited wishful reactions from a variety of quarters. It almost appears as if the world is welcoming the Chinese Communist Party’s top leader back onto the world stage after a regrettable absence.

Why is that so? Perhaps it is because there is a popular yearning for stability, both economic and political. This is only reasonable after a global pandemic costing millions of deaths; a downturn in growth and prosperity with a concomitant rise in inflation now affecting most of the developed world; and a hot war and cold winter in Europe not to mention what many refer to as a “new Cold War” developing between the two most powerful countries in the world. Observers and commentators (and even some wary national leaders) are all looking for signs for optimism.

Reviews of the Biden-Xi bilateral meeting at the G20 meeting seemed to search for constructive developments. Ostensible Chinese agreements to return to climate talks and other cooperative engagements, from which the PRC unilaterally walked away, were lauded and hailed as accomplishments. Positive comparisons to the cantankerous Alaskan meeting between senior foreign policy officials in March 2021 were made as if the juxtaposition in and of itself was a diplomatic breakthrough. Talks between U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and General Wei Fenghe, the PRC Minister of Defense, at the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM+) in Cambodia shortly after the G20 also seemingly gave rise for some optimism that the mil-to-mil relationship could improve. Furthermore, establishing a “floor” in the bilateral relationship has now become a regular talking point for U.S. officials. Ironically, the implication being that setting a “floor” would be an achievement.

Xi’s international performance coupled with domestic Chinese events further feed the global optimism. Chinese society finally buckled under the draconian restrictions of zero COVID policies leading to mass protests throughout the PRC. These demonstrations were not only by students, but also by ordinary laobaixing (老百姓) , the common people, who have just had enough. Many feared that Chinese authorities would use overwhelming violence to suppress these protests as was the case in 1989 during the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Instead, the CCP regime loosened many of the zero COVID restrictions almost overnight in the face of unprecedented public opposition. Many are calling this major reversal a cause for optimism as well.

However, any sense of realism should dictate cause for concern as these developments only underscore the challenges that the PRC under a single, unitary leader pose to liberal democratic interests and values. Xi controls all the levers of power, turns them as he sees fit, and many react in an almost Pavlovian way. Yet, despite his paramount power, Xi has not publicly acknowledged the protests nor been at the public forefront of reversing course on zero COVID. This provides both the opportunity to claim the credit if loosening restrictions was the right decision as well as a fig leaf for a potential return to lockdowns and utilizing all aspects of the ubiquitous surveillance state to crack down on protestors. Regardless, it just does not appear realistic to anticipate a sudden end to what some observers call China’s ‘Führer era’ since Xi’s ascension to power in 2012.

Externally, despite Xi’s recent international charm offensive, the PRC continues to establish and push “a new normal” in the Taiwan Strait. On 13 November, the largest contingent of nuclear-capable PLAAF H-6 bombers, 18 out of a total aircraft sortie of 21, entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ). Apparently, this was in response to a Japanese politician visiting Taiwan. Furthermore, on the same day, it was reported that PLA troops scuffled again with Indian soldiers along the line of actual control (LAC) along the disputed Himalayan border. Despite wishful Western thinking, these examples underscore what a variety of strategic documents, published since the summer of 2022, have emphasized about the PRC under Xi Jinping:

• The Biden Administration’s National Security Strategy identifies China as the U.S.’s most “consequential geopolitical challenge.”

• NATO’s Strategic Concept states, “The People’s Republic of China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security, and values.”
• According to Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, “China is an increasingly disruptive global power.”

Perhaps even more illustrative is (re)examining Xi’s own statements at the 20th Party Congress in October:

• “Confronted with drastic changes in the international landscape, especially external attempts to blackmail, contain, blockade, and exert maximum pressure on China, we have put our national interests first, focused on internal political concerns, and maintained firm strategic resolve.”

• “We have made clear that the leadership of the Communist Party of China is the defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the greatest strength of the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, that the Party is the highest force of political leadership, and that upholding the centralized, unified leadership of the Party Central Committee is the highest political principle.”

• “Taiwan is China’s Taiwan. Resolving the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese, a matter that must be resolved by the Chinese. We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary.”

Moreover, Xi’s personnel changes inaugurated at the 20th Party Congress do not augur well for optimism. It has been widely reported that the six that have joined him on the Politburo Standing Committee are all loyalists to Xi’s personal leadership. There is no such thing as a “team of rivals” at the helm of the CCP. Xi personally selected men known as being his personal proteges and allies over the course of many years of service to him and the CCP. They are Zhao Leji and Wang Huning, who previously served on the Standing Committee, and were joined by Li Qiang, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang and Li Xi (see Appendix). This coterie of diehard loyalists will undoubtedly back Xi as the CCP continues to pursue its objective of “national rejuvenation” regardless of the cost imposed on domestic freedoms for the Chinese people or on the international rules-based order. No temporary charm offensive by Xi and the resultant wishful response from the West will change that unfortunate trend.

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