MESOP REPORT : ISW INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY: July 18-25, 2015 – SYR IA – IRAQ – TURKEY – KURDISTAN

Reviewing the Week – Compiled by Christopher Kozak

This report is derived from open sources collected and processed at ISW during the reporting period. The report includes analysis on Iraq, Syria, ISIS, Kurdistan

The U.S. successfully moved towards closer security cooperation with several key regional partners as escalating security threats generated increased interest in participation in U.S.-led security structures. An wave of domestic violence triggered by an ISIS-linked suicide bombing in southern Turkey on July 20 pushed the Turkish government to dramatically increase its involvement in the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition by opening the strategic Incirlik Airbase in southern Turkey to U.S.-led coalition aircraft, conducting airstrikes against ISIS positions in northern Syria, and reinforcing the Syrian-Turkish border. In Iraq, Gen. Dempsey and U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter separately visited the Iraqi capital of Baghdad to discuss preparations for a major upcoming Iraqi Security Force (ISF)-led operation to recapture the city of Ramadi from ISIS forces with the assistance of U.S. military advisors in the next several weeks.

Nonetheless, this reliance on regional allies belies the fact that the U.S. and its partners will be pressured by competing priorities amidst continuing budget cuts and an array of global commitments. These commitments appear likely to expand in the near-term. Russia conducted escalations in frozen conflicts around its periphery in Georgia, Moldova, and Japan in a likely move to assert dominance over its immediate sphere of influence. Meanwhile, ISIS continued to expand its trans-regional activities in order to inflame tensions in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Turkey, Egypt, Libya, and Israel and continued operations in its Interior in Iraq and Syria which threaten to trigger an escalating response from Iran. The announcement of an alleged al-Qaeda-linked militant group in Egypt suggests that this expansion could also produce a corresponding increase in al-Qaeda-linked activities throughout the region. Although the U.S. will likely seek to increasingly leverage its local partners in order to address these mounting threats, perceived prioritization by the U.S. amongst these expanding threats may generate long-term strategic divergences between the U.S. and its allies. Senior U.S. military personnel, for example, have recently floated conflicting statements terming Russia or “radical extremism” as the greatest security threats to the United States. At the same time, critical Middle Eastern allies such as Saudi Arabia and Israel continue to view Iran as their main existential threat and have reacted negatively to the announcement of the nuclear accord between Iran and the P5+1 Group of Nations on July 14, prompting Secretary Carter to visit both nations and pledge additional U.S. military support. Similarly, Turkey has leveraged its intensified campaign against ISIS to conduct a simultaneous escalation against Kurdish militants linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). These differences in prioritization and overall strategic objectives will likely impose limits on the effects that the U.S. can achieve through reliance on its regional partners.  

IRAQ

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey and U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter visited Baghdad this week, providing a visible sign of U.S. engagement at the onset of a new phase of the counteroffensive against ISIS in Anbar Province. Gen. Dempsey publicly repeated the assessment of U.S. advisers based in Iraq who claimed that an increase in U.S. troops in Iraq is unnecessary. Nonetheless, U.S. Army Chief of Staff nominee Gen. Mark Milley offered a potentially divergent assessment during his confirmation hearing this week, stating that the forward deployment of U.S. joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs) with Iraqi troops “should be considered.” Meanwhile, Secretary Carter arrived in Baghdad in an unannounced visit on July 23 to discuss the upcoming operation to seize the Anbar provincial capital of Ramadi with Iraqi leaders and U.S. advisers. Over the week, nearly 5,000 Iraqi Security Force (ISF) members including 500 tribal fighters and 3,000 U.S.-trained soldiers approached Ramadi from the south, west, and northeast in what a U.S. official described as “shaping” and “isolating” operations with the ultimate objective of recapturing the city. The ongoing operation to seize Ramadi will mark a pivotal test for the current U.S. strategy in Iraq given that the assaulting ISF units have been trained by U.S. advisers and will receive close coalition air support.

Top U.S. officials including President Barack Obama and Secretary of Defense Carter have consistently highlighted the presence of capable ground forces under the command-and-control of the Iraqi government as a core principle of U.S. strategy in Iraq. The performance of the ISF in the ongoing operations will thus be a crucial benchmark for both the U.S. and the Iraqi government, whose sovereignty has been increasingly undermined by the expansive operations of Iranian proxy forces operating outside the framework of the ISF. Most importantly, a successful operation in Ramadi would greatly improve the morale of the ISF after it was shattered by the loss of Ramadi to ISIS in May 2015. Amidst the ongoing operations around Ramadi, Iranian proxy forces are conducting their own independent operations around Fallujah. Gen. Dempsey described the divergent priorities of the ISF in Ramadi and the Iranian proxies in Fallujah as the result of a compromise in which Iranian proxy forces agreed to play a supporting role to operations in Ramadi. Nonetheless, the proxies have identified Fallujah as a primary objective since June 2015, and the co-presence of ISF and Iranian proxy forces in Anbar Province comes closer to competitive cooperation than mutual support. This discrepancy suggests that Iraqi leaders still do not exercise command-and-control over the Iranian proxy militias and are instead attempting to fold existing operations into their own campaign design. 

Meanwhile, ISIS increased its rate of terrorist attacks this week against civilians in both Baghdad and Diyala Provinces, two regions of great significance for both the Iraqi government and the Iranian proxies. This pattern of attacks in Diyala Province in particular appears to constitute an effort to directly threaten the local Shi’a population and the nearby Iranian border in a way which generates sectarian conflict, destabilizes the capital, and diverts ISF and militia resources away from ISIS strongholds in Ramadi and Fallujah. The significant increase of attacks in Diyala will likely draw the attention of Iranian proxies such as the Iranian-backed Badr Organization. Diyala comprises the primary support base for the Badr Organization and the province  remains particularly vulnerable to sectarian violence given the assumption of the governorship by the Badr Organization in May 2015, the heavy presence of Iranian proxy militia forces, and the unresolved issue of Sunni internally-displaced persons (IDPs) in the region. If security in Diyala Province continues to deteriorate, these security concerns may impede the ability of the ISF and Iranian proxy forces to expand their anti-ISIS operations in Anbar Province and elsewhere without exposing other important fronts to increased risk of ISIS attack and general sectarian violence. The security of Diyala Province constitutes a top Iranian priority due to the province’s position along the Iranian border and this interest is reflected in the unique level of influence enjoyed by Iranian proxy forces in the province. A statement on July 22 from the governor of Diyala Province announcing that  Badr Organization head Hadi al-Amiri had been “officially authorized by the government” to manage security forces in the province and pledging to work  under his guidance further confirms that local security efforts lie in the hands of the Iranian axis. A resurgence of ISIS forces in Diyala could thus presage increased deployments of Iranian proxies or Iranian military forces in the area if the ISF and Iraqi Shi’a militias cannot secure the province without abandoning their campaigns in other regions of Iraq.

See: “The Resurgence of ISIS in Diyala and its Implications for Iranian Proxies,” by Sinan Adnan and Jessica Lewis McFate, July 25, 2015; “Iraq Situation Report: July 21-23, 2015“; “Iraq Situation Report: July 18-20, 2015“; “Control of Terrain in Iraq: July 20, 2015“; “ISF Disposition in Anbar: May 15 – May 27, 2015,” by Theodore Bell and Patrick Martin, May 29, 2015; “The Fall of Ramadi Was Avoidable,” by Kimberly Kagan and Frederick W. Kagan in The Washington Post, May 18, 2015; “ISIS Captures Ramadi,” by Patrick Martin, Genevieve Casagrande, Jessica Lewis McFate, and the ISW Iraq and Syria Teams, May 18, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Iraq analysts Sinan Adnan and Theodore Bell or ISIS expert Jessica Lewis McFate here.

U.S. NATO ally Turkey escalated its role in the fight against ISIS as the Syrian Civil War spilled across the border. The Turkish government granted the U.S.-led coalition access to the strategic Incirlik Airbase on July 23 and confirmed that Turkish warplanes will actively participate in the anti-ISIS coalition. Turkish media sources indicated that Turkey and the U.S.-led coalition aim to establish an “ISIS-free” zone enforced by airstrikes reaching forty to fifty kilometers deep into northern Syria, although the exact terms of the deal remain unknown. This deal was reportedly secured during a phone call between U.S. President Barack Obama and Turkish President Recep Erdogan on July 22 and followed high-level talks in Turkey by U.S. Special Envoy to the Anti-ISIS Coalition Gen. John Allen (ret.) on July 7-8. Turkish aircraft later conducted two rounds of airstrikes targeting ISIS forces inside of Syria near the Turkish border as well as positions belonging to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Iraq. Turkish authorities also launched a campaign of arrests, detaining at least 297 suspected ISIS and Kurdish militants across thirteen Turkish provinces. Senior Turkish officials characterized these operations as the start of a new policy of “active defense” against internal and external threats. This rapid shift in Turkish policy follows several days of violence inside Turkey attributed to ISIS and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militants, including an ISIS-linked SVEST detonation at a rally of pro-Kurdish youth activists in southern Turkey on July 20 and several PKK-claimed assassinations of Turkish police officers accused of “collaboration” with ISIS.Over the near-term Turkey will continue to face an expanded domestic threat from both ISIS and PKK militancy in the form of violent attacks directed against the Turkish state. Turkey’s decision to escalate against both militant groups suggests that Turkey intends to leverage the calls for further action against ISIS in order to assert its own strategic interest in limiting the expansion of armed Kurdish groups along the Turkish border. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of President Erdogan may also seek to utilize these security threats to increase its own political standing amidst ongoing negotiations to form a coalition government and the potential of a call for early elections.

Although the agreement with Turkey will likely increase the effectiveness of U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition efforts to disrupt ISIS from the air, the deal does not address the continued lack of effective ground partners in Syria and the perception that current U.S. strategy is insufficient continues to grow among U.S. policymakers. Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security Rep. Michael McCaul called on President Obama to build a “multinational” ground force capable of eliminating “terrorist sanctuary” in Syria on July 22. McCaul also noted that efforts to defeat ISIS in Syria will be “impossible” with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power. There is little indication that senior Pentagon officials are considering a change in strategy despite these critiques. Meanwhile, eighteen prominent moderate and Islamist rebel brigades rejected an initiative by the Islamist-leaning Revolutionary Command Council based in Turkey to form a new joint military structure across multiple Syrian provinces. This rejection illustrates the difficulty that the U.S. will face in trying to organize the fractious Syrian opposition into an effective ground partner under without a substantial change in policy. Many Syrian rebel groups nonetheless remain committed to combatting both ISIS and the Syrian regime, and a retooled strategy in Syria could enable the U.S. to seize these natural opportunities to leverage local resistance against ISIS as a component of anti-ISIS strategy. Prominent hardline Islamist group Ahrar al-Sham, for example, published a second editorial in Western press highlighting the group’s desire to fight ISIS in addition to the Syrian regime. At the same time, the group continues to maintain close cooperation with Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in the fight against President al-Assad. The opportunity to cooperate with Ahrar al-Sham and other potential U.S. partners against ISIS will thus require a U.S. strategy that addresses the full scope of the Syrian Civil War, including JN’s embedded position within the Syrian opposition. Although the U.S. conducts airstrikes to disrupt the immediate threat JN poses to the U.S. homeland, including a recently confirmed strike which killed JN-linked senior al-Qaeda facilitator Muhsin al-Fadhli on July 8, this counterterrorism mission remains insufficient to severely limit JN’s wider influence in Syria.

A revitalized U.S. strategy in Syria must also anticipate regional developments, particularly the potential for further Iranian engagement in the conflict. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei claimed on July 18 that the nuclear accord will not change Iranian policy towards the U.S. or its regional allies, including Hezbollah and the Syrian regime, suggesting that Iran will likely increase its direct support to Assad following the implementation of sanctions relief prescribed by the nuclear deal. The prospect of increased Iranian activity in Syria could prompt further regional destabilization that threatens key U.S. regional allies. U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter traveled to Israel to reinforce the partnership between the two nations as the “cornerstone of [U.S.] strategy in the Middle East” in the wake of the signing of the nuclear accord between Iran and the P5+1 Group of Nations. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon in turn noted in a joint press briefing that the disorder generated by the Syrian Civil War exacerbates Israeli security concerns, particularly regarding the delivery of weapons from Iran via Syria to Hezbollah and other militant organizations. Ya’alon linked these concerns to U.S. interests in the region, stating that Iranian “aspiration for hegemony beyond the Middle East” also comprises a critical concern for the U.S. These statements suggest that U.S. regional allies also desire further U.S. commitments in order to respond to the conflict in Syria.

See: “Significant Offensives in Syria: June 6 – July 9, 2015,” by Christopher Kozak and Genevieve Casagrande, July 9, 2015; “Rebels Launch New Offensive in Southern Syria,” by Jennifer Cafarella, July 2, 2015; “The Threat of New Al-Qaeda Leadership: The Case of Syria’s Abu Mohammed al-Joulani,” by Jennifer Cafarella, June 30, 2015; “ISIS Counterattacks in Northern Syria,” by Christopher Kozak with Jennifer Cafarella, June 25, 2015; “Control in Syria: June 19, 2015“; “The YPG Campaign for Tel Abyad and Northern ar-Raqqa Province,” by Christopher Kozak and Genevieve Casagrande, June 17, 2015; “Likely Courses of Action in the Syrian Civil War: June-December 2015,” by Jennifer Cafarella and Christopher Kozak, June 12, 2015; “An Army in All Corners:” Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria, by Christopher Kozak, April 30, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Syria analysts Jennifer Cafarella or Chris Kozak here