MESOP – ISW INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY: September 25 – October 2, 2015

Reviewing the Week – Compiled by Christopher Kozak and Daniel Pitcairn (ISW) /The report includes analysis on Russia in the Middle East, Iraq, Syria, ISIS + Kurdistan

Key Take-Away – The start of the Russian air campaign in Syria marks a dramatic step change in the Syrian Civil War and reflects a determined effort by Russian President Vladimir Putin to bolster his bargaining position ahead of any negotiations over a political resolution to the conflict. The majority of Russian airstrikes in the first two days of strikes reportedly targeted Syrian rebel factions in northwestern Syria rather than ISIS positions in the east of the country, revealing the immediate Russian priority to strengthen Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and ensure his role in any future political transition. U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter stated that the strikes were “tantamount to pouring gasoline on the fire,” and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry asserted that the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition will not abate and will instead “dramatically accelerate” its own airstrikes in Syria. The announcement of an “intelligence coordination center” in Baghdad with representatives from Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria also drew a negative U.S. verbal response, with Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work telling the Senate that the United States will not “provide any classified information that would help them on the battlefield.”

Although President Putin has publicly claimed that sending Russian ground troops to Syria is “out of the question,” evidence is growing that he is preparing a broader intervention. The Russian Black Sea Fleet conducted new naval exercises involving landing ships offshore from the expanding Russian naval facility at the Port of Tartus on the Syrian Coast, and Putin is apparently considering granting combatant status to Russian forces already in Syria. Meanwhile, U.S. defense officials and regional sources stated that Iran deployed several hundred combat troops to Syria as well as components of Iraqi Shi’a militias responsive to designated terrorists in order to participate in a major upcoming offensive with Russian air support. Russian and Iranian forces may direct their efforts towards seizing areas of northwestern Hama Province and southwestern Idlib Province that have been captured by rebel forces over recent months, removing a rebel threat to the regime heartland of Latakia Province. Russia may also intend to assist the Syrian regime in retaking the strategically and symbolically significant city of Palmyra in central Syria from ISIS, a move for which Russian state media is already conditioning the Russian public. These operations would likely spur ISIS to escalate its spectacular attacks in support of defensive operations in western Iraq and eastern Syria over the short term and will likely drive Syrian rebel factions closer to Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN).

The escalation of Russian military activity in the Middle East has also generated shifts in the diplomatic postures of multiple actors involved in the Syrian Civil War. Both the U.S. and Russia signaled a willingness to move towards a negotiated settlement. President Obama called for a “managed transition” away from Syrian President Bashar al-Assad during his September 28 speech before the UN General Assembly, and President Putin called on September 30 for President Assad to be prepared to take a “flexible position” and “compromise for the sake of his country.” The chorus of countries calling for a political resolution to the conflict in Syria is also growing louder. Leaders of multiple European countries have expressed support for an agreement which preserves the rule of President Assad for an undefined transition period, while the foreign ministers of Greece and Cyprus recently issued statements supporting efforts by Egypt to reach a political solution. Nonetheless, the Russian intervention in Syria has also hardened the positions of regional and international actors opposed to President Assad. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu reaffirmed that Turkey remains opposed to any political transition in Syria involving Assad due to the risk of forming a new “permanent status quo,” while Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir stressed that there are only “two options” for a settlement to the Syrian Civil War – a “political process” leading to a transition government or a “more lengthy and more destructive” military option which removes Assad from power. These tensions will likely come to the fore during a “contact group” meeting on Syria scheduled for October which involves Russia, Iran, the U.S., Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.

 

IRAQ

Russian presence in Iraq pressures U.S.-led coalition:  The U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition faces significant new hurdles as Russia opened an “intelligence coordination center” to work with Iraq, Syria, and Iran in Baghdad. On September 30, Russian “military experts” deployed to the center, which will reportedly coordinate airstrikes and ground operations in Syria. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee that the United States does not know what information Iraq may provide Russia under the new arrangement and that the United States would not share classified information that could benefit Russian, Syrian, or Iranian operations. This suggests that American-Iraqi intelligence sharing will likely decrease, potentially depriving Baghdad of valuable information on ISIS and the United States of actionable intelligence on targets for airstrikes. Moreover, PM Abadi stated that he “would welcome Russian airstrikes in Iraq” if Russia were to make a formal request to join the U.S.-led coalition. Subsequently, Abadi asserted that if Russia offered to conduct airstrikes in Iraq “we would consider it and I would welcome it” without mentioning the condition that Russia join the anti-ISIS coalition. He also expressed disappointment with the current level of Coalition air support. PM Abadi has been facing pressure from both Russia and Iranian proxies in Iraq that may be shaping his behavior, but he also likely seeks to drive the U.S.-led coalition to conduct more airstrikes by expressing his willingness to accept Russian support outside of the coalition framework. Unilateral Russian airstrikes could force the coalition either to adopt a higher risk tolerance, or to create a de facto division of territory and airspace into Russian and coalition zones. Secretary of State John Kerry noted that “all of the efforts need to be coordinated…this is not yet coordinated.

Peshmerga launch offensive southwest of Kirkuk: The Peshmerga captured thirteen ISIS-held villages near Hawija, southwest of Kirkuk, with air support from the U.S.-led international coalition. ISIS has historically used these villages to launch attacks on the city. The Kurdish Regional Government’s (KRG) Minister of Peshmerga Affairs reported that operations are designed to secure Kirkuk and nearby oil production facilities. For the KRG, holding the territory immediately surrounding Kirkuk is essential to maintaining control of the entire province, a long-standing Kurdish goal. If secured, the oil infrastructure would help make an independent Kurdish state economically viable. The Kurdish offensive doubles as a demonstration of force by the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition, which is continuing to operate in Iraq despite Russian overtures in Baghdad.

Shi‘a militia releases Turkish hostages after demands met: The remaining sixteen Turkish construction workers abducted by an Iranian proxy Shi’a militia on September 2 in Sadr City have been released and returned to Ankara after the abductors’ demands were met. The demands, which reflected Iranian interests, included guarantees of safe passage granted by Sunni militants in Syria to Shi’a civilians in two besieged Syrian villages. Earlier in September, the ISF engaged in a shootout with Kata’ib Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militia, in Baghdad while searching for the workers. The incidents underscore the impunity with which Iranian proxy militias operate throughout Iraq. They also demonstrate Iran’s willingness to work through Iraqi proxy groups in order to exert leverage over Turkey when it suits Iran’s interests. The fact that the hostages were released in conjunction with the establishment of a joint Russian-Iranian-Syrian-Iraqi headquarters in Baghdad also suggests that Iran feels empowered in the region, which may manifest itself in efforts to exert greater leverage over PM Abadi’s government.

See: “Confirmed Iranian Personnel Sightings in Iraq: October 2014 – October 2015,” by Andrew Haddad and ISW Iraq Team, October 2, 2015; “Warning Update: Iran and Iraqi Shi’a Militias Deploy Ground Forces in Syria,” by Christopher Kozak, October 1, 2015; “Iraq Situation Report: September 26 – October 1, 2015“; “Iraq Situation Report: September 22-25, 2015“; “Regional Conflict Between Iran and Turkey Manifests Itself in Iraq,” by Sinan Adnan, September 12, 2015; “Iraq Control of Terrain Map: September 11, 2015“; “Kata’ib Hezbollah and Iranian Proxies Challenge Iraq’s Proposed National Guard Law,” by Sinan Adnan, September 8, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Iraq expert Patrick Martin or ISIS expert Jessica Lewis McFate here.

 

SYRIA

Russia begins air campaign in Syria: Russia entered a new phase of its operations in Syria with the start of an air campaign in support of the Syrian regime. Russian warplanes conducted multiple sorties against positions held by Syrian rebel factions including Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in Idlib, Hama, and Homs Provinces in northwestern Syria as well as several ISIS positions in ar-Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour Provinces. The decision to concentrate airstrikes against areas not controlled by ISIS highlights Russia’s clear intent to bolster the position of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad rather than prioritize the fight against ISIS. U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter stated that the Russian airstrikes were “tantamount to pouring gasoline on the fire” of the Syrian Civil War, and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry asserted that the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition will “dramatically accelerate” its own airstrikes against ISIS. Russian Chief of Staff Sergei Ivanov stated that the air operations would be temporary and not involve Russian ground forces, while Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that airstrikes would continue as long as the Syrian Army was “on the offensive.” These comments came amidst reports that hundreds of Iranian troops have deployed to northwestern Syria in preparation for an offensive into Idlib Province, which Jabhat al-Nusra has controlled since April 2015.

Russia and Iran push Syrian regime as partner against ISIS: Russia paired the start of its air operations in Syria with political effort to assert the necessity of cooperation with the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. On September 28, President Putin delivered his first speech before the UN General Assembly in over ten years in which he stated that it would be an “enormous mistake” to refuse to work with the Syrian Army in the fight against terrorism and called for the formation of a new anti-terrorism coalition which included Russia, Iran, and the Syrian regime. Russia later chaired a UN Security Council ministerial meeting on September 30 and circulated a draft resolution pressing for coordination between “all forces” fighting ISIS. Russia also opened an “intelligence coordination center” in Baghdad with participation from Iran, Syria, and Iraq in order to coordinate operations against ISIS, raising the possibility that intelligence shared with Iraq may be passed to U.S. adversaries. These Russian initiatives have received strong support from Iran, which has remained a strong supporter of President Assad and repeatedly stressed the need for a “united front” against extremism in the Middle East. Although both Russia and Iran have signaled some degree of willingness to negotiate the eventual departure of Assad – with President Putin asserting that Assad must be “flexible…for the sake of his country” – both have argued that the fight against ISIS and other terrorist groups takes priority over political reforms and the pathway for an agreement on the fate of the Syrian leader remains distant. These tensions will likely be on display during an announced “contact group” meeting in October between Russia, Iran, the U.S., Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.

Anti-regime actors reassert stance against Assad: Several regional and international powers opposed to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad intensified their rhetoric in response to increased Russian support for the Syrian regime. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu reaffirmed that Turkey remains opposed to any political transition in Syria involving Assad, warning that such an arrangement would risk turning into a “permanent status quo.” Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir stressed that there are only “two options” for a settlement to the Syrian Civil War – a “political process” leading to a transition government or a “more lengthy and more destructive” military option which removes Assad from power. Meanwhile, France reportedly announced the opening of a criminal probe against the Syrian regime for alleged crimes against humanity and stated that French officials are actively considering the establishment of one or more “safe zones” in northern Syria in cooperation with unspecified “partners.” These announcements came shortly after France announced that its warplanes conducted their first anti-ISIS airstrikes in Syria on September 27. Strong statements released by several countries criticizing the Russian intervention on behalf of the Syrian regime also likely reflect attempts to assert a unified position against Assad in light of the new status quo. On October 2, the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, France, Germany, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia released a joint statement expressing their “deep concern” with Russian airstrikes, claiming that the strikes “led to civilian casualties…did not target [ISIS]…and will only fuel more extremism and radicalization.” This declaration may represent a verbal effort by nations opposed to the Syrian regime to stress the solidarity of their position amidst earlier signs of softening positions towards the timeline for the removal of Assad from power.

See: “Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 – October 1, 2015,” by Genevieve Casagrande, October 2, 2015; “Warning Update: Iran and Iraqi Shi’a Militias Deploy Ground Forces in Syria,” by Christopher Kozak and Sinan Adnan, October 1, 2015; “Warning Update: Russia Expanding Facilities at Tartus Naval Base,” by Christopher Kozak with Hugo Spaulding and Daniel Urchick, September 30, 2015; “Russia’s First Reported Airstrikes in Syria Assist Regime with Targeting Broader Opposition,” by ISW Research Team, September 30, 2015; “International Community’s Opinions on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,” by ISW Research Team, September 30, 2015; “Russia Ushers in a New Era of Global Geopolitics,” Frederick Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, September 27, 2015; “Perspectives on the Syrian Civil War: September 27, 2015,” by Genevieve Casagrande, September 27, 2015; “New Russian Activity in Syria: Istamo Weapon Storage Facility SE of Latakia,” by ISW and AllSource Analysis, September 24, 2015; “Russian Deployments at Al-Assad Airport in Syria,” by ISW and AllSource Analysis, September 24, 2015; “Forecasting the Syrian Civil War,” by Christopher Kozak, Jennifer Cafarella, and the ISW Syria Team, September 17, 2015; “Russian Deployment in Syria: Putin’s Middle East Game Changer,” by Hugo Spaulding, Christopher Kozak, Christopher Harmer, Daniel Urchick, Jessica Lewis-McFate, Jennifer Cafarella, Harleen Gambhir, and Kimberly Kagan, September 17, 2015; “Control of Terrain in Syria: September 14, 2015“. Direct press or briefing requests for Syria analysts Jennifer Cafarella or Chris Kozak here.