The prevailing political framework established over four decades ago has allowed for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait while enabling rapid economic growth in both Taiwan and China.
Driven by the strategic imperative of working with Beijing to contain Moscow, the United States sought a rapprochement with China in the early 1970s. The thorniest issue between the two sides was Taiwan, which they never resolved but successfully finessed in the Shanghai Communiqué (1972) and the Normalization Communiqué (1979). Although President Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, privately came closer to Beijing’s position on Taiwan, in these documents the United States acknowledged but did not recognize or endorse the PRC’s view that Taiwan is a part of China.
Even though the PRC did not achieve its objective of having the United States adopt its position on Taiwan, its leaders displayed pragmatism and patience. China’s willingness to accept fundamental differences over Taiwan’s status as long as the United States did not explicitly challenge China’s position and Taiwan did not pursue independence reflected the reality that, even if it wanted to use force, it did not have the requisite military capabilities. In addition, at the time of normalization, China’s priority was modernizing its economy and it desperately needed U.S. investment to do so.
Equally important was the fact that Taiwan’s leadership agreed with the PRC that Taiwan was a part of China, only differing on which entity was the rightful “China”—the PRC or the ROC. Chiang Kai-shek did not allow the United States to pursue a more creative approach that would have attempted to secure representation in international organizations for both the PRC and Taiwan. Although this position was not unanimous among Taiwan’s population, its citizens could not express their views under Chiang’s authoritarian rule. Given the Taiwan government’s position, however, it did not pursue independence or otherwise challenge the status quo.
Despite holding starkly different views on Taiwan’s status, for decades China, Taiwan, and the United States refrained from seeking to fundamentally overturn the status quo and did not cross each other’s red lines. The United States has maintained only unofficial relations with Taiwan, as establishing formal diplomatic relations with the island would necessitate severing relations with Beijing. China, while increasing its coercion of Taiwan, has not set a formal deadline for unification or pressured Taiwan to enter political negotiations. Although Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which has traditionally advocated for independence, pushed the envelope when it pursued a referendum in 2008 on joining the United Nations under the name “Taiwan,” it has since moderated its stance, asserting that Taiwan does not need to declare independence because it is already an independent country, the “Republic of China (Taiwan).”
With this political framework and China’s economic liberalization as a foundation, cross-strait economic ties boomed, with Taiwanese investment helping fuel the PRC’s economic rise and Taiwanese businesses benefiting from the PRC’s low labor costs. During the three decades between 1991 and 2021, Taiwanese investment in the PRC totaled $194 billion. Cross-strait trade exploded, rising from $342 million in 1990 to $208 billion in 2021. China is now Taiwan’s largest trading partner, accounting for nearly 23 percent of its foreign trade, a number that increases to 30 percent if Hong Kong is included. With the help of this two-way trade, Taiwan’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew from $166 billion in 1990 to $775 billion in 2021.
The status quo is under increasing strain as China, Taiwan, and the United States reevaluate whether the long-standing political formulation continues to serve their respective interests.
A number of factors—the emergence of a stronger and more assertive China, the rise of a distinct Taiwanese identity and the Taiwanese people’s lack of interest in becoming part of the PRC, growing U.S. support for Taiwan, and the steady deterioration of U.S.-China relations—have combined to prompt Beijing, Taipei, and Washington to question both the desirability of the status quo and one another’s commitment to it.
The Chinese government believes that Taiwan’s separation was an injustice that the country had to endure because of its previous weakness. Its 2022 white paper on Taiwan reflected, “from the mid-19th century, due to the aggression of Western powers and the decadence of feudal rule, China…went through a period of suffering worse than anything it had previously known…Japan’s 50-year occupation of Taiwan epitomized this humiliation…The fact that we have not yet been reunified is a scar left by history on the Chinese nation.”
In the eyes of China’s leaders, the country no longer needs to tolerate what it was forced to when it was weak. Xi is using China’s growing power to alter the status quo, turning to coercive tools, such as military threats, diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and disinformation campaigns to erode public confidence in U.S. support, undermine Taiwan’s elected government, and convince Taiwanese people that unification with—and submission to—China is inevitable and therefore resistance is dangerous and ultimately futile. Beijing is also using economic leverage and information operations to try to build support or at least tolerance in Taiwan for a process leading to unification. China’s strategy is less risky than using force and is difficult for Taiwan or the United States to counter, but at the same time, it has largely backfired by increasing the sense of Taiwanese identity and further alienating the Taiwanese public from the PRC.
Taiwan’s development into a vibrant democracy has allowed its citizens to express their opinions on cross-strait relations, while China’s turn toward even greater authoritarianism has made the Taiwanese more skeptical of living under PRC rule. Chiang Kai-shek, like his PRC counterparts, endorsed a “One-China” framework, agreeing that Taiwan and the mainland were both a part of the same polity but asserting that the Republic of China was the rightful government of all of China. For over four decades, this was the only view that could be publicly held in Taiwan. During the period of martial law that lasted until 1987, the KMT could theoretically have concluded a deal with Beijing and imposed its decision on the population. With Taiwan’s democratization in the 1980s and 1990s, however, citizens could challenge the KMT’s narrative and express a separate Taiwanese identity. As a result, most Taiwanese do not view their political status as in any way linked to the Chinese Civil War and do not want unification. Instead, they would point to the separate national and political identity that they have forged over decades as evidence that Taiwan should be viewed on its own terms and recognized as a separate polity. China’s crackdown on democracy and civil society in Hong Kong has accelerated these trends, convincing many Taiwanese that they cannot trust PRC promises and leading them to reject unification in any form. Another result of Taiwan’s democratization is that any change in the relationship between Taiwan and China now requires a constitutional amendment, which must be approved by three-fourths of the members of Taiwan’s legislature and a majority of all eligible voters.
Reflecting these changing views within Taiwan, the share of Taiwanese people who favor moving toward unification has dropped significantly over time, while support for independence has dramatically risen (see figure below). These polls likely underestimate popular support for independence; a different survey found that more than two-thirds of Taiwanese support independence if Taiwan could still maintain peaceful relations with the PRC. This shift is occurring despite a continued affinity among Taiwanese people for Chinese culture and ultimately is rooted in a rejection of the PRC’s political system.

Protest movements in Taiwan
and Hong Kong begin
Taiwan holds first presidential election
China imposes national security
law on Hong Kong
Maintain status quo,
decide at later date
Maintain status quo
indefinitely
Maintain status quo, move
toward independence
Maintain status quo, move
toward unification
Independence as soon
as possible
Unification as soon as
possible
Note: Non-responses are excluded.
In the United States, Taiwan’s evolution into a democracy and a growing appreciation for its strategic importance, paired with increasing PRC pressure on Taiwan, have increased calls to upgrade relations and visibly demonstrate support for Taiwan. U.S.-Taiwan relations have consistently evolved to include more high-level interactions, but they are entering a qualitatively new territory. In 2020, for instance, the Trump administration lifted many “self-imposed restrictions” on contact with Taipei’s representatives in Washington, which the Biden administration upheld. Two former senior officials in the Trump administration, after stepping down, also called for the United States to abandon its One China policy and recognize Taiwan as an independent country. In 2021, two Republican congressmen introduced a bill advocating that the United States walk away from its One China policy and recognize Taiwan as an independent country; the bill was reintroduced in 2023 with eighteen Republican cosponsors.
Those calling for the United States to recognize Taiwan as an independent country are decidedly in the minority, as doing so would lead to a rupture in U.S.-China relations and could prompt major Chinese military action against Taiwan. In addition, if China were to take such an action following this unilateral U.S. move, it would be far more difficult for the United States to bring together an international coalition to sanction China or to enlist the help of regional allies for a defense of Taiwan. Instead, the United States would be cast as a destabilizing force, and the Taiwanese people would pay the greatest cost. Thus U.S. recognition of Taiwan as an independent country would be irresponsible and ill-advised. At the same time, however, growing calls for such a change in U.S. policy have put more pressure on presidential administrations to demonstrate support for Taiwan.
Objecting to steps the United States has taken regarding relations with Taiwan, China has accused the United States of having a “fake” One China policy. The United States asserts that its actions are consistent with its One China policy and are a necessary response to heightened Chinese coercion of Taiwan. This discord has created an action-reaction dynamic whereby China puts pressure on Taiwan, prompting the United States to take steps to demonstrate its support for Taiwan, in turn leading to more Chinese pressure on the island.
The Chinese government has also accused Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen of covertly pursuing independence by changing history textbooks to emphasize elements of Taiwan’s history that do not center on its relationship to China, redesigning its passports to display “Republic of China” in a smaller typeface to give prominence to the name “Taiwan,” and further pursuing “de-Sinicization.” To show its displeasure, China has shut off all channels of communication with Taiwan’s government, expanded disinformation and influence operations targeting the island, increased military activities near Taiwan—including erasing the median line in the Taiwan Strait—and ratcheted up economic pressure.
Each side is now accusing the other of altering the status quo, while perceiving its own actions as necessary defensive steps to prevent further erosion of the status quo. The United States believes that its moves to strengthen ties with Taiwan are necessary responses to PRC provocations and that cross-strait relations are more stable when Taiwan can approach the PRC from a position of self-confidence and strength. China is convinced that the United States has effectively abandoned its One China policy, that it is actively endorsing or implicitly emboldening an independence movement in Taiwan, and that U.S. support for Taiwan remains the primary obstacle standing between China and its ability to achieve unification. In Taiwan’s democratic system, where leaders have to appeal to the voters who are alarmed by the PRC’s coercive actions, there is little desire for more cross-strait integration or political negotiations that would lead to PRC control, and there is growing impatience with Taiwan’s lack of international recognition.
As a result of these dynamics, reassurances offered by each side over the past seven years are deemed by the other parties to be either insincere or inadequate. Despite Washington’s public and private statements that it continues to adhere to its One China policy and does not support Taiwan’s independence, Beijing believes that its actions belie those words and that Washington is using Taiwan to contain China. Though the Chinese government continues to publicly assert that it prefers to achieve peaceful unification, its coercive actions toward Taiwan and continued focus on developing a viable military option to capture the island leave the United States and Taiwan questioning its intentions. China’s failure to abide by its commitments to Hong Kong or to honor its pledges to the United States not to militarize the South China Sea or conduct cyber espionage for commercial gain have led many in Taipei and Washington to doubt whether any reassurances Beijing offers can be trusted.
The likelihood of resolving cross-strait differences peacefully is steadily decreasing.
For decades, analysts have assessed that China is willing to defer using force against Taiwan as long as it believes it can achieve peaceful unification at some point in the future. Because of the recent change in dynamics between Taiwan and China, however, the prospect of a peaceful and consensual resolution of cross-strait differences has grown increasingly remote. The PRC is likely to conclude that if it wants to achieve unification, it will need to resort to nonpeaceful means to do so.
The most consequential change to cross-strait dynamics has been Taiwan’s democratization and the emergence of a separate political identity. According to one long-running poll, whereas only 18 percent of those in Taiwan identified as “Taiwanese” in 1992 (the first year of the survey), now nearly 64 percent identify as such, while those who identify as “Chinese” has declined from 25.5 percent to 2.4 percent and those who identify as “both Taiwanese and Chinese” has declined from 46 percent to 30 percent (see figure below). Accompanying this rise in Taiwanese identity has been a steep decline in support for unification and increased support for independence (see figure above).

Protest movements in Taiwan
and Hong Kong begin
Taiwan holds first presidential election
China imposes national
security law on Hong Kong
Both Taiwanese
and Chinese
Note: Non-responses are excluded.
Taiwan’s growing alienation from China is driven above all by the PRC’s turn toward even greater authoritarianism and its violation of “One Country, Two Systems” in Hong Kong, which remains its proposed model for Taiwan. Under that arrangement, which Deng Xiaoping first introduced in the 1980s, the ROC would cease to exist, the PRC would govern Taiwan as a “special administrative region,” and it would control the island’s foreign and defense affairs. Taiwan would be allowed to maintain a separate economic and social system, and it would be granted a “high degree of autonomy” to oversee its internal affairs, but Beijing would be able to exercise a veto over Taipei’s leaders.
In recent years, however, Beijing has made clear that it has no intention of honoring the legally binding commitments that it made when it took possession of Hong Kong, which has had chilling effects in Taiwan. In 2019, after Hong Kong’s government put forth a bill that would allow individuals from Hong Kong to be extradited to the PRC, massive protests erupted, which police quelled using tear gas and rubber bullets. Although Hong Kong’s government eventually withdrew the bill, China imposed a “national security law” the following year that severely curtails the rights of Hong Kong residents by targeting crimes of “secession” and “subversion.” The authorities have arrested protestors, former opposition lawmakers, and journalists under the auspices of this and earlier laws, demonstrating the meaninglessness of China’s pledges that Hong Kong would “enjoy a high degree of autonomy” and that its people would enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly.
As these events in Hong Kong were unfolding, Taiwanese concerns about unification increased dramatically. Rather than providing reassurances to Taiwan or putting forward another proposal for unification that would guarantee Taiwanese more rights and freedoms, China has moved in the opposite direction. The Chinese government insists that the implementation of One Country, Two Systems in Hong Kong is a “resounding success” and continues to view it as “the best approach to realizing national reunification” with Taiwan. Interestingly, however, Beijing has made clear that “One Country is the precondition and foundation of Two Systems; Two Systems is subordinate to and derives from One Country.” Presumably, this means that if protests were to occur in Taiwan following unification, the PRC would impose limits on the separate social systems, as it has done in Hong Kong.
The Chinese government has also reduced the number of guarantees it would offer to Taiwan under One Country, Two Systems, rendering an already unappealing proposal even more so. Whereas Beijing formerly pledged that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would not have a presence in Taiwan and that Taiwan could maintain some semblance of a military, in a major speech in 2019 Xi did not provide this reassurance. Xi also did not guarantee that Taiwan would be allowed to maintain its political institutions following unification. Instead, he pledged that “the social system and lifestyles of Taiwan compatriots will be fully respected…and the private property, religious beliefs, and legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan compatriots will be fully guaranteed.” Beijing, however, could be expected to define “legitimate rights and interests” narrowly, to exclude most political rights.
Regardless of the specific offer Beijing makes to Taipei, its pledges will not be taken seriously given its actions in Hong Kong. Despite the Sino-British Joint Declaration’s status as a recognized international treaty, China’s foreign ministry spokesman explicitly dismissed it as a “historical document” that “no longer has any practical significance, and it is not at all binding for the central government’s management over Hong Kong.” As long as China continues to put forward One Country, Two Systems as the only basis for peaceful unification and flouts this arrangement in Hong Kong, the likelihood of peacefully resolving cross-strait differences is remote.
As the prospect of achieving peaceful unification grows more remote, China will increasingly employ coercive tools against Taiwan.
China is already using a range of tools against Taiwan to achieve its political objectives, including military threats, diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, information campaigns, and psychological operations (see figure below). Although Beijing continues to develop its military options for Taiwan contingencies—which could take the form of a quarantine or blockade of the island, missile strikes against critical infrastructure, the seizure of one or more of Taiwan’s offshore islands, or a full invasion—the risk that these options carry means it likely views force as the last resort. Instead, the PRC will presumably attempt to gain control of Taiwan by leveraging an array of coercive instruments. Although the PRC views coercion as being consistent with peaceful unification, Taiwan and the United States would argue that relying on such pressure is incompatible with a consensual resolution of cross-strait issues. Nonetheless, in the years ahead, this pressure will likely intensify and could enter a qualitatively new realm.
Beijing’s preferred course of action is to take a series of diplomatic, economic, military, and covert steps that taken alone do not rise to the level of prompting an international response but together could cause the Taiwanese people to lose faith in their ability to resist and doubt that countries will assist them. The Chinese government’s hope is that this prompts the Taiwanese public to support political leaders who favor negotiated acquiescence to its political demands.
On the diplomatic front, China is attempting to peel away the roughly dozen remaining countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan by offering them economic inducements to instead establish diplomatic ties with the PRC. These relationships are important to Taiwan for a number of reasons; these countries often advocate for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, and formal diplomatic ties with countries provide a psychological boost to the Taiwanese people. During President Tsai’s administration, to signal its displeasure that she did not explicitly endorse the 1992 Consensus (a formulation whereby Taiwan agrees that there is one China in the world but asserts that there are different interpretations as to which government is the rightful representative of China), the PRC has persuaded nine countries—Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Kiribati, Nicaragua, Panama, Sao Tome and Principe, and the Solomon Islands—to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Beijing also pressures countries to narrow their unofficial relations with Taiwan, which is an even more worrisome development because Taiwan’s most important relationships are with countries that do not formally recognize it.
China is also blocking Taiwan’s participation in the world’s leading international organizations, which require that members be sovereign states recognized as such by their peers. Without UN membership, Taiwan can only participate in meetings within the UN system when China allows it to do so, and China uses this leverage as a bargaining chip. For instance, after Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou endorsed the 1992 Consensus, China allowed Taiwan to participate in meetings of the World Health Assembly from 2009 to 2016 under the name “Chinese Taipei.” In 2013, China allowed Taiwan to attend the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) assembly as a “special guest” of the president of the ICAO Council. When President Tsai declined to endorse the 1992 Consensus, China intervened to ensure that Taiwan would not be allowed to participate in any such meetings. Today, Taiwanese passport holders cannot even visit the United Nations headquarters in New York as tourists due to PRC pressure.
In recent years, China’s attempts to constrain Taiwan’s international space have intensified. Chinese diplomats interrupted the proceedings of an international meeting on conflict diamonds (the Kimberly Process) in Australia until the hosts forced Taiwan’s delegation to leave. Chinese officials in Fiji disrupted Taiwan’s national day reception by attempting to intimidate guests, and, after being confronted, physically assaulting a Taiwanese official. China has also put pressure on multinational companies to alter their websites so that Taiwan is not displayed as a country in drop-down menus.
China has already employed economic coercion against Taiwan and could both expand the scope of such pressure and use it to influence domestic politics in Taiwan. After President Tsai came into office, China placed limits on tourism to Taiwan. In 2021, China banned the import of Taiwanese pineapples (90 percent of Taiwan’s pineapple exports went to China), and subsequently banned Taiwanese wax and sugar apples, grouper, and meat. Beijing’s most significant moves to date followed U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, after which it announced import bans on more than two thousand Taiwanese agricultural products and introduced an export ban on natural sand to Taiwan (a critical input to the manufacture of semiconductors). China has also pressured Taiwanese companies operating in the PRC to publicly voice support for the 1992 Consensus and oppose Taiwan independence. And China typically targets industries and regions in Taiwan that support the DPP in an attempt to harm the party’s electoral chances.
Political anddiplomaticEconomicMilitary*Psychological
2017201820192020202120222023
*Orange dots indicate the first instance of a military action which in many cases is repeated. Subsequent instances of the same action are not included.
Date |
Type |
Action |
4/8/2023 |
Military |
In response to President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy, China conducts three days of intense military drills in the Taiwan Strait, which include simulating targeted strikes on Taiwan |
3/26/2023 |
Political and diplomatic |
Taiwan loses diplomatic ally Honduras to China |
12/25/2022 |
Military |
Following President Biden’s signing of the NDAA that contained provisions on Taiwan, seventy-one Chinese aircraft are tracked around Taiwan, with forty-seven entering its air defense identification zone (ADIZ) |
12/10/2022 |
Economic |
China suspends some beer, liquor, and beverage imports from Taiwan |
9/27/2022 |
Political and diplomatic |
Taiwan excluded from the International Civil Aviation Organization’s 41st Assembly Session |
9/13/2022 |
Political and diplomatic |
China threatens Lithuania amid closer Taiwan-Lithuania ties |
9/8/2022 |
Military |
Chinese drones cross the Taiwan Strait median line for the first time |
8/16/2022 |
Political and diplomatic |
China imposes visa bans on Taiwanese political figures |
8/4/2022 |
Military |
China fires waves of missiles over the Taiwan Strait, including one that flies over Taiwan, and conducts extensive military drills near Taiwan |
8/2/2022 |
Economic |
China suspends natural sand exports to Taiwan hours after Pelosi lands in Taiwan |
8/2/2022 |
Economic |
China bans thousands of Taiwanese food imports |
6/20/2022 |
Political and diplomatic |
Taiwanese visitors to the World Cup forced to enter Qatar under the name “Chinese Taipei” |
6/15/2022 |
Economic |
China bans grouper fish from Taiwan |
6/12/2022 |
Psychological |
China asserts maritime sovereignty rights over the Taiwan Strait |
5/23/2022 |
Political and diplomatic |
After Chinese pressure, Taiwan unable to join WHO assembly |
5/16/2022 |
Psychological |
China pays Taiwanese celebrities to conduct “cognitive warfare” |
4/1/2022 |
Psychological |
China launches disinformation campaign about Ukraine targeting Taiwan |
1/24/2022 |
Psychological |
Taiwan’s Investigation Bureau states China is using fake social media accounts to subvert the public’s trust in government and meddle in elections |
12/9/2021 |
Political and diplomatic |
Taiwan loses diplomatic ally Nicaragua to China |
11/29/2021 |
Political and diplomatic |
Report of far-ranging Chinese efforts to get Taiwanese citizens deported to China |
11/22/2021 |
Economic |
China fines Taiwan-based Far Eastern Group USD $74.2 million for alleged regulatory violations |
11/5/2021 |
Political and diplomatic |
China sanctions Taiwan Premier Su Tseng-chang, Lesiglative Speaker You Si-kun, and Foreign Minister Joseph Wu |
10/4/2021 |
Military |
Taiwan reports record PLA incursions into its air defense identification zone (ADIZ) |
9/18/2021 |
Military |
China conducts exercises southwest of Taiwan |
8/17/2021 |
Military |
China conducts assault drills in seas near Taiwan |
8/16/2021 |
Psychological |
Following U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Chinese tabloid argues Taiwan cannot rely on the United States |
3/1/2021 |
Economic |
China bans Taiwanese pineapples |
2/5/2021 |
Psychological |
Reuters reports on extensive Chinese sand dredging near Taiwan’s offshore island of Matsu, an attempt to exhaust Taiwan’s coast guard and disrupt economic activity |
10/8/2020 |
Political and diplomatic |
Chinese diplomats harass Taiwanese officials in Fiji, resulting in a fistfight |
9/19/2020 |
Military |
Chinese warplanes cross median line forty times in two days |
9/17/2020 |
Military |
China sends two anti-submarine aircraft toward Taiwan in response to U.S. Undersecretary of State Keith Krach’s visit to Taiwan |
9/15/2020 |
Military |
China fires rocket directly over Taiwan |
8/31/2020 |
Political and diplomatic |
China threatens Czech senate speaker over Taiwan visit |
8/10/2020 |
Military |
Chinese fighter jets cross the median line during U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar’s visit to Taiwan |
5/13/2020 |
Military |
China warns France not to sell arms to Taiwan |
4/30/2020 |
Political and diplomatic |
China threatens to halt medical supplies and boycott Dutch goods after the Netherlands allows Taiwan to change the name of its representative office |
4/10/2020 |
Political and diplomatic |
Taiwan accuses China of impersonating its citizens after WHO chief criticizes Taiwan’s “racist campaign” |
4/9/2020 |
Political and diplomatic |
China bars students from studying in Taiwan, claiming COVID-19 concerns |
3/19/2020 |
Military |
Ten unmarked Chinese speedboats attack Taiwan coast guard cutters |
3/17/2020 |
Military |
Chinese warplanes fly first nighttime mission near Taiwan |
3/2/2020 |
Psychological |
China pressures Taiwan with fighter jets and fake news amid COVID-19 outbreak |
2/15/2020 |
Economic |
China economically threatens Eswatini, Taiwan’s last African ally |
2/11/2020 |
Military |
China’s military conducts drills near Taiwan after Taiwan Vice President Lai Ching-te transits the United States |
1/27/2020 |
Political and diplomatic |
International Civil Aviation Organization blocks critics of its Taiwan policy on Twitter |
1/6/2020 |
Psychological |
China uses disinformation campaign before Taiwan’s elections |
12/26/2019 |
Military |
China sails aircraft carrier through the Taiwan Strait |
11/13/2019 |
Political and diplomatic |
China detains Taiwanese professor over “threat to national security” |
10/17/2019 |
Political and diplomatic |
Responding to Chinese pressure, Western brands change how they label Taiwan |
9/20/2019 |
Political and diplomatic |
Taiwan loses diplomatic ally Kiribati to China |
9/16/2019 |
Political and diplomatic |
Taiwan loses diplomatic ally Solomon Islands to China |
8/8/2019 |
Psychological |
China pays five Taiwanese media groups for pro-China coverage |
8/6/2019 |
Political and diplomatic |
Taiwanese beverage chains forced to adopt Chinese claims on Taiwan and Hong Kong |
7/31/2019 |
Economic |
China halts individual tourism to Taiwan |
6/26/2019 |
Psychological |
Chinese cyber operative helps candidate win Kaohsiung mayor election |
6/7/2019 |
Political and diplomatic |
At China’s request, Spain deports Taiwanese nationals to China |
5/2/2019 |
Psychological |
Report from Taiwan’s National Security Bureau states that China uses media partnerships in Taiwan to manipulate discourse and sow division |
3/31/2019 |
Military |
China’s military crosses the Taiwan Strait median line for the first time in twenty years; following Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, China normalized this activity, with PLA aircraft crossing the median line nearly one hundred times over the six months following Pelosi’s visit |
11/22/2018 |
Political and diplomatic |
China attempts to meddle in Taiwan’s local elections |
10/25/2018 |
Military |
China unilaterally ceases joint maritime rescue drill with Taiwan |
8/26/2018 |
Political and diplomatic |
China bans “Made in Taiwan,” in favor of “Made in Taiwan, China” |
8/21/2018 |
Political and diplomatic |
Taiwan loses diplomatic ally El Salvador to China |
5/24/2018 |
Political and diplomatic |
Taiwan loses diplomatic ally Burkina Faso to China |
5/1/2018 |
Political and diplomatic |
Taiwan loses diplomatic ally Dominican Republic to China |
4/27/2018 |
Political and diplomatic |
China continues to threaten U.S. airlines for implying Taiwan is an independent state |
3/22/2018 |
Political and diplomatic |
China fines Muji over label that said, “Place of Origin: Taiwan” |
3/21/2018 |
Military |
China sails aircraft carrier through Taiwan Strait |
3/9/2018 |
Political and diplomatic |
WHO escorts Taiwanese experts out of the World Conference on Tobacco or Health in South Africa |
2/28/2018 |
Economic |
China implements thirty-one incentives to accelerate brain drain in Taiwan |
2/27/2018 |
Political and diplomatic |
China’s Aviation Authority sends a letter to thirty-six foreign airlines demanding that they relabel Taiwan |
2/12/2018 |
Political and diplomatic |
After Chinese pressure, Taiwan renames its representative office in Papua New Guinea |
1/16/2018 |
Economic |
China destroys several shipments of imported Taiwanese food products after companies failed to label them as produced in “Taiwan Area” or “Taiwan Area, China” |
1/15/2018 |
Political and diplomatic |
China punishes additional multinational corporations (including Delta Air Lines and Zara) for listing Taiwan as a country |
1/12/2018 |
Political and diplomatic |
Responding to Chinese pressure, Marriott apologizes for labeling Taiwan a country |
12/22/2017 |
Political and diplomatic |
Hong Kong visa applications for Taiwanese scholars rejected |
12/11/2017 |
Military |
China conducts “island encirclement” patrols near Taiwan |
11/16/2017 |
Political and diplomatic |
China bans group tours from visiting the Vatican and Palau in an attempt to isolate Taiwan’s allies |
11/13/2017 |
Political and diplomatic |
Taiwan’s environmental minister shut out of UN climate talks |
8/15/2017 |
Political and diplomatic |
China refuses to allow Taiwan to access INTERPOL’s I-24/7 database |
7/5/2017 |
Political and diplomatic |
China halves the number of students who can study in Taiwan |
6/27/2017 |
Political and diplomatic |
China pressures Ecuador to force Taiwan to change the name of its representative office in Quito |
6/12/2017 |
Political and diplomatic |
Taiwan loses diplomatic ally Panama to China |
5/30/2017 |
Psychological |
China attempts to flood online forums with negative and misleading information about Taiwan’s annual military exercises |
5/26/2017 |
Political and diplomatic |
China charges Taiwanese activist for “subverting state power,” marking the first time China charged someone from Taiwan with subversion |
3/27/2017 |
Political and diplomatic |
At China’s request, Spain deports Taiwanese nationals to China |
2/4/2017 |
Political and diplomatic |
Cambodian prime minister bans Taiwan’s flag |
1/12/2017 |
Political and diplomatic |
After $40 billion pledge from China, Nigeria asks Taiwan to move its representative office from the Nigerian capital |
12/21/2016 |
Political and diplomatic |
Taiwan loses diplomatic ally São Tomé and Príncipe to China |
11/25/2016 |
Military |
Chinese aircraft circle around Taiwan for the first time on a long-distance training mission |
11/6/2016 |
Political and diplomatic |
INTERPOL rejects Taiwan’s bid to attend its general assembly |
9/21/2016 |
Political and diplomatic |
China forces out Taiwan officials from UN fisheries meeting |
9/16/2016 |
Economic |
China cuts tourism to Taiwan |
8/9/2016 |
Political and diplomatic |
At China’s request, Kenya deports Taiwanese nationals to China |
6/24/2016 |
Political and diplomatic |
China halts communication with Taiwan in protest of President Tsai’s refusal to endorse the 1992 Consensus |
6/23/2016 |
Political and diplomatic |
Taiwan excluded from the International Civil Aviation Organization’s 39th Assembly Session |
6/8/2016 |
Political and diplomatic |
Taiwanese professor blocked from attending International Labor Organization conference |
China has also regularized military activity in the Taiwan Strait and established a new baseline for its operations. This shift is most starkly visible in the PLA’s near-daily flights through Taiwan’s self-declared air defense identification zone (ADIZ); in 2022, Chinese military aircraft entered this airspace on 268 of 365 days (see figure below). In addition to increasing the frequency of these flights, the PLA has increased their sophistication, including its most advanced fighter jets, nuclear-capable bombers, and early warning aircraft in the patrols. In addition, following Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the PLA effectively erased the median line in the Taiwan Strait, an important demarcation that helped the two sides avoid incidents, by operating across that line. During that same period, the PLA fired ballistic missiles around Taiwan (including at least one that flew over the island), operated near Taiwan’s territorial seas, and established a presence of naval vessels closer to Taiwan. These actions have real operational consequences, allowing the PLA to conduct exercises for Taiwan contingencies and test the readiness of Taiwan’s military, shrink the warning time that would be available if it chose to initiate hostilities, and potentially disguise the opening salvo of a conflict as a routine exercise.

Taiwan’s unilaterally declared air defense identification zone (ADIZ) is an area in which aircraft are required to identify themselves for civil air traffic control.
Chinese aircraft regularly fly into the ADIZ, often crossing the Taiwan Strait median line, an unofficial maritime border that the two sides respected for decades.
Approximate flight paths of PLA aircraft violating the ADIZ in August 2022, the month with the most violations
Chinese aircraft violating Taiwan’s ADIZ by month
Violations spiked after House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan.
Notes: Flight paths shown on the map include multiple aircraft. While Taiwan’s ADIZ extends to cover a portion of the PRC, its Ministry of National Defense only tracks PLA aircraft that enter the ADIZ east of the Taiwan Strait median line.
China will look to increase the scope and intensity of its coercive activities aimed at Taiwan. The South China Sea offers an instructive case study and demonstrates that China will seek to take piecemeal actions that cannot be reversed to create a new baseline or “new normal.” These “gray zone” tactics are especially effective against Taiwan because its leaders have fewer options to respond and cannot afford to be seen as escalating cross-strait tensions or causing a crisis; Beijing is able to exploit this asymmetry and act without fear of losing control of escalatory dynamics. In addition, because any one of these actions, taken in isolation, does not pose an existential threat to Taiwan, it is far more difficult for the United States to respond without being seen as fueling tensions.
One area that China is likely to turn to, with the South China Sea again serving as a precedent, is “lawfare,” or the use of law as a weapon of conflict. China could choose to unilaterally declare that it will not respect Taiwan’s territorial waters or airspace or that it will administer Taiwan’s waters and airspace because, in its view, Taiwan is a part of China and the PRC is the sole legal government of China. It could follow this announcement by sailing ships within twelve nautical miles of Taiwan’s coast and even flying military aircraft over the island of Taiwan. Doing so would force Taiwan’s military to either ignore a blatant violation of its sovereignty, which would deal a significant blow to the Taiwanese government’s credibility, or to fire the first shot and risk being seen as the initiator of a conflict. Particularly worrisome is a scenario in which Beijing requires civilian aircraft and cargo vessels heading for Taiwan to submit to PRC aviation and customs control on the grounds that the PRC has jurisdiction over the waters and airspace surrounding Taiwan. There is already evidence that the PRC could be contemplating such an action: following President Tsai’s meeting with U.S. Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy in California in April 2023, the PRC announced an inspection operation in the Taiwan Strait and reserved the right to board cargo ships. Though it appears that China did not actually board any ship, this could be the first step in testing such a tactic.
The chance of a conflict will rise as Xi Jinping approaches the end of his tenure and the basis of his legitimacy shifts from delivering economic growth to satisfying Chinese nationalism.
The biggest question going forward is what Xi Jinping’s intentions are vis-à-vis Taiwan and how important he deems the subjugation of Taiwan for his legacy. Although he has not put an explicit timeline on achieving unification with Taiwan and continues to assert a preference for peaceful unification (while keeping open the option to use military force), indicators suggest that he could seek to resolve this issue on his watch.
Xi has repeatedly linked unification with Taiwan to the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” which he has stated must be achieved by 2049. Beijing’s 2022 white paper on Taiwan asserts that achieving unification “is indispensable” and “an essential step” for achieving China’s rejuvenation. The paper continues, “The Taiwan question arose as a result of weakness and chaos in our nation, and it will be resolved as national rejuvenation becomes a reality.” Xi’s subsequent report to the Twentieth National Congress of the Communist Party of China notes, “Resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China’s complete reunification is…a natural requirement for realizing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Xi went even further in his March 2023 speech to the National People’s Congress, asserting that achieving unification “is the essence of national rejuvenation.” Although Xi is not the first Chinese leader to tie unification with rejuvenation, he is linking the two more explicitly than any of his predecessors.
Taken at face value, an implicit timeline of 2049 would give the United States ample time to reinforce deterrence and prepare for a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait, with the goal of heading one off. It would also provide the opportunity for a successor to Xi to emerge who might not be as wedded to this timeline. Given that Xi most likely will not be ruling China in 2049 (he would be ninety-six years old), the question turns to whether he is determined to resolve this on his watch and is working under a tighter timeline. Xi has stated that the Taiwan issue “cannot be passed from generation to generation,” which could mean that he will not hand this off to his successor. Xi clearly sees himself as a pivotal leader who should go down in history on par with Mao Zedong. It is unclear, however, what he would point to as his achievements to justify such a claim. Taking Taiwan, something that eluded Mao and Deng, would cement his place in history. Thus, there is a possibility that Xi is growing impatient with the status quo and believes that Taiwan is central to his legacy. That said, windows into Xi’s thinking are far from clear.
Senior U.S. officials have echoed this line of analysis, indicating that they believe Xi could be determined to bring Taiwan under the PRC’s control in an abbreviated timeline. CIA Director William Burns stated in July 2022 that he “wouldn’t underestimate…Xi’s determination to assert China’s control” over Taiwan and that “the risks of that become higher…the further into this decade that you get.” Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines assessed that the threat to Taiwan “is critical or acute between now and 2030.” Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated, “What’s changed is this: the decision by the government in Beijing that that status quo is no longer acceptable, that they wanted to speed up the process by which they would pursue reunification.” Finally, Admiral John Aquilino, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), noted, “I see actions that give me concern that the timeline is shrinking” and that “this problem is much closer to us than most think.” Such assessments could suggest that Xi is focused on achieving progress on Taiwan to mark the hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the PLA or the end of his third term (2027) or fourth term (2032).
Beyond a desire to build his legacy, Xi could also be driven by the need to rebuild the foundation for the CCP’s political legitimacy. For over four decades, the CCP has enjoyed an implicit social contract with the Chinese people whereby it delivers sustained economic growth and, in exchange, its monopoly on power is not challenged. China’s economy has not contracted since Deng Xiaoping ushered in the period of “reform and opening” in late 1978, with its economy expanding by an average of more than 9 percent annually from 1980 to 2021. Over that period, China’s annual GDP has increased nearly fifty-fold, from $300 billion to $14.9 trillion. But China is now confronted with an array of issues, above all an aging and shrinking population and slowing productivity growth. Investing in infrastructure and the property sector, the CCP’s favored tool to prop up economic growth, has run its course. Xi’s policies—principally his turn toward statism, his crackdown on innovative technology companies, his embrace of a zero-COVID policy for three years, his failure to implement much-needed economic reforms, and his assertive foreign policy that has prompted countries to rethink economic ties—have also contributed to China’s economic challenges. U.S. policies, above all export controls on advanced technologies, will also make it harder for China to achieve sustained growth. As a result, China is likely entering a long-term economic slowdown.
As China’s economic growth has slowed under Xi, he has increasingly turned to nationalism to justify the CCP’s monopoly on power. With a further downturn, he could turn to the Taiwan issue to rally support for the CCP and his personal rule. As Xi approaches the end of his tenure and looks toward his legacy, the risk of a conflict over Taiwan will grow.