MESOP TODAYS COMMENTARY : ERDOGAN’S TRICKY MOVES / Erdoğan’s masterful plan

ÖMER TAŞPINAR – July 26, 2015, Sunday – Zaman – The devastating terrorist attack in Suruç changed the Turkish domestic and foreign policy dynamics in a way that is surprisingly favorable to the Justice and Development Party (AKP). I must admit that I did not expect such a masterful exploitation of this terrorist attack. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has managed to improve his relations with the US while simultaneously improving the AKP’s domestic political fortunes in the snap elections he clearly wants. On the domestic front, contrary to my prediction, the AKP did not use this terrorist act as an excuse to blame the US. As it is well known, Ankara was lately taking some reluctant steps against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) militants at home, mainly because of American pressure. After the Suruç tragedy, one would normally have expected Ankara to step up the pressure against ISIL by cooperating with the international coalition led by the US. Yet, as I argued in my last column, I believed this was not likely to happen because the AKP government continued to see the Kurds of Syria aligned with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as an existential threat while it saw ISIL as a temporary challenge that will dissipate once the Assad regime is gone. I thought the Suruç terrorist attack would provide legitimacy to those who feared going after ISIL would trigger retaliation. This is why I believed Suruç would make Turkey’s cooperation with the anti-ISIL international coalition more difficult.

But in the couple of days that followed this heinous terrorist attack, Erdoğan decided that Turkey can wage a war two fronts. In other words, it was possible to declare war against ISIL while targeting the main enemy that Ankara wanted to defeat: the PKK. This is a masterful strategy because it allowed Erdoğan to score points with the Obama administration by opening the Incirlik air base. Erdoğan has been insisting on a direct line of communication with the White House for the last couple of years. But US President Barack Obama was clearly disappointed with Erdoğan’s autocratic turn after the Gezi park protests and his Syria policy since 2012. Obama also did not want to legitimize Erdoğan’s presidential regime vision by communicating with him as he regularly did when Erdoğan was perceived as the reformist prime minister of Turkey (between 2008 and 2012).

Erdoğan knew that the use of the Incirlik air base was very important for Obama. He insisted on a phone call from Obama to seal the deal after Suruç. Now that Incirlik is open and Turkey is actively engaged in the military campaign against ISIL, Erdoğan will have more leverage with Washington. For instance, he will be on stronger ground in asking the US to refrain from cooperating with Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) forces in Syria.

At the same time, what really matters for the AKP is the military campaign against the PKK and the political war against the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). In fact, behind the facade of a war against ISIL what the AKP is really waging is a war against the PKK. This strategy suits Erdoğan’s domestic plan perfectly well because it will force the Kurdish political movement — the HDP — to choose between the PKK and its much enlarged constituency representing 13 percent of the nation.

On the domestic front, as he discretely favors early elections Erdoğan will continue to make the argument that the country needs a strong government at such difficult times. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) will also find it more difficult to engage in coalition talks in such a political environment. In short, Erdoğan managed to hit three birds with one stone. He improved relations with Washington, torpedoed AKP-CHP coalition talks and weakened the HDP’s hand. This is indeed a masterful plan.