Michael Rubin on the Issues Facing Kurdistan in the Middle East (MORE SURPRISE BY ‘AMERICAN ENTERPRISE’)
NewEnglish Review – 17-3-2014 – In the March New English Review we published both an interview with Dr. Michael Rubin and reviewed his recently published book, Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engagement with Rogue Regimes. Michael Rubin, is a former Pentagon expert on Iran and Iraq during the Bush era, and is currently a Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) in Washington, DC. At the conclusion of our previous interview we afforded him the opportunity to address issues facing the Kurds in the Middle East. He had recently traveled to the Kurdish autonomous area in the Northeastern province of Hasakah in Syria observing the developments of what the Kurds there call Rojava. In this second interview Rubin addresses with Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Rubin’s acute observations round out a piece of the puzzle in the Middle East, the emergence of Kurdistan.
Gordon: Dr. Rubin thank you for returning to address the issues facing Kurdistan in the Middle East
Rubin: Thank you for inviting me back.
Gordon: You have witnessed the development of the Autonomous Kurdish area in Syria’s Northeastern Province. What are the dynamics that led to its creation?
Rubin: No secret there. Kurds are largely spread across four countries: Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. In recent years, Kurds in Syria have largely had it the worst. Certainly, the PKK fought an insurgency in Turkey, but if Kurds accepted the Turkish constitution and denied many aspects of their own identity, then they did not face barriers in Turkey. Indeed, Atatürk’s successor ?smet ?nönü was Kurdish. Iranian Kurds suffer discrimination both on ethnic and sectarian grounds, but they are recognized as Iranian citizens. The Syrian Baath Party, however, actively sought to strip Syrian Kurds of citizenship, effectively leaving Syrian Kurds stateless, unable to own land, attend university, or take government jobs. With the collapse of effective state control, it was a no-brainer to establish an alternate administration. And what a good job the Kurds have done: “Rojava,” as the Kurds call their statelet, has functioning government services and is relatively placid. Indeed, it has become a refuge not only for Syrian Kurds, but tens of thousands of Syrian Arabs.
Gordon: Recently, George Sabra, the President of the Syrian National Council was interviewed. Why is he opposed to the creation of Rojava, the Syrian Kurdistan?
Rubin: Blame it on tribalism. Most Kurds in Syrian Kurdistan support Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The Syrian National Council tends to lean more to Masud Barzani, president of Iraqi Kurdistan. Barzani will never accept alternate administration which does not acknowledge his influence or leadership.
Gordon: The Syrian People’s Protection Units (YPG) have successfully fought battles with the al Qaeda affiliates, the al Nusrah Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) in their homeland. What evidence have they uncovered about foreign Jihadi fighters, their countries of origin and how they entered Syria?
Rubin: There’s little secret about how Jihadis enter Syria: They pay $40 to Turkish border guards and cross the Turkish border unmolested. That said, Nusrah and ISIS are no longer simply Syrian movements, but demonstrate the internationalization of Al Qaeda affiliates.
Gordon: While the adjacent Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq has offered sanctuary and support for embattled Syrian Kurdish refugees, what complicates cooperation with the YPG fighters and the Democratic Union Party (YPD)?
Rubin: It’s been quite some time since the KRG really offered sanctuary; indeed, several months ago, the KRG cut the bridge that spanned the river which marks the Syria-Iraq border crossing at Feesh Habur, and Masud Barzani has refused to allow many food and medical aid deliveries into Rojava. The YPG and YPD also suspect that Barzani is less interested in fighting Al Qaeda than in asserting control over Hasakah’s oil fields.
Gordon: What is the status of KRG political and economic relations with Erdogan’s Turkey?
Rubin: The political and economic ties between Erdo?an’s Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan have never been so warm or vast. We’ll see if that continues, however. The dispute between Islamist cult leader Fethullah Gülen and Prime Minister Erdo?an could spill into Iraqi Kurdistan. After all, Gülenist schools operate throughout Iraqi Kurdistan and Barzani has shown no desire to close them, despite Turkish government hints that he should.
Gordon: Given the recent adoption of a new Constitution by the KRG, how will that impact on current negotiations with the central Baghdad government of President Maliki?
Rubin: That’s not really an issue, since Iraqi regions—grouping of three provinces or more—can establish their own federal order.
Gordon: Did the failure of the Obama Administration to negotiate a Status of Forces agreement with the Maliki government in Iraq facilitate Iran’s rising hegemony in the region?
Rubin: Absolutely. Maliki is not a willing Iranian agent: Iraqis are nationalists and tend to resent Iran’s overbearing attitude. But the U.S. withdrawal has prevented Maliki from carving out autonomous space by playing U.S. and Iranian interests off each other. That gives Iran leverage and undercuts Iraq’s range of diplomatic movement.
Gordon: Is the Assad regime complicit in supporting Kurdish autonomy in Syria?
Rubin: The Kurds have a chosen to concentrate on fighting Al Qaeda rather than the Syrian regime. While they quickly wrested control over much of their region from Assad, they have allowed Syrian troops to remain in certain pockets, and air links remain between Qamishli, the main city of Syrian Kurdistan and both Damascus and Latakia. Whether that makes either side complicit or simply guilty of prioritizing conflict is a matter of interpretation.
Gordon: There are allegations that the Assad regime has opportunistically supported al Qaeda affiliated militias in Syria and in neighboring Iraq. What are your views?
Rubin: I’m not sure I buy that: Before the civil war, Assad was guilty of supporting Jihadists so long as they took their fight to Iraq. Once the blowback started, he has put everything into fighting Al Qaeda affiliates. Turkey has been playing more of a double game when it comes to Al Qaeda-affiliated militias.
Gordon: Who is in control of Syria’s oil reserves in the Hazakah Province and where does it flow?
Rubin: The Kurds have secured the oil fields, but because the storage is full and there is no way to export the oil, the fields are no longer producing.
Gordon: Is the Obama Administration denying humanitarian and military assistance for Syria’s Kurdish refugees and the PYG local militias?
Rubin: Yes. The Obama administration refuses to work with the Syrian Kurdish administration because federalism does not fit into the initial narrative of regime versus opposition umbrella.
Gordon: What is the status of the Iranian Kurds given the advent of the Rouhani Presidency?
Rubin: Executions in Iranian Kurdistan have skyrocketed.
Gordon: Why is the Erdogan AKP government against Kurdish regional autonomy in Syria?
Rubin: Both because the PYD is closely affiliated with the PKK and because the Turks do not want to bless a second federal Kurdistan on their border.
Gordon: Premier Erdogan in Turkey had struck a deal in 2013 with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. What happened in the subsequent negotiations for a cease fire?
Rubin: The ceasefire has held, but the Kurds are still waiting to see what they get for their willingness to negotiate. At the very least, they want Öcalan’s release from prison.
Gordon: What did the roiling corruption scandals in Turkey reveal about Erdogan’s personal role in funneling support via known terrorist financiers to Al Qaeda militias in Syria?
Rubin: Well, I don’t have a crystal ball but already we see the revelations show the depth of Prime Minister Erdogan’s relationship with Al Qaeda financiers like Yasin al-Qadi.
Gordon: What evidence was revealed about the extent of illicit gold trading with Iran and how did Erdogan’s AKP government avoid US and EU sanctions?
Rubin: The basic outline of the gold-for-gas scandal has long been known; what has become evident is the specific mechanisms by which the smuggling occurred.
Gordon: Erdogan’s AKP majority in the Ankara parliament has passed legislation curtailing human rights, muzzled the country’s independent judiciary and public prosecutors, and established control over social media, sparking wide spread protests. Do you think those draconian initiatives will have any impact on the upcoming March 30, 2014 municipal elections?
Rubin: I’m a historian so I get paid to predict the past, not the future. One question will be whether elections in Turkey will any longer be free and fair.
Gordon: Why did Erdogan engage in open warfare against his former Islamist ally, Sheikh Mohamed Fethulleh Gulen, and his Hizmat movement in Turkey?
Rubin: Autocrats don’t mind sharing power during the ascendency, but they’re loath to share power once they believe themselves at the top.
Gordon: Saudi Arabia recently designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group thereby isolating Qatar. How does that impact on Erdogan’s Islamist alliances in the Middle East Region?
Rubin: Erdogan doesn’t operate by consensus. He’s Brotherhood through-and-through, and so I would simply expect to see him work more closely with Doha rather than Riyadh in the future.
Gordon: Given Russian President Putin’s seizure of Crimea, how will that impact on relations with surrounding Muslim states?
Rubin: Turkey won’t recognize Russia’s referendum in the Crimea, but Erdogan has a remarkable ability to pursue policies that benefit his own personal pocketbook, and so I wouldn’t expect a radical change of policy by Turkey toward Russia.
Gordon: Dr. Rubin thank you for this concise and revelatory discussion of the issues facing the Kurds in the Middle East.
Rubin: Thank you for having me back.
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