MESOP ISW INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY OF THE WEEK : KURDISTAN – IRAQ & SYRIA

ISW INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY: July 25-August 3, 2015 – Reviewing the Week – Compiled by Christopher Kozak

Key Take-Away – The approach of the 25th anniversary of the Persian Gulf War on August 2 provides a notable reflection of history as the U.S. attempts to balance the interests of a diverse coalition of global and local partners against a common adversary in the Middle East. Successful U.S. efforts to negotiate an expanded Turkish role in the anti-ISIS coalition face consequences on the ground after Turkey launched a campaign of airstrikes targeting the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Iraq concurrent with its operations against ISIS in northern Syria. This aerial campaign complicated U.S.-led coalition support for the PKK-linked Syrian Kurdish YPG against ISIS and fueled political turmoil in Iraqi Kurdistan, which threatens to widen the divide between rival Kurdish political parties. NATO held an emergency session on July 28 to discuss the security situation along the Turkish border after Turkey invoked Article IV of the Washington Treaty to call for consultations with NATO member-states. Although NATO members including the U.S. repeatedly emphasized their respect for Turkey’s right to respond to terrorism, these developments threaten to undermine U.S. efforts to leverage Kurds in both Iraq and Syria as some of the only effective ground partners in the fight against ISIS and some U.S. officials have urged Turkey to “de-escalate” the current round of clashes with the PKK.

Nonetheless, the opportunity to leverage Turkey in order to limit the flow of foreign fighters to ISIS through Syria is a major step forward for the anti-ISIS coalition. The targeting of the first batch of moderate Syrian rebels graduating from the U.S. Department of Defense-led train-and-equip program by Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) provides further illustration of the limited options available to counter ISIS on the ground in Syria. Although U.S. President Barack Obama authorized broader rules of engagement in response to this threat permitting defensive airstrikes against any party that attacks U.S.-backed rebel forces, a significant portion of the first batch of U.S.-trained rebels have been killed, captured, or otherwise rendered combat ineffective. This lack of local partners in Syria appears particular concerning given continued expansion by ISIS, JN, and other Salafi-jihadist groups operating in the country as well as an admission by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on July 26 that the Syrian Army faces manpower “shortfalls,” which have led the Syrian regime to prioritize the defense of its core terrain at the expense of other regions of the country.

More broadly, the U.S. also confronts multiple demands from allied states for additional assistance in the face of intensified aggression from global adversaries. Even as U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey, and other senior U.S. officials testified before the U.S. Senate in support of the nuclear accord with Iran, the U.S. State Department approved a deal to provide Saudi Arabia with 600 new Patriot missiles in a $5.4 billion deal widely viewed as a measure to bolster Saudi support for the nuclear negotiations.

 IRAQU.S. NATO ally Turkey began a campaign of airstrikes targeting positions of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Iraq last week. The U.S. response to the Turkish air campaign against the PKK has been supportive of Turkey’s right to target “terrorist groups” in self-defense but also urged “de-escalation” between Turkey and the PKK. Chief of Staff of the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve Gen. Kevin Killea confirmed that Turkey is “a very strong partner in the [anti-ISIS] coalition” and stated that Turkish airstrikes in northern Iraq have “minimal” impact on Operation Inherent Resolve. The PKK is respectively an ally and a rival of the two major Iraqi Kurdish political parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Turkish airstrikes against the group have further distanced the two factions. The KDP issued a request that the PKK move its “combat sites” out of Iraqi Kurdistan in the context of the ongoing Turkish airstrikes, while the PUK and its splinter party Gorran condemned Turkish actions and called upon the international community to halt the Turkish strikes. The KDP and the PUK both serve as effective ground partners of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition, with U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter describing the Iraqi Peshmerga as a “model” for what the U.S. is “trying to achieve” in Iraq during Peshmerga during a visit of Arbil in northern Iraq on July 24. Iraqi Kurdish fragmentation thus has the potential to undermine U.S. efforts to combat ISIS in Iraq and undermine the overall stability of northern Iraq during a critical political juncture for the region after the PUK and Gorran recently increased their cooperation to push fundamental reforms that would reorganize the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) from a presidential to a parliamentary system. These changes essentially challenge the position of KDP leader and president of Iraqi Kurdistan Masoud Barzani as his presidential term approaches its expiration on August 20.

 

Meanwhile, U.S. CENTCOM commander Gen. Lloyd Austin visited Baghdad in a clear sign of U.S. support which marks the third visit of a senior U.S. official to the country since the commencement of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)-led operations to recapture the capital of Anbar Province, Ramadi. Although the ISF have not made major gains in the city since the start of operations in July 13, the operation is moving in a positive direction as the ISF seized Anbar University south of the city in addition to areas north and east of Ramadi. At the same time, the operational tempo of Iranian proxy forces around Fallujah has largely decreased, indicating either that operations halted in the face of staunch resistance by ISIS or that the proxies have adjusted their goal from clearing Fallujah to merely isolating the city. Gen. Killea confirmed that the ISF are currently in the isolation phase of operations in Ramadi, but did not elaborate on a timeframe for the start of clearing operations in the city. Gen. Killea also confirmed with regards to the “Popular Mobilization” that the U.S.-led coalition will provide support only to forces which report directly to the “chain of command” in the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Other fronts in Iraq have remained relatively static throughout the week. The town of Baiji in northern Iraq remains contested with multiple ISIS asymmetric attacks targeting ISF and militia forces in the area, while neither the Kurdish Peshmerga nor ISIS have launched major offensive efforts along frontlines in Ninewa and Kirkuk Provinces. No major attacks by ISIS occurred in Salah ad-Din, Diyala, or Baghdad, though these provinces remain active fronts on which attacks by ISIS are expected. Meanwhile, ongoing demonstrations in Baghdad expressing public anger against poor public services and corruption have generally remained peaceful. The protests have primarily targeted the Council of Representatives (CoR) and the Electricity Minister as well as local governments throughout southern Iraq. Although these protests occurred in close proximity to the Green Zone in central Baghdad, the ISF has so-far responded nonviolently under the orders of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, giving no indications of a greater political movement at this time. 

See: “Iraq Situation Report: July 28-30, 2015“; “Iraq Situation Report: July 24-27, 2015“; “The Resurgence of ISIS in Diyala and its Implications for Iranian Proxies,” by Sinan Adnan and Jessica Lewis McFate, July 25, 2015; “Control of Terrain in Iraq: July 20, 2015“;. Direct press or briefing requests for Iraq analysts Sinan Adnan and Theodore Bell or ISIS expert Jessica Lewis McFate here. 

 

  SYRIA

 

NATO held an extraordinary session on July 28 to address declining security along the Syrian-Turkish border after Turkey invoked Article IV of the Washington Treaty. NATO affirmed its solidarity with the Turkish government in the face of recent terrorist attacks inside Turkey by ISIS and the PKK, and the U.S. State Department repeatedly emphasized Turkey’s right to respond to terrorism. Nonetheless, several NATO member-states including the U.S. urged Turkey to curb its air campaign targeting positions of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Iraq. The Turkish campaign against the PKK launched concurrently with expanded Turkish action against ISIS in Syria places the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in a complicated position, as the PKK-linked Syrian Kurdish YPG currently comprises the most effective coalition ground partner in Syria. This tension also comes amidst continued uncertainty regarding the exact parameters of U.S.-Turkish cooperation to clear ISIS from the Turkish border in Aleppo Province in northwestern Syria. Senior U.S. officials including State Department spokesperson John Kirby tempered expectations regarding previous statements that the U.S.-led coalition intends to establish a “safe zone” or “ISIS-free zone” in northern Syria, emphasizing that the U.S.-led coalition solely agreed to clear ISIS from Aleppo Province without providing guarantees to permanently protect civilians or prevent regime airstrikes in the region. This caution likely reflects concerns that military operations to effectively clear ISIS from the border region would require further negotiations to agree upon a Syrian rebel ground partner acceptable to both the U.S. and Turkey despite Turkish support to more hardline Islamist factions.

Meanwhile, the limitations of the strategy currently employed by the U.S. in its own efforts to establish a moderate ground partner in northern Syria were highlighted after Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) attacked the headquarters of a rebel faction participating in the U.S. Department of Defense-led train-and-equip program and kidnapped the group’s commander, prompting the U.S. to conduct several airstrikes against JN positions in Aleppo Province in retaliation. Anonymous U.S. defense officials later stated that U.S. President Barack Obama approved broader rules of engagement in response to this incident authorizing defensive airstrikes to protect U.S.-backed rebels from aggression from any party, including ISIS, JN, and the Syrian regime. Nonetheless, a significant portion of the first batch of U.S.-trained rebels have been killed, captured, or forced to retreat into Kurdish-held areas of northwestern Syria. The failure to protect these moderate rebels from threats outside of ISIS further reduces the appeal of the train-and-equip program to other rebel factions and could lead the U.S. to instead explore cooperation against ISIS with Islamist groups such as Ahrar al-Sham who possess close ties to Turkey.

This blow to U.S. policy in Syria came even as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad acknowledged that the Syrian Army faces a “shortfall of human capacity” in a televised speech on July 26 and issued a general amnesty for deserters and draft-dodgers who reenlist in the military. Assad also stated that his regime is “obliged in certain circumstances” to abandon regions of the country in order to prioritize core regime terrain, in an admission that the pro-regime forces cannot indefinitely sustain Assad’s “army in all corners” strategy to maintain outposts throughout northern, eastern, and southern Syria. In an illustration of this weakness, JN-led Islamist rebel forces seized at least twelve villages and military positions in the al-Ghab Plain south of Jisr al-Shughour in Idlib Province on July 27, placing rebel forces at the gateway to the Alawite-majority regime heartland of coastal Latakia Province. The remaining regime positions in Hasaka, Deir ez-Zour, Aleppo, and Dera’a Provinces also appear increasingly tenuous amidst increasing pressure from the YPG, ISIS, and Syrian rebels. Nonetheless, despite these mounting indicators of regime retrenchment, the U.S. and its coalition allies appear ill-prepared to prevent further losses by the Syrian regime from turning into substantial gains for both ISIS and JN throughout Syria.

See: “Turkey Expands Campaign against ISIS and the PKK,” by Christopher Kozak, July 25, 2015; “Significant Offensives in Syria: June 6 – July 9, 2015,” by Christopher Kozak and Genevieve Casagrande, July 9, 2015; “Rebels Launch New Offensive in Southern Syria,” by Jennifer Cafarella, July 2, 2015; “An Army in All Corners:” Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria, by Christopher Kozak, April 30, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Syria analysts Jennifer Cafarella or Chris Kozak here.

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