MESOP : ISW INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY: September 5-13, 2015 – Reviewing the Week Iraq – Syria & Kurdistan
Compiled by Christopher Kozak
Key Take-Away – The 14th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks highlighted how global terrorism has evolved since the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). ISIS retains the majority of its strongholds in Iraq and Syria, and continues to contest new terrain one year after the start of a U.S.-led airstrike campaign. Zawahiri claimed that ISIS and AQ can cooperate in order to conduct attacks against the U.S.-led coalition and other “secularists” in Iraq and Syria. Confrontation and coordination between the two organizations will likely promote increased violence and regional disorder. This risk appears particularly high in Lebanon, where the eruption of major anti-government demonstrations in response to sixteen months of political deadlock may open opportunities for escalation by existing ISIS and AQ-linked militant networks.
The past week also witnessed significant moves by Iran and Russia to secure their interests inside of Iraq and Syria at the expense of the U.S. and its partners on the ground. Russia deployed advanced military equipment, prefabricated housing units, and a small force of Naval Infantry from the annexed Crimean Peninsula to the Syrian Coast, possibly in preparation for further direct military involvement on behalf of the Syrian regime, leading U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to warn that Russian actions risked “confrontation” with the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition. At the same time, Russia took steps to present itself as a constructive actor in the implementation of the ‘Minsk II’ ceasefire agreement in Ukraine amidst a sharp reduction in offensive operations conducted by Russian-backed separatists in the east of the country. Russia may seek to leverage these changes in posture in Syria and Ukraine in order to promote its calls for a new international anti-ISIS coalition that includes Russia as well as the Syrian regime. The proposal will likely be a major theme in President Vladimir Putin’s upcoming speech before the UN General Assembly, his first in ten years. Meanwhile, Iranian-backed politicians and militia groups began to use violence to challenge Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi and undermine a series of major reforms, including a National Guard law crucial to promoting the inclusion of Iraqi Sunnis. An Iranian proxy group also kidnapped eighteen Turkish workers in Baghdad and released demands calling for Turkey to direct Syrian rebel forces to lift the sieges of two regime enclaves in northern Syria, highlighting Iran’s efforts to protect its interests in both countries. Similar efforts by Iran to exert regional influence through its proxies will likely become increasingly common as sanctions on the Iranian government are rolled back in accordance with the Iranian nuclear accord signed in July.
IRAQ
Iranian proxy groups have begun to use violence to challenge Iraqi Prime Minister (PM) Haidar al-Abadi and the control of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Baghdad. Iranian proxy groups including Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) publically denounced a new initiative in the Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) to pass a National Guard law crucial for the inclusion of Iraqi Sunnis, escalating their political resistance to PM Abadi in a notable unity of effort among several groups linked by their allegiance to the Supreme Leader of Iran. Iranian proxies in Baghdad conducted further escalation through kinetic action with the kidnapping on September 2 of eighteen Turkish workers in a Shi’a area of Baghdad known to be a headquarters for Kata’ib Hezbollah. The kidnappers later released a video of the hostages on September 11 which demanded several concessions from the Turkish government, including the cessation of support to certain Turkish-backed rebel groups in Syria as well as the relief of several besieged Shi’a-majority towns in northern Syria with a presence of Lebanese Hezbollah. The video highlights not only that Iranian proxy groups are willing to defy the authority of the Iraqi government in Baghdad through a high-profile kidnapping, but also that such groups clearly acted at the behest of Iran. Iranian proxy groups can be expected to continue prosecuting Iranian objectives in both Iraq and Syria, which include blocking the reform agenda of PM Abadi and disrupting security cooperation and political relations between the U.S. and Iraq.
Supporters of the reforms spearheaded by PM Abadi have leveraged the kidnapping of the Turkish workers to challenge the position of proxy militias in Iraq. Senior Shi’a leaders including Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and Sadrist Trend leader Moqtada al-Sadr – who have backed PM Abadi and his reforms – have publically denounced the kidnappers. The escalation of intra-Shi’a competition in Baghdad could challenge the progress of PM Abadi’s reforms as well as overall security in Baghdad and southern Iraq. Popular demonstrations continued across southern Iraq, though they have remained peaceful and have not required the ISF to redeploy forces from the frontlines to protect demonstrators or quell greater insecurity. However, in an isolated but noteworthy incident on September 7, local security forces prevented a peaceful sit-in in the strategic southern province of Basra in direct violation of PM Abadi’s orders that the ISF protect protesters. This incident, along with a recent trend of unidentified gunmen targeting protest organizers and journalists in Basra, raises concerns regarding the lack of government control over the oil-rich province. Further confrontation in Baghdad will drive the similar instability in Basra, as previously witnessed when Shi’a militias launched campaigns in both cities in 2008.
Meanwhile, the anti-ISIS campaign continues to make limited progress. A Department of Defense spokesperson stated that both Ramadi and Baiji remain “highly contested” with no significant changes in the status of operations to reclaim either city. Although the ISF has not lost further urban territory to ISIS since the fall of Ramadi, ISIS still possesses the ability to launch attacks against major cities such as Baiji. The ISF main effort to secure Ramadi has not yet succeeded after eight weeks; the campaign to secure Tikrit lasted only four weeks, raising questions about the impediments that are driving the protraction of the Ramadi operation. ISIS also continued its attacks against Peshmerga positions south of Kirkuk City in a likely attempt to probe the defenses of Kurdish forces. It remains unclear whether ISIS intends to simply divert Peshmerga attention away from other contested areas, such as Sinjar, or to instead set conditions for future offensives to seize northern oil fields, Kirkuk City, or other objectives currently guarded by Kurdish forces. Meanwhile, Turkey also launched a ground operation against the Kurdish PKK in northern Iraq after a PKK attack in Turkey on September 6 killed sixteen Turkish soldiers. Although the operation does not represent the first Turkish incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan, its timing applies additional pressure on PM Abadi as he faces numerous internal security challenges.
See: “Regional Conflict Between Iran and Turky Manifests Itself in Iraq”; “Iraq Situation Report: September 9-10, 2015”; “Kata’ib Hezbollah and Iranian Proxies Challenge Iraq’s Proposed National Guard Law,” by Sinan Adnan, September 8, 2015; “Iraq Situation Report: September 4-8, 2015”; “Iran’s Proxy Militia Leaders Pose Threat to Iraq Prime Minister’s Reforms,” by Kimberly Kagan, September 3, 2015; “Iraq’s Prime Minister Implements Reform Agenda,” by Patrick Martin, Sinan Adnan, and Theodore Bell, August 30, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Iraq experts Sinan Adnan and Patrick Martin or ISIS expert Jessica Lewis McFate here.
SYRIA
Russia increased its direct military involvement in the Syrian Civil War with an initial deployment of forces to the Syrian Coast. Anonymous U.S. intelligence officials stated that Russia delivered prefabricated housing units, a portable air traffic control tower, and an advance team of Naval Infantry to Latakia Province with the intent to establish at least two forward operations centers, including an expansion to an existing regime airbase. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov confirmed Russian airlifts of military equipment to Syria as part of “current contracts” but declined to comment on changes in the scale or scope of Russian involvement. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry called his Russian counterpart to warn that an escalation on behalf of the Syrian regime could risk “confrontation” with the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition. The U.S. later requested that Bulgaria and Greece close their airspace to Syria-bound Russian transport aircraft, prompting Iran to announce its own approval for Russian overflights. The exact motivations behind Russia’s decision to escalate in Syria remain unclear. A series of major defeats for the Syrian regime since March 2015 may have prompted Russia to intensify its activity in Syria in order to defend its only close ally in the Middle East. Russia may also seek to leverage its expanded involvement to promote its calls for a new international coalition against terrorism including Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in advance of the opening of the new UN General Assembly session on September 15. Russia’s decision to drop its objections to the establishment of an independent UN body to attribute responsibility for chemical weapons attacks in Syria in exchange for guarantees of respect for the sovereignty of the Syrian regime may reflect an interest in pursuing this diplomatic track so long as its ‘red line’ is preserved.
The Syrian regime continues to face military setbacks from Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and rebel forces, which seized the regime’s Abu Dhuhur Military Airbase in eastern Idlib Province, taking advantage of a massive sandstorm that grounded the Syrian Air Force. The sandstorm also enabled ISIS to attack the strategic Jazal Oil Field in central Homs Province and the Deir ez-Zour Military Airbase in eastern Syria. Concurrently, the assassination – likely by the regime – of an anti-regime Druze sheikh in Suwayda Province in southern Syria triggered major demonstrations against the Syrian government which could drive further fractures among regime-supportive minority populations. The Syrian regime’s military campaign across Syria thus remains vulnerable, even though increased Russian and Iranian support could reverse the pace of its decline. Prominent European officials including the foreign Ministers of Austria and Britain also expressed support for the temporary retention of President Assad in a transition government for up to six months, highlighting a divergence with other European countries such as France which have listed the “neutralization” of President Assad as a pre-condition for any political solution to the Syrian Civil War.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Defense began a review intended to improve the train-and-equip program for moderate rebel fighters. The review follows an attack against the first vetted unit by Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra in late July. Options reportedly under consideration include providing additional intelligence to the trained fighters, increasing unit size, and inserting rebels into “safer terrain.” The withdrawal of Jabhat al-Nusra fighters from frontlines in northern Aleppo Province in early August may provide space for new U.S.-trained rebels to support local opposition forces in efforts to establish an “ISIS-free” zone along the Turkish border. Nonetheless, the program risks being outpaced by realities on the ground as ISIS continues its offensive targeting rebel forces in the same area, disrupting key opposition supply lines in the northern Aleppo countryside. Australia and France also announced the expansion of their air campaigns against ISIS into Syria. A British Royal Air Force drone also successfully targeted two British ISIS militants in ar-Raqqa City on August 31 in an apparent confirmation of expectations that Britain will also expand its involvement in Syria in the near future. Both the expansion of airstrikes and the softened position on President Assad may reflect growing pressure among European states to resolve the crisis in Syria as a result of the mounting refugee crisis in Europe.
See: “Syrian Rebel Forces Pressure Regime Heartland,” by Christopher Kozak, August 20, 2015; Turkey Expands Campaign against ISIS and the PKK,” by Christopher Kozak, July 25, 2015; “Rebels Launch New Offensive in Southern Syria,” by Jennifer Cafarella, July 2, 2015; “An Army in All Corners:” Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria, by Christopher Kozak, April 30, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Syria analysts Jennifer Cafarella or Chris Kozak here.