Mosul & die Fehler amerikanischer Politik im Irak / Thomas von der Osten-Sacken


David Romano analysiert in Rudaw, was die USA in den letzten Jahren im Irak falsch gemacht haben und weshalb es zu den desatsrösen Entwicklungen kam. Nein, es war nicht falsch Sadddam zu stürzen, wie es jetzt wieder allenthalben in deutschen Medien heißt, die seiner “Stabilität” und “starken Hand” hinterhertrauern. Was heute im Irak geschieht ist eben, da hat Romano völlig Recht, nicht die Folge verfehlter Demokratiebemühungen in Regionen, in denen, wie uns ja gerade wieder alle möglichen Nahostexperten erklären, die Menschen wahlweise nicht in einigermaßen freien Ländern leben wollen oder dazu in der Lage seien. Das Gegenteil ist vielmehr der Fall:

For years, Washington promoted a “united Iraq” and stronger central government over all other considerations. While occasionally paying lip-service to the need for Prime Minister Maliki to “share power more,” the Americans effectively gave Mr. Maliki carte blanche to do as he likes. They delivered huge sums of money, weapons, training and other aid to Baghdad, including this month’s delivery of the first of thirty-six F-16 fighter planes. While American diplomats appeared resolute in siding with the Maliki government in its disputes with the Kurds and others wanting more decentralization of power, they showed no such commitment to Iraq’s constitution and the clear limits it places on Baghdad’s authority.

When during the past several years Maliki blocked the legal formation of more regions in Iraq, even going so far as to send his security forces to arrest Sunni Arab politicians trying to exercise their constitutional rights on the matter, the United States had nothing to say. When Baghdad failed to incorporate Sunni Awakening Councils into the armed forces or allow Sunni Arab regions to look after their own security (something which is also constitutionally permitted), no more than a few murmurs of concern were heard from Washington. When Baghdad cut off the Iraqi Kurds’ share of the budget, spokespersons in Washington remained mum.

Now the Americans are shocked, and asking themselves how some rag-tag ISIS Jihadis, outgunned and outnumbered by Iraqi military forces in Mosul by around 15 to 1, managed to overrun the city. “We gave them so many weapons, training and money,” they exclaim, “and now they won’t even step up to the plate.” Policy makers in Washington should also ask themselves how the Iraqi Kurds, who received next to nothing in military or financial assistance, manage to hold out against the Jihadis and keep their region secure.

The answer, I think, has to do with governance. Kurdish fighters feel that their regional government represents them and are willing to fight for it and their land. In contrast, Shiite Iraqi Army recruits do not know Sunni areas like Mosul and do not want to be there, much less die there. Sunni soldiers, meanwhile, do not feel that the government they serve is theirs. They have seen their communities shut out by Maliki and his disconnected politicians in Baghdad. The Sunni Arabs faced serious persecution in the last couple of years, seeing their peaceful protests violently put down by Maliki and their elected leaders sidelined and hunted down one by one.

Allowing constitutionally-envisioned decentralization of power and the formation of other regions could have stopped this and put locals in charge of their own security and finances. This never happened except for in Iraqi Kurdistan, and even there local governance has come under threat by Maliki’s pressure (although Washington could not care less, of course). In the rest of Iraq, promised money and governing authority from Baghdad hardly filters down to the regions, and security forces take all their orders from far-away politicians of the central government.

Given how badly the Americans continue to misread Iraq, whoever in Washington has been making U.S. policy there should be transferred to the Fiji, Mauritius or similarly important desks as quickly as possible. The real threat in Iraq was never Kurdish secession, but rather renewed authoritarianism in Baghdad and the resistance this would spark in excluded communities. Instead of being so overbearingly “respectful of Iraq’s territorial unity,” the Americans should have been a bit more concerned with Iraq’s constitutional integrity and the decentralization it promised.