MESOP MIDEAST WATCH: BACKGROUND PAPER FROM NATO ON ISIS

Pieter Van Ostaeyen and the Status of ISIS, December 2022

Key Reflections

* The ISIS affiliates in Afghanistan and sub-Saharan Africa are growing in momentum, recruitment, funding streams, technology, and ability to launch attacks.

* Throughout 2022, ISIS have attempted various daring operations to free prisoners in facilities in Iraq and Syria. Although the strategy is not new, every prisoner freed is a surplus for ISIS.

* Nations are divided over repatriating their citizens from ISIS detention camps in Syria. These camps have become cesspools for extremism, but equally, bringing people back is not straightforward since many in the camps are radicalised.

* ISIS is becoming more prominent again on social media and has intensified its efforts on platforms such as Twitter, where previously banned accounts have become active.

* The pandemic and Putin’s war in Ukraine have taken some focus away from counter-terrorism, but Belgium still has 125 terrorist fighters unaccounted for. Some in prison, due to be released, have claimed their ideological beliefs remain extreme.

* The Kremlin-affiliated private military company, the Wagner Group, has been engaged in the destabilisation of Syria as well as countries in the Sahel, exploiting natural resources.

Transcript:

SG: Dr. Sajjan Gohel

PVO: Pieter Van Ostaeyen

SG: Hello, and welcome to DEEP Dive, brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme. I’m your host, Dr. Sajjan Gohel. Each episode, we speak to experts and practitioners in international security and defence, counter-terrorism, and geopolitical current events to gain insight into the most pressing matters of global affairs.

In this episode, we speak with Pieter Van Ostaeyen, a historian and Arabist with a background in mediaeval history. He is currently completing his PhD at the University of Leuven in Belgium, researching the usage of social media and the ideological strife between jihadist groups. Pieter has also served as a visiting fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy in Brussels as well as a member of the editorial board at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) in The Hague. Pieter is a prominent primary source researcher and the author of several books looking at the transnational jihadist movement. He is currently investigating how ISIS is using artificial intelligence to utilise hate speech and the jihadist perceptions of the Crusades and exploitation of religious texts.

Pieter Van Ostaeyen, welcome to NATO DEEP Dive.

PVO: Thank you very much. Thank you for this opportunity. It’s an honour.

SG: It’s our pleasure. Let’s look at ISIS, as you have studied this group in extensive detail. What is the state of ISIS in Iraq and Syria today?

PVO: Ever since the fall of the town of Baghuz in March 2019, the presence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has seriously degraded. If we look at a number of attacks in Syria and Iraq, they have been dropping steadily since 2019. So, in Iraq and Syria, the group is still active, they’re still present. The most spectacular operation they conducted lately was the prison break in northern Syria earlier this year. But for the rest, basically, the group is back to where it came from—just a jihadist insurgency. Nothing more than that.

SG: You mentioned the prison break that took place earlier this year. And throughout 2022, we’ve seen ISIS attempting various daring operations to free prisoners in facilities in Iraq and Syria. Have those been ultimately successful for ISIS? And what have the consequences of those attempted prison breaks been?

PVO: Well, every single prisoner they can free is a surplus for ISIS, of course, because they replenish their ranks. And they have been able to do so in some cases. So…every successful prison break is a successful operation. But this isn’t a new code of conduct, basically, it’s been going on for years even. In 2013-2014, and even before the Islamic State [ISIS] was created in Syria, they were already conducting these prison breaks throughout Iraq, so it’s a strategy they have been following for years already. It’s nothing really new.

SG: On a related point, some countries are seeking to repatriate their citizens from the ISIS detention camps such as al-Hol, al-Roj in Syria. What are the challenges in doing this, bearing in mind that some of the women served as brides to ISIS terrorists and many of the children that have grown up in these camps have potentially been radicalised?

PVO: The main issue is that most European countries didn’t want to repatriate their ISIS fighters or families. It’s been an ongoing debate throughout Europe [for] years already basically. And it still is ongoing. For example, Belgium is very reluctant to repatriate at all. The bigger issue is the fact that we left them there and basically that those camps are like the ninth gate of Hell, if I understand correctly. What is worrying from my own perspective is that if we repatriate them, how are we going to deal with them? We have no idea if deradicalisation programmes in any form are actually working. And I have the idea, generally, that a lot of the people that we have been repatriating already still are radicalised. So, I don’t think that repatriation is the golden key, but it should be because leaving them there on the ground in Syria and Iraq—that’s a possible recipe for catastrophe.

SG: If we look at how ISIS is evolving in the present age, what types of technology is it utilising, even though it may not be at full capacity like it was before? And at the same time, connected to this, what are their funding streams? What are they doing in terms of getting their messaging out? Is it successful? And how are they funding their operations?

PVO: On the funding…recently there has been a published a UN report that explains all the funding streams. For example, what is most worrying right now is that it seems that there are a lot of hubs active throughout southern Africa—not only in Mozambique, but even in South Africa itself—and that seems to be worrying. There have been links discovered with other countries as well. So, in the case of funding, yes, they might have found new ways. In the sense of technology, I do think that everything has remained more or less the same, at least [on] the surface.

As [for technology] what I’m seeing, they still have a significant presence on Telegram, and it’s quite easy to find them there, to follow them there, and to catch up on their daily news. They have been very active lately as well on local media; they have a particular subgroup that is specifically aimed at IS-KP fighters, so the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (IS-KP). And they have been quite active, and they are recruiting other people to translate texts to spread the word to recruit. So…in a way, it’s back to the future. We’re seeing what we saw 10 years ago, the recruiting is still going on social media. I might even add it has intensified a lot since Twitter has been taken over by Elon Musk. He propagated free speech again, and he said that they would release some previously banned accounts. We see a lot of Islamic State [ISIS] accounts returning to Twitter and openly propagating Islamic State [ISIS] news again, whereas, for example, a few months ago, that was purely impossible.

SG: You used the term “back to the future.” Could ISIS re-emerge in terms of its recruitment strategy of people in Europe? Because we’re now in this so-called post-pandemic travel period—it’s increasing people’s ability to move, which is greater than it was before. Could this be utilised by ISIS to attract a new wave of foreign terrorist fighters? Is there an appetite for those that are getting radicalised in Europe to once again link up with ISIS, or are their priorities now elsewhere?

PVO: They’re definitely trying. As I mentioned just now, in Khorasan province of Afghanistan, they’re trying to recruit new people from Europe. I’m pretty sure that the same thing is going on throughout Africa. The only issue for those recruits right now is that it’s a lot more difficult to travel to the war zone. Especially because of, basically, the distance, and the hurdles they have to take before they arrive there. Going to Syria was easy—you just have to travel through the Schengen Zone, cross the border with Turkey, and then you got into Syria quite easily. It’s not the same going to Afghanistan and probably isn’t as easy as well to go to the Sahel region, for example, or join ISIS in Congo or Mozambique. So, it has changed. The will is still there by a lot of people here in Europe, in my opinion, to go there. But it’s less organised than it was before, and the hurdles are bigger. It’s a geographical issue for them right now, in a way.

SG: That’s interesting. You’re speaking to me from Belgium; this is an important country in the context of what ISIS has done in the past. We all remember the 2016 Brussels bombings by ISIS recruits that resulted in the death of 32 people and over 340 injured, many with life-changing injuries. It was one of ISIS’ most audacious terrorist attacks, using coordinated suicide bombings both at the Brussels airport and a railway station. How has Belgium dealt with the ISIS challenge subsequently? And what’s the status of the terrorist situation inside Belgium today?

PVO: First of all, most of the measures we have taken in our battle on jihadi groups of whatever origin were taken immediately after the foiled attack in Verviers in January 2015. Then after the Paris attacks in November 2015 and the Brussels attacks in March 2016…we took a number of measures, but most of the measures that were taken were short-term. They were aimed at destabilising these groups and proactively trying to track them down. But there was no real interest in taking measures on a longer term, like, for example, education, integration, and cleaning up neighbourhoods—literally cleaning them up, cleaning up the streets, taking care of housing and stuff like that.

Ever since, however bizarre it may sound, but ever since COVID kicked in, the attention seems to have dropped a bit. And then when President Putin decided to invade Ukraine, now the attention has completely dropped. The main focus right now here in Belgium is on the ongoing war in Ukraine. And people tend to forget that we still have 125 Belgian terrorist fighters that are unaccounted for, ever since the fall of Baghuz, in March 2019. And the fact that a lot of the people we have convicted have nearly served their time already, and they’re going to be released soon. A lot of them, when they come out, they say, ‘I’m not deradicalised, I’m more radical than ever.’ We see a perfect example of that, for example, in the person of Jean Louis Denis, nicknamed Le Soumis, he was the leader of Resto du Tawheed, the sister organisation of Sharia4Belgium. When he came out of prison, I think two years ago, he said, ‘I’m more radical than ever and I’m going to continue my struggle for an Islamic state.’

We see the same thing happening in the UK. Anjem Choudhury even came back to Twitter and basically, he’s reposting his ideas of 10 years ago. So, we’re threatened in a way that history will repeat itself for at least some of these individuals. One big question we might ask ourselves is, indeed whether they will be able or willing to join a next war zone, that’s a whole other thing.

SG: And that’s perhaps the future challenge that counter-terrorism agencies are going to have to address. You mentioned Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine; it raises a topic I wanted to ask you in connection to everything. What has been Russia’s role in Syria currently, because we know that they have utilised the private military company, the Wagner Group to help assist in its operations in Syria. We’ve seen the Wagner Group in Ukraine, as well. But based on your understanding of events in Syria, what exactly does the Wagner Group do? And has it actually contributed to the destabilisation of Syria?

PVO: Definitely the Wagner Group is, in a way, the secret, private militia of Putin, something like that. Not so secretive anymore, but especially in Syria, they were doing all the dirty jobs. What is most worrying right now about the Wagner Group is not the fact alone that they are active in Ukraine, but the dominance of the Wagner Group in countries in the Sahel, like for example, Mali. Since the last coup in Mali, the government there has entrusted the Wagner Group almost with everything. And at this point, the Wagner Group is not only a major player in a military role in Africa, but it’s also exploiting the natural riches of African states. They have been in control of gold mines, cobalt mines, whatever, throughout the entire continent, and they’re building up their empire, quite successfully.

SG: Just goes to show you what a potent ally the Wagner Group is for the Kremlin, assisting in its operations around the world, not just in Ukraine and Syria, but as you mentioned, also in Sub Saharan Africa as well. I wanted to pivot to another dynamic, which is the role of Iran. We know that Iran, much like Pakistan, has served as a conduit for al-Qaeda and affiliated groups to travel in and out of the country. Does ISIS, or affiliated groups like IS-KP, have the same opportunity to utilise Iran? And if so, what does Iran get out of all of this?

PVO: What we see from the confrontations between the Islamic State [ISIS] and Iran, it’s not like there is some kind of a mutual understanding. They’re sworn enemies. The one thing we hear from the Islamic State [ISIS] from Iran are successful attacks, if they kill, for example, a police officer somewhere or attack a military point or whatever, but most of them are small scale attacks. It’s not like the mutual agreement, I would call it, between al-Qaeda and Iran, where we still suspect that the top leadership of al-Qaeda right now still resides in Iran—who was likely to be named as a successor of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, Saif al-Adel. And as far as we know, the man has been residing in Iran for years. And that also might explain why we still didn’t hear anything about the succession of Dr. al-Zawahiri as a leader of al-Qaeda, even though it’s been about 190 days, I’m not exactly sure, but it’s been a long time that al-Qaeda has been leaderless. Another thing that Iran has, from its point of view, successfully contributed to is the war in Syria, obviously, because they send over militia in big numbers to Syria to fight the dirty war of the al-Assad regime.

SG: You mentioned about many al-Qaeda leaders residing in Iran, and you also spoke about the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri. Well, Ayman al-Zawahiri, as we now know, was found in a compound in the heart of Kabul, under the protection of the Haqqani Network. The question I have for you is, how did ISIS react to the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri? They both had been very much attacking each other, verbally, with strong criticisms on either side. Did ISIS celebrate the death of al-Zawahiri? Or have they been somewhat muted?

PVO: From an official point of view, I would say that their reaction was meek. They didn’t really celebrate it or make any big statements about it. But in private conversations with ISIS fanboys or fighters, it’s also not always easy to make the distinction between them, they were openly mocking al-Qaeda. They were saying, ‘We’ve always said that Zawahiri is an empty shell, al-Qaeda is an empty shell, you shall see.’ I assume that the bigger hope for a lot of the fanboys or the lower-level ranks, is that they will incorporate a lot of al-Qaeda fighters in the short term, but I’m not really sure that it’s going to happen. Especially since the rift between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State [ISIS] has been so immense for the last decade, I doubt that anything major will happen.

On the other hand, there was the al-Furqan [Media Foundation] statement announced today [30 November 2022] by the Islamic State [ISIS] earlier today, and one of my close contacts was told two days ago already that this would be a major statement by the Islamic State [ISIS]. So, we have no idea whatsoever what is coming up. Could be anything.

SG: That’s interesting. As a final question, you’ve got a background in mediaeval history, looking at the Crusades, you have been an extensive researcher on groups like ISIS. How much does it help you to have the prism of history that aids you in the work that you do? I am a historian, so I was just curious to get your take on whether that lens has been a very helpful tool to your research?

PVO: Oh, yeah, definitely. For me, it’s obvious if I weren’t a historian, I wouldn’t be doing this at all. If I would just have studied Arabic and Islamic studies, I would have probably engaged in language studies or something. But since my background as a historian, I have always been fascinated by the impact that early history can have on current events. And if you look, for example, a very stupid example maybe, but when the international coalition started bombing the Islamic State [ISIS], it took them exactly half an hour before they called it a new crusade. So, for me history is the foundation of my scholarship. It’s basically a pyramid building up. History is a cake, and the topping is my knowledge of Arabic and Islamic Studies. That’s, for me, that’s at least how it’s how it’s working.

SG: Well, that’s an excellent analogy to use, and from one historian to another, I certainly respect and admire the work that you’ve done and contributed significantly to our understanding about the dynamics of ISIS and other jihadist groups. Let me just thank you once more, Pieter Van Ostaeyen, thank you so much for spending the time talking to us today.

PVO: Thank you. It’s been my honour and my pleasure.

SG: Thank you for listening to this episode of DEEP Dive. I’m your host, Dr. Sajjan Gohel. DEEP Dive is brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme. The production and research team are Marcus Andreopoulos and Victoria Jones. For additional content, including full transcripts of each episode, please visit: deepportal.hq.nato.int/deepdive.

Disclaimer: Please note that the views, information, or opinions expressed in the DEEP Dive series are solely those of the individuals involved and do not necessarily represent those of NATO or DEEP.

This transcript has been edited for clarity.