MESOP TODAY’S OPINION : THE END OF AN AFFAIR ? – End of Myth of Turkey-KRG Alliance

By Kamal Chomani – Today’s zaman – 24-9-2014 – Before the fall of the city of Shingal to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) terrorists, Turkey was considered a reliable ally of the Kurdistan region. However, the IS offensive on the city and elsewhere in the region brought about an end to this relationship.

Relations between the Kurdistan region and Turkey have been improving over the past eight years. Undoubtedly, the developments were embraced warmly by many people in both areas, yet many were critical about the relations between the two. The Turkey-Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) alliance has been overestimated in the region. While many KRG officials and pro-KRG journalists and scholars — even foreigners — were promoting a “real marriage of Turkey and the KRG” and a “strategic alliance of Turkey and the KRG,” the Turkish officials never supported that. Surprisingly, the Turkish officials always refrained from using any kind of term that showed they considered the KRG a sovereign regional government. To be more precise, by Turkish officials I mean the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and “Erdoganist” officials.

Turkey has over 1,000 companies operating in the area that the KRG controls, with almost 40,000 workers — more than any other country, including Iran, which has had good relations with the KRG since 1992. The $15 billion in Turkish investment and trade has given Turkey huge advantages without the KRG getting anything in return. The KRG has become dependent on Turkey’s products, even though Turkey is dependent on the KRG market. Both sides are trying to increase the amount of investment. This is a far more lucrative business for Turkish gross domestic product (GDP) than that which Turkey has with Germany, the UK or France.

But why has Turkey turned a blind eye to ISIL terrorist attacks against the KRG when the KRG considered Turkey a regional ally, not only to protect the KRG from enemies but to support the KRG’s claims for independence?

One of the serious issues with the Kurdistan region’s foreign relations is that these relations are formulated on the bases of the interests of the two ruling parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by KRG President Massoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by former Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. Regional and foreign policy is based on the interests of the families of these two leaders.

The failure of the myth of the Turkey-KRG alliance was revealed when Turkey refused to help the KRG in fighting against ISIL in any way. Many Turkish and Kurdish journalists and scholars have discussed Turkish-KRG relations, but all the relations have been between two leaders: KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. These two leaders have conflated their personal interests with their countries’ interests.

Though there have been radical changes in Turkey and in the whole region, the AKP government has always been hesitant to go forward with the relationship with the KRG other than economically, which is something that will not only benefit the country but also officials at the same time.

As relations between the two have not been institutionalized because of the aforementioned reasons, their legality remains uncertain. Apart from Nechirvan Barzani and a few men in his circle, no one knows how the KRG’s relations with Turkey have been formulated and on what bases Barzani has signed huge oil and gas deals with the AKP government. It is said that Nechirvan Barzani has signed a huge oil and gas deal with the AKP government for the next 50 years, but we do not know what is in the agreement. The oil and gas policies only reflect the interests of the KDP and PUK, not those of the public in Kurdistan, the media or other political parties. It is strange that Turkey has not gone beyond the Iraqi limitations in its relations with the KRG. Just to give an example, the KRG built oil pipelines in its territories, yet Turkey has not built any pipelines to move the KRG’s oil to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. And according to Saddam Hussein’s former regime and the Turkish government, the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline cannot move any oil from any parts of the Kurdistan region without the acceptance of both Turkey and Kurdistan.

KDP and PUK headquarters in Turkey

Erdo?an has paid a visit to the Kurdistan region, and Massoud Barzani and Nechirvan Barzani have regularly paid visits to Turkey, yet Turkey has not allowed the KRG to open an office in Turkey. What we have now in Turkey are headquarters for the KDP and PUK. On the other side, in the KRG relationship with Iran, there has been less development with regard to political and economic relations, especially as compared to Turkey, but the KRG now has an official office in Tehran which is recognized by the Iranian government. It was Iran that collaborated with the KRG in fighting against the ISIL terrorists. Massoud Barzani acknowledged the role of Iran in his Arbil press conference with Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister. Due to losing Turkey as an ally, the KRG was obliged to take part in Baghdad’s new government without insisting too much on its demands. Iran then became the winner again in Iraq’s politics. Surely this has given a chance to the PUK to criticize KDP relations with Turkey more and invigorate the discourse that strengthening relations with Iran will benefit the KRG more as compared to strengthening relations with Turkey.

According to Kurdish news sources, Massoud Barzani has spoken with his nephew, Nechirvan Barzani, about his failure to make Turkey a trusted ally. In the meantime, both the chief of staff to the KRG presidency, Dr. Fuad Hussein, and the KRG’s chief of foreign relations, Falah Mustafa, have said they have lost hope that Turkey will support the KRG.

The AKP and Erdogan should have realized that the KRG has done much for the sake of having a regional power be its ally, and an ally is hard to find these days, not only due to economic reasons.

The KRG courted Turkey and took a position against Iraq and Iran for the sake of winning Turkey’s support; they signed oil deals with the AKP government without Baghdad’s acceptance and supported Turkey’s regional power to balance Iran’s hegemony in regional politics, but the AKP government did not appreciate the KRG’s endeavors.

For both nations, Turks and Kurds, it is great to have very good relations; in having these type of relations both sides are winners. But we have realized that unless Turkey has a Kurdish issue in its territories, Turkey’s governments cannot have Kurdish allies in Iraq.

Turkey should first solve its Kurdish issue; only then can we build trust between us, for otherwise it will be impossible for trust to be rebuilt. Most importantly, relations should be institutional, not personal. In Turkey and the Kurdistan region there are other political parties that should be part of the relations between the two, as well as the media and public opinion. If relations are not institutionalized and remain between specific leaders, then they will end nowhere but in desperation, as happened with Erdogan and Barzani.

Kamal Chomani is the co-founder of the Kurdish Policy Foundation (KPF) and writes on Kurdish affairs.