MESOP THIS WEEKS REPORT : BY ISW INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY: June 6-13, 2015

Reviewing the Week – Compiled by Harleen Gambhir

  Key Take-away: President Obama and other leaders condemned Russian aggression at the Group of 7 (G7) summit, pledging to extend sanctions against the country soon after Russian-backed separatists launched a new offensive in eastern Ukraine on June 3. U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton and Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power also pushed for more decisive action, signaling an increased effort by the U.S. to pressure and isolate and Russia. The Obama administration also announced a plan to send 450 additional U.S. trainers to Iraq’s Anbar province to support an offensive to retake Ramadi, two days after President Obama announced that the U.S. does not have a “complete strategy” to train the Iraqi Security Forces and defeat ISIS. This incremental increase of support by the U.S. is unlikely to have immediate effects on ISIS, especially as the organization appears to be preparing for a major offensive targeting Anbar, Baghdad, or Shi’a holy sites to mark the holy month of Ramadan beginning on June 17. Wilayat Sinai’s attack on the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) airbase in Egypt on June 9 indicates that ISIS’s regional affiliates may support ISIS’s effort with spectacular attacks on international interests during Ramadan as well.

 IRAQ: The U.S. delivered the first 1,000 of 3,000 AT4 anti-tank rockets to Iraq on May 30 and also announced on June 10 the deployment of 450 additional U.S. advisors to Taqqadum Airbase, south of Habaniya Airbase. The ISF and Popular Mobilization continue to pressure ISIS in and around Fallujah and Ramadi, with the aid of Russian Kornet anti-tank rockets and American AT4 rockets to repel SVBIED attacks. Popular Mobilization forces assaulting through the Thar Thar also reached and reportedly secured priority infrastructure on the ‘Tigris Arm,’ north of Fallujah. In a departure from previous stated objectives, prominent militia commander Hadi al-Amiri declared on June 11 that the Popular Mobilization will next focus on liberating Fallujah, which ISIS captured in January 2014. In Baiji, the Popular Mobilization and the ISF have increased their hold on the district and have opened supply lines to friendly forces in the refinery. However, ISIS remains operational south of Kirkuk and in Diyala, where it maintains a steady stream of low-level attacks involving direct and indirect fire, IEDs, and SVBIEDs. Several of ISIS’s attacks this week may indicate its plans during Ramadan. ISIS moved VBIEDs along the Euphrates River valley and near Shi’a holy sites, likely in preparation for a major offensive to mark the beginning of Ramadan on June 17. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) destroyed multiple VBIEDs west of Samarra on June 6 as well as VBIEDs near Haditha, west of al-Asad Airbase on June 9 and 13. Eight VBIEDs directed toward Karbala were also interdicted on June 10. ISIS is likely moving VBIEDs in support of multiple objectives.  ISIS may be testing ISF and Popular Mobilization reactions to attacks near military bases and significant holy sites in preparation for larger attacks over Ramadan. Alternatively ISIS may have attempted and and failed to attack proximate targets intended to commemorate the one year anniversary of the fall of Mosul. ISIS also may be seeking to divert ISF and Popular Mobilization fighters to shrines at Samarra and Karbala in order to prepare for a main offensive in Anbar. ISW previously forecasted that ISIS’s most likely course of action over Ramadan would be the consolidation of control along the Euphrates River, and ISIS’s movement near Haditha is an indicator of such intent. VBIEDS intended to strike the shrine cities of Karbala, Najaf, Samarra, and the capital would correspond with a more dangerous option for ISIS to conduct spectacular attacks over Ramadan to maximize sectarianism and broadly improve its military opportunities in Iraq. 

See: “Iraq Situation Report: May 28-29, 2015“; “ISF Disposition in Anbar: May 15 – May 27, 2015,” by Theodore Bell and Patrick Martin, May 29, 2015; “Iraq Situation Report: May 26-27, 2015“; “Iraq Situation Report: May 23-25, 2015; Control of Terrain in Iraq: May 25, 2015“; “The Fall of Ramadi Was Avoidable,” by Kimberly Kagan and Frederick W. Kagan inThe Washington Post, May 18, 2015; “ISIS Captures Ramadi,” by Patrick Martin, Genevieve Casagrande, Jessica Lewis McFate, and the ISW Iraq and Syria Teams, May 18, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Iraq analysts Sinan Adnan and Theodore Bell or ISIS expert Jessica Lewis McFate here.

SYRIA: Turkish officials released statements suggesting that deals with the U.S. to impose a no-fly zone over Syria and to provide air support to moderate rebels participating in the train-and-equip program against ISIS were close to fruition. These statements are likely attempting to pressure the U.S. to embrace more expansive policies against the Assad regime ahead of the international anti-ISIS coalition meeting being held in Paris on June 2. Meanwhile, Kurdish officials stated that the U.S.-led coalition agreed to support a YPG-led effort to clear ISIS-held terrain along the Turkish border, including the ISIS stronghold of Tel Abyad in northern ar-Raqqa Province, and connect Kurdish-held terrain in Aleppo and Hasaka Provinces. If successful, ongoing Kurdish advances along this corridor would greatly increase the scope of the self-proclaimed Kurdish autonomous zone of Rojava – a development which would likely prompt backlash from Turkey. Meanwhile, pressure on the Assad regime continued to build on multiple fronts. Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat-al Nusra led rebel forces in the Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room (headquarters) in the seizure of the town of Ariha south of Idlib City, the last major obstacle to completing opposition control over Idlib Province. Rebels will likely move to consolidate their hold over the remaining regime holdout positions in the province in preparation for future offensives against Latakia or Hama Provinces. Meanwhile, ISIS continued to consolidate and expand its control over Palmyra and its associated network of military installations and infrastructure in central Syria. ISIS will most likely aim to capture the Deir ez-Zour military base in the East, as well as the T4 military base near Palmyra, positioning ISIS forces for future attacks against the regime near Damascus and the Syrian central corridor. Despite early reports of a regime mobilization for a counteroffensive against Palmyra, the Assad regime likely lacks sufficient manpower to deploy significant reinforcements to either front. Recent reports of mass conscription incidents in the coastal Alawite heartland highlight the strain currently faced by regime forces. 

See: “ISIS Control and Expected Offensives in Central Syria: May 29, 2015,” by Christopher Kozak and Jennifer Cafarella, May 29, 2015; “The Jabhat al-Nusra and Rebel Campaign for Idlib Province,” by Jennifer Cafarella, May 29, 2015; “Control in Syria: May 28, 2015“; “Syria Situation Report: May 21-26, 2015“; “The Regime’s Military Capabilities: Part 1,” May 26, 2015; “New ISIS Offensives in the Syrian Civil War,” by Christopher Kozak, May 14, 2015; “An Army in All Corners:” Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria, by Christopher Kozak, April 30, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Syria analysts Jennifer Cafarella or Chris Kozak here.