MESOP NEWS Expert Commentary – Syria Talks Were Just “Theater”
January 24, 2017 | Anna Borshchevskaya – CIPHER BRIEF – Russia, Iran and Turkey on Tuesday pledged to jointly enforce the fragile ceasefire in Syria, wrapping up two days of peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan. The countries wrote in a statement that they will “seek, through concrete steps and using their influence over the parties, consolidation of the ceasefire” and will “establish a trilateral mechanism to observe and ensure full compliance with the ceasefire.”
Russia and Iran, which back Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and Turkey, which supports the opposition, brokered the ceasefire in December. The three nations also organized this week’s two-day conference, attended by a delegation of Syrian rebels and representatives of the government regime. The UN special envoy to Syria, Staffan de Mistura, mediated the mostly indirect talks. The Trump administration did not send a delegation to Astana, but the U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan attended as an observer.
Another round of talks is tentatively set for Feb. 8 in Geneva.
The Cipher Brief’s Mackenzie Weinger spoke to Anna Borshchevskaya, the Ira Weiner Fellow at the Washington Institute, to get her thoughts on this week’s conference, what Russian President Vladimir Putin’s goals are in Syria, and how a Trump administration may potentially approach the devastating conflict.
The Cipher Brief: What are your major takeaways from the Syria talks in Astana?
Anna Borshchevskaya: There were no real surprises, in the sense that anybody who’s been watching this conflict for a long time and Russia’s involvement in particular, knows that there weren’t going to be any major breakthroughs. That ultimately Russia was not interested in real peace. This is more of a theater, I don’t know how else to describe it. And that’s pretty much what came out at the end — we can’t really point to anything tangible other than a general statement, a general declaration. Certainly some members of the opposition have boycotted the talks.
And what was also interesting from the Russian side, for example, in terms of Russian representatives, they weren’t as senior as the ones that go to Geneva. For example, it’s usually [Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail] Bogdanov who speaks in Geneva, and it’s my understanding, at least from what I’ve seen, that he wasn’t there. That was also interesting.
Certainly another interesting point that came out was the point of disagreement between Russia and Iran over whether or not the U.S. should be present at the talks. And that, in and of itself, was not very surprising because Russia and Iran never held identical views on Syria. We’ve known that from the beginning. These talks, again, simply highlighted that in the end, long-term, Russia and Iran have somewhat different visions of what Syria is. But that, in and of itself, was not surprising.
TCB: What is your assessment of the announcement that Iran, Russia, and Turkey will jointly enforce the fragile ceasefire in Syria? Did anything jump out at you from the announcement, or was it just business as usual and this was predictable?
AB: I think it’s predictable in the sense that it’s just talk, because for one thing the ceasefire has been violated before. It’s kind of funny to hear them talk about enforcing the ceasefire when there are routine violations. And, in fact, I think even some among the Syrian opposition have mentioned that during the talks. Again, it’s all very theatrical.
TCB: How would you describe Russian President Vladimir Putin’s main motivations in the talks, and now going forward?
AB: The first thing is Putin is obsessed with great-power status. And holding these talks in Astana with or without the U.S. is from his perspective a major victory because he wants America to lose. He believes in zero-sum diplomacy. From his perspective, this is a major victory. Going forward, Putin certainly wants Russian presence in Syria, but he wants this to be a quick, easy victory that he can present to the Russian public as a short, victorious war. There are long roots in Russian history where Russian leaders always look for distractions, distracting the domestic public with these short, victorious wars. And I don’t think he wants to get bogged down in Syria. He wants to have it both ways — he wants to ensure that Russia’s interests are represented, that whoever is in charge in Damascus ensures Russia’s interests are taken into account, but at the same time he doesn’t want huge investment. He’s very conscious of Syria not becoming another Afghanistan.
TCB: In the case of Iran, how does the country differ from Russia in its intentions with Syria? What can we expect to see from Tehran, and what flashpoints are there to come between Washington and Iran over Syria?
AB: One major difference is Iran is more directly wedded to Assad himself. Iran wants sort of a statelet, if you will, that they can control. And it reminds me a little bit of how Putin looks at the former Soviet states, in terms of its privileged sphere of influence. Putin is less interested in Assad himself than in having either Assad or someone like him who can, again, ensure their interests. They don’t care so much about who specifically is in charge in Damascus so long as that person assures their interests, so long as Russia has access to the base, to the Mediterranean, and more broadly has this entry point to the Middle East.
At the same time, what’s also important for Putin is he views foreign policy, the Middle East and other regions, as geopolitical struggle with the U.S. It’s not so much Syria, but what it represents. Just like it’s not as much the Middle East, but what it represents. In that sense, Russia and Iran do have quite a number of disagreements. What does unite them is their shared conviction that they need to reduce American influence in the region. So the shared antipathy of the West, of Western values, of democracy, that’s what’s bringing them together.
TCB: Looking at the U.S., what do you make of the sidelining of Washington here? Now there’s the Trump administration, which spells a lot of uncertainty in the region. How does it change the power balance of brokers in the Middle East, and what role does a Washington under a President Donald Trump ideally take going forward?
AB: I don’t think it was necessarily by accident that the date was chosen so close to President Trump’s inauguration for these talks. I think Putin wanted to present a fait accompli to the Trump administration. They were counting on the U.S. still being wrapped up in its own domestic issues to not pay as much attention. They did extend an invitation to Washington that Washington declined, but I think the larger point was to demonstrate that the power shift is in Eurasia, with or without the United States. This was a clear statement of power, a change in balance of power.
I also think that without the United States, and the West more broadly — these are the only actors who are truly interested in peace in Syria. Putin is not interested in real peace, he’s interested in using Syria as leverage and so forth. Without the United States, it’s hard to imagine you can broker real peace. Certainly, as long as Assad stays in power, refugees are not going to come back to Syria. And that presents a problem for Europe and for the West. And Putin capitalizes on this because he wants Europe to be weak and divided, and Syria in that sense was a gift to him because by helping Assad essentially conduct an ethnic cleansing of his own people, he helped drive these refugee flows into Europe. That helped destabilize Europe.
I don’t see how this conflict can really be resolved without U.S. presence. What the Trump administration should do — I think the Trump administration should assume a leadership position that has long been missing in this conflict for six years now. It’s because of the absence of American leadership that Russia, that Putin stepped into a vacuum.
That said, there are many questions remaining about Trump’s policy towards Russia and ISIS that he has not provided a clear answer for. For example, he said he wanted to be tough on Iran but work with Russia on Syria. These two goals are incompatible because Russia and Iran are allied in Syria, so you can’t do both. He also said Russia is a partner in fighting ISIS, even though Russia has hit anyone but ISIS. And again, we don’t have a clear statement of policy. Another possibility could be that Trump may merely resume what the Obama administration was trying to do before the bombing of the UN convoy in September where they wanted to have limited cooperation in Syria.
TCB: Another round of talks is set for Feb 8 in Geneva – what key things will you be watching for then?
AB: I’ll be watching for who is included in the talks, especially from the Syrian opposition side. I’ll be watching who will be going from the Russian side. And certainly for some more statements that are a little clearer in terms of policy from the Trump administration.