MESOP : ISW INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY: October 24-30, 2015 – Kurdistan – Syria – Iraq & Russia in Middle East

Reviewing the Week – Compiled by Christopher Kozak & Daniel Pitcairn –  This report is derived from open sources collected and processed at ISW during the reporting period. The report includes analysis on Iraq, Syria, ISIS, Kurdistan.

Key Take-Away – Russia strengthened its position in the Middle East and Europe. Moscow successfully lobbied to include its regional partner Iran in multilateral talks on the Syrian Civil War held in Vienna on October 30. Iran has never been invited to a major international conference on the conflict in Syria. The talks in Vienna also involved traditional U.S. partners such as Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan that have recently been drawn closer to Russia through arms sales and establishment of joint “mechanisms” to coordinate efforts against ISIS and its affiliates in the region. The discussions in Vienna reportedly centered upon a plan to enact a ceasefire in Syria within the next six months followed by a transitional government featuring both Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and members of the Syrian opposition. The inclusion of Iran and the general contours of the talks demonstrate that Russia is successfully generating a negotiating environment favorable to its strategic objectives, including the expansion of its great power status and the preservation of President Assad for as long as possible. Russian operations to destabilize former Soviet states in Eastern Europe also paid political dividends for Russia this week. Pro-Russian political blocs won local elections in several key cities throughout southern and eastern Ukraine. The gains demonstrate Russia’s ability to strengthen its political leverage over Ukraine without escalating military operations in the separatist Donbas Region. Russia can restart military escalation once its political leverage diminishes or achieves its interim objectives. Meanwhile, the parliament of Moldova voted to oust the pro-European coalition government in a no confidence motion led by the pro-Russian opposition. Russia has also been accused of facilitating anti-government protests against the pro-Western government of Montenegro.

The U.S. took new steps to compete with Russian outreach throughout Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. U.S. President Barack Obama authorized numerous measures to intensify the anti-ISIS campaign in Iraq and Syria and continues to weigh additional options. The U.S. established a new Special Operations Task Force in Arbil in Iraqi Kurdistan and dispatched U.S. Special Operations Forces to assist Syrian Kurdish and allied tribal fighters against ISIS in northern Syria. The U.S. Air Force ordered four surveillance aircraft to deploy to Jordan to help combat the cross-border threat posed by ISIS. The U.S also ordered additional air assets to Incirlik Airbase in Turkey. In North Africa, the U.S. conducted high-profile deliveries of military assistance to Egypt, including F-16 fighter jets and parts for M1A1 tanks. The White House has also considered establishing a ‘no-fly zone’ over Syria and may be considering embedding advisors with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) at the brigade level. A more muscular anti-ISIS policy could help the U.S. counter Russian offers of military assistance that threaten U.S. influence in Iraq and the wider Middle East. The push for intensified action in the anti-ISIS campaign also comes in response to widespread concern regarding the resiliency demonstrated by ISIS and the slow pace of ongoing operations. U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter detailed the revamped counter-ISIS strategy as a focus on the “three R’s – Raqqa, Ramadi, and Raids” in testimony on October 27. The strategy calls for the U.S. to enable offensives by local ground forces against the ISIS-held cities of ar-Raqqa in Syria and Ramadi in Iraq while maintaining a heightened tempo of airstrikes and Special Operations Forces raids throughout both countries. The intensification is noteworthy, but does not constitute a fundamental change in strategy. The U.S. and its allies are meanwhile preparing to respond to intensified Russian activity within the former Soviet sphere. NATO reportedly plans to increase its troop presence in Poland and the Baltics to counter Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry will make official visits to all five former Soviet republics in Central Asia from November 1-3 for the first time in U.S. history amidst the ongoing expansion of Russian military influence in the region.

Russia continues to set military conditions in Syria by shipping Iranian weapons to the regime and expanding its air campaign south. Russian cargo planes have been ferrying Iranian weapons to Syria on behalf of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps for the past ten days in violation of UN Security Council embargos, according to anonymous Western intelligence officials.Russian warplanes also reportedly conducted airstrikes near the Israeli-held Syrian Golan Heights on October 28, the first since the air campaign began on September 30. If confirmed, Russian activity in southern Syria could signal deepening cooperation with Israel and Jordan after the two countries established independent coordination “mechanisms” with Russia on September 21 and October 23, respectively. The airstrikes could alternatively help Iran posture against Israel and possibly Jordan. Russia may intend to support pro-regime forces likely led by Hezbollah in attempts to seize terrain along the Golan Heights border, including a Russian signals intelligence (SIGINT) facility captured by rebel forces in October 2014. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon warned of the risk posed by Iranian attempts to position Hezbollah along the Golan Heights during a joint press conference with U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter at the National Defense University on October 28. Ya’alon also cautioned that Israel would act to enforce its three “red lines” including the violation of Israeli sovereignty and the delivery of advanced weapons or chemical agents to “rogue elements” such as Hezbollah. Ya’alon nonetheless expressed confidence that Israel remains “free to operate” in order to protect its interests, suggesting that Russian involvement in southern Syria does not currently threaten Israeli priorities.

See: “Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 – October 28, 2015,” by Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola, October 30, 2015; “Russian Military Activity: October 21-27, 2015,” by Hugo Spaulding, October 27, 2015; Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare, by Maria Snegovaya, September 21, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Russia and Ukraine analyst Hugo Spaulding or Syria analyst Chris Kozak here.

An ISIS counteroffensive against the Syrian regime’s supply line to Aleppo City disrupted the regime’s offensive against Syrian rebels in Aleppo. ISIS seized multiple checkpoints along the primary ground line of communication from Hama City to regime-held portions of Aleppo Province on October 23. The gains both constrict the ability of pro-regime forces to deploy reinforcements to northern Syria and position ISIS to attack deeper into regime-held terrain north of Damascus. ISIS later attacked the northern outskirts of the key regime-held town of Safira southeast of Aleppo City on October 26. Safira is a hub for Iranian military activity in Syria and contains facilities involved in the production of chemical weapons and “barrel bombs”. ISIS is unlikely to seize Safira, which is heavily fortified due to its strategic importance to both Iran and the Syrian regime. Nonetheless, the attack on Safira presents a major challenge to the regime following the closure of the primarily ground route for resupply during ISIS’s earlier advances. ISIS’s gains demonstrate the limited military capabilities of the Syrian regime despite increased support from both Russia and Iran. The clashes near Safira also disrupted the ongoing ground offensives by pro-regime forces against rebel-held terrain in the southern countryside of Aleppo and ISIS-held positions surrounding the besieged regime-held Kuweires Airbase. The fierce fighting in northern Syria prompted Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) deputy commander Gen. Hossein Salami to give a public statement on October 27 justifying increased Iranian casualties following the deaths of several prominent IRGC commanders in Aleppo and Hama Provinces.

Turkey prepares to head to the polls in politically-charged early elections on November 1. Turkish President Recep Erdogan called this week for Turkish voters to elect his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and allow it to form a “single-party government”. The AKP lost its thirteen-year-long parliamentary majority during June 2015 elections, forcing Erdogan to enter negotiations to form a coalition government. The weak performance by the AKP stemmed in part from historic gains that led the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) to claim its first seats in the Turkish Parliament. Erdogan called for new elections after negotiations to form a coalition government failed in August. Erdogan likely expects that recent clashes between the AKP-led Turkish government and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) will undermine popular support for the HDP and enable the AKP to reclaim its majority. Initial polling suggests, however, that the November 1 elections will be equally inconclusive, forcing a second round of negotiations to form a coalition government. The final composition of the Turkish Parliament will have major implications for the Syrian Civil War. Turkey currently provides important bases for U.S. forces in the anti-ISIS coalition as well as financial and military support to rebels fighting the Syrian regime. The main Turkish opposition parties have called for a more moderate policy that would be open to talks with both the Syrian Kurds and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, current ‘red lines’ for the Turkish government under Erdogan. The formation of a coalition government would likely force Erdogan to temper his policies on Syria.

See: “Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 – October 28, 2015,” by Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola, October 30, 2015; “ISIS Contests Regime Supply Line to Aleppo City,” by Christopher Kozak, October 28, 2015; “Update: International Community’s Position on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,” by Christopher Kozak, October 24, 2015. “Regime and Iranian Officials Launch Multi-Pronged Offensive in Aleppo,” by Christopher Kozak, October 21, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Syria analysts Jennifer Cafarella or Chris Kozak here.

President Obama may seek to leverage a more muscular anti-ISIS policy to dissuade Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi from deepening Iraq’s cooperation with Russia. Abadi faces pressure from his political constituency, which intensely distrusts the U.S. and persistently calls for Iranian and Russian support to supplant the U.S.-led coalition. Abadi’s spokesperson stressed on October 28 that Baghdad had not requested the involvement of the U.S. in ground operations, underscoring the difficult balance that Abadi must strike in order to maintain his position as prime minister while receiving sufficient assistance to defeat ISIS. Increased activity by the U.S. or its coalition allies may also provoke backlash from Iranian proxy militias, who have repeatedly threatened to target U.S. personnel and pro-Western political actors in Iraq if the coalition becomes more involved in the anti-ISIS fight.

Maliki and his allies confront Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi about reforms. Salary cuts for government employees appear unlikely following major criticism from federal employees, members of Abadi’s parliamentary coalition from the State of Law Alliance (SLA), and the spokesperson of the Shi’a religious authority Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The new salary scale would significantly decrease wages for public employees, who constitute at least 40% of the Iraqi workforce. The Iraqi government faces a severe shortfall in funds due to the dramatic decrease in crude oil prices. The negative public response to Abadi’s proposed salary cuts is emboldening former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and his supporters. Maliki, currently one of Abadi’s vice presidents, is positioning himself to regain power should Abadi fail. Maliki openly stated that the reform packages had “no legal force”. At least forty-five SLA members who support former Prime Minister Maliki also threatened to withdraw Abadi’s mandate as prime minister if he did not concede to their demands to consult with political parties on the reforms within seventy-two hours. Maliki does not currently possess sufficient support in the Council of Representatives (CoR) to hold a vote of no-confidence against Abadi. The threat issued by Maliki and supporting members of SLA nevertheless underscores the intense pressure Abadi faces within his own political bloc as he seeks to reform the Iraqi government, manage Iraq’s faltering economy, and defeat ISIS with dwindling resources. The opposition to the salary scale expressed by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s representative may accelerate the fractures among Shi’a political parties if they perceive that the religious leader’s support for Abadi is diminishing.

ISIS continued to conduct lethal operations amidst gains by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). ISIS attacked positions held by the ISF and the ‘Popular Mobilization’ near Baiji, Fallujah, Sinjar, and Samarra even as the ISF and Shi’a militia forces solidified control of Baiji and its environs after seizing the area last week. ISIS likely seeks to capitalize on opportunities to reopen the Baiji front. Iranian proxy militias that played a large role in the operations in Baiji will likely refocus their efforts on other forward operations, particularly north of Baiji and in eastern Anbar Province. These shifts could leave Baiji vulnerable to another attack by ISIS. Progress in ongoing operations to retake Ramadi remains limited. Operation Inherent Resolve spokesperson Colonel Steve Warren reported that the ISF are regrouping on all “five axes of attack” in Ramadi but did not provide a timeframe for the recapture of the city.  Meanwhile, ISIS conducted Suicide Vest (SVEST) and Suicide Vehicle-Borne IED (SVBIED) attacks on civilians in several areas including Baghdad, Tuz Khurmato in eastern Salah ad-Din Province, and the Shi’a shrine city of Samarra. The blasts corresponded with the major Shi’a religious holiday of Ashura. The attacks demonstrate that ISIS maintains the capacity to operate far from its core terrain even as it suffers military setbacks and the loss of territory.

See: “Iraq Control of Terrain Map: October 30, 2015“; “Iraq Situation Report: October 21-26, 2015“; “Political Crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan Escalates into Violence,” by Patrick Martin, October 12, 2015; “Iraqi Security Forces Launch New Offensive in Ramadi,” by Patrick Martin, October 8, 2015; “Iraq After Russian Intervention in Syria,” by Patrick Martin, October 7, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Iraq expert Patrick Martin or ISIS expert Jessica Lewis McFate here.