MESOP : WHO HAS USED WHOM ? – Abdullah Ocalan: Is The Famed Kurdish Leader A Double Agent Working For Turkish Intelligence Against His Own Party, The PKK?
Öcalan argues that ‘MİT wanted to use me but I used them instead.’”
By Palash R. Ghosh — International Business Times – 24.2.2013
The name Abdullah Öcalan may not sound familiar to most people, but is known to everybody in Turkey. For a few months in early 1999 he even made international headlines, when the Kurdish independence leader turned up in Rome, where he provoked a diplomatic brouhaha as the guest of an uneasy Italian government — before fleeing to Kenya and eventually being captured there by Turkish agents.
The Turks were after him for a reason: He was, at the time, the country’s number one public enemy. The 64-year-old co-founder of the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is widely blamed for tens of thousands of deaths, of both civilians and soldiers, arising from the Turkish state’s multi-decade war against Kurdish nationalists in the southeastern part of the country.
The Kurds, a separate ethnic group related to Iranians, have been seeking for a long time to form an independent state. Since his arrest, Öcalan has been incarcerated at the Imrali island prison in the Sea of Marmara — up until recently he was the sole inmate in the facility. He was sentenced to death, but that was later commuted to life imprisonment after the Ankara government eliminated capital punishment as part of its bid to join the European Union (a process that is still ongoing).
Over the past 14 years, the world has changed dramatically for both Öcalan – called “Apo” (“uncle”) by his legion of admirers – and the Kurds. While the PKK still wages a periodic campaign against the Turkish state from armed camps across the border in northwestern Iraq and Iran, the Kurds of Turkey – representing at least 20 percent of the population – have gained some civil and political rights, thereby compromising the PKK’s radical and violent agenda.
Even Öcalan has called for an end to the violent insurgency and for a focus on a political solution to the ancient Turk-Kurd conflict. Late last year, Turkish media reported that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP) – a longtime adversary of the Kurds – directed his senior intelligence officials to reach out to the jailed Öcalan in order to commence some kind of peace dialogue between Ankara and the PKK.
Quite a surprising turnaround, given that in 2012 Erdogan had ordered Turkish jet fighters to bombard PKK bases in Iraq, killing scores of Kurdish guerrillas.
Murat Yetkin, a columnist for Turkey’s Hürriyet Daily News, commented that talks with Öcalan would have been “unthinkable” just a few years ago. “But now the majority of the people, Turks and Kurds, are giving silent consent to the process, hoping for an end to the violence,” Yetkin wrote.
Specifically, Öcalan has been talking to Hakan Fidan, the head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MİT), and his aides. In connection with these preliminary negotiations, PKK guerillas have temporarily offered to lay down their arms. However, in the complex, serpentine world of Turkish political intrigue, not everything is as it seems; indeed, whose side is Öcalan really on?
Questions about Öcalan’s true loyalties and motivations have floated for many years, even among his Kurdish brethren. Some critics have accused Öcalan of working in league with MİT. Writing in KurdishAspect.com in 2007, a columnist named Sosun Welat explicitly accused Öcalan of serving as an agent for MİT and blamed him for perpetrating a “systematic betrayal and treason to [the] Kurdish cause.” “Öcalan played a double agent role for years,” Welat wrote. “His rise and fall was well planned and controlled by [the] Turkish state. He and PKK provided cover for [the] Turkish state to … destroy [the] Kurdish heartland, its way of life, culture, language.”
Welat and other observers believe that prior to the forming of the PKK, in the mid-1950s, Turkish intelligence infiltrated Kurdish activist groups and helped establish their Communist credentials, thereby providing a legitimate excuse to oppress Kurds in the name of preventing the spread of Communism (which would, of course, please Turkey’s then-new allies in Western Europe and the U.S.). Then in the 1970s, so the theory goes, Turkish intelligence facilitated the emergence of PKK, hoping to use it as a counterforce that would weaken other Kurdish insurgents. “MİT planned to split Turkish leftist groups by creating (its own) Kurdish leftist group, PKK — but apparently it got out of control,” said Emrullah Uslu, an analyst at the Jamestown Foundation and a professor of political science and international relations at Yeditepe
According to at least one eyewitness, Öcalan’s ties to MİT even go back fifty years.
Late last year, Turkish journalist Mehmet Avni Özgürel, who himself has been linked to MİT, told local media that he saw Öcalan attend meetings at a foundation operated by Turkish intelligence in the 1960s, when the future PKK leader was still a student. Özgürel’s allegations about Öcalan’s unsavory arrangements with non-Kurdish organizations were painted with a fairly wide brush. He told the Aksiyon weekly magazine that besides his links to MİT, Öcalan had relationships with senior political figures in foreign countries, including the U.S., UK and Greece.
“I don’t want to elaborate on this [Öcalan’s relations with other countries] now because one day I want to prove it with documents that show where and with whom Öcalan met,” Özgürel told the publication.
He may have good reason to keep quiet; some Turks believe that one investigative reporter lost his life probing alleged connections between Öcalan and MİT.
Özge Mumcu, the daughter of journalist Uğur Mumcu, who was killed by a car bomb in 1993, told reporters in 2010 that her father died because “he probably was investigating evidence proving that Öcalan was a MİT agent.” (Mumcu’s murder has never been solved.) Mumcu was planning to meet with a retired prosecutor named Baki Tug to discuss Öcalan’s ties to MİT but he never made that appointment. According to Memcu’s son, Tug knew of Öcalan’s MİT relationship because in 1972 Tug was asked by Turkish intelligence to release Öcalan from jail after he was arrested for participating in a pro-Kurdish, anti-government boycott. Öcalan was freed without explanation, within weeks.
About a month after Mumcu’s death, another man who was investigating the same links, Gen. Eşref Bitlis, died in a mysterious plane crash. Yeditepe University’s Uslu said that Öcalan has admitted “that when he was a student at Ankara University he had contacts with MİT. But Öcalan argues that ‘MİT wanted to use me but I used them instead.’”
But MİT isn’t the only organization seemingly anathema to Kurdish interests that Öcalan has been linked to. Some of Öcalan’s closest associates allege that he is controlled by the Ergenekon terrorist organization, also known as the “deep state” — a secretive group comprising Turkish military officers, right-wing nationalists, and others who seek to topple the government of moderate-Islamist Prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. According to Öcalan’s former right-hand-man, Hüseyin Yıldırım, “Öcalan controls the PKK and the ‘deep state’ controls Öcalan.” As Yıldırım sees it, “Öcalan made an agreement with the ‘deep state’ at İmralı [prison] to save his life.” Following this line of reasoning — which may be little more than a conspiracy theory — the Kurdish-Turk conflict is now being directed by Ergenekon in order to foment social chaos, thereby precipitating a military coup.
Political scientist Uslu speculated that in 2004, entities related to the “deep state” may have asked the PKK to resume its violent activities, after a ceasefire, despite the fact that Kurds in Turkey had gained new rights as the government sought to enter the EU. In order to protect himself from accusations of serving as a double agent, Öcalan has also claimed that the PKK was infiltrated by Ergenekon. But his former colleague Yildirim says that Öcalan is trying to throw up a smokescreen.
“This is in fact putting his own crimes on the shoulders of others,” Yildirim told Taraf. “This is an effort to protect himself.”
Meanwhile, today Kurdish PKK guerrillas remain encamped over the border in Iraq, awaiting a victorious battle against Turkish forces that seems more and more distant by the day.
Indeed, Uslu contends that MİT continues to penetrate the PKK through a new organization called Koma Civakên Kurdistan (KCK) – leaders of whom are actually MİT agents. But it is a mystery what Turkish intelligence can gain at this point in keeping Öcalan alive and continuing to support its alleged “enemy,” the PKK. “This problem has turned into a political and sociological crisis,” Uslu concluded. “I don’t know what the MİT is aiming for with this, but it is no secret that MİT does not want to harm Murat Karayılan, the current acting head of the PKK.”
As it apparently does not have any interest in hurting Öcalan.
Indeed, Öcalan remains safely locked away in Imrali prison with secrets that he will likely take to the grave, the same place many of his former friends and current enemies will have to leave their suspicions about him.
Interview with Mr. Kemal Burkay (1st Part): If September 12th Coup D’état Never Happened, Peaceful Solution to the Kurdish Problem Was Possible
ResearchTurkey – – April 7, 2013Interview
Interview with Mr. Kemal Burkay (1st Part): If September 12th Coup D’état Never Happened, Peaceful Solution to the Kurdish Problem Was Possible Chairman of The Rights and Liberties Party (HAK-PAR),…
Once again a possibility of giving an end to the armed conflict in Kurdish problem has come to the agenda. Hopes for the end of armed conflict are alive. Nevertheless, concrete steps that will solve the Kurdish problem are still not clear. On the eve of a solution in the Kurdish problem that has long been among the most significant political issues of Turkey for decades, we are honoured to make an interview with Mr. Kemal Burkay –a significant name in the Kurdish politics in Turkey-. In the first part of the interview, we discussed the history of the Kurdish politics in Turkey since the separation of Kurdish movement from Turkish left in 1960s with Kemal Burkay. Mr. Burkay, Chairman of the Rights and Liberties Party, poet and writer, analysed the historical progress of the Kurdish problem and contemporary solutions proposed to end the armed conflict to Centre for Policy Analysis and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey).
The Full Text of the Interview
“There were two main tendencies among Kurdish people in 1960s: One was the patriotic, anti socialist section that we used to call Kurdish nationalists.…The ones who had similar socialist ideas like us, we worked at TİP.”
Mr. Burkay, we really thank you for accepting our proposal of an interview. You entered into politics in 1960s through Workers Party of Turkey (TİP) then you continued your battle through different political parties and associations. At the same time, you are known as an important poet and writer, you were never detached from the literature. In order to provide a brief introduction about you to our readers, I would like to start with Workers Party of Turkey. How you participated to TİP, why did you leave, why and how you went abroad, could you explain it briefly?
I participated into TİP in 1965. I started to work as a lawyer in Elazığ in 1964. I was interested in literature at the same time. Meanwhile, we published a monthly review called “Çira” in Elazığ, it was a literature review. Within that frame, we used to discuss political and social issues. I was the editor. I also had my poems published at different reviews. My first novel was published in series at Vatan Newspaper in 1963. I wrote a new novel called “Çiçekler ve Zincirler” (Flowers and Chains) which was published by Özyürek publications afterwards. At that time, I considered myself closer to TİP and had socialist ideas, nevertheless I was not thinking about entering into politics. At that time, TİP was organized in villages of our region, it established the Diyarbakır organization. They sent a lawyer from Manisa in order to establish another organization in Elazığ. He came by and talked to us. We were a couple of lawyers who were attracted to socialist ideas, but neither of us wanted to organize a party. Organized politics take a great deal of time and I was dealing with literature. We directed him to the workers, labourers who had political tendencies. That friend of us talked to them, but when he went back, the police threatened these labourers and warned them in order not to participate in any organizations, so they gave up. This situation hurt us. We gathered as 4-5 lawyers and organized Workers Party of Turkey. That was the beginning of my political life and it has been very intense since. I worked hard and spent a great deal of time. It really hindered my literature works. I couldn’t write any other novels but kept writing poems. I worked for TİP until 1972; in 1971 we were arrested for TİP case. I went abroad in 1972 and came back in 1974. After my arrival, we organized another socialist political party: Kurdistan Socialist Party. And I broke with TİP. Starting from 1974, the Kurdish movement was organized through different channels. I was the general secretary of this illegal party.
Did you go to Lebanon first?
I went abroad in 1972 because of the TİP case. Nevertheless, I was also arrested in Diyarbakır for Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Centres (DDKO) case. I was being tried for two different cases, but I was discharged from both of them. Then, there was another arrest, that’s why I went abroad and stayed there for 2 years. I came back when the general pardon was issued. I went to Europe via Lebanon, I stayed in Germany.
What was the general political attitude towards Kurdish people within the Workers Party of Turkey at that time? In that sense, what was the fundamental approach, were there some flaws?
We were working in harmony with Turkish friends in TİP. There were two main tendencies among Kurdish people in 1960s: One was the patriotic, anti socialist section that we used to call Kurdish nationalists. They organized the illegal Kurdistan Democrat Party in 1965. The ones who had similar socialist ideas like us, we worked at TİP. We supported the socialist ideas and thought that Kurdish problem would be solved if the socialist system were to be established in Turkey.
You thought that instead of political reforms in accordance with Kurdish demands the macro level socialism would be a cure to Kurdish problem?
We thought that would work out. There were not such precise resolutions in TİP on that matter. In the fourth congress, the party took a decision that later in 12 March era, served as the basis for the dissolution decision of the Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, in the party program, there were not distinct statements formulated in regard to the Kurdish problem.
At that time, was it openly called “the Kurdish Problem”?
At the beginning, even saying “Kurdish” was problematic. But TİP had a positive attitude towards the Kurdish problem (then called the “Kurdish issue”) General Chairman Aybar (Mehmet Ali Aybar) made some statements. Beside, although with some difficulties, the problem was being discussed more and more. For instance, in Ankara we published a review called “Yeni Akış” (The New Flow) where we discussed the Kurdish problem. We could publish only four issues. In 1966, I stayed for four months in Ankara Ulucanlar Prison because of an article published in that review. It was the end of 1966 and the beginning of 1967.
“Even the word “Kurdish” could be a problem. But, that was already the reason why we were arrested, because we said “Kurdish nation”, we discussed the Kurdish problem in a moderate way.”
That’s the prison that has been transformed into a museum now, right?
Yes. We, three friends, were writers in the “Yeni Akış” review. We were later discharged and acquitted. For instance, for the first time, we used the expression “Kurdish nation” in that review. It was not possible to say “Kurdish nation” until then. Even the word “Kurdish” could be a problem. But, that was already the reason why we were arrested, because we said “Kurdish nation”, we discussed the Kurdish problem in a moderate way. With the 12 March coup, all developments ceased for good.
What were prosecuting attorneys and judges saying, what was your fault? Was it clearly stated that the problem was the use of such expression?
Of course, in that era, when you were tried for such matters, it was either called the “Propaganda against National Unity” or the “attempt to establish another state” with an attribution to 125th article. We were persecuted for propaganda in Yeni Akış case. Even, that was called (crime of) “Racial thoughts” by the 3rd paragraph of 142nd article.
Is it true that when judges and prosecuting attorneys read to you the content of your crime, they did not use the expression “Kurdish” in sentence?
They could not use it, because according to them, such thing did not exist. I was taken to Istanbul in 12 March era when I was taken into custody for the first time. Elrom (Israelian Consulate Efraim Elrom) was kidnapped; that’s why, a group of fifty people consisting of politicians, scientists, unionists, writers were taken into custody as if they were hostages. That group included Muammer Aksoy, Yaşar Kemal, Kemal Türker the unionist. I was also taken, we stayed at Davutpaşa Barrack. Before we went there, in the first Office, a janitor who pretended to be a police officer was interrogating everyone. They also brought Musa Anter, he was taken from Istanbul. The janitor asked to Musa Anter “What is your crime?” He replied with a clear voice: “Defending Kurds”. The other was suprised, asked, “Is there such a thing as Kurd? There is no such language as Kurdish” Musa Anter replied “Of course there is, I even wrote the dictionary for it.” The janitor was even more surprised and understood that the guy was a tough one, not a coward. At that time, saying that “Kurdish people exists, there is a Kurdish language” required courage.
“There were Kurdish people demanding for more everywhere. TİP could not embrace that, not only TİP, none of the leftist parties could.”
When you were back, you said that you disconnected yourself from TİP and organized a new political party. What was the fundamental reason for that?
Yes. As I stated before, we worked in a harmony with Turkish friends in TİP. But the Kurdish problem was revived in discussions and organizational platforms. There were Kurdish people demanding for more everywhere. TİP could not embrace that, not only TİP, none of the leftist parties could. For instance, TİP took a very progressive decision in the fourth congress about Kurdish people, but it could not defend that decision at the court. And it was closed for that. When TİP was reestablished in 1974, they literally laid an embargo on the Kurdish problem.
What was the decision that TİP took?
It can be considered major in terms of the circumstances of that time. The decision read something like “In the eastern regions of Turkey lives Kurdish nation. Kurdish problem is not only a matter of underdevelopment, it is also a problem of the use of constitutional rights…” It was enough to declare the existence of the Kurdish nation. We could say that when TİP was re-established in 1974, it was very cautious. Friends from TİP stopped talking about the Kurdish problem, they even started to consider those who did, as provocateurs. Even when the Turkish left began to recognize the Kurdish problem and discuss self-determination issue in 1960s and 70s, it never engaged in an attitude that would include the Kurdish problem in its party program and defend it in a decisive way. The general ambiance of the time suggested that a socialist state would come and solve the problem. They were thinking that discussions revolving around the Kurdish problem were premature and exaggerated. Nevertheless, Kurdish movement had a great potential and was in a resurgence era that required a channelization. We thought that. We of course had socialist ideas at the time and believed in the necessity of a socialist state. That’s why we organized Kurdistan Socialist Party. In our program, we targeted for both the liberation of Kurdish nation and both a democratic, in the future, socialist society.
You left this party in 2003, why?
I left the general secretary position in 2003; I no longer hold any administrator positions. I went abroad in 1980 and I wanted to leave the general secretary position even in 1987. In home, due to the operations of the junta, our organizational works have been severely damaged, there were arrests, trials etc. Our organizational work has been weakened but starting from 1987, we recovered. I wanted to leave in 1987 so that someone from the home country could fill the position. Our friends disagreed, so I kept performing my duty. I wanted to leave again in 1994 and 1998 during the congresses. I wasn’t allowed to do so by my friends again. So, I went on all the way until 2003. Why I wanted to leave? I was not a lazy man; to the contrary, I was a very hard working one. I worked during day and night when I held the general secretary position. But I never was an ambitious man; I didn’t wanted to become a president or something else.
“Not only pressures, exiles, worries and arrests, but what is happening within the organization exhaust you.”
I understand that you had same feelings when you wanted to leave the organizational politics. So, you want to do great works when you start, but when you are not capable of doing so, you blame and outwear yourself?
Yes, the directorship is a very demanding position with too many responsibilities, it is exhausting. Not only pressures, exiles, worries and arrests, but what is happening within the organization exhaust you. Sometimes you see the weaknesses and negative attitudes of the people belonging to the organization, and this upsets you more than the arrests and exiles. Maybe, for that reason, I wanted to quit in a relatively early time. But I was able to do so only in 2003. Then I was very determined and my friends accepted. But when I came back, I went under a lot of work again; sometimes I am really amazed with myself.
Kemal Burkay 2
You lived abroad for 32 years, especially in Sweden. Starting from Sweden of course, based on your observations, what do you think about the attitude of European governments toward the Kurdish problem, since the beginning? Did it revolve; was there a certain sensitivity about the issue always?
In 1960s, the Kurdish problem was mostly considered to be the problems of Iraqi Kurds. As you know, in 1960s, there was a salvation war, a guerrilla fight leaded by Mustafa Barzani (Father of Mesut Barzani) in Iraqi Kurdistan. Through such channel, Europe was familiar with the Kurdish problem. The Kurdish problem in Turkey was not the centre of attention in such dimensions. I stayed in Germany between 1972-74, and the public opinion knew little about the Kurdish problem. When I talked about the Kurds, they were thinking about what is written in Karl May’s famous travel novel called “Durch Die Wilde Kurdistan”. The author wrote it in prison. He collected the data from the notes of travellers and wrote the book as if he travelled through Kurdistan. The book was quite famous in Germany. They thought of that book when Kurds were mentioned in Germany. Nevertheless, after the cultural and political efforts of Kurdish people working in Germany and in other European countries, Europe began to recognize Kurdish people and their problems. There were some associations being established in Germany. These associations were later gathered under an organization called KOMKAR. In Turkish it meant The Union of Kurdish Workers Associations. There were sister associations of KOMKAR in other countries like Sweden, Netherlands, France, afterwards in United Kingdom, Austria, Switzerland and many others. KOMKAR had an important role in the recognition of the Kurdish problem and the revival of Kurdish culture abroad, for instance the resurgence of Newroz tradition. It is possible to say that in 1970s, KOMKAR was the almost only mass association Kurdish people had in Europe. Of course, in 1970s our domestic activities were also quite alive. We were working in democratic organizations, we were publishing reviews. We published a Turkish-Kurdish one. Of course, this was not easy in 1970s. It was difficult but we did it. By running as an independent candidate, we won the municipality elections of Diyarbakır in 1977; Mehdi Zana was our friend. We also won the municipality of Ağrı. Our friends were in administrator positions of TÖB-DER (Unity and Solidarity Association of All Teachers) for 4 years along with Turkish friends. We were quite active in such democratic organizations and unions. There were also some developments in Europe, as I mentioned KOMKAR was established. In 1979, after 1980s these activities continued. At that time, European countries had a very positive approach toward Kurdish people. Turkey was an ally of NATO and Western European countries, but it had a Kurdish problem. The democratic rights of Kurdish people had a certain support in European public opinion. Kurds had a positive image. For instance in Sweden, the most prestigious foreign group was the Kurds. They were more prestigious than Chileans, Palestinians. But the appearance and activities of PKK changed these all.
Did PKK ruin the image?
Yes, they did.
“It is not true to assume that it is Europeans that exposed the Kurdish problem.”
To the contrary of the discourse claiming that “Foreign countries supported the Kurdish issue in order to create disorder in Turkey”, do you claim that Europeans become familiar with the Kurdish problem through the efforts of Kurdish people leaving from Turkey in 1970s?
That was exactly what happened. The other discourse is a pitiful attempt; it is not true to assume that it is Europeans that exposed the Kurdish problem. It is even like assuming that European countries supported PKK… I already mentioned that the efforts made during 1960s, 70s, 80s increased the prestige of Kurdish movement and KOMKAR had a remarkable role in it. The prestige of Kurds was so good in Sweden. But later, PKK started to grow stronger. Then they started to use guns, the partisanship of PKK in Europe started to grow slowly. It was an organization with weapons and weapons made sound. On the contrary, the other organizations such as ours, started to lose power when the junta came into power. Their staffs was arrested, put into the prison, the democratic movement was crashed in a way. The junta of course also crashed and put into prison some people from PKK. The democratic movement both on Turkish and Kurdish side was crashed.
Since activities of PKK make the headlines more quickly, did they become more popular?
Of course, when they started to fight with arms, the sound of weapon repressed all the others. Through 1990s PKK started to grow stronger. Even in the end of 1980s PKK did not hold the situation under control but it seized more power eventually. For instance, they committed two murders in Sweden; they shot two people who left the organization. One was shot in a park the other, who was the member of the central committee, was shot during a meeting in Stockholm. They also committed murders in Germany.
When those happened?
Between 1985-86.
“PKK was declared as a terrorist organization and pressures intensified. We also got our share.”
You mean that soon after PKK started an arm fight, there were drastic disputes, insider murders and executions both inside the Kurdish movement and PKK?
Of course. These activities started between 1985-87. Sweden hasn’t witnessed a political murder for a long time. These two consecutive political murders shook the Swedish society and decreased the prestige of Kurdish population to the lowest. They started to think of Kurds as a terrorist population. The same thing happened both in Germany and in France. There were such instances where German people stopped renting their apartments to Kurdish people. We started to have difficulties in finding a hall for Newroz meetings. Whereas, before we were regarded with great sympathy. These violent acts had a negative impact in European public opinion against Kurdish people. Of course, activities of PKK continued, especially in the beginning of 1990s. PKK was identified as a terrorist entity. Especially events in 1993, the movement toward more violence in Europe, invasion of offices of Turkish airlines, bombing of Turkish workplaces, violence against Turkish embassies… These acts raised a great reaction in Germany, Sweden and other countries, and European countries were naturally very uncomfortable with such activities. PKK was declared as a terrorist organization and pressures intensified. We also got our share. For example, one day the police raided our organization, after the murders I mentioned. Because of course Swedish police couldn’t tell apart and considered all of us same. Afterward, both Germans and Swedish people realized that we were different and had nothing to do with those violent acts. But in the beginning, such events occurred and the prestige of Kurdish people was badly affected. Because it was difficult to explain such distinction to the average man on the street. PKK had such a negative role.
What do you think about the claim that the European countries support PKK very much?
That support comes from the Kurdish people. There is a considerable Kurdish mass in European countries. A remarkable part of the Kurdish people there considered the armed battle of PKK as a fight for the freedom of Kurdish people, despite of all the mistakes made since the beginning of armed combat, the violence applied towards the members deciding to leave and the lack of democracy. I mean, there is state on one hand and there are Kurdish people on the other hand. PKK is an organization fighting for Kurds. With that state of mind, some Kurds supported PKK. Of course, not all Kurds did, but there is around two million Kurds in European countries. One million of them live in Germany, even you gain hearts of one tenth of this population, and this is a remarkable power. Let’s assume that PKK demanded aid, even extortions from businessmen there. An armed organization is scary; you would give money away in order to avoid trouble. Peasant would do that also. Of course, it has been complicated you know. There is such a drug traffic coming from Turkey that PKK got also involved in this affair. The same applies to the intelligence bureau and everyone knows that there has been a fight over profit.
The profit issue and other dimensions of these events are widely discussed now.
Among the unlawful elements of the state there were conflicts concerning the sharing of the profit. PKK also got involved. Thus, the war transformed into mafia kind of trade and continued until today.
“We worked at TÖB-DER, there has been a general assembly about education and there, the right to education in mother tongue was declared as a decision, imagine that it was only years 1977-78. That was the decision of an organization of 200,000 members.”
Did the approach of the state has as much of an impact as the aims and violent activities of PKK? Villages burnt down, people dying on both side… Turkish martyrs generate some sensitivity, also on the Kurdish side, when relatives and neighbours die, didn’t that have an impact?
Of course, war led to a polarization. I already mentioned, before 12 September coup, Kurdish political movement, especially we, the Liberty Path Movement or Kurdistan Socialist Party (We were known as Liberty Path at the time) had good connections with the Turkish democracy. We worked at TÖB-DER, there has been a general assembly about education and there, the right to education in mother tongue was declared as a decision, imagine that it was only years 1977-78. That was the decision of an organization of 200,000 members. Again the Assembly of Democratic Education beside TÖB-DER, around forty democratic organizations, which included Turkey Writers Union, Revolutionary Trade Unions Federation and Community Centres, in a common decision criticized pressures put on Roja Welat newspaper. Roja Welat was a newspaper that we published in Kurdish. This was important. We had such good relations. We occasionally organized common meetings; Turkish friends participated to our event nights. But after 12 September, both democratic movement and peaceful, legal Kurdish movement were crashed. PKK remained as the sole representative. As it was an armed organization and used this power, it became a side of the war. The army and PKK in opposite sides, a cruel war broke out. Thousand of villages were burnt down; millions of people left their soil, villages and towns to immigrate into metropolis. They suffered a lot and they were miserable, which engendered anger in Kurdish society. On the other side, as funerals of martyrs kept coming, the anger inside Turkish society both against PKK and Kurds grew. In such polarization peaceful democratic powers withered away. They sometimes ask us “What happened? You were very strong before 12 September.” That’s what happened, 12 September changed the balance of powers, blocked the way for peaceful powers and paved the way for arms, on purpose or not. Maybe on purpose, because the junta people believed that they could solve every problem with force. But this did not happen, among Kurds PKK empowered itself. In addition to that, external powers got involved. PKK got bases in Syria, Iraq, Iran and those countries choose to use Kurds against each other. That became an international problem. So, when we failed to solve it as a domestic matter, the problem became internationalized. It is wrong to consider this as a game of imperialist powers; it is not realistic but deceiving. The problem is inside, when you fail to solve it, it grows and we arrive at today’s conditions.
“I think that if it were possible to prevent left movement and Kurdish movement shifting toward violence, the developments would be certainly better.”
What you are saying is unknown to the generations that came after 1980s. Doing politics in organized way, conducting your fight with peaceful and long-term means, trying to solve the Kurdish problem by putting things in a perspective, by mutual discussions and debate… You illustrate for us how the armed combat of PKK harmed both your organized fight and the development of Kurdish movement. But didn’t PKK have an important role in the rapid development of “Kurdish identity” and the rapid recognition of Kurdish problem? There are lots of Kurds who accept the devastation brought by PKK, but still think this way. Do you think it was not worth to pay such price? Or do you claim that if your thoughts and your understanding of politics were to persist, you could still earn same gains or even beyond that?
I think that if it were possible to prevent left movement and Kurdish movement shifting toward violence, the developments would be certainly better. There is nothing gained through the armed battle, but great losses exist. The gains we obtained through the organized fight in 1970s and 1980s in Turkey and in Europe are obvious; also Turkish friends had great contributions in 1970s. If the violence did not take over and the democratic movement was not crashed, both Turkish democracy and Kurdish movement would be more advanced. Moreover, Kurdish movement would have obtained more gains. 1960s and 1970s are years when both the leftist movement and Kurdish movement were awaken. We saw that the violence would bring more harms than the gains in the left experience. There were two main streams in the leftist movement in 1970s: One side wanted to conduct the fight through peaceful political means whereas the other one sided with armed fights. TİP preferred to lead a peaceful political fight. But the other side started with a youth movement, for example Deniz Gezmiş and his friends, Mahir Çayan and his friends, then some Maoist groups, Perinçek groups etc… They came up with a battle of people theory. They thought that the goal was only reachable through armed battle, victory of a war of people, but not with political works or peaceful methods. We thought differently. Considering the circumstances in Turkey, national and international balances we said that armed battle did not have a chance of success. I think we were not wrong. The sparkle of revolution time withered away soon. After the collapse of Soviets Union, left became a marginal movement. That’s put aside, secondly, I think that in Turkey at that time, even in 1960s and 1970s, even with difficult circumstances and the imperfection of democracy, there were ways to organize people through peaceful and democratic means and render them conscious. For instance, TİP did that, we were doing that. We continued with that attitude through 1970s. Ok, we were illegal at that time, because it was not possible to establish a Kurdish party; even it was impossible to establish a democratic association. That’s why we had to organize ourselves illegally, but we never resorted to violence. We published papers, reviews, we got organized in democratic associations and unions, we established associations, we run in the elections even with independent candidates. We obtained some success.
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“PKK appeared in 1978 as a marginal group leaded by Abdullah Öcalan and soon after its appearance, it declared other Kurdish groups as enemies.”
Is it like a “Gandhi Walk”?
Of course, not to that extent, we were not such a great mass, but we had a chance. The unarmed Kurdish movement was very active in the region in 1970s. We and the other groups, DDKD, Rizgari, KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) were very actively there. PKK appeared in 1978 as a marginal group leaded by Abdullah Öcalan and soon after its appearance, it declared other Kurdish groups as enemies. He declared all of us as “collaborators, traitors” and set his first goal as our removal. So, even if they believe in armed fight, let’s assume that PKK is right, that victory is possible only through the armed fight and a revolution would save Kurdistan, was that the right method? Should one remove the other patriotic powers and associations within the society? A patriotic entity would follow the politics of the front, I mean although it would try to dominate over other thoughts and methods, it would be in solidarity with others and try to win over masses. But not like that, interestingly, as soon as PKK appeared in 1978, it declared all of us enemies, pointed gun at us. They shot our staff along with the staff of KDP and other associations. It terrorized the Kurdish movement and consternated in the region. Seeing this, we said it was dangerous; we didn’t fall for their games and did not reply with violence. In the era before 12 September, through the implementation of agents and provocateurs on both side, the left and right movements were pushed into conflict with each others. We said that some dark powers were trying to do the same thing and terrorize the Kurdish movement, so we did not fall for that, and as PSK, as Liberty Path we did not resort to violence. But some was tempted so partisans of KDP and PKK started to fight and kill each other. Hundreds of them died. At that time, before 12 September, more than 10.000 people emigrated from Siverek.
So, PKK started to kill Kurds? Before the state, did PKK force people to immigration?
Unfortunately, yes. The conflict between PKK and KDP resulted in the emigration from the region because people were shooting each other, aşiretler (clans) confronted and so on. I think that was yet another game of the people who were in preparation for a coup: pushing Kurds into a fight. I never doubted that some agent provocateurs played a role in those events. The same game was plotted again the leftist movement, the agent provocateurs ruled the state with violence, for example Mahir Kaynak. Mahir Kaynak was a Military Academy student who was expelled from the army before 12 September. A group of military school students were expelled because they were leftist or revolutionists Mahir Kaynak was one of them, he became an assistant at an university, he was the leading figure among defenders of fight of the people theory. “This can’t be done in reformist ways, only through armed fight and fight of the people we can do it. We have to invade cities from countryside.” He was saying. He was clearly a MIT (National Intelligence Organization) agent. You know, now he works as a commentator?
“Believe me when I say that if it was not for the coup and there were elections, we could gain %70 of the municipalities in the region, we were that strong. If we run for parliamentary elections through the establishment of a legal party or independent candidates, we could have 60-70 deputies in the parliament.”
Yes, he confessed it himself later. Uğur Mumcu also wrote about it at the time. To sum up, you are saying that the state tries to terrorize both the leftist and Kurdish movement and pushed them into violence on purpose?
Yes, the state worked in the framework of a plan in order to mislead both leftist and Kurdish movement and to prepare the basis for a coup. I think that it was wrong for both leftist and Kurdish movement to resort to violence. That detached us from masses. We were repressed at the wrong time. Sometimes that happens, I mean if the state wants to crash something, it wants to first make a criminal out of you. And if you grab an arm and withdraw to mountains, the state reclaims its duty to fight you and it seems legitimate. With all armed forces it descends upon you and so did the state. I think if the leftist movement and Kurdish movement, but especially Kurdish movement was not terrorized, we would have been more advanced now. I named you the municipalities we won as Liberty Path before 12 September. We were in solidarity with other peaceful associations. At the beginning of 1980, we established an association called the National Democratic Collaboration. Believe me when I say that if it was not for the coup and there were elections, we could gain %70 of the municipalities in the region, we were that strong. If we run for parliamentary elections through the establishment of a legal party or independent candidates, we could have 60-70 deputies in the parliament. Because we controlled the region. We had the support of the people. So, without shedding any blood, through the sheer power of masses we could generate some important developments. We could have municipalities and enter into the parliament. We could become a partner of the coalition. We could have such transformation through the reforms. At that time, we were publishing “Roja Welat” with a circulation rate of 40,000. We were already publishing books in Kurdish. Those happened through the fight.
Do you think that MIT or the deep state had an impact in the establishment of PKK? This relation has been brought up in relation to the assassination of Uğur Mumcu and many other events. As if he found the existence of such relation.
Abdullah Öcalan clearly reveals that. I mean, establishment of PKK, its declaration of other Kurdish associations as enemies, his immediate attack on us and pushing us into violent means, these are intriguing. No patriotic organization would do that.
Recently, Vice-president Bülent Arınç also said that Abdullah Öcalan used to perform the namaz, and that as he was going to be a Nur student but suddenly turned into a different path. He alluded to such possibility saying, “I wonder if MIT or others intervened.”
Yes, firstly, Abdullah Öcalan has an interesting story before he established PKK. He frequents the Association of Fight against Communism as a young, religious member. MIT derived much of its staff from there. Avni Özgürel says the same thing: “He frequented an MIT association in Ankara, I saw him there, he was the Office boy.” Öcalan revealed this in his previous statements and interviews. For instance, he has a book called “The language and literature of the Revolution”. He explains this saying that “We established PKK, for 3 years, it was the state who fed us and provided us with protection and weapons.” This is true because even at time, we saw that. For instance, PKK shot the president of our organization in Doğubeyazıt in front of his door, he died. The murderer was captured but released afterward from the police station. Then he was captured because of Siverek events, there was a warrant of arrest about him given by Ağrı (Karaköse) High Criminal Court, he was wanted, but he was released. So the problem is that, people from MIT were involved in this. Öcalan himself says this; there are lots of other examples. For instance, there is a guy called the Pilot among the founders of PKK. He quit his piloting position in Air Force Command and founded PKK along with Öcalan.
It was told that Öcalan’s first wife also had a relation with MIT.
Yes, his first wife was the daughter of someone named Ali Yıldırım who lived somewhere around our homeland. Ali Yıldırım was an informer for the government in Şeyh Sait Act. He was known as a spy, she is his daughter. Hürriyet newspaper had an interview with Ali Yıldırım in 1990s and asked him: “Your daughter is married to a separatist leader, a terrorist, what do you say about this?” He answered exactly like this: “I gave my daughter to the government, government knows about it.” This was published in Hürriyet newspaper; those who are curious can search and find it. At that time this was something very obvious, in 1980 Öcalan went to Syria before the coup and after that relations with Syria were built. Then Syria picked on the PKK, trained its members. The PKK placed these members first in Turkey’s borderline and in 1984 started its guerrilla acts. Back then, Öcalan was always in Damascus and the PKK was under Syria’s control. And the control Syria conducted on the PKK lasted until the day the PKK was removed from Syria. So to speak Turkey set a trap and thought that this was wise; started a fire but got itself caught in the fire. That fire still continues.
Please cite this publication as follows:
ResearchTurkey (April, 2013), “Interview with Mr. Kemal Burkay (1st Part): If September 12th Coup D’état Never Happened, Peaceful Solution to the Kurdish Problem Was Possible”, Vol. II, Issue 2, pp.6-21, Centre for Policy Analysis and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, ResearchTurkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=2984)