MESOP RECOMMENDATION : Unrecognized De Facto States in World Politics – The Kurds

By Michael M. Gunter – Professor Tennessee Tech University / Brown Journal of World Affairs 2014

The purpose of this article is first to examine what may sometimes be the relative or even ambiguous definition of a state. Second, it will transition into an analysis of why the Kurds—often regarded as the largest ethnic group in the world without their own state—still find themselves in that position. For a number of reasons, however, the Kurds have recently become empowered and are now challenging the boundaries of the current state system established by the Sykes-Picot Agreement at the end of World War I.

This situation has enormous regional and even international implications, particularly for Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran—the states in which the Kurds live. Finally, this article will analyze the state-like institutions the Kurds have recently managed to achieve and what the future for the Kurds may portend.

The Relative Nature of a State

According to international law, for an entity to be officially recognized as a state it must possess a permanent population, a defined territory, and the capacity to enter into diplomatic relations with other states.1 Max Weber famously defined the state as an entity that possesses a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”2

Despite this apparent definitional precision and clarity, the concept of a state remains relative since it is not always certain whether an entity meets the required criteria. In the real world, political disputes often lead to the questioning of a state’s legitimacy. Furthermore, an independent, sovereign state proves to be a relative concept because even the most powerful state is dependent on others.  

In the Wimbledon case of 1923, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) recognized that an entity remained an independent state even when it contracted to give away some of its sovereignty: “The Court declines to see, in the conclusion of any treaty by which a state undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a particular act, an abandonment of its sovereignty.”3

An independent, sovereign state proves to be a relative concept because even the most power- ful state is dependent on others.

Article Four, Chapter One of the Charter of the United Nations reserves membership in the organization to only “peace-loving states,” which meant at the organization’s inception in 1945 the states allied against the Axis states of Germany, Japan, and Italy. Such entities as India, the Philippines, Syria, and Lebanon became members of the UN before they officially became independent states, a situation that again illustrates the relativity of statehood. Furthermore, debates have occurred over whether such entities as Biafra, Kosovo, Northern (Turkish) Cyprus, Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), and Abkhazia, among many others, are or were states. A bewildering array of terms further confuses the issue given that statehood includes varied concepts such as vassal states, protectorates, and free cities, to name a few.

As a refuge for victims of this definitional dilemma, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) was founded in 1991 at the Peace Palace in The Hague as “an international, nonviolent, and democratic member- ship organization.”4 The preamble to the Covenant of the UNPO declares that “the right to self-determination is enshrined in the UN Charter, the Interna- tional Covenants of Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” and goes on to state that “its implementation should be based on its broadest…understanding; including autonomy, devolution, and power-sharing, and federalism in all its forms, rejecting thereby a narrow focus and charges of secessionism.”5 Thus, membership in the organization “is open to all Nations and Peoples who are not adequately represented at the UN,” including “indigenous peoples, minorities, and unrecognized or occupied territories.”6 Article 6 of the UNPO goes on to define an eligible member as “a group of human beings which possesses the will to be identified as a nation or people and to determine its common destiny as a nation or people, and is bound to a common heritage which can be historical, racial, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious or territorial.”7 By stressing the will to become a nation, the covenant’s definition recalls Ernst Renan’s famous definition of a nation being “a daily plebiscite.”8

From an original membership of 15, the organization’s web site claims presently a membership of almost 70, although it paradoxically lists only 41. Most of these members come from the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia. With offices in Brussels and The Hague, the UNPO seeks to raise awareness of issues important to its members through advocacy, campaigns, and events within the UN, the European Parliament, and various state political institutions.

The Kurds

Within the mountainous borders where Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria converge in the Middle East live approximately 30 million Kurds. They are a largely Sunni Muslim, Indo-European-speaking people, ethnically distinct from the Turks and Arabs, but related to the Iranians with whom they share the Newroz (New Year) holiday at the beginning of spring. A reasonable estimate is that there may be as many as 15 million Kurds in Turkey (20 percent of the population), 6.5 million in Iran (11 percent), five million in Iraq (20 percent), and two million in Syria (10 percent). At least 200,000 Kurds also live in parts of the former Soviet Union (some Kurdologists claim as many as one million largely assimilated Kurds live there) and recently a Kurdish diaspora of more than 1.5 million has risen in Western Europe. Finally, it should be noted that numerous minorities such as Christian Assyrians and Armenians, Turkomans and Turks, Arabs, and Iranians also live in Kurdistan.

The desire of many Kurds for statehood, or at least cultural autonomy, has led to a continuous series of Kurdish revolts since the creation of the modern Middle East state system following World War I. The states in which the Kurds live fear that Kurdish demands will threaten and even destroy their territorial integrity. The resulting situation constitutes the Kurdish problem.9

Despite their common dilemma, the Kurds themselves are notoriously divided geographically, linguistically, and tribally. In all the Kurdish revolts of the twentieth century, for example, significant numbers of Kurds supported the established government because of their tribal antipathies for those rebelling. In Iraq, these pro-government Kurds have been derisively referred to as josh (little donkeys), while in recent years the Turkish government created a pro-government militia of Kurds called village guards. More recently, however, a greater sense of pan-Kurdish identity has arisen due to the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, increasing Kurdish rights in Turkey, and the civil war in Syria.

Historical background

The origin of the Kurds is uncertain, although some scholars believe them to be the descendants of various Indo-European tribes that settled in the area as many as 4,000 years ago. The Kurds themselves claim to be the descendants of the Medes, who helped overthrow the Assyrian Empire in 612 BCE, and recite interesting myths about their origins involving King Solomon, jinn (supernatural beings that can take human or animal form and influence human affairs), and other magical agents. Many believe that the Kardouchoi—an ancient people believed to be the ancestors of the Kurds—gave his 10,000 Greek mercenaries a terrible mauling as they retreated from Persia in 401 BCE. In the seventh century CE, the conquering Arabs applied the name Kurds to the mountainous people they Islamicized in the region.

Although semi-independent Kurdish emirates such as Ardalan existed into the middle of the nineteenth century, there has never been an independent Kurdistan (literally, land of the Kurds) in the modern sense of an independent state. However, Sharaf Khan Bitlisi, the Kurdish author of the Sharafnama, an erudite history of the ruling families of the Kurdish emirates, completed in 1596, identified numerous historical Kurdish dynasties, which in effect enjoyed independence at various times. Early in the sixteenth century, most of the Kurds loosely fell under Otto- man Turkish rule, while the remainder was placed under the Persians. Badr Khan Beg, the ruler of the last semi-independent Kurdish emirate of Botan, surren- dered to the Ottomans in 1847. Some scholars argue that Sheikh Ubeydullah’s unsuccessful revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1880 represented the first indication of modern Kurdish nationalism, while others consider it little more than a tribal-religious disturbance.

During World War I, one of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points (Number 12) declared that the non-Turkish minorities of the Ottoman Empire should be granted the right of “autonomous development.” The stillborn Treaty of Sèvres signed in August 1920 provided for “local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish area” (Article 62) and in Article 64 even looked forward to the possibility that “the Kurdish peoples” might be granted “independence from Turkey.” Turkey’s quick revival under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk—ironically enough with considerable Kurdish help as the Turks played on the theme of Islamic unity—altered the entire situation. The subsequent and definitive Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923 recognized the modern Republic of Turkey without any special provisions for the Turkish Kurds.

The failure to create a Kurdish state after World War I stemmed from the Kurds’ lack of a sense of nationalism. The doctrine of nationalism only found fertile ground as a reaction to attempts by Turkish, Arab, and Iranian national- ists to assimilate the Kurds whom they looked upon as primitive tribal peoples in need of the benefits of their more highly developed sense of nationalism and modern development.

M. Hakan Yavuz elaborates on the modern origins of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey: “The major reason for the politicization of Kurdish cultural identity is the shift from multi-ethnic, multi-cultural realities of the Ottoman Empire to the nation-state model.”10 The Kemalist reforms, which aimed to create a modern Turkish nation-state, “resulted in the construction of Kurdish ethno- nationalism.”11 Throughout his analysis, Yavuz emphasizes that “the major dif- ference between Turkish and Kurdish nationalism is the presence of the state… Since Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran evolved in response to modernizing nation-states, it constantly stresses its ethnic ‘difference,’ sometimes even evoking racism to historicize itself.”12

Hamit Bozarslan fundamentally matches Yavuz’s analysis when he argues that two significant factors that prevented Kurdish nationalism from exerting significant influence from 1919–1921 were “the ideal of Islamic fraternity and the fear of the establishment of an Armenian state.”13 However, “the proclama- tion of the Kemalist Republic in 1923 meant the end of…the Ottoman tacit contract between center and peripheries [and]…to a large extent explains the… traditional [Kurdish] dignitaries…participation in the subsequent revolts.”14

Similarly in Iraq, Kurdish nationalism only began to develop after World War I in response to the attempts to build a modern Arab state that would per- mit no more than a minimal amount of Kurdish autonomy.15 Thus, the revolts of Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji in the 1920s and Mulla Mustafa Barzani begin- ning in the 1930s were mainly tribal affairs at times opposed by more Kurdish josh (literally, little donkeys or Kurds who supported the Iraqi government in Baghdad) than supported.

With the late blooming of Kurdish nationalism, recent Kurdish quests for statehood have arisen in each of the separate states in which the Kurds live. This division into four separate states has complicated any attempt at pan-Kurdish statehood—a unified state would have to achieve the almost impossible task of partitioning each of those existing states. Furthermore, the Kurdish national movement has achieved strikingly different levels of success in each one of these states. In fact, many Kurds have either assimilated into the larger surrounding Arab, Iranian, and Turkish populations or are satisfied with their current status to the extent that they do not actively seek independence or at least would be satisfied with true democracy, some type of local autonomy, or federalism.

Mahabad Republic of Kurdistan

Also known as the Democratic Republic of Kurdistan, the Mahabad Republic of Kurdistan in northwestern Iran was a rump Kurdish state proclaimed on 22 January 1946 that received considerable aid from the Soviet Union, but collapsed by December 1946.16 Its much-revered leader Qazi Muhammad was hanged on 31 March 1947 and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) he headed virtually ceased to exist. During its brief tenure, however, schools in the Mahabad Republic began to teach in Kurdish, while scholars also began to translate texts into that language. A printing press provided by the Soviet Union produced a daily newspaper and a famous monthly journal called Nishtiman (Motherland). Limited amounts of Soviet military aid also arrived.

There is debate over whether Qazi Muhammad actually sought complete independence or whether he simply sought autonomy. During the Mahabad Republic of Kurdistan’s brief existence, the minuscule entity extended no further than the small cities of Mahabad, Bukan, Naqada, and Ushnaviya in a part of what is now the Iranian province of Western Azerbaijan. Thus, not even all of Iranian Kurdistan supported the experiment, let alone the Kurds in other states. On the other hand, the Mahabad Republic had pan-Kurdish ambitions and at- tracted such non-Iranian Kurds as Mulla Mustafa Barzani, a famous Iraqi Kurdish leader who served as one of the republic’s generals. There also can be no doubt that the Mahabad Republic became a symbol of forlorn Kurdish nationalism and statehood in the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the Mahabad Republic collapsed due to Iran’s vigorous response, the Soviet Union’s unwillingness to offer more support, and divisions within the Kurdish community. Subsequently, the Iranian Kurds have failed to achieve any further advances toward statehood.17

The Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) refers to the Kurdish self- government that has administered the Kurdish region in northern Iraq since 1992. Since the adoption of the new Iraqi Constitution in October 2005, the KRG has gained constitutional legitimacy as a constituent state in a democratic, federal Iraq. As of 2014, the KRG consists of the three provinces of Irbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Dohuk with a combined population of approximately five million. For the first time ever, most Iraqi Kurds now think of their government in Irbil, not the one in Baghdad, when the concept of government is broached. Thus, as of 2014 the Iraqi Kurds not only possess their most powerful regional government since the creation of Iraq following World War I, but also play a prominent role in the Iraqi government in Bagh- dad. Kurds have occupied the posts of president (Jalal Talabani) and foreign minister (Hoshyar Zebari), among several other cabinet positions. This dual governmental role stands in mark contrast to the situation that existed before the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, when the Kurds were treated as second-class citizens or even worse.

Many Kurds have either assimilated or are satisfied with their current status to the extent that they would be satisfied with true democracy, some type of local autonomy, or federalism.

Nevertheless, enormous problems remain. For example, the actual division of power between the Iraqi government and the KRG remains in dispute. These contested powers include the ownership of natural resources (mainly oil) and the control of the revenues they garner, the role of the KRG army or peshmergas (guerrillas, literally “those who face death”), and the final status of disputed ter- ritories such as Sinjar, Khanaqin, and oil-rich Kirkuk.

The ultimate question is how long this new and unique Kurdish position of strength will last. Many Arabs resent Kurdish claims to autonomy as a chal- lenge to Arab patrimony and consider a federal state for the Iraqi Kurds within Iraq as a prelude to secession. This view seems reasonable in light of the fact that unofficial referenda held in February 2004 and again in January 2005 al- most unanimously called for independence despite the opposition of the main Kurdish leaders, who argued that independence would not be practical given strong regional opposition.18 In the summer of 2008, Kurdish and Arab Iraqi forces came close to actual blows over territorial disputes in Khanaqin. When the Kurdish parliament unilaterally approved a new constitution for the KRG in June 2009, Baghdad denounced the move as tantamount to secession.

After the Gulf War of 1991 and the failure of the ensuing Kurdish uprising in March 1991, the mass flight of Kurdish refugees to the mountains and borders of Iran and Turkey forced the United States to launch Operation Provide Comfort (OPC). OPC created a safe haven and maintained a no-fly zone to encourage the refugees to return to their homes by protecting them from further attacks by the Iraqi government. In addition, the unprecedented UN Security Council Resolution 688 of 5 April 1991 gave the fledgling KRG support by condemning “the repression of the Iraqi civilian population…in Kurdish populated areas” and demanding “that Iraq…immediately end this repression.”19

On 19 May 1992, elections in the protected Kurdish region both for the position of supreme leader (president) and parliament resulted in a virtual dead heat between Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The KDP and PUK decided not to pursue the selection of a president and to share power equally in parliament, which met for the first time in Irbil on 4 June 1992. An executive with Fuad Masum as the prime minister was established on 4 July 1992.

At its inception, the KRG was handicapped by the refusal of the surround- ing states of Turkey, Iran, and Syria (not to mention Saddam Hussein’s Iraq) to countenance the concept of any type of Kurdish administration or state. Each state feared the precedent it would set for its own restless Kurds. In addition, the KRG suffered from immense economic problems and a seeming paralysis of decision making due to the equal sharing of power between the KDP and the PUK, as well as Barzani’s and Talabani’s decision not to participate in the administration.

In December 1993, fighting first broke out between the PUK and the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan. Then, on 1 May 1994, the PUK and the KDP began a bloody on-again, off-again civil war that took over 3,000 lives, caused untold suffering and destruction, and threatened the very existence of the KRG. The KDP-PUK fighting led to the creation of two rump governments or ad- ministrations: the KDP’s in Irbil and the PUK’s in Sulaymaniyahh. Only one parliament continued to meet in Irbil. After repeated attempts by the United States—as well as on other occasions Britain, Iran, and Turkey—the United States finally managed to broker a ceasefire in September 1998.

As of 2014, some five million people live under the KRG, including per- haps 100,000–200,000 Turkomans and 50,000 Assyrians. Given recent devel- opments, probably more than 80 percent of the population is now urban and only 20 percent is rural. Irbil has some one million people and Sulaymaniyah maybe 750,000. On 7 May 2006, the two separate KRG administrations were finally unified under President Massoud Barzani (already serving as such since 12 June 2005) and his nephew Nechirvan Idris Barzani as the prime minister. It was agreed that the PUK would hold the latter position in the future. Talabani eventually became the largely ceremonial president of Iraq.

However, the Kurdish people remained frustrated at the lack of services, transparency, women’s and youth’s rights, institutionalization, and, of course, continued nepotism and corruption. Nawshirwan Mustafa—who resigned from his post as the number-two man in the PUK in December 2006 and eventually set up his own political Gorran (Change) Party to contest the 25 July 2009 elec- tions—charged that both the KDP and PUK received $35 million per month as part of the funds transferred to the KRG by the central government in Baghdad but did not have to account for it.20 Senior leaders of both parties hid their ownership of large companies by funneling tens of millions of dollars through mid-level party members or reliable friends. Both the Barzanis and Talabanis had small groups that were running their business interests for them. The PUK, for example, owned Nokan, a conglomerate in Sulaymaniyah, with interests in construction, trade, and food. Steps also had to be taken to separate the interests of the two ruling parties (the KDP and PUK) from those of the KRG.

Despite claims that the KRG is business friendly, huge economic problems also remain. For example, there is no banking, taxing, insurance, or postal system. The public payroll gobbles up three-quarters of the budget, and as discussed above, crony capitalism and nepotism thrive. The government is still unable to provide regular electricity and affordable fuel. Nevertheless, over the past several years the economic situation in the KRG has improved dramatically—the re- gion was spared the horrific civil war that engulfed Arab Iraq to the south after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. What is more, the Kurds now receive 17 percent of the Iraqi national budget. Earlier the KRG was receiving 13 percent of Iraq’s funds, originally allocated from the oil the UN allowed Iraq to sell un- der UN Security Council Resolution 986 of 14 April 1995. From 1997–2001, the UN Oil-for-Food program had also pumped some $4.6 billion into the KRG.21 Despite serious inefficiency, most Kurds are now better off than Iraqis under Baghdad’s administration. Trade over the border with Turkey has been particularly profitable. New roads are being built, refugees are being resettled, food supplies are adequate, water and electricity are available, and shops are full of refrigerators from Turkey and even potato chips from Europe.

Civil society is also emerging with dozens of newspapers, magazines, and television and radio stations representing a broad spectrum of opinion. People have freedoms—freedom of speech, press, and association, among other civil liberties—impossible to imagine in the rest of Iraq. In addition to the KDP and PUK, there are numerous other smaller political parties, and criticism of both administrations is tolerated. The entire region under the KRG has 10 hospitals.

Better medical training, however, is needed and some medical specialties such as neurosurgery and plastic surgery are lacking. The electricity is still sometimes turned off, but hospitals have their own generators. The incidence of cancer is high, probably due to Iraqi usage of chemical weapons in the past and the current lack of chemotherapy. Most medical and electric services require only a nominal fee.

The KRG currently has many of the trappings of an independent state: its own president, prime minister, and parliament; its own flag and national anthem; its own army that even prevents Baghdad’s army from entering the Kurdish region; its own international airports and educational system in which few even bother to learn Arabic anymore; and its own stamp entered into the passports of visitors. However, many wondered what would happen to the KRG once the remaining U.S. troops were withdrawn from Iraq at the end of 2011. The KRG and Baghdad had already come perilously close to blows over Kirkuk, and the disputed internal border often referred to as “the trigger line”—Khanaqin in 2008—was a prime example.22 Despite the U.S. withdrawal, however, the KRG has continued to gain increased significance by providing strategic depth for Turkey against Baghdad and Tehran and a safe haven for U.S. operations in the region.23

Meanwhile, the Iraqi Kurds had their own Kurdish Spring, first when the anticorruption Gorran Party split the long-entrenched PUK in the KRG elections held on 25 July 2009, and subsequently when violent demonstrations broke out in Sulaymaniyah, the KRG’s second largest city, on 17 February 2011, and continued until forcibly curtailed by the KRG leadership on 19 April 2011. Most of the demonstrators were pro- testing against corruption, nepotism, and the lack of effective services such as jobs and electricity. Intellectuals and journalists also protested against limitations against speech and press as well as daily harassment.

Despite the U.S. withdrawal, the KRG has continued to gain increased significance by providing strategic depth for Turkey and a safe haven for U.S. operations in the region.

Among all displeased demographics there was deep anger against Barzani’s KDP and Talabani’s PUK family domination over society and government.24

Unlike the objects of the Arab Spring demonstrators, however, the KRG had just been democratically elected in July 2009 and thus was not so easily denounced as illegitimate. The KRG was also successful in preventing demon- strations from breaking out in Irbil, its capital and largest city, by closing the universities, sending the students home, and banning large gatherings. Nevertheless, the anti-KRG demonstrations that did occur constituted a serious wake-up call that all was not well with the KRG. As Barham Salih, the KRG prime minister from 2009–2012, declared: “We must do better. Our citizens demand better, and they deserve better.”25

Furthermore, premature Kurdish independence that would be seen as destroying Iraq would be opposed by not only the United States but also by all the KRG’s regional neighbors. What is more, the KRG continued to enjoy in federal Iraq all the advantages of independence without its disadvantages. It would be far better for the Iraqi Kurds to be seen as doing their utmost to keep Iraq united. Only if the Kurds’ best efforts failed and Iraq still split apart would the Kurds then be seen as having had independence forced upon them and therefore justified. Patience and astute diplomacy remained the main call words.

On 18 December 2012, Talabani, the longtime leader of the PUK and also currently the president of Iraq, suffered a debilitating stroke. Mam (Uncle) Jalal, as Talabani affectionately was called, had worked successfully to help keep Iraq united and had also just met with Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki in an attempt to ease tensions between the KRG and Baghdad over the territories disputed between them and the disposition of the oil reserves. Many wondered that the death or even incapacity of Talabani would lead to tensions. Despite dire predictions, however, nothing untoward has occurred.

On 21 September 2013, the KRG held its fourth parliamentary elections. Barzani’s KDP gained 37.7 percent of the vote, which earned it 38 seats, a gain of eight from the previous election in 2009. Nawshirwan Mustafa’s Gorran Party replaced the incapacitated Talabani’s PUK (now headed, during the election, by Barham Salih) as the second largest party by winning 24.21 percent of the vote and 24 seats in parliament, which, however, was a loss of one seat from its showing in 2009. The PUK was the big loser, garnering only 17.8 percent of the vote and just 18 seats, a loss of 11 from the previous election. The two Islamic parties won slightly over 15 percent of the vote. Despite the rule limiting the KRG president to only two four-year terms, Barzani had already had his term extended a month earlier for another two years, while his nephew Nechirvan Barzani remained the prime minister.

The Kurdistan Communities and Kurdistan Workers Party in Turkey

A discussion of the longstanding revolt of the Partiya Karkaken Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK) in Turkey is beyond the scope of this article.26 Rather we will seek to review more recent events that hold aspects of autonomy or even putative statehood for the Kurds in Turkey.

Since 2005, the PKK and all its affiliated organizations have supposedly been restructured according to the ideal of democratic autonomy in an umbrella entity called the Koma Civaken Kurdistan (Kurdistan Communities Union or KCK). According to PKK’s leader Abdullah Ocalan, the KCK is organized in the form of assemblies from the bottom up, as an alternative to the traditional nation-state: “It is the umbrella organization…composed of economic and ecological communities, democratic compatriots, and open cultural identities.”27 Elaborating, Ocalan added “the KCK can be defined as the democratization

of civil…as the umbrella organization of civil society.”28 In addition, “the KCK model is not the opposite of a union of states but a democratic confederalism; it is a parallel and complementary union of civil society, created because of pressing social needs.”29 Economically, “the KCK will be in a position to defend society and the environment against the devastating effects of capitalist modernity, with its sole aim at achieving maximum profits.”30 Socially, “the KCK system…will have a symbiotic relationship with the state as well as a competition.”31 Regarding the security aspect, “the KCK will have to have its own defense forces.”32 Diplomatically, “the KCK…proposes a system that resolves problems without differentiating between ethnicities and nations but that takes denominational, ethnic, and national differences into account.”33

The Demokratik Toplum Kongresi (Democratic Society Congress or DTK) was established in Turkey in October 2007 as a structured assembly of local councils to implement what Ocalan has called “democracy without the state.”34 This edifice is supposedly organized at the village, urban neighborhood, district, city, and regional levels, but also reputedly has an intricate suprastructure including a Permanent Chamber of 101 delegates, Coordination Council of 13 delegates including two chairs, one male and the other female, and an Executive Com mittee of five delegates. Since being expelled from the Turkish Parliament when his party the Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party or DTP) was banned on 11 December 2009, Ahmet Turk has served as the co-chair of the DTK along with Aysel Tugluk.

In a move that infuriated the Turkish government, the DTK declared democratic autonomy within Turkey in July 2011.35 However, Aysel Tugluk also added that the Kurdish people would remain loyal to Turkey’s national unity. Understandably, Ankara saw the DTK and KCK as an attempt to establish an alternative Kurdish government on Turkish soil and continued its wholesale ar- rests of members of these organizations for terrorism. Although precise figures are unavailable, the Human Rights Watch has asserted that several thousand are currently on trial and that another 605 are in pretrial detention on KCK/ PKK–related terrorism charges.36 In 2013, Turkey and the PKK tenuously entered into peace negotiations, which at the time of this writing seemed to be reaching a dead end.37

Kurdish Autonomy in Syria

From being a sleepy, unimportant backwater in the Kurdish struggle, the geographically divided, heavily suppressed handful of Syrian Kurds seem to have suddenly graduated into a burgeoning center of newly empowered Kurdish nationalism and autonomy due to the forces set forth by the civil war that broke out in Syria in March 2011.38

Upon closer analysis, however, a potential base for Kurdish nationalism in Syria had earlier been constructed when, starting in 1979, Hafez al-Assad allowed Ocalan’s PKK to use Syria as a safe house in its struggle against Turkey. Although Turkey finally forced Assad to expel the PKK in October 1998, its remnants created in 2003 the Partiya Yekitiya Demckratic (Democratic Union Party or PYD). Salih Muslim (Mohammed) became its new leader on the eve of the civil war and at its outbreak was allowed to return from exile. With its military wing, the Yekineyen Parastina Gel (Peoples Defense Units or YPG), the PYD quickly became the largest, best armed, and most disciplined Syrian Kurdish party.

On 19 July 2012, the embattled Assad regime suddenly pulled most of its troops and authority out of the Kurdish regions of northeastern Syria, which lie just below Turkey’s southern border, to concentrate on holding its position in the heartland of the country.39 Kobani (Ayn al-Arab) proved to be the first city occupied by the PYD, followed in short order by Amuda and Afrin the following day. On 21 July, YPG forces took the cities of Derik (al-Malikyah), and a day later Serekaniye (Ras al-Ayn) and Dirbesi (al-Darbasiyah). By the beginning of August 2012, PYD forces occupied most Kurdish cities with the exception of Qamishli and Hasaka, which also had considerable numbers of Arabs and other groups residing there. The speed with which all this occurred led to speculation that there was an agreement between the regime and the PYD. Indeed, on 7 April 2011, Decree 49 already had granted long-sought-for citizenship to the ajanib, those Syrian Kurds who had been classified as foreigners who could not vote, own property, or work in government jobs according to the notorious Decree 93 since 1962. In the event, the largely Kurdish province of Hasaka for a time remained mostly free of the fighting that was raging in the west of Syria, which did involve Kurdish areas in Kurd Dagh (Afrin) as well as Aleppo.

De facto PYD autonomy continued to develop after the civil war had be- gun. On 12 December 2011 the PYD created the Peoples Council of Western Kurdistan (PCWK), an elected local assembly of 320 members with executive and legislative branches to provide social services and a modicum of authority in places undergoing anarchy and violence due to the civil war. The PCWK has local representatives such as mayors throughout Syrian Kurdistan, including the Kurdish quarter in Aleppo, to carry out the work of municipalities instead of the Assad regime. In addition, the PYD confusingly formed local, self-organized civilian structures under the label of the Tevgera Civaka Demokratik (TEV-DEM) or the Movement for a Democratic Society, also known as the Democratic Popular Movement. Also still operating in September 2013, the Supreme Kurdish Council was yet another entity that supposedly sought to achieve administrative coordination between the PYD and the other Kurdish parties.

All this seemingly overlapping and bewildering proliferation of institutional forms, however, gave the PYD an enormous edge over the other, much weaker Kurdish political parties in organizational strength and effectiveness. However, it should be noted that the various bodies the PYD has created in Syria to sup- posedly begin implementing grassroots democracy only pretended to include the local population; in practice they did little. The PKK leadership in the Qandil Mountains and Ocalan in his Turkish prison on the island of Imrali are the ones who really rule through various PKK/PYD commanders responsible for different areas. As of September 2013, Shahin Jallo (Cello) from Kobani is reportedly the commander-in-chief of all military units of the PYD/YPG in Syria. Formerly, he was a member of the PKK central committee and a leading PKK operative in Europe.40 Nevertheless, this proliferation of governmental institutions led to comparisons with how the KRG initially had been created back in 1991.

The resulting Syrian Kurdish autonomy caused great apprehension in Tur- key. Suddenly PKK flags were flying just across its southern border with Syria; what had been just 500 miles of border with Kurdistan (the KRG) had overnight metastasized into a border of 750 miles. A second or even pan-Kurdish state seemed possible. Ankara feared that this newly won Kurdish Syrian position would serve as an unwanted model for Turkey’s own disaffected Kurds and the PKK. Turkey also feared that the Syrian Kurdish autonomous area bordering the KRG might seek to unite with the KRG and form for Turkey the nightmare of a pan-Kurdish state. Thus Turkey hoped that its influence over the non-Kurdish Syrian opposition and the KRG would help to control pan-Kurdish ambitions. On 25 July 2013, amid reports that the PYD was about to declare Kurdish autonomy in Syria, Turkey publicly invited Salih Muslim to Istanbul for talks. Indeed one report claimed that the PYD had already produced a social contract or constitution for the Syrian Kurdish regions called Western Kurdistan or Rojava (the direction of the setting sun) by the Kurds. Under its provisions, Syria would become a democratic parliamentary federal system and Western Kurdistan, with Qamishli as its capital, would become one of the federal or autonomous self-ruling regions making its own internal decisions. Kurdish and Arabic would be its official languages and self-ruling units would protect the Syrian borders from foreign intervention.

The PYD leader also hastened to assure Turkey that his party’s call for a local administration for Syria’s Kurdish regions did not mean that it was seeking independence that would threaten Turkey: “Our thought is to establish a provisional council of 40 to 50—maybe a hundred people.” He added that “this council will comprise Kurds, Syriacs, Arabs and Turkmens,” and was simply a necessary ad hoc device to help alleviate the war-torn situation until the end of the civil war would allow more permanent arrangements. “Kurds will need to have a status in the new order in Syria. But what’s in question now is a provi- sional arrangement…it’s not about making a constitution.” 41 Salih Muslim, however, readily admitted, “we apply Apo’s [the imprisoned PKK leader Abdul- lah Ocalan] philosophy and ideology to Syria.” The PYD leader continued by declaring that “we have put forth a project: ‘democratic autonomy.’” This term, of course, comes right out of Ocalan’s latest books published in English.42 Muslim elaborated that “we as the Kurdish Freedom Movement…reject classical models like federalism, con-federalism, self-government, and autonomy,” explaining that “our goal is the formation of a new Kurdish society, the formation of a free person, a person with free will…The point is to renew society from the bottom up.”43 Muslim also demanded “the constitutional recognition of the Kurds as a second ethnicity in Syria.”44 Although this demand might make Assad think twice about his tactical ally, Muslim further claimed “the PYD has opened Kurdish cultural centers and language schools…We are profiting from the unrest.”45

On 12 November 2013, the PYD moved yet another step toward some type of statehood by declaring provisional self-rule in areas under its control and announced that it had formed a constituent assembly with a view toward creating a transitional government. Elections would be held within three months. However, both Turkey and the KRG responded negatively. Barzani declared that “this is clearly an unilateral . . . act which disregards the other Kurdish parties.”46 Thus, it remains to be seen what the future holds for Kurdish statehood within what seemed to be the crumbling remains of the now failing Syrian state.

Conclusion

The analysis above suggests that the solution to the Kurdish problem and chances for some type of Kurdish statehood will vary in each state in which the Kurds live. The KRG in Iraq has already become a virtually independent de facto state. In Turkey, on the other hand, there will be no separate Kurdish state. Rather, the solution will most likely be a more democratic Turkey that largely satisfies Kurdish demands. Depending on the final outcome of the Syrian civil war, the Kurds in Syria might also achieve de facto independence or at least some type of local autonomy. Only in Iran has there been no movement toward a solution to the Kurdish problem.

The solution to the Kurdish problem and chances for some type of Kurdish statehood will vary in each state in which the Kurds live.

Thus, based on the analysis above, the newly empowered Kurds have suddenly become a major factor in the Middle East equation. In retrospect, the single most important reason for this significant development was the U.S. destruction of Saddam Hussein in 2003 that allowed the Iraqi Kurds to become virtually independent as the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the first proto-Kurdish state in modern times and a powerful model for other Kurds in Turkey, Syria, and even Iran. Thus there is now a formidable new sense of Kurdish nationalism further empowered by its surrounding enemies in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria no longer united in opposition as in the past they always were. Indeed, there is now a virtual Turkish-KRG alliance fueled by Turkey’s need for Kurdish oil and facilitated by a common Sunni bond between Turkey and the Kurds opposed to now Shia-dominated Iraq, Iran, and even Syria as long as Assad remains in power.

NoTeS

1.        Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 165 League of Nations Treaty Series, art. 1 (1933), 19.

2.        Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), 78. Max Weber first used this famous definition in a speech he made at Munich University in 1918 on Politik als Beruf [Politics as a Vocation].

3.        Wimbledon Case, PCIJ, Series A, no. 1 (1923), 25. This case involved Germany refusing the British steamship Wimbledon, chartered by a French company, access to the Kiel Canal on the grounds it was carrying munitions to Poland in violation of German neutrality laws issued in connection with the war between Poland and Russia in 1920. The World Court ruled that Germany was acting in violation of Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles.

4.        “Home Page,” Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization.

5.        Ibid.

6.        Ibid.

7.        Ibid.

8.        Ernest Renan, “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation” [What is a Nation] (lecture delivered at the Sorbonne, France, March 11, 1882).

9.        For background, see: David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004); Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structure of Kurdistan (London: Zed Books, 1992); Wadie Jwaideh, The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Develop- ment (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006). For an excellent more popular study, see: Jonathan C. Randal, After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness? My Encounters with Kurdistan (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997).

10.      M. Hakan Yavuz, “Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, no. 7 (2001): 1.

11.      Ibid., 2.

12.      Ibid., 3. For further analyses, see: M. Hakan Yavuz, “A Preamble to the Kurdish Question: The Politics of Kurdish Identity,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 18, no. 1 (1998): 9–18; Robert Olson, “Five Stages of Kurdish Nationalism, 1880–1980,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 12, no. 2 (1991): 392–410.

13.      Hamit Bozarslan, “Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey: From Tacit Contract to Rebellion (1919–1925),”

Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism, ed. Abbas Vali, (Costa Mesa: Mazda, 2003): 165.

14.      Ibid.

15.      For more information on Iraq, see: Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder CO: West- view Press, 2011); Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Eric Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005). For background, see: C.J. Edmonds, Kurds, Turks and Arabs: Politics, Travel and Research in North-Eastern Iraq, 1919–1925 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957).

16.      For further analysis of the Mahabad Republic, see: William Eagleton, The Kurdish Republic of 1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); Archie Roosevelt Jr., “The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad,” Middle East Journal 1 (1947): 247–69.

17.      For subsequent analysis of the Kurdish situation in Iran, see: Farideh Koohi-Kamali, The Political Development of the Kurds in Iran (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Carol Prunhuber, The Passion and Death of Rahman the Kurd (New York: Universe Incorporated, 2010).

18.      “98 Percent of the People of South Kurdistan Vote for Independence,” KurdMedia, February 9, 2005.

19.      For the citations, see: United Nations Security Council, Resolution 688 (New York: United Na- tions, 1991).

20.      Nawshirwan Mustafa, interview by Michael M. Gunter, Sulaymaniyah, KRG, November 13, 2005; “Nawshirwan: Oil Exports in Kurdistan Increased the Power and Influence of the Barzani Family,” Daily Online News, November 18, 2012. The Gorran leader concluded, “The corruption and bribery are ram- pant in Kurdistan.” The knowledgeable Michael Rubin concludes that “corruption is endemic throughout the Middle East, but in Kurdistan is particularly rife.” See: Michael Rubin, “Why Does Barzani Oppose Modern Banking for Kurdistan,” Kurdistan Tribune, October 13, 2012.

21.      Dr. Barham Salih (prime minister of the KRG 2009-2011), interview by Michael Gunter, Irbil, KRG, May 4, 2011.

22.      For background, see: Michael M. Gunter, “Arab-Kurdish Relations and the Future of Iraq,” Third World Quarterly 32, no. 9 (2011): 1623–35.

23.      For further analysis, see: Ofra Bengio, “Will the Kurds Get Their Way?” American Interest, October 22, 2012.

24.      For more background, see: Kamal Chomani and Jake Hess, “Pro-Democracy Demonstrations in Northern Iraq/South Kurdistan,” MESOP, March 3, 2011; Kawa Hassan, “South Kurdistan 2011: Massive Political and Social Energies: No Fundamental Changes,” Kurdistan Tribune, February 6, 2011.

25.      Andrew Parasiliti, “Barham Salih: Bashar’s Days Are Numbered,” Al Monitor, September 13, 2012.

26.      For recent analyses of the Kurdish problem in Turkey, see: Mustafa Cosar Unal, Counterterrorism in Turkey: Policy Choices and Policy Effects Toward the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (London and New York: Routledge, 2012); Marlies Casier and Joost Jongerden, Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish Issue (London and New York: Routledge, 2011); Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence (New York: New York University Press, 2007).

27.      Abdullah Ocalan, Prison Writings III: The Road Map to Negotiations, trans. Havin Guneser (Cologne, Germany: International Initiative Edition, 2012), 93–4.

28. Ibid., 94.

29. Ibid., 98.

30. Ibid., 96.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., 97.

33.      Ibid.

34.      For a detailed description of the DTK, see: Joost Jonderden and Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya, “Democratic Confederalism as a Kurdish Spring: The PKK and the Quest for Radical Democracy,” The Kurdish Spring, ed. Mohammed M.A. Ahmed and Michael M. Gunter (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Press, 2013), 180–84.

35.      “Kurdish Group Declares Democratic Autonomy within Turkey’s Borders,” Sunday’s Zaman, July 14, 2011.

36.      “Turkey: Arrests Expose Flawed Justice System,” Human Rights Watch, November 1, 2011.

37.      For an analysis, see: Michael M. Gunter, “Reopening Turkey’s Closed Kurdish Opening?” Middle East Policy 20 (2013): 88–98.

38.      For background on the Kurds in Syria, see: Jordi Tejel, Syria’s Kurds: History, Politics and Society

(London and New York: Routledge, 2009).

39.      Tim Arango, “Kurds Prepare to Pursue More Autonomy in a Fallen Syria,” New York Times, Sep- tember 28, 2012; Aymenn Al Tamimi, “Syria’s Kurds Stand Alone After Rejecting Rebels and Regime,” The National, July 23, 2012.

40.      Michael M. Gunter, email interview with Eva Savelsberg, KurdWatch, European Center for Kurdish Studies, Berlin, Germany, August 26, 2013; KurdWatch, What Does the Syrian-Kurdish Opposition Want? Politics between Erbil, Sulaymaniyahh, Damascus and Qandil, KurdWatch Report 9 (Berlin: European Center for Kurdish Studies, 2013), 16.

41.      Hemin Khoshnaw, “Salih Muslim’s Ankara Visit Marks Major Policy Change,” Rudaw, July 29, 2013.

42.      For example, see: Abdullah Ocalan, Declaration on the Democratic Solution of the Kurdish Question (London: Mesopotamian Publishers, 1999); Abdullah Ocalan, Prison Writings: The PKK and the Kurdish Question in the 21st Century, trans. and ed. Klaus Happel (London: Transmedia Publishing Ltd., 2011); Abdullah Ocalan, Prison Writings III: The Road Map to Negotiations, trans. Havin Guneser (Cologne, Germany: International Initiative, 2012); Emre Uslu, “PKK’s Strategy and the European Charter of Local Self-Government,” Today’s Zaman, June 28, 2010.

43.      “Turkey’s Henchmen in Syrian Kurdistan are Responsible for the Unrest Here,” KurdWatch, No- vember 8, 2011.

44.      Ibid.

45.      Ibid.

46.      “PYD ‘Playing a Dangerous Game’: PYD Has Authority Only on Regions ‘Given by the al-Assad Regime’: Iraqi Kurdish Leader Barzani,” Anadolu Agency, November 14, 2013.

Michael M. Gunter is a professor of political science at Tennessee Technological University in Cookeville, Tennessee. He is the author of numerous critically praised scholarly books and articles on the Kurdish question, the most recent being Kurdish Historical Dictionary, 2nd ed., 2011 and The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey, 2nd ed. In addition, he is the co-editor (with Mohammed M. A. Ahmed) of The Kurdish Question and the 2003 Iraqi War, 2005.