MESOP Reviewing the Week – Compiled by Christopher Kozak – ISW INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY: July 11-18, 2015

This report is derived from sources collected and processed at ISW during the reporting period. The report includes analysis on Iraq, Syria, ISIS, Kurdistan.

Key Take-Away: The conclusion of a nuclear accord between Iran and the P5+1 Group of Nations on July 14 marks a landmark diplomatic breakthrough which will likely place Iran in a position to increase its regional leverage through its expanded political influence and the removal of over $100 billion of sanctions currently placed on the country. The Iranian nuclear deal in particular has raised concerns that a revitalized Iran may redouble what President Obama termed its “less legitimate” activities throughout the region. Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias have taken the lead in ongoing military operations targeting ISIS forces in the longtime ISIS stronghold of Fallujah, and increased Iranian support would likely further enable these proxies to expand their ability to conduct independent offensive operations at the expense of the Iraqi government and the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition. Meanwhile, the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad also stands to benefit from additional Iranian assistance, which could shift the momentum of the conflict back in the regime’s favor following a series of major losses to ISIS and rebel forces over previous months.

Iran could also choose to revitalize its engagement in Afghanistan in response to ISIS’s growing presence in the country through new efforts to mobilize the Shi’a Hazara minority or elements of the Afghan Taliban. At the same time, the prospect of an expanded Iranian role in the region will likely lead Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and other Arab states opposed to any growth in Iranian influence to redouble support to their own regional proxies, particularly Islamist rebel factions in the Syrian Civil War and Yemeni government forces combating the al-Houthi rebel movement. Deepening regional involvement will likely exacerbate these ongoing regional conflicts in the near-term.

Concerns over deepening Iranian influence in the region will also likely assist ISIS’s own recruitment efforts among Sunni populations in the Near Abroad, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Although ISIS appears to be under pressure in the Iraq and Syria, ISIS’s affiliates in the Near Abroad have continued to escalate their activity through the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, and the potential for spectacular attacks during the Eid al-Fitr holiday this weekend remain high. ISIS forces in Egypt expanded their activities from the Sinai Peninsula to the Egyptian mainland despite a recent crackdown by Egyptian security services. ISIS’s affiliates in Afghanistan stand poised to exploit an influx of foreign fighters moving into the country from Pakistan as well as preexisting fractures within the Afghan Taliban which may be exacerbated by Mullah Omar’s Eid al-Fitr letter expressing tolerance for reconciliation in a departure from previous statements. Meanwhile, reports of clashes between security services and armed gunmen allegedly affiliated with ISIS in Kyrgyzstan’s capital of Bishkek indicate that ISIS may have expanded its operations into Central Asia in a manner that will intensify security concerns within Russia. The U.S. appears to be escalating its efforts to counter ISIS in the Near Abroad to respond to ISIS’s expansion, conducting a drone strike in Afghanistan which allegedly killed the top commander of ISIS’s Wilayat Khorasan on July 13 and reportedly seeking to establish drone bases in North Africa to act against ISIS’s affiliates in Libya. Although these operations may successfully limit the growth of ISIS’s regional affiliates, ISIS’s expansion into Russia’s sphere of influence presages future challenges that the U.S.-led coalition will face as ISIS crosses other geopolitical boundaries outside of the Middle East.

IRAQ: The nuclear deal signed between Iran and the P5+1 Group of Nations on July 14 will likely result in expanded Iranian leverage in Iraq through its proxy militias, which are leading the offensive against ISIS in Fallujah despite the announcement of concurrent operations in the area by the Iraqi government. U.S. President Barack Obama commented directly on the threat that Iranian proxy groups pose to the Iraqi government and U.S.-led coalition efforts in Iraq during a press conference on July 15, stating that Iran has “natural” influence in Iraq as a neighboring state but describing Iran’s role in supporting several prominent Iraqi Shi’a militias as “less legitimate.” President Obama stressed that the U.S. will work to “de-conflict” its operations in the vicinity of Iranian proxy groups in Iraq and will only provide support to military operations directed by the Iraqi government. The U.S. thus appears unlikely to provide direct aerial support to the militia-led main effort taking place west of Fallujah despite the presence of nearby Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) units, reflecting a scenario similar to that scenario previously witnessed in the initial militia-led operation to clear Tikrit. The U.S.-led coalition is, however conducting airstrikes “near Fallujah” in likely support of nearby ISF-led operations. This precise de-confliction may stymie claims of victory by Iranian proxy groups in Iraq, but they may also hinder the effectiveness of operations to clear Fallujah, which has been an ISIS stronghold for 18-months. Iranian proxies continue to lack the high-end capabilities that the U.S.-led coalition can provide to the ISF in order to achieve decisive victory.

Elsewhere in Iraq, ISIS detonated a VBIED northeast of Baghdad in Diyala Province on July 17 which killed as many as 75 individuals and injured at least 145 others. This extremely high casualty attack by ISIS not only demonstrates that ISIS’s terror tactics are still fully operable throughout Iraq, but also highlights that ISIS has reconstituted its attack capability in Diyala Province in the vicinity of the provincial capital at Baquba as well as Baghdad itself. The risk of further violent attacks against civilians remains high this weekend as Muslims celebrate the Eid al-Fitr holiday marking the end of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which has significance for both ISIS and anti-ISIS forces. ISIS has historically increased its terror attacks against civilians during Eid al-Fitr, and the ISF has repeatedly heightened security in anticipation of this escalation. ISIS may attempt to capitalize on the forward deployment of some provincial ISF units from their bases in southern Iraq to expand its attacks into Iraq’s Shi’a heartland and mixed areas such as Baghdad. ISIS may also seek to launch a significant complex attack against fixed military positions or areas previously recaptured from ISIS in order to regain the initiative to mark the end of Ramadan or the start of its next campaign. Various Iraqi Shi’a militias have also utilized the Eid al-Fitr holiday as a messaging theme to garner support for expanded operations in Anbar Province, although a breakthrough near Fallujah in the short-term remains unlikely.

See: “Iraq Situation Report: July 14-16, 2015″; ” Iraq Situation Report: July 11-13, 2015″; “ISF Disposition in Anbar: May 15 – May 27, 2015,” by Theodore Bell and Patrick Martin, May 29, 2015; “The Fall of Ramadi Was Avoidable,” by Kimberly Kagan and Frederick W. Kagan inThe Washington Post, May 18, 2015; “ISIS Captures Ramadi,” by Patrick Martin, Genevieve Casagrande, Jessica Lewis McFate, and the ISW Iraq and Syria Teams, May 18, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Iraq analysts Sinan Adnan and Theodore Bell or ISIS expert Jessica Lewis McFate

SYRIA: The conclusion of a nuclear accord between Iran and the P5+1 Group of Nations on July 14 will likely provide Iran with an increased ability to exert influence within Syria if the sanctions relief included as a component of the deal is approved by the UN Security Council. Although U.S. President Barack Obama highlighted the “important” role that Iran could play in achieving a political solution to the Syrian Civil War, Iran remains highly unlikely to cease its military support to the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. President Assad sent messages to top Iranian officials stating that his government believes that the nuclear deal will produce a “greater drive” in Iranian support to its regional allies, suggesting that Assad expects additional economic and military support. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Russia may also intend to amplify its support to the Syrian regime through a deal to provide the country with 200,000 tons of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) per year via the annexed Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Increased Iranian and Russian assistance could enable pro-regime forces to reestablish momentum in the regime’s favor after major losses to Syrian rebels and ISIS in the first half of 2015. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other regional powers that fear expanding Iranian regional influence as a result of the nuclear deal will likely respond by increasing their own support to Islamist groups within the Syrian opposition. The potential for an increased Iranian ground presence could also trigger a heightened security posture from Israel, which recently reorganized its Special Forces units to streamline its response to threats along its borders. Deepening involvement by regional actors on both sides of the Syrian Civil War would likely escalate the conflict in the near-term, exacerbating the already-devastating humanitarian toll of the war and threatening wider regional conflict.

Meanwhile, the U.S. moved forward in its efforts to support anti-ISIS partners on the ground in northern and southern Syria. The U.S. inserted the first contingent of moderate Syrian rebels participating in the U.S.-led training program into southern Syria from Jordan amidst continuing concerns regarding the small number and mixed reliability of participants in the program. In a likely move to leverage these critiques, hardline Islamist group Ahrar al-Sham published an editorial in the Washington Post calling for the U.S. to loosen its vetting standards and embrace the Islamist yet “homegrown” Sunni opposition. Although successful anti-ISIS efforts will likely require a careful reevaluation of the standards utilized by the train-and-equip program, Ahrar al-Sham’s close cooperation and ideological alignment with Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jahbat al-Nusra (JN) renders the group a particularly poor candidate for potential future outreach among Syrian Islamist factions. U.S. efforts to raise an anti-ISIS rebel force will also face pushback due to the continued focus on the fight against the Assad regime by Islamist and moderate rebels alike, particularly amidst the ongoing battles for Dera’a and Aleppo Cities. This resistance to prioritizing the fight against ISIS will likely be exacerbated by the infusion of support from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other regional powers seeking to directly counter Iran and its allies following the conclusion of the nuclear deal.

Finally, U.S. Special Envoy to the Anti-ISIS Coalition Gen. John Allen (ret.) stated that the U.S. “does not support” the establishment of an independent Kurdish governing entity in northern Syria. This statement follows talks between Gen. Allen and Turkish officials on July 7-8 and may represent a component of a rumored deal in which Turkey opened the Incirlik Airbase in southern Turkey to U.S.-led coalition aircraft in exchange for U.S. guarantees not to support the establishment of an independent Syrian Kurdistan along the Turkish border. The final outcome of the negotiations for a Turkish coalition government which began this week will likely play a key role in the outcome of the U.S.’s attempts to balance the concerns of Turkey and Syrian Kurds within the framework of the anti-ISIS coalition, as the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Turkish President Recep Erdogan has advocated for a more muscular policy of intervention in Syria than the other political parties which form its potential governing partners. These attempts to coordinate the local and regional partners of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition come amidst a heightened risk of attacks by ISIS in Syria this weekend as the Islamic holy month of Ramadan comes to a close. In particular, ISIS launched significant shaping operations this week targeting regime positions surrounding the strategic T4 (Tiyas) Airbase east of Homs City, raising the possibility that ISIS may attempt to seize the base this weekend in commemoration of the Eid al-Fitr holiday.

See: “Significant Offensives in Syria: June 6 – July 9, 2015,” by Christopher Kozak and Genevieve Casagrande, July 9, 2015; “Rebels Launch New Offensive in Southern Syria,” by Jennifer Cafarella, July 2, 2015; “The Threat of New Al-Qaeda Leadership: The Case of Syria’s Abu Mohammed al-Joulani,” by Jennifer Cafarella, June 30, 2015; “ISIS Counterattacks in Northern Syria,” by Christopher Kozak with Jennifer Cafarella, June 25, 2015; “Control in Syria: June 19, 2015”; “The YPG Campaign for Tel Abyad and Northern ar-Raqqa Province,” by Christopher Kozak and Genevieve Casagrande, June 17, 2015; “Likely Courses of Action in the Syrian Civil War: June-December 2015,” by Jennifer Cafarella and Christopher Kozak, June 12, 2015; “An Army in All Corners:” Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria, by Christopher Kozak, April 30, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Syria analysts Jennifer Cafarella or Chris Kozak.

Syria. ISIS also criticized Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria in this issue of Dabiq likely to belay concerns regarding the successes of Syrian Kurdish forces near ISIS’s strongholds in northern Syria. Meanwhile, ISIS may also attempt to seize the strategic T4 airbase in central Syria from the Assad regime over the Eid al-Fitr holiday weekend in order to set conditions for a future offensive to gain territory in the Syrian central corridor.

In the Far Abroad, ISIS continues to urge supporters to launch polarizing attacks in the West. An ISIS member in Syria reportedly instructed individuals in France to behead a member of the French military near the one-year anniversary of the attack on the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris, France. This event follows ISIS’s celebration in Dabiq magazine of Yassin Salhi, who beheaded his employer and attacked a gas plant near Lyon, southern France on June 26. ISIS stated that Salhi had “defended” the caliphate through his attack, providing a reflection of ISIS’s close conceptual linkage between its physical caliphate and external supporters. Additionally, it is possible ISIS inspired an attack in the U.S. on July 16, as a gunman opened fire at two military facilities in Chattanooga, Tennessee and killed four Marines. Although the coincidence of the attack with the Eid al-Fitr holiday may be significant, no link to ISIS has yet been established.

See: ISIS’s Global Strategy: A Wargame, by Harleen Gambhir, July 15, 2015; “ISIS-Linked Regional Activity: June 2015,” by Harleen Gambhir, June 27, 2015; “ISIS Loses Libyan Stronghold,” by Cody Zoschak with Harleen Gambhir, June 24, 2015; “ISIS Declares Governorate in Russia’s North Caucasus Region,” by Harleen Gambhir, June 23, 2015; “ISIS Sanctuary Map: June 19, 2015”; “ISIS’s Military Operations During Ramadan: A Forecast for 2015,” by the ISW Analytic Team, June 7, 2015; The ISIS Defense in Iraq and Syria: Countering an Adaptive Enemy, by Jessica Lewis McFate, May 15, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Counter-Terrorism analyst Harleen Gambhir or ISIS expert Jessica Lewis McFate here.