MESOP NEWS TODAYS RECOMMENDATION : Michael Gunter US Middle East Policy & the Kurds

It would not be too much to declare that two words largely define and explain US foreign policy toward the Middle East, including the increasingly important Kurds: oil and Israel. Of course, once this axiom is appreciated, many
additional factors and nuances also come into play, but even these usually stem originally from the two terms listed. The Kurds are one of these additional nuances. However, before examining the fascinating people whom Dana
Adams Schmidt, for many years a foreign correspondent for the New York Times, once concluded were “the fightingest people in the Middle East,”1 it would be useful to briefly survey earlier American involvement in the Middle East – before the post-World-War-II era led to today’s connection with the Kurds.


Interestingly, the very term Middle East was coined by the famous American naval strategist Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan2 in 1902.
Earlier the area was (and still is more accurately) called the Near East or Levant. Although the main US interest in the Middle East until oil and Israel was in its proselytising religious missionaries,3 other interesting
nuances arose long before today’s prominent geostrategic involvement with the Kurds.
For example, in 1805, US marines attacked the Barbary pirates off the coast of North Africa, Tripoli being prominently mentioned in today’s US marine hymn. The Greek war of independence in 1821 then forced the US to
choose between its democratic ideals and its economic and strategic interests in the Ottoman Empire, a reoccurring theme today regarding the Kurds and Turkey. In 1831, David Porter became the first US minister in the Middle
East, posted to Istanbul, while in 1842 Cyrus Hamlin established what eventually became the famous Robert College and today’s Bosporus University in Istanbul. Moreover, onthe very day of his assassination, 14th April
1865, Abraham Lincoln reportedly expresseda desire someday to see “the Holy Land”. The following US president and civil war general Ulysses S. Grant famously toured the Middle East in 1878 after he left the White House. A
decade earlier, in 1867, Mark Twain had toured the Middle East and published his often humorous
impressions in The Innocents Abroad.
Furthermore, in 1891 William Blackstone submitted a memorial to US president Benjamin
Harrison calling for American support for a Jewish state in Palestine, while Clara Barton
journeyed to Turkey in 1896 to succour the victims of the Armenian massacres in 1896.
After World War I, the US ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Henry Morgenthau, penned
his accounts of the Armenian massacres in Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (1919).
Subsequently, in 1932, the American engineer Karl Twitchell surveyed the Arabian Peninsula
for water, mineral deposits and oil. A year later Saudi Arabia granted US oil companies the
right to prospect for oil. At the end of World War II and shortly before his death, US president
Franklin D. Roosevelt famously met with Saudi king Ibn Saud on his return from Yalta.
I. Overview
The US has come to affect the Kurdish situation perhaps more than any other state. For
example, the US invasion of Iraq and overthrowof Saddam Hussein in 2003 led directly

ORIENT II/ 2017 43
1 Schmidt, Journey among Brave Men, 1964. This unique citation in the text was taken from the back book
flap.
2 Mahan’s classic study on how the “frictionless sea” enabled the great powers to dominate the world was
called The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 and was first published in 1890.
3 Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present,

to the present autonomy of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, while also
helping to open the gates of hell to the onslaught of the so-called Islamic State (IS)
against the Kurds in both Iraq and Syria.
However, the US does not really have any grand foreign policy strategy towards the
Kurds, because they live in four separate states (Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria), each one
of which requires its own separate considerations.
What is more, the states in which the Kurds live are usually more important for US
foreign policy. The Kurds therefore cause problems for the US when it deals with these
more important states. Nevertheless, given its interest in Middle East stability as well as
human rights, the US has come to accept that it does owe the KRG at least a certain amount
of protection given how it supported the US in the 2003 war against Saddam Hussein and
subsequently even more against IS. Indeed, the virtually independent KRG largely owes its
very existence to the US.
Despite its support for the Iraqi Kurds, however, Washington opposes their independence
because it feels that this would lead to the partition and end of Iraq, and thus greater instability
in the Middle East. The US position on this point is all the more adamant given the attitudes
of states such as Turkey, Iran and the various Arab governments, all of which oppose
Kurdish independence as a threat to their own territorial integrity. The US does tentatively
support the KRG as a way of maintaining the political unity of Iraq and satisfying the Kurds.
This position, of course, can be inherently contradictory at times, and its successful implementation
is a delicate balancing act.
Many observers emphasise how much the Iraqi Kurds love the Americans. This needs to
be qualified because the Kurds remember that they earlier were twice betrayed by the US, in
1975 and again in 1991, and therefore might be again. Indeed, some Kurds began to fearthe worst when the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group Report (December 2006) suggested that the hard-won Kurdish federal state might
have to be sacrificed to the perceived need for a re-established, centralised Iraqi state.4 Fortunately,
for the Kurds, the recommendations of the report were not adopted by the US, but their mere consideration illustrated how tenuous future US support might be.
On the other hand, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates acknowledged in a meeting with
KRG president Massoud Barzani on 11th December 2010 that Kurdish cooperation is indispensable
for the successful implementation of security and strategic framework agreements between the US and Iraq, and essential for a unified and peaceful Iraq.5 Even more importantly, the US Obama administration a
few days later publicly committed itself to brokering disputes between the KRG and the
Baghdad government and also to helping resolve the Kirkuk issue.6 However, in the summer
of 2014, Kirkuk became a moot point when Baghdad abandoned it before the onslaught
of IS and the KRG occupied it. When IS suddenly attacked the KRG in August 2014
and drove to within 20 miles of its capital Erbil, the US quickly responded with just enough air
strikes to save the Kurdish day. Turkey, on theother hand, supposedly the KRG’s best regional
ally, chose to do nothing.
Thus, Washington sees the KRG as a friend and de facto ally, but not as important of one
as it still sees Turkey or even the Shiite government in Iraq. Therefore, the message is
clear: the KRG must get along with Turkey and Baghdad or else it might not be able to
count on US support in a showdown between either of these two powers and the
KRG. Fortunately for the Iraqi Kurds, Turkey is beginning to accept the KRG politically as
4 Baker III and Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward—A New Approach, 2006.
5 Kurdistan Regional Government, President Barzani and Defense Secretary Gates in Erbil Reaffirm Long-
Term KRG-US Relations, 2009.
a friend rather than a security threat, as had been the earlier view. Clearly, however, the
Kurdish question holds only a secondary position in the national security of the US and
the democratisation process it is pursuing in the Middle East. Considering his relatively
weak hand compared to Turkey and the Baghdad government, Qubad Talabani, the
KRG representative in the US from 2006 until 2012, made a felicitous impact and was
able to gain much goodwill for the Kurds. His successor Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, formerly
the KRG representative in London, has continued Talabani’s successful work.
On the other hand, rightly or wrongly, the Turkish Kurds are often perceived in the US
as too closely tied to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which the US considers to be a
terrorist organisation.7 As a result, the causeof the Turkish Kurds in the US has not prospered
as well as that of their brothers and sisters to the south.8 This is all the more so
given the longstanding US alliance with Turkey. Washington has paid even less attention
to the Kurds in Iran, although they might someday serve as a potential ally
against the Iranian government in much the same way as the Iraqi Kurds did against
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
As for the Kurds in Syria, they were clearly off the radar until the Syrian civil war, which
began in March 2011, quickly led to de facto Kurdish autonomy in the form of Rojava. The
Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its military arms the People’s Defense
Units (YPG) and Women’s Defense Units (YPJ) became the main US ally and
boots on the ground in the war against IS in Syria. This was much to the chagrin of US
NATO ally Turkey, which considers the PYD, YPG and YPJ merely an extension of its existential
enemy the PKK. Thus, the US is faced with the problem of squaring the
proverbial circle in attempting to harmoniseits alliance with Turkey and the Syrian Kurds.
Following this brief overview, the remainder of this article will seek to analyse what
might be viewed as the seven stages of American foreign policy towards the Kurds.9
The first three of these stages were Woodrow Wilson’s promises during World
War I, Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s era (1961-1975) and the 1991 US war against Iraq,
while at the time of writing the last four – the status of the KRG in Iraq since 2003,
Turkey and the PKK, Syria and the existential IS threat, and the new Trump era – are
continuing processes.
II. First Stage
American foreign policy involvement with the Kurds dates back to World War I and President
Woodrow Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points, the twelfth of which concerned a forlorn
promise of “autonomy” for “the other nationalities [of the Ottoman Empire] which are
now under Turkish rule.”10 However, resurgent Kemalist Turkey’s successful struggle
to regain its territorial integrity and British Iraq’s decision to maintain control over the
oil-rich Kurdish region of northern Iraq known as the Mosul vilayet ended nascent
Kurdish hopes for independence, or indeed any type of autonomy.11 The first brief
Wilsonian stage, or prelude to American foreign policy toward the Kurds, had ended.

7 For background, see McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 2004; White, The PKK: Coming Down
from the Mountains, 2015.
8 For further background, see Casier and Jongerden, Nationalism and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism
and the Kurdish Issue, 2010; Yildiz and Breau, The Kurdish Conflict: International Humanitarian Law
and Post-Conflict Mechanisms, 2010; Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence,
2007.
9 For further background, see Charountaki, The Kurds and US Foreign Policy: International Relations in the
Middle East since 1945, 2010.
10 See Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 1965, 626.
11 For background, see Edmonds, Kurds, Turks and Arabs: Travel and Research in North-Eastern Iraq, 1919-
1925, 1957.

III. Second StageA half century passed before American foreign policy again became involved with the Kurds. Inwhat might be called the second or Mullah Mustafa Barzani stage in American foreign policy
toward the Kurds, the US encouraged and to a certain extent even supported Barzani’s revolt
against Iraq during the early 1970s.12 Thus, the  Iraqi Kurds became the ‘good Kurds’ from the
point of view of American foreign policy. Washington pursued this policy for several reasons:
1) as a favour to its then-ally the Shah-ruled
Iran; 2) as a ploy during the Cold War as Iraq
was seen as an ally of the Soviet Union; 3) as
a means to relieve pressure on Israel so Iraq
would not join some future Arab attack on the
Jewish state; and 4) as a means to possibly
satisfy its own need for Middle East oil since
Barzani had promised that the US would find a
friend in OPEC once oil-rich Kurdistan had
achieved independence.
Accordingly, US president Richard Nixon and his
national security advisor and later Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger first encouraged the Iraqi
Kurds to revolt against Baghdad, but then with
their ally Iran double-crossed the Kurds when the
Shah decided to make a deal with Saddam Hussein.
To rationalise US actions, Kissinger argued
that the “benefit of Nixon’s Kurdish decision was
apparent in just over a year: Only one Iraqi division
was available to participate in the October
1973 Middle East War.”13 Cynically, he also
claimed that “covert action should not be confused
with missionary work.”14 Barzani himself
died a broken man four years later in US exile.15
IV. Third Stage
The third stage of American foreign policy toward
the Kurds began with the Gulf War in
1991, lasted until the US attack on Iraq in March
2003, and in the process led to the creation of
the KRG, the closest approximation of an independent
Kurdish state in modern times. However,
this Iraqi Kurdish experience began in
tragedy as the US failed to support their uprising
at the end of the first Gulf War in March 1991.
Once it became clear the United States was not
going to intervene, the uneven struggle turned
into a rout and some 1.5 million Kurdish
refugees fled to the Iranian and Turkish frontiers,
where they faced death from the hostile climate
and lack of provisions. Thus, after much soul
searching, Washington reversed its decision
and took several steps to protect the Kurds.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 688
of April 5, 1991, condemned “the repression of
the Iraqi civilian population […] in Kurdish populated
areas” and demanded “that Iraq […] immediately
end this repression.” Under the aegis
of Operation Provide Comfort and a no-fly zone
imposed against Baghdad, the Kurds were able
to return to their homes in northern Iraq, where
they began to build a fledgling de facto state and
government, which soon became today’s KRG.
However, in May 1994, the two main Iraqi Kurdish
parties – Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan
Democratic Party and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan – fell into a civil war that immensely
complicated American foreign policy toward
them. How could the US help and protect
the Iraqi Kurds when they were busy killing
themselves? In late January 1995, US president
Bill Clinton sent a message to both Barzani and
Talabani in which he warned: “We will no longer
cooperate with the other countries to maintain
security in the region if the clashes continue.”16
New peace initiatives early the next year finally
led to significant developments and renewed
attempts by Washington to bring the
Michael Gunter
12 For background, see Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq, 1981; Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament in
Iraq: A Political Analysis, 1999.
13 Kissinger, White House Years, 1979, 1265.
14 Village Voice, The CIA Report the President Doesn’t Want You to Read, 1976, 70-92. The part dealing with
the Kurds is entitled ‘Case 2: Arms Support,’ and appears on pp. 85 and 87-88.
15 Korn, The Last Years of Mustafa Barzani, 1994, 12-27.
16 Cited in Caglayan, Clinton Reprimands Barzani and Talabani, 1995, 18; as cited in Foreign Broadcast Information
Service—West Europe, February 1, 1995, 27.
ORIENT II/ 2017 47
Iraqi Kurds together. After separate meetings
with US state department officials, Barzani
and Talabani eventually met personally for the
first time since the summer of 1994, when
their civil war had begun. After two days of
lengthy sessions, they reached a tentative
agreement to permanently end their fighting
and establish peace.
In announcing this pact, US Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright also made general promises
of American support for the Iraqi Kurds –
contingent upon their continuing unity – by declaring,
“the United States will decide how and
when to respond to Baghdad’s actions based
on the threat they pose to Iraq’s neighbors, to
regional security, to vital U.S. interests and to
the Iraqi people, including those in the
north.”17 President Clinton repeated Albright’s
lukewarm assurances in letters to Congress
on 6th November 1998 and again on 19th May
1999.18 Although these pronouncements did
not constitute an ironclad agreement of protection,
they were – in contrast to Nixon’s and
Kissigner’s covert and broken promises of a
quarter of a century earlier – public declarations.
Thus, they could not be and have not
been so cavalierly ignored, particularly after
the Iraqi Kurds supported the US in its war to
overthrow Saddam Hussein in 2003. Subsequently,
of course, the US has had to walk a
fine line as mediator between the new Baghdad
government and the KRG, both of which
it largely created.
V. Fourth Stage
The fourth stage of American foreign policy toward
the Kurds began with the US war to remove
Saddam Hussein from power in March
2003 and continues to the present in 2017.
This most recent period might also be called
the de facto US-KRG alliance stage. Until this
fourth stage, Turkey’s opposition to Kurdish
identity and its important strategic alliance
with the US since the beginning of the Cold
War and the Truman Doctrine to contain Soviet
expansionism had arguably been two of
the main reasons for the inability of the Kurds
to create any type of independent state in the
modern Middle East, which began to develop
after World War I. Although Washington has
always paid lip service to the idea of Kurdish
rights, whenever it was necessary to make a
choice it always backed its strategic NATO
ally Turkey when it came to the Kurdish issue.
Only when the US perceived the Iraqi Kurds
to be a useful foil against Saddam Hussein
did Washington begin to take a partially pro-
Kurdish position, at least towards the Iraqi
Kurds. US support for the developing KRG,
the disagreements over sanctions against
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the future of Iraq
itself gradually began to fray the longstanding
US-Turkish alliance.
The US war to remove Saddam Hussein from
power in 2003 furthered this process and
even partially reversed alliance partners. For
the first time since the creation of Iraq, the
Iraqi Kurds now had a powerful ally in the US.
This ironic situation was brought about by
Turkey refusing to allow Washington to use its
territory as a base for a northern front to attack
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in March 2003
during the second Gulf War. Given Turkey’s
failure to join the US alliance against Saddam
Hussein, the Iraqi Kurds were suddenly thrust
into the role of US ally, a novel position they
eagerly and successfully assumed.
VI. Fifth (PKK) Stage
Commencing a decade earlier and then overlapping
the third and fourth stages analysed
above is what might be called the fifth or PKK
stage of American foreign policy toward the
Kurds. In contrast to its support for the ‘good’
Iraqi Kurds and despite Turkish conspiracy theories
to the contrary, as noted above, the US has
strongly opposed the ‘bad’ Kurds of the PKK.
For example, in February 1999 the US helped
US Middle East Policy and the Kurds
17 Cited in Kazaz, Ambiguity Surrounds N. Iraq Kurdish Agreement, 1998.
18 USIS Washington File, Text: Clinton’s Report on Iraq’s Non-Compliance with UN Resolutions, 1998.
48 ORIENT II/ 2017
Turkey capture Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of
the PKK, when he was expelled from Syria.
Turkey’s longtime and continuing geostrategically
important position as a US NATO ally is
clearly the main reason for this situation. Other
explanations include the US fear of Islamic extremism
and Turkey’s alliance with Israel, although
this is currently tenuous. As a constitutionally
secular state and despite the pretensions
of its president Recep Tayyip Erdogan,19
Turkey is still seen as a bastion against Islamic
extremism, while support for Israel remains a
given for American foreign policy.
VII. Sixth (Syrian) Stage
The sixth or Syrian stage of American foreign
policy towards the Kurds stems from the Syrian
civil war.20 Given the unforeseen consequences
of George W. Bush’s overthrow of
the Saddam Hussein regime, leading to so
much death and destruction, as well as the
eventual rise of IS, Bush’s successor Barack
Obama took a much more cautious road in
the Middle East, thereby allowing Russia and
Iran to extend their influence given their much
more active role in the Syrian civil war.
Obama’s restraint only partially began to
change after IS attacked the KRG in August
2014 and the Syrian Kurdish city of Kobane
the following month. Indeed, US air support
for the beleaguered Syrian Kurds in Kobane
proved indispensable for the eventual Kurdish
victory the aftermath of which heralded continuing
US support against IS.
However, as noted above, US support for the
Syrian Kurdish PYD, YPG and YPJ has
deeply antagonised Turkey, which views them
as a mere extension of the PKK. Thus, Washington
is faced with the almost impossible
dilemma of trying to balance its support for the
one without alienating the other. In addition,
internal US frustration with Obama’s discreet
strategy probably helped Donald Trump, who
promised a more robust response to IS, win
the presidency in November 2016.
VIII. Seventh (Trump) Stage
What will be the new Trump administration
policies toward the Kurds? Will the new president
continue to support the Kurds in Syria or
emphasise a renewal of the NATO alliance
with Turkey? Trump’s earlier statements that
NATO allies should carry more of their own
burdens potentially calls into question NATO’s
future, especially given Trump’s avowed admiration
for Russian president Vladimir Putin.
How will the stated intentions of the new administration
to emphasise business affairs affect
its relations with Turkey and the Kurds?
Will the Trump administration support putative
independence for the KRG?
It would be difficult to speculate accurately
about any new US president, let alone Donald
Trump. He has literally been all over the
map with his statements and claims, only to
walk many of them back or simply ignore
them if and when they became inconvenient.
Indeed Trump’s relationship with the truth and
accuracy is sometimes tenuous, and his espousal
of ‘alternative facts’ often not to be
taken literally.
Nevertheless, through all Trump’s unseemly
fog, one does discern certain broad paths that
will affect US relations with Turkey and the
Kurds. Firstly, Trump has expressed a liking
for both and proclaimed his desire for them to
work together. For example, during a talk
about the failed coup attempt in Turkey on 16th
July 2016, Trump declared: “I’m a big fan of
the Kurdish forces. At the same time, I think
we have a potentially – we could have […] potentially
very successful relations with Turkey.
And it would be really wonderful if we could
put them somehow both together.”21
Michael Gunter
19 Gunter, Erdogan and the Decline of Turkey, 2016, 123-35.
20 For background, see Gunter, Out of Nowhere: The Kurds of Syria in Peace and War, 2014.
21 Rudaw, ‘I am a Big Fan of the Kurds,’ Says Donald Trump, 2016.
ORIENT II/ 2017 49
Once Trump learns who and what the many
nuances of the multidimensional Kurdish
issue are, how will his expressed fondness for
them translate into the different types of Kurds
he will have to deal with in Turkey, Syria and
Iraq? As already pointed out, from the US foreign
policy perspective there are ‘good’ Kurds
and ‘bad’ ones. However, even in the case of
the ‘bad’ PKK, the IS challenge in Syria has
led the US to support the PYD/YPG/YPJ ally
of the PKK in addition to actually working with
the PKK in Iraq to help save the Yazidis when
IS launched its genocidal attack against them
in August 2014. Some even suspect that the
US terrorist label for the PKK might eventually
be set aside as Washington already has
declined to use it for the PYD, YPG and YPJ.
Donald Trump appears to be more favourably
disposed toward Turkey than his predecessor
Barack Obama was. If so, he will have to deal
with the three main problems Turkey currently
has with the US: 1) ending cooperation with the
Syrian Kurdish PYD, YPG and YPJ; 2) extraditing
Fethullah Gülen, the Muslim cleric currently
living in the US, whom Turkey claims orchestrated
the failed coup of 16th July 2016; and 3)
coordinating the war against IS. The new president
will probably put a lot less pressure on
Turkey for its perceived human rights and general
domestic problems, and instead emphasise
making business deals which will aid both countries,
possibly at the expense of the Kurds.
In emphasising business deals, Trump is tapping
into one of the main historic wellsprings of
the unique American national style of foreign
policy: economics is good; politics is bad. According
to this premise, international trade
benefits all states and gives them a vested interest
in peace, but multilateral politics and its
constant search for power and security lead to
war. Given its historic geographic isolation and
insulation from world politics, Washington had
been able to pursue such policies successfully
until the post-World-War-II Soviet threat propelled
it reluctantly into world politics. Thus, in
emphasising business deals and economics
while questioning political entanglements,
Trump is harkening back to pre-World-War-II
policy themes that remain deeply imbedded in
the American national psyche.22
Rex Tillerson – the billionaire, former Exxon-
Mobil CEO and Trump’s choice for the all-important
post of Secretary of State – may further
this outlook toward touting business
cooperation and success instead of squabbling
over problems with human rights. As one
assessment of Tillerson put it, Trump “wants
his cabinet to do deals around the world to advance
American interests in what is shaping
up to be a neo-mercantilist model.”23
Although some of the current differences between
the US and Turkey on IS will remain,
General Michael Flynn, Trump’s new National
Security Advisor, also seems more favourably
inclined toward Turkey on security and foreign
policy issues.24 On the very day Trump was
elected as the new US president, General
Flynn wrote an article stating that “Turkey is
really our strongest ally against the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), as well as a
source of stability in the region.”25 Moreover,
Flynn added that “the Obama administration
is keeping Erdogan’s government at arm’s
length – an unwise policy that threatens our
long-standing alliance.”26
Flynn’s sudden forced resignation in February
2017 concerned his relations with Russia and
thus was not directly related to his pro-Turkish
position. However, subsequent revelations
US Middle East Policy and the Kurds
22 For reminding me about these themes, I am grateful to Hook and Spanier, American Foreign Policy since
World War II, 2016, 14.
23 Mahanta, Rex Tillerson’s Corporate Realpolitik, 2016.
24 Nordland, Turkey Cheered by Words of Michael Flynn, Trump’s Security Adviser, 2016.
25 Flynn, Our Ally Turkey is in Crisis and Needs Our Support, 2016.
26 Ibid.
50 ORIENT II/ 2017
that he was paid by the Turkish government
were more problematic. On the campaign
trail, Trump took a hard line against admitting
Syrian refugees to the United States, declaring:
“If I win, they are going back.”27 True to
his word, in the first 10 days of his administration
Trump issued an executive order – albeit
revoked – barring refugees from seven
Muslim-majority states for 120 days, and Syrian
refugees indefinitely. Syrian refugees listened
with alarm as Trump called them ‘terrorists’
and incorrectly blamed them for violent
attacks in the US and Europe. However, a
tough Trump position against admitting
refugees to the US might lead him to give
them more support in solving their problems in
the Middle East and Europe as a way of alleviating
the pressure to send them to the US.
Michael Gunter
27 Amos, For Refugees and Advocates, An Anxious Wait for Clarity on Trump’s Policy, 2016.
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US Middle East Policy and the Kurds