MESOP : ISW INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY SYRIA – IRAQ & KURDISTAN : September 18-25, 2015

Reviewing the Week -Compiled byHarleen Gambhir with Daniel Pitcairn
Key Take-Away – Russia in the Middle East – Russian President Vladimir Putin is racing to build an alternate anti-ISIS coalition that includes Iran and the Syrian regime ahead of his speech at the UN General Assembly on September 28. This alliance is manifesting on the ground, as Russia is constructing two new military facilities and deploying ground-attack aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems in northeastern Syria, while reportedly creating a military coordination cell with Syrian, Iranian, and Iraqi Shi’a militia commanders in Baghdad. This geopolitical maneuvering will undercut the role of the U.S. in the Middle East, while deflecting attention away from Russia’s strategic adventurism in Eastern Europe and Ukraine. Russia has also begun construction of two large military bases near its border with Kiev-controlled northeastern Ukraine and is likely to reach an agreement to establish an airbase in Belarus. Russia is alternating military activity in Syria and Ukraine while creating long-term capacity that will enable it to project force and achieve its political goals on its own timeline.
 
Russia’s escalation in the Middle East has triggered diplomatic and political reshuffling that will challenge the U.S.’s desired outcomes across the region. Russia has reportedly demanded that the U.S. coordinate its international counter-ISIS campaign with Russia, Syria, and Iran. U.S. President Barack Obama agreed to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in their first formal face-to-face talks in over a year, marking the degree to which Russia has forced its way to the top of the international agenda amidst accelerating Russian military involvement in Syria and Iraq. Putin met with both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish President Recep Erdogan this week, indicating that neither will immediately challenge Russian presence in Syria through military means. Leaders in Western Europe and Turkey softened their rhetoric regarding Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s role in a political settlement of the Syrian Civil War, prompted by the Russian military presence, the ongoing refugee crisis, and in the case of Turkey a desire to advance talks for a natural gas pipeline.
 
Putin’s anti-ISIS strategy thwarts the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition. Russia’s backing of Assad undercuts the Syrian opposition writ large, not just ISIS. Russia’s mobilization in Syria may also neutralize Turkey as an effective anti-ISIS actor and will likely undermine the implementation of the U.S.-Turkey “ISIS-free zone.” The net result will be a two-way geopolitical loss for the U.S., both to Russia and to ISIS, without the hope that their violent engagement in Syria will mitigate the threat that either poses to the West.

IraqIRAQ
Unconfirmed Russian presence in Baghdad: An unconfirmed report stated that a joint Russian and Iranian “coordination cell” had been established in Baghdad that included “low-level Russian generals,” a development of which Iraqi Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari stated that he had “no knowledge.” ISW will watch for additional indicators to verify this report and identify the size and nature of the Russian presence, should it exist.
Debate over U.S. role in Iraq: General David Petraeus testified that the U.S. needs to provide greater support to the ISF, anti-ISIS Iraqi Sunni tribal fighters, and the Peshmerga during a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 22. In particular, General Petraeus recommended deploying joint tactical air controllers and embedding U.S. advisers with the ISF at the brigade headquarters level. Within Iraq, Iranian proxy militias responded to unsubstantiated rumors by Anbar province officials and anonymous sources that U.S. advisers had taken an increased role in operations to recapture Ramadi, including the provision of Apache helicopters, which Anbar’s governor denied. Qais Khazali, the leader of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, an Iranian-backed group, condemned U.S. “conspiracies” to keep the “Popular Mobilization” out of Anbar operations and rejected the purported presence of U.S. combat troops. Proxy militias likely will attempt to prevent any expansion of the role of U.S forces, including by using lethal force against U.S. forces or against the ISF.
ISIS pressures the ISF near Baiji and Baghdad: ISIS continues to place significant pressure on the ISF as the Iraqi government struggles to make progress on the political front. ISIS launched two SVBIED attacks on ISF positions at the Baiji oil refinery north of Tikrit on September 19, causing a large fire within the refinery. On the same day, the ISF interdicted two SVEST attackers in western Baghdad. ISIS also detonated a VBIED in eastern Baghdad on September 21, demonstrating that ISIS maintains lethal capabilities in various parts of Baghdad despite the heavy presence of security forces. In addition, the ISF launched a clearing operation against ISIS in the Thar Thar area, northwest of Baghdad, an area that Federal Police and the “Popular Mobilization” ostensibly cleared in late May and June of 2015. The ISF and “Popular Mobilization” have been unsuccessful in restricting ISIS freedom of movement in this zone.
Iraqi government under political pressure: Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi’s reform efforts appear to have stalled, with no noticeable progress made since he dismissed 123 senior ministerial officials on September 10. The Iraqi parliament held its last session on September 16 but has recessed for the Eid al-Adha holiday. Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias have resisted PM Abadi’s reform program and teamed with PM Abadi’s political rivals within the Shi’a political scene, particularly VP Nouri al-Maliki, to prevent additional reforms from passing. Qais al-Khazali, leader of the proxy militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), dismissed popular demonstrations as “moribund” and having reached their final stages, blaming the government for not having dealt with them appropriately. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq suspended its affiliates participating in the popular demonstrations that began on July 31. Proxy militias no longer see either any benefit to participating in the demonstrations or any ability to influence the movement from within, and are more likely to attempt to suppress the movement through violence rather than harness it against PM Abadi. Provincial governments resisted demands by ongoing popular demonstrations to conduct major reforms, initiating only nominal reshuffling within provincial governments without diminishing political parties’ influence or increasing their accountability to Iraqi citizens. Meanwhile, Turkey continued to conduct airstrikes against the PKK in northern Iraq.
See: “Iraq Situation Report: September 22 – 25, 2015“; “Iraq Situation Report: September 18-21, 2015“; “Regional Conflict Between Iran and Turkey Manifests Itself in Iraq,” by Sinan Adnan, September 12, 2015; “Iraq Control of Terrain Map: September 11, 2015“; “Kata’ib Hezbollah and Iranian Proxies Challenge Iraq’s Proposed National Guard Law,” by Sinan Adnan, September 8, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Iraq experts Sinan Adnan and Patrick Martin or ISIS expert Jessica Lewis McFate here.
SyriaSYRIA
Turkey and Israel respond to Russian buildup: Regional powers active in the Syrian Civil War were forced to react to new realities on the ground as Russia continued its military buildup along the Syrian Coast. Most recently, Russia delivered at least 24 ground attack aircraft and several surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems to an airfield in Latakia Province on September 20 and commenced Russian surveillance drone and manned flights from its base there, reportedly ahead of a possible air campaign. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on September 21 and agreed to establish a joint coordination team headed by the deputy chiefs of the two countries’ armed forces in order to avoid confrontation between their aerial, naval, and electromagnetic operations in Syria. Two days later, Turkish President Recep Erdogan met with President Putin in Moscow and agreed to form a foreign minister working group on the Syrian Civil War. President Erdogan later stated that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad could take part in a transition process in Syria, marking a significant change in Turkish rhetoric that is likely linked to mounting Russian military pressure and recent talks over the delayed Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline between Russia and Turkey.
International actors soften stance on President Assad: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry reaffirmed that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad “has to go” in a statement on September 19. In contrast, prominent European countries continued to soften their position on the role of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in any political settlement to end the Syrian Civil War. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius stressed on September 21 that France will not demand the departure of President Assad as a precondition to peace talks, and, three days later, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that negotiations should include President Assad as well as other regional players. These comments follow similar statements by the foreign ministers of Austria, Britain, and Spain in recent weeks and likely stem from a mounting refugee crisis in Europe driven in large part by the Syrian Civil War. Russia will likely attempt to leverage these statements in order to legitimize its calls for a new international anti-ISIS coalition that includes Russia, Iran, and the Syrian regime during talks at the upcoming UN General Assembly. The proposal will likely constitute a key agenda item during a meeting between President Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama on the sidelines of the General Assembly, which would represent their first face-to-face talks in over a year.
U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in Syria faces new challenges: The insertion of a second batch of seventy-five U.S.-trained rebel fighters into northern Syria was marred by allegations that some members of the group defected or turned their weapons over to Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). The U.S. Department of Defense rejected the defection claims as part of an active JN disinformation campaign to discredit the U.S. train-and-equip program, but the rumors will likely further erode confidence in the U.S.-led anti-ISIS campaign within Congress, the American public, and the international community. On the ground, ISIS continued to position itself to seize additional territory in eastern and western Syria. ISIS deployed a large number of reinforcements to Deir ez-Zour City from western Anbar Province in Iraq in alleged preparation for a major offensive against regime-held portions of the city, which may be an effort to prevent Russian build up in the area. ISIS also claimed to seize parts of the highway between Homs City and the strategic T4 (Tiyas) Airbase in eastern Homs Province after a sharp intensification of IED and VBIED attacks in Homs City that have been claimed by both ISIS and JN.
 
See: “New Russian Activity in Syria: Istamo Weapon Storage Facility SE of Latakia,” by ISW and AllSource Analysis, September 24, 2015; “Russian Deployments at Al-Assad Airport in Syria,” by ISW and AllSource Analysis, September 24, 2015; “Forecasting the Syrian Civil War,” by Christopher Kozak, Jennifer Cafarella, and the ISW Syria Team, September 17, 2015;  “Russian Deployment in Syria: Putin’s Middle East Game Changer,” by Hugo Spaulding, Christopher Kozak, Christopher Harmer, Daniel Urchick, Jessica Lewis-McFate, Jennifer Cafarella, Harleen Gambhir, and Kimberly Kagan, September 17, 2015; “Posture of Syrian Regime and Allies: September 14, 2015,” by ISW Syria Team, September 14, 2015; “Military Situation on the Syrian-Turkish Border: September 14, 2015,” by ISW Syria Team, September 14, 2015; “Control of Terrain in Syria: September 14, 2015“; “An Army in All Corners:” Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria, by Christopher Kozak, April 30, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Syria analysts Jennifer Cafarella or Chris Kozak here.