Russia resumed its aggressive air campaign in northern Syria in a renewed attempt to defeat the acceptable opposition and coerce the integration of its remaining fighters into Salafi-jihadi groups, demonstrating its unfitness to serve as a U.S. counter-terrorism partner. Russia conducted airstrikes against ISIS in
Deir ez Zour City and its
environs in eastern Syria from January 26 – 31 and February 3 – 6, vying to blunt the jihadist group’s
ongoing offensive against pro-regime forces in the besieged Deir ez Zour Military Airport. Russia nonetheless belied its alleged commitment to the anti-ISIS fight by deliberately targeting acceptable opposition forces during this period, aiming to enhance the Salafi-jihadi makeup of the opposition and thereby bolster the purported counter-terrorism mandate of the pro-regime alliance. In pursuit of that objective, Russian warplanes targeted opposition terrain behind front lines in
northern Hama,
western Aleppo, and
southern Idlib Provinces from January 26 – February 7, resuming air operations in those areas just two days after the conclusion of Russia-sponsored
peace negotiations on the Syrian Civil War in Astana, Kazakhstan. Notably, Russia repeatedly targeted current and former U.S.-backed opposition forces during the course of those operations. Russia, for instance, conducted airstrikes against a
Jaysh al Mujahideen headquarters in western Aleppo Province on January 19 and a
Jaysh al Aza headquarters in northern Hama Province on January 29, continuing its campaign to eliminate U.S. ground partners in Syria. Likely by design, such strikes have rendered the targeted groups increasingly vulnerable to the
attacks of al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat Fatah al Sham as it also works to defeat the acceptable opposition. Russia also delivered a shipment of fifty SS-21 ‘Scarab’
short-range ballistic missiles to the Port of Tartus in western Syria on or around February 6,
firing at least two ‘Scarab’ and four SS-26 ‘Iskander’ ballistic missiles against opposition terrain in Idlib Province over the next forty-eight hours, according to anonymous U.S. officials. This missile capability will likely advance the deliberate targeting campaign against the acceptable opposition, which will continue until Russia dismantles these groups and compels their remnants to cooperate more closely with Salafi-jihadi forces out of military necessity. In the process, Russia will in effect enhance a Salafi-jihadi threat in Syria that it has little intent to counter.
