MESOP: SYRIA UP TO DATE SITUATION REPORT & MAP (BY ISW) / CLICK FOR MAP PICTURE

By: Jennifer Cafarella & Brian Fisher -Key Takeaway:VBIED Attacks in Aleppo May Signify Increased ISIS Aggression:

The three attacks targeting JN, the YPG, and Harakat Hazm in Aleppo Province on January 10 may indicate an attempt by ISIS to disrupt rebel systems in Aleppo Province. ISIS may undertake such attacks as a conditions-setting operation for a renewed offensive against the JN and rebel-held town of Marea north of Aleppo city. Alternatively, the attack that killed a Harakat Hazm commander could have been conducted by JN, which has increased its direct aggression toward moderate rebel forces since ousting the Syrian Revolutionaries Front (SRF) from the Jabal al-Zawiya area of Idlib Province. Continued attacks against JN and rebel forces in Aleppo may threaten the ability of anti-regime forces to maintain their resistance to the regime’s attempted encirclement of Aleppo City.

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JN Conducts a Double Suicide Attack in Tripoli:

JN appears to be increasing its pressure on supporters of the Assad regime in Lebanon. The double suicide vest (SVEST) attack in Lebanon’s northern city of Tripoli marks the first serious breach of a security plan implemented by the Lebanese Armed Forces in June of 2014 following tension between Alawite and Sunni communities connected to opposing sides of the war in Syria. The attack follows a warning issued by JN leader Abu Mohammad al-Joulani in November 2014 that “the true battle in Lebanon has not actually begun, and what is coming, Allah willing, is worse and more bitter for Hezbollah.” While the attack did not target Hezbollah forces or supporters, it targeted the National Democratic Party, an Alawite political organization with ties to the Assad regime. The statement by the Lebanese Interior Minister may indicate cooperation between ISIS and JN in conducting the attack, however ISIS has issued no formal claim of participation.

The Regime Continues to Foment Unrest

Unrest continues to build in the Druze area of Suwayda Province as the regime continues to conscript young men for military service despite statements of protest by Druze leaders. If this trend continues, the regime may risk losing critical elements of support from within the Druze community, which may provide an increasing advantage to rebel forces combating the regime in southern Dera’a Province. Regime forces remain unsuccessful in changing the momentum in southern Syria, where rebel forces with the participation of JN continue to make gains against regime strongholds.