MESOP TODAYS IRAQ SITUATION REPORT – August 14 – 17, 2015 – by: Patrick Martin & ISW Iraq Team

Key Takeaway:   ISIS launched a large complex attack against ISF and Iraqi Shi’a militia positions in Baiji district on August 14, recapturing several parts of the city in an offensive that involved between 7-10 VBIEDs, direct and indirect fire, and up to 200 gunmen. The attack was ISIS’s largest in the area since its complex attack on the Baiji Oil Refinery, north of the city, on April 14. ISIS exploited the ISF campaign to recapture Ramadi in Anbar by launching this offensive in northern Salah ad Din, a typical maneuver used by ISIS when one of the cities under its control comes under heavy counter-attack. By attacking on another front, ISIS not only diverts attention away from its main defenses, but it also maximizes its opportunity to make new gains while the ISF is massed elsewhere.

ISIS also deployed VBIEDs in Baghdad and Diyala as continuous diversionary efforts. ISF and Iraqi Shi’a militias continue to clash with ISIS in Baiji and west of the city. The ISF has also increased pressure on ISIS in Anbar, advancing into southeastern Ramadi for the first time since operations to recapture the city were announced on July 13. Clearing operations continued north, east, and south of Ramadi. Continued successes near Ramadi will strengthen PM Haidar al-Abadi’s independence from the Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias only if those successes do not coincide with simultaneous security failures in other parts of the country, such as Baiji.

PM Abadi introduced additional major reforms to the central government as part of a fundamental restructuring of the central government approved by the Council of Representatives last week. On August 16, he eliminated four ministerial positions and merged several ministries to reduce the size of the Council of Ministers (CoM) from 33 to 22 members. The reforms coincided with the release of the final report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Fall of Mosul, which named former PM Nuri al-Maliki, Ninewa governor Atheel al-Nujaifi, and several former IA senior officers and Sunni officials accountable for the fall of Mosul. Nujaifi’s Mutahidun bloc responded vehemently, and members of Maliki’s State of Law Alliance threatened to boycott the CoR in response. These negative responses will potentially make Abadi’s future reforms more difficult to pass through the CoR, and it may impede the current momentum of the reform movement, though PM Abadi will likely be able to overcome opposition by working to avoid prosecution of major figures or making concessions to the political parties of the accused. With the names of the accused sent to the office of the Public Prosecutor, a senior judiciary member who can order investigations of government officials, it will be important to see what action is taken. Meanwhile in southern Iraq, the popular demonstrations witnessed over the last two weeks resulted in at least three cases of violence against demonstrators by unidentified assailants over the weekend, as well as several cases of demonstrators threatening to storm provincial government buildings. Violence and increased unrest among the demonstrations, as well as sustained calls for reform, can result in additional pressure on Abadi, particularly if rivals like Maliki wield provincial power in key provinces like Basra. However, none of the violent incidents witnessed over the weekend appear to have been politically driven.

The Kurdistan Shura Council, an advisory body attached to the Kurdish Justice Ministry, announced that Kurdistan Regional President Masoud Barzani would stay in office and retain full powers until the next elections in 2017. The Shura Council gave no decision on the Regional Presidency Law, which the main opposition parties, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran (Change), are disputing. Both opposition parties have been attempting to change the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) from a presidential system to a parliamentary one since June. Accordingly, the Speaker of the KRG Parliament, senior Gorran member Yusuf Muhammad Sadiq, rejected the Council’s decision to keep Barzani in office until 2017 in a statement made on August 17. It will be important to watch if a compromise can be reached between Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and his opponents before August 20, when Barzani’s term officially expires. Despite the dispute, it remains likely that Barzani’s term will be extended for two more years.