MESOP : Interview with Professor Ziya Öniş: Explaining the Politics behind Turkey’s Stormy Year
Author: Research Turkey -30. 8 2014 – Assessment of a Turbulent Year in Turkey Series – I
Any observer of Turkish politics will tell you that the past 12 months have been replete with momentous turning points and critical junctures. Beginning last May, the Gezi Park protests, the corruption investigations, local elections of 2014 March, and the Soma mine tragedy made headlines worldwide. The key events, however, did not just take place in domestic politics. Turkey’s continuing involvement in Syria’s civil war and its implications for Turkey together with the developments in Iraq has had wide-reaching consequences. Additionally, there were moments in the past year where the domestic and the international politics intersected, such as in the Reyhanlı bombing, the decision to shoot down a Syrian jet, and the EU’s criticism of the government’s internet restrictions. What do these diverse events mean for Turkey’s politics? And – perhaps more importantly – what would occur in the near future with respect to Turkey’s foreign and domestic spheres?
In order to better understand the context and meaning of these events, the Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (Research Turkey) interviewed an expert on Turkey’s political economy. A member of Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (Research Turkey)’s Advisory Board and Professor of International Relations at Koç University, Ziya Öniş analysed Turkey’s political events and trends by taking into account both domestic and international implications. In our interview, Professor Öniş delved into the underlying significance of what made news since last May as he took us through Turkey’s pivotal 12 months.
Professor Öniş went into great detail to explain the aforementioned topics and also gave his predictions for where Turkish politics is heading. He spoke about the need for what he called a U-turn in Turkish foreign policy, using Turkey’s involvement into politics of Syria as an example of how Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) strategy went awry. Professor Öniş also suggested factors that contributed to the AKP’s ability to weather corruption allegations and triumph in March’s local elections. Additionally, he gave a nuanced take on the AKP government’s redistributive policies, emphasizing that the AKP has both exclusionary and inclusionary practices. Finally, Professor Öniş outlined two potential governments under President Erdoğan; one where Erdoğan, victorious in his run for president in August, could change the office to be more proactive and another where Erdoğan’s presidency may allow the AKP to become more moderate.
Synopsis of the Interview
“Gezi Park protests are perceived very differently by different segments of Turkish society. For example, the opposition sees this as a major turning point, as a major positive step forward in Turkey’s democratization. The government perception is that it is an attempt by the minority to regain power.”
“Gezi is also important in terms of highlighting the mutual fears of different segments of society and showing the polarization and what I call the gated communities in Turkey, communities which are increasingly in conflict with one another. This is perhaps not a new phenomenon in Turkish politics but it has been aggravated in the recent period.”
“One of the ironies is that there does not seem to be any organic link between the protests and the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP), which is the party closest in terms of sympathy with the Gezi Park protests. The two appear to be quite independent. And one of the paradoxes is that the CHP has not been able to capitalize on Gezi Park in electoral terms.”
“In the context of Arab Spring with Turkey trying to position itself as the promoter of democracy, what we observe is Turkey being over-engaged, over-active in regional politics.”“Although the AKP continues to maintain its broad electoral popularity, what we observe is a large segment of the electorate is quite critical of Turkey’s Syria policy.”“I think there is a realization that this over-engagement has backfired and Turkey needs to be more subdued, more pragmatic in its approach.”
“Although politicians and experts in Ankara would not openly admit that the Syrian policy has been a failure or Egyptian policy has been a failure, the term often used in Ankara these days is a ‘reset’ in Turkish foreign policy which I would interpret as a pragmatic U-turn.”
“I think what we see in the context of those corruption allegations is a very striking and interesting split between two key elements, which are the AKP elites and the Gülen movement in Turkey and representatives of the Gülen movement.”
“One interpretation is that these allegations represent a clash of interests between different segments of the new elites and a power struggle. But there is also, at the same time, growing elements of crony capitalism in Turkey, meaning that increasingly, wealth depends on close access to leadership and to the government.”
“At one level, I think the AKP era is a huge success story in the sense of bringing socially inclusive development to Turkey, meaning that with economic growth, low inflation and with redistributive policies in the areas of health, education, public transport, and local services, a large number of people have benefited from this process.”“The essential challenge is what would happen if the AKP is not able to maintain the growth rates of the early era, where growth was taking place at 7 and 8 percent per annum.”
“I think we can interpret the constraints on press freedom – the ban on Twitter, YouTube – all these elements are part of the same picture of trying to limit opposition, trying to compress the space for the opposition in Turkey.”
“As long as the economy is succeeding and as long as you have large segments of people who are committed to the AKP, not only in terms of economic benefits but in terms of being close to their own identity, these external criticisms are not able to have much impact at a time when the EU membership process is in total collapse and when the EU itself is in a deep economic and identity crisis.”
“The impetus for change, for democratization, for reversing this backsliding will have to come internally. You may see… Gezi Park protests were a part of this process of reversing the backslide. But, as I was arguing, it will not be possible as social protests alone.”
“The benign scenario would be that when Erdoğan becomes president under a parliamentary system, his powers will be more restricted, and he will act differently now as the President of the whole country rather than the party leader and the incentive structure facing him will change.”
“The alternative scenario is that President Erdoğan is able to change the constitution through his control over the party, and moves Turkey in a more Putin-style presidential system and this could be a dangerous route for Turkey.”
“Corruption is penalized in the Turkish context when there is a major economic crisis.”
“If corruption allegations are directed toward a person within your group, you still do not react because it is like somebody in your family being involved – you do not want to penalize someone in your family. If it is from the other side, you are very sensitive. If the corruption scandal happened, for example, in the CHP, then the reaction would be different.”
“Most scholars, analysts, and journalists are either critical and focus on the negative elements or are 100 percent supportive and focus on the positive elements but the AKP trajectory – the AKP story – is a mixture of exclusion and inclusion.”“It is quite clear – Turkey has been doing this – which the way forward is to be extremely critical of militant Sunni activism. This is the way for Turkey to show that we are not in favour of this just because they are Sunnis; this is not permissible. And cooperation with Iran is also a positive development as a way of overcoming this notion of Turkey and Iran being on different sides on the basis of sectarian conflict.”
Full Text of the Interview
Professor Öniş, thank you for taking the time to interview with the Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (Research Turkey). We would like to hear your thoughts on the tumultuous year Turkey has had, starting with Gezi Park protests last May and moving into the civil war in Syria, the local elections, corruption allegations, and some of the other events that have taken place between then and now. It has officially been one year since the Gezi Park protests began. To what extent do you think these protests have changed politics in Turkey?
That is a very good question; I have also been trying to think about how much impact did the Gezi Park protests have on Turkish politics. Let me say that these protests were an extremely important turning point in Turkish politics in the following sense. They represented a spontaneous reaction, if you like, to growing authoritarianism in Turkey and they were also important in terms of representing the reaction of young people, especially secular young people, concerned with the fact that with the growing conservatism of Turkish society, the living space for various groups, especially the secular – but not only the secular people, other minorities as well – has been compressed. So it was an important reaction from below at a time when organized opposition in Turkey has been quite weak and unable to contest the growing power and dominance of the AKP government. But how much impact, beyond that, did Gezi Park have on the substance I am not sure. In the sense that the protests did not significantly undermine the electoral power of AKP, when you look at the March municipal elections, there is a decline of AKP’s vote from about 50 percent to 43 percent, but 43 percent is still a large majority and has not, therefore, reduced the confidence of Erdoğan and the AKP elites about their own position. Gezi Park also, to my mind, illustrated the polarization of Turkish society. I have been trying to follow the newspapers; newspapers that are close to the government and newspapers that are more critical (which are increasingly few in number) and you see how Gezi Park is perceived very differently by different segments of Turkish society. For example, the opposition sees this as a major turning point, as a major positive step forward in Turkey’s democratization. The government perception is that it is an attempt by the minority to regain power. So, the Prime Minister has effectively used this kind of argument within his own constituency to say that over the past 9 years, religious, conservative people in Turkey have been liberated; they were the underdogs but they now enjoy certain privileges like wearing the headscarf. Now, what the secularists want is a return back to the days of Old Turkey, if you like. This is often the rhetoric that is used, ‘Old Turkey’ vs. ‘New Turkey’. So, one side sees that Gezi represents the position of the secularists, the growing repression of the minority by the majority. From the other side, it represents the possible comeback of the minority to reclaim the rights and sort of push the majority out of power. One side sees Erdoğan’s position as a very limited majoritarian understanding but Erdoğan thinks that he has the majority, and the danger is that if you are lenient, if you are tolerant, then the minority will come back, and often gives reference to the Menderes era and to what happened in Egypt after the Egyptian coup in the summer of 2013. So, Gezi is also important in terms of highlighting the mutual fears of different segments of society and showing the polarization and what I call the gated communities in Turkey, communities which are increasingly in conflict with one another. This is perhaps not a new phenomenon in Turkish politics but it has been aggravated in the recent period.
“Gezi Park is perceived very differently by different segments of Turkish society. For example, the opposition sees this as a major turning point, as a major positive step forward in Turkey’s democratization. The government perception is that it is an attempt by the minority to regain power.”
Do you think the protesters or people who align themselves with the Gezi movement see themselves as having achieved successes over the past year? Do they see themselves as having accomplished some of their aims since they started demonstrating last May?
I think if you talk to many activists and protesters they see this as a very critical turning point, a very important moment in Turkish politics – a moment where people came together spontaneously from very different backgrounds and gathered and started a protest about an environmental cause which then became a larger protest about government policies. Many of these people see this as a very important turning point. But then, looking at it as an outside observer, beyond that, has it resulted in a major change in the substance of Turkish politics? At least from the moment, I am not sure, because we see the dominance of the AKP at the very centre of Turkish politics and in the short-term it appears to have created a backlash where the reaction has been quite fierce and there is increasing intolerance of the opposition. One of the ironies is that there does not seem to be any organic link between the protests and the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP), which is the party closest in terms of sympathy to the Gezi Park protests. The two appear to be quite independent. And one of the paradoxes is that the CHP has not been able to capitalize on Gezi Park in electoral terms. My argument would be, at the moment, there is pressure on the AKP from above, in declining international image and increasing criticism from the EU and the United States, which was not the case in the early years of the AKP when the international community was very favourable because the party was reformist in the economic and political realms. Now, what you observe is growing criticism from outside and growing criticism from below but as long as the party and the leadership have the entrenched power in Turkish politics and as long as they have the monopoly of power electorally, as well as very significant economic and political power in terms of control over the media, in terms of access to state contracts, then, so far, these pressures do not seem to have an impact in terms of democratizing or reversing the democratic backslide. So, it is a very important moment but whether it has led to a real change in Turkish politics, for the moment, I have question marks about that. And my essential point would be that social protests are very important but unless social protests are translated into and have the impact on established party politics and change the domestic political equilibrium within the party system, their impact will be limited.
I want to turn to another important event from May of 2013, which was the bombing in Reyhanlı. You write, “The attack on Reyhanlı, home to thousands of Syrian refugees and a gathering point for rebels fighting to topple President al-Assad, amplified the fears that the civil war in Syria had moved to Turkey. Indeed, the Reyhanlı incident showed that the civil war in Syria had indeed became part of Turkish domestic politics, but through a quite different route than Prime Minister Erdoğan originally had in mind, namely through causing increasing security risks for Turkish citizens located right across the Syrian border.”1 So, the somewhat angry reaction directed toward Syrians following the bombings in Reyhanlı, in the view of some, showed that the Turkish public was growing increasingly worried about negative consequences of involvement in the Syrian civil war. What do you think about the Reyhanlı bombing? What did it show about the way Turkish people perceive Turkey’s involvement in the civil war in Syria?
As you know, this new activism of Turkish foreign policy in recent years, especially with Davutoğlu becoming foreign minister in 2009, has been a contributor to AKP’s continued political success in the sense that it represents an image of Turkey that is based on an increasingly assertive power – not just a passive observer of regional or global events but an active participant, a regional power, a regional leader, a country which is aspiring for a regional role. But in the context of Arab Spring with Turkey trying to position itself as the promoter of democracy, what we observe is Turkey being over-engaged, and over-active in regional politics. I would agree that Turkey could not have been indifferent to developments in Syria, in Egypt, in the Arab World. They are our next-door neighbours so we are very much in contact. In recent years, relations with Syria in the pre-Arab spring period had improved quite significantly based on economic interaction and cultural affinity. The problem is that Turkey was too involved in the domestic politics of Arab states. It tried to shape developments in Syria, and there, I think, Erdoğan over-estimated his leverage based on his personal relations with Assad. Initially, the idea was to put pressure on Assad to undertake reform in Syria. When it backfired, Turkey shifted to support the opposition. Support of opposition had the unfortunate effect of perhaps contributing to further instability because Turkey, perhaps unintentionally, became part of internal sectarian conflicts in Syria. Similarly, in Egypt, I think Turkey was too much behind the Muslim Brotherhood. When the coup happened in the summer of 2013, the reaction was very fierce criticism. I think you can be critical of the coup, but in the same time, you can be more since because these are domestic dynamics. The problem was, and this links to your question about Reyhanlı, Turkey was so engaged in domestic politics that the instability generated in Syria, which is not totally because of Turkey’s involvement, but Turkey also became part of this process and it started to become a security threat for Turkey. And I think it started to undermine the popularity of AKP’s foreign policy. And although the AKP continues to maintain its broad electoral popularity, what we observe is a large segment of the electorate is quite critical of Turkey’s Syria policy. I think this is aggravated also by the fact that there is a huge exodus of refugees now. Estimates vary, but you can see them on the streets these days. Clearly, this is an important problem. I think we have to accept that Turkey has played a humanitarian role which has been positive in embracing the refugees. But, at the same time, Turkey has not been receptive to the idea of collaboration with international actors. The approach has been unilateral. The exodus of refugees has reached such a point that it represents a security threat which is a problem for Turkey. Nowadays, I think what we can say that we see a U-turn in Turkish policy – a more pragmatic turn. I think there is a realization that this over-engagement has backfired and Turkey needs to be more subdued, more pragmatic in its approach. But now we have reached a crossroads in our foreign policy where we feel we are in a state of isolation because Turkey seems to be squeezed in between two blocks. One is the Russia-China block with which Turkey wants to interact more in economic and political terms. The other is the Western blocks which are our traditional allies, which we are still committed to in terms of NATO membership. Turkey differs from China and Russia in being a promoter of democracy but also differs from the United States and Europe for being increasingly independent, assertive and acting unilaterally so we find ourselves in an isolationist position which limits the effectiveness of Turkey to play a more constructive role in the region.
“Turkey is not in a position of Sweden or Denmark – the problem is next door. But you have to be more pragmatic, more detached, and more multilateral and realize that your capacity depends on your domestic performance rather than your ability to intervene in the domestic politics of individual states.”
Keeping in mind your argument that Turkey’s Syrian “policy might have been counter-productive in terms of undermining Turkey’s image of a benign regional power, by drawing it into sectarian conflicts and over-involvement in the domestic politics of key Arab states,”2 is there a way forward for Turkey in the middle of the civil war in Syria and in terms of foreign affairs for it to play an effective role?
I think what Turkey needs to do is to be more pragmatic. It needs to act much more in cooperation with its Western allies rather than trying to be over-assertive, over-engaged in the region. I think a unilateral approach to foreign policy is costly for Turkey. And also I think it is important for Turkey because Turkey’s effectiveness in the region is conditional on its strong links with the West – the European Union and the United States. This is the element that made Turkey attractive to many Arab elites in the 2000s. The closer Turkey is, ironically, to the West, the more attractive, it is to the Arab world as a model of economic development, as a model of moderate Islam and democratic politics. So, Turkey needs to be more detached, it has to increase its economic and political capacity to be a role model, to be more cooperative and multilateral in its foreign policy and certainly Turkey should refrain from supporting any of the movements within Syria or within Iraq which would contribute to further instability, because there are serious allegations that Turkey has been supporting the opposition groups which unintentionally contributed to the growth of jihadist and extreme Sunni elements. To what extent these allegations are true, I am not sure. There are conflicting evidences on this. But the danger is that if you are too involved, you will face these kinds of allegations. So, I think it is very difficult for Turkey. It is like you have a fire next door. You will be affected by this process; you cannot escape. Turkey is not in a position of Sweden or Denmark – the problem is next door. But you have to be more pragmatic, more detached, and more multilateral and realize that your capacity depends on your domestic performance rather than your ability to intervene in the domestic politics of individual states.
Regarding the Syrian refugee population in Turkey, do you believe that the welcoming attitude Turkey has displayed so far toward the refugees will continue? Or is there a point at which Turkey may have to say that it has no more room or resources for refugees?
I think we are reaching a critical point. There is growing public reaction because the problem has spread. These people are now moving to different parts of the country and you see Syrian refugees in Istanbul, in many other parts of Turkey. And obviously there is a huge cost of maintaining these refugee camps because the numbers are very large. The government, at some point, will have to limit this, and there is growing internal resentment because it is creating a security problem. This is an element which has been causing a loss of popularity, although so far it has not significantly affected the overall popularity of the AKP in electoral terms, but I think there is growing disenchantment. I think we have seen a U-turn in Turkish foreign policy in the past six months, so in that sense I am quite hopeful. I think there is a realization among the foreign policy-making elites that this kind of policy has not been effective. Although they would not openly admit that the Syrian policy has been a failure or Egyptian policy has been a failure, the term often used in Ankara these days is a ‘reset’ in Turkish foreign policy which I would interpret as a pragmatic U-turn. I would interpret that the ambition has not faded in Erdoğan’s mind or Davutoğlu’s mind to play an ambitious regional role but, in practical terms, I think they realize that there are limits to Turkish power to play that kind of grand leadership role in the region.
“Turkey has been moving from a rule-based economy to an economy where increasingly, I think, wealth creation is related to your connections and capacity to link with the state elites.”
As we move through the year Turkey has had, the corruption investigations in December shook the Turkish political scene. Based on your assessment of the political economy of the AKP era, do you think that these claims have merit?
I think what we see in the context of those corruption allegations is a very striking and interesting split between two key elements, which are the AKP elites and the Gülen movement in Turkey and representatives of the Gülen movement. As you know, the Gülen movement has been a civil society movement with their activities based on charity work, schools, and they have very significant economic interests at the same time; investments in different sectors, so it is an organization which in the past is clearly religious conservative in its leanings but a moderate version. It has represented a detached position from politics but clearly they have supported the AKP, especially in the early years. More recently, their power has increased and there are allegations that representatives of the Gülen movement have been increasingly represented within the judiciary, within the police force and within the bureaucracy. In a way, you can see it as intra-elite conflict, a conflict within the new elites of Turkey. One interpretation is that these allegations represent a clash of interests between different segments of the new elites and a power struggle. But there is also, at the same time, growing elements of crony capitalism in Turkey, meaning that increasingly, wealth depends on close access to leadership and to the government. I think what we see is the emergence of new businesses, especially in the area of construction which I think is the new arena where rent distribution has been taking place in Turkey and many people with close links to the government have been benefiting from access. In a sense, Turkey has been moving from a rule-based economy to an economy where increasingly, I think, wealth creation is related to your connections and capacity to link with the state elites. To what extent are the corruptions scandals? There are allegations, obviously, but we do not know. There is evidence that as the AKP becomes more powerful economically and politically, as the leadership becomes increasingly powerful and they monopolize the centre of Turkish politics and the economy, then personal access to the state is a very important element in acquiring wealth and becoming part of this rent distribution.
“The benign face of the AKP era is the story of socially inclusive growth… the negative side is concentration of power, concentration of wealth, and the exclusionary side of the AKP is such that the closer you are to power, the more you benefit from this process.”
Relating to what you just mentioned, I want to draw on another of your publications where you write that the AKP utilizes “a particularistic form of redistribution that by definition favours insiders close to the party’s informal networks” and that the AKP’s “redistributive mechanisms have been critical to its ability to bring the winners and losers of neo-liberal globalization into the orbit of one single, broad-based, cross-class electoral coalition.”3
There is an interesting pattern. At one level, I think the AKP era is a huge success story in the sense of bringing socially inclusive development to Turkey, meaning that with economic growth, low inflation and with redistributive policies in the areas of health, education, public transport, and local services, a large number of people have benefited from this process. We see the rise of middle classes as well as the reduction of poverty at the lower levels. So the benign face of the AKP era is the story of socially inclusive growth and we see per capita income rising from 3,500 to over 10,000 dollars per annum as Turkey reaches a middle-income level – very significant progress over a period of a decade and from which large segments of society benefit, so no wonder why such a large segment of the population vote for the AKP in the elections. But at the same time, you see the negative side. The negative side is concentration of power, concentration of wealth, and the exclusionary side of the AKP is such that the closer you are to power, the more you benefit from this process. There is still inequality of income and wealth in Turkey but with growth and some parallel social policies, the benefits have been distributed quite widely, so it is a paradoxical pattern of inclusion and exclusion at the same time, if you like. The essential challenge is what would happen if the AKP is not able to maintain the growth rates of the early era, where growth was taking place at 7 and 8 percent per annum. Now what we seem to see at this point is 3 percent – low-growth equilibrium. It is difficult to predict the future but many commentators argue that rather than an economic crisis in the near future, what Turkey will experience, probably, is a kind of slower growth. But then the essential challenge is, with slow economic growth, will the AKP be able to maintain this broad, cross-class electoral coalition? In the previous era, you could distribute the benefits of growth to both the winners and relative losers so that they could be part of the same coalition. Now, I think we may be in for bigger distributional conflicts in an era of slower economic growth. And Turkey seems to have reached a plateau, and many people describe this as a middle-income trap. We have an economy increasingly reliant on debt. This is also interpreted as one reason why many people continue to vote for the AKP – because instability may hurt them, especially if you are in heavy debt – firms are in debt, consumers are in debt. But there are major issues of sustainability of economic growth and the possibility of a low-growth scenario may hurt the AKP in the future. I do not expect that it will have a dramatic impact in the next elections, but, over a longer period of time, the party, unless it undertakes very serious economic reforms, it may not be able to maintain this popularity.
Do you think the investigations initiated by the police and judiciary show there is an irreparable rift between the members of the Gülen movement in the Turkish government and the AKP?
I think for the moment there is a very serious clash. It is interesting because in terms of ideology the rift between the two groups is not the same as between the secularists and the conservatives in Turkey because that rift is based on different identity perspectives, different views of the world. One group is very Western-oriented in their lifestyles and the other is more conservative. So there you have a clash of cultures, if you like, a Kulturkampf, but in the case of Gülenists and the AKP conflict, it is more of an internal power struggle. Now, you may argue that the Gülenists may represent a milder form of Islam, a more moderate form, but ultimately these people are part of the same religious conservative block in terms of their basic identities, their basic outlook. So, in the short-term, there is a power struggle but in the long-term, one would also expect to mend the rift would be easier given that the identity of these groups are not fundamentally dissimilar to one another.
I want to tackle another event that perhaps combines elements of our discussion of domestic and foreign policy. In March, a Syrian jet was shot down in the midst of the allegations of corruption and in advance of the local elections. Could this action and the focus on the Assad regime and the civil war in Syria in general, be interpreted as an attempt to turn attention away from criticism of the AKP in the run-up to an election?
I think that is a good point in the sense that, as we discussed earlier, domestic politics and foreign policy are extremely interlinked. This is perhaps not unique to Turkey, but in the Turkish case I think you see that there is a loop; that foreign policy is very much determined by domestic political considerations and domestic politics are very much affected by foreign policy, so it is a two-way dynamic. I would agree with you that a more aggressive style of foreign policy, especially toward Syria in March, was a reflection of trying to take attention away from domestic political concerns because, as I said earlier, I think this assertive foreign policy has paid dividends for the AKP. This is the idea of a more self-confident Turkey, in the age of BRICS (countries such as Brazil, China, India, and South Africa), which can act more independently, not just a more passive observer but an active player on the global and regional scene. Erdoğan’s championing of the Palestinian cause made him very popular on the Arab streets as well among the Turkish electorate. More recently, I think we see a decline in Erdoğan’s popularity in the Arab world but also this assertive policy which paid dividends in the past, this kind of aggressive stance toward Syria – like the incident you mentioned – has not been paying dividends as in the past. What we see in the course of 2013 is increasingly vocal criticisms and resentment of this assertive foreign policy and growing consensus in different circles (which are divided on other issues) that Syrian policy has backfired. As I said earlier, later in the year we see a change of course, rather than this more aggressive foreign policy of the earlier era we see a more subdued and pragmatic U-turn.
“I think we can interpret the constraints on press freedom – the ban on Twitter, YouTube – all these elements are part of the same picture of trying to limit opposition, trying to compress the space for the opposition in Turkey.”
Turning to another event from this spring, a ban on the website YouTube was enacted following the leak of a recorded conversation between several top government officials. Can this be interpreted as an example of Turkey’s democratization process, lacking, as you write, “adequate checks and balance mechanisms to curb an excessive concentration of power at the very centre of the political system?”4 Does this ability to block a website demonstrate a sign of the lack of checks and balances that you mention?
Definitely. I think we can interpret the constraints on press freedom – the ban on Twitter, YouTube – all these elements are part of the same picture of trying to limit opposition, trying to compress the space for the opposition in Turkey. Also, they represent the fears about the Gezi protests, the fears that if the majority is lenient, if the party in political power which represents the majority are lenient then the majority may lose the various gains it had acquired over the period. These kinds of moves represent the fears but also they represent the fact that, in Erdoğan’s mind set, his vision of democracy is a majoritarian democracy. His understanding of democracy is majoritarian electoral democracy – if I win the elections and if I have the majority, then I can do whatever I want. The minorities, in that case (which is the other 50 percent of the population, but fragmented), have to be part of the majority or will lose from this process. So, one element is the fear – the fear that there will be a comeback on the part of the old elites. The other is to show to his constituency that I am strong, that we have the upper hand, and we have the mandate to control and if there is negative criticism then we should control and regulate that negative criticism. And one of the striking elements, to my mind, is the very limited impact of external criticism and the decline of EU and US soft power on Turkey. In the recent period, there is increasing criticism and weakening of Turkey’s international image but this is not translating into a change in Turkish politics. When interpreting this criticism, because the party has such a strong majority in domestic politics, Erdoğan is able to say that Turkey is growing and becoming increasingly important and external powers cannot accept it. The perception is a lack of tolerance from the outside of a strong Turkey that wants to play a more active role, which the Western countries do not like. That kind of representation is projected to a large segment of the conservative electorate. As long as the economy is succeeding and as long as you have large segments of people who are committed to the AKP, not only in terms of economic benefits but in terms of being close to their own identity, these external criticisms are not able to have much impact at a time when the EU membership process is in total collapse and when the EU itself is in a deep economic and identity crisis. The EU does not appear to be an attractive model. And then – this is an interesting element which I want to write about this summer – is how foreign events are projected to Turkey’s domestic politics. You talked about the Syrian incident – with the Crimean incident and the Russian invasion, the argument is what happened? Could the West intervene? Could the EU do anything about this? The economic crisis in Greece, problems of rising right-wing nationalist parties, Islamophobia in Europe, all these elements come together and explain why the EU has increasingly limited soft power on Turkey. One, because the membership option does not appear to be feasible, so you cannot agree that if we just open this chapter or that chapter, this can trigger the momentum again. I think this momentum has been lost and just simply opening the environmental chapter or another chapter will not have an impact. In the absence of the EU anchor of full membership, which was so critical in the early 2000s, that has disappeared there is very little public enthusiasm, even among the more secular, Western-oriented liberal people in Turkey. Plus, the EU in itself does not appear to be an attractive model. The EU’s leverage on Turkish politics appears to be very limited. For the US, the strategic relationship appears to be important. The US, in any case, has been a major supporter of the EU membership process but unlike the EU, the US does not impose any kind of democratic conditionality. It would favour a more democratic Turkey but does not have the kind of EU conditionality on democratization. The point I am trying to make is that Turkey has the potential to play a much deeper role by differentiating itself from the rest of the region. The irony is that if you try to become one of the Middle Eastern countries, your credentials as a role model diminish the more you move away from the West. The more authoritarian you become and the more your economy becomes a low-growth economy, and then you lose your soft power, which could be quite critical. I personally believe that Turkey has the potential to play a very important role in the region, not as a sort of dominating leader country but as a kind of benign regional power. But Turkey, at the moment, I think, is losing that capacity, which is unfortunate.
“The benign scenario would be that when Erdoğan becomes President Erdoğan under a parliamentary system, his powers will be more restricted, and he will act differently now as the President of the whole country rather than the party leader, and the incentive structure facing him will change.”
I think you make a very perceptive point that the EU’s influence has decreased, the military’s influence has decreased as a political actor, and the AKP “has embraced a more Asian-style ‘globalism’ where economic success through global integration and diversification of markets still occupies the centre stage, but combined with a less ambitious or minimalist understanding of democracy.”5 Are there prospects for a turn to more fast-paced democratization in Turkey while still keeping economic growth at centre stage?
I obviously want to be more hopeful on this. Obviously, you know reversals and U-turns are possible – we should not think of what is happening at the moment as a kind of final equilibrium. But it will be more difficult in the sense that compared to ten years ago; the external context is less favourable. The impetus for change, for democratization, for reversing this backsliding will have to come internally. You may see, turning to our initial discussion, Gezi as a part of this process of reversing the backslide. But, as I was arguing, it will not be possible as social protests alone. What we need is stronger opposition from the opposition parties, more constructive opposition from CHP, for example. And we see some elements of that. For example, in the presidential elections I think the candidacy of Ekmeleddin İhsanoğluwas an imaginative step by the CHP leadership in reaching wider segments of society. The CHP has to move away from being just the representative of the old-style secularists to be a broad-based party; otherwise it will not win any elections. So that is one element. The second would be political opposition within the AKP because there are more liberal, moderate elements within the AKP which, if they come back, if they have more political power, could be in the position to change the party more in the direction of what it was in the early 2000s. There are avenues open for political change. It will have to come more internally at a moment when external forces have less impact. But then, I think the reputation element is also important. It is quite clear that leaders and politicians in Turkey care about the country’s international reputation so external criticism would have some effect on human rights practices but provided there is a political movement within domestic politics and within the organized opposition or within the existing party. And in that context, it is interesting to think about what would happen after the summer of 2014. When Erdoğan becomes the president what kind of presidency, will this be? The benign scenario would be that when Erdoğan becomes the President under a parliamentary system, his powers will be more restricted, and he will act differently now as the President of the whole country rather than the party leader, and the incentive structure facing him will change. His ability to control the party from a distance will be more limited with the change of party leadership so this could pave the way for political change in Turkey in a more open, moderate, more pluralistic direction. So we may have a comeback of the early 2000s – this is the benign, optimistic scenario. The alternative scenario is that President Erdoğan is able to change the constitution through his control over the party, and moves Turkey in a more Putin-style presidential system and this could be a dangerous route for Turkey. It could mean increasing centralization and it could be a further concentration of economic and political power, clearly a scenario that would not be attractive to any kind of liberal person on the centre-right or centre-left – this is also a possibility, but I seriously hope the first scenario prevails. It is possible that the first scenario will occur because in the short term, I think, it is clear that Erdoğan will not be able change the Constitution – he will not have the mandate to move to a presidential system in the very near future. He is elected as the president of a country which has more parliamentary traditions. That means the power of the presidency is constrained. Some people argue that he will push it to the limits because the 1982 constitution still gave certain powers to the president, which a proactive president could use. But people like Gül or Ahmet Necdet Sezer, our previous presidents, did not use these privileges. I think that they were more conciliatory in their style. I think Gül, at least until the last year, has been an exemplary president. Although I had a very positive view of his performance as a president, I have been disappointed by his stand since 2013. So, one argument is even if the parliamentary system continues, Erdoğan will try to have control over his party and will use his veto powers much more aggressively than Gül has used them. But my guess is that, for example Özal, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, also moved into the presidency and tried to control his party through a caretaker Prime Minister (Yıldırım Akbulut at the time) and it did not work. Now, you may argue that Özal had a different personality. In addition, the position of the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi – ANAP) in the late ’80s was different from the AKP because the ANAP was losing power by the time Özal became the president. After Özal was elected as the president, ANAP lost the legislative elections of 1991. Now, it is a different environment. Erdoğan moved to the presidency at a time when AKP still has something like 45 percent of the votes.
I want to make sure that we discuss the 2014 March local elections. It seems that that the results of the 2014 local elections gave the biggest boost to the idea of a President Erdoğan. While we have talked about it briefly, I am interested in your analysis of what was a strong showing for the AKP in an election where they received most of the popular votes.
It is interesting because one of the big lessons is that allegations of corruption have not undermined popular support for Erdoğan or the AKP.
“As long as the AKP is able to continue economic growth (although there are problems in terms of sustaining the momentum) and the average person and business benefits from this, allegations of corruption do not seem to work.”
Why do you think that is?
I think that this is in line with earlier patterns in Turkish politics. As long as there is the image of a party which is creating strong economic momentum, creating public services, and generating an environment of growth from which businesses or individuals benefit, the idea of some people gaining more or allegations of corruption in that kind of growth environment do not seem to hold. In the public mind set, the idea is that the benefits are so large that there are also costs to this in terms of some people misusing it. Corruption is penalized in the Turkish context when there is a major economic crisis. For example, when there was the big 2000-2001 economic crisis in Turkey and there were more bank failures and associated corruption scandals, the coalition partners were heavily penalized in the 2002 elections, which paved the way for the AKP. But as long as the AKP is able to continue economic growth (although there are problems in terms of sustaining the momentum) and the average person and business benefits from this, allegations of corruption do not seem to work. Second, the point about gated communities is that if corruption allegations are directed toward a person within your group, you still do not react because it is like somebody in your family being involved – you do not want to penalize someone in your family. If it is from the other side, you are very sensitive. If the corruption scandal happened, for example, in the CHP, then the reaction would be different. This kind of group psychology is quite striking that these are people from “our end, our people” and there is a strong identity affiliation in the context of the religious/secularist divide in Turkey. Also, I think Erdoğan has been quite effective in his propaganda of trying to link these allegations with the Gülen movement and their power struggle. So there are question marks about whether these allegations are true or not in the public’s mind. But I think that is secondary; the two arguments are that as long as there is economic success and as long as this is our party. And there are costs if you penalize Erdoğan and if you penalize the AKP – who will replace them? The opposition. And the opposition would mean a return to the old days, which would undermine the position of many people who are located in the religious/conservative camp. In that sense, it is interesting and from a Western eye it is very paradoxical that a government which is facing such serious corruption allegations is able to maintain this kind of popularity. But having said that, I think there is a downward slide in the sense that it was almost fifty percent in 2011; now, two-and-a-half years later, it is 43 percent or 44 percent. This shows that the AKP has seriously lost the liberal vote and centre-left segments and Gülen people but it also shows that the weight of these groups in Turkish society is not strong enough in the broader picture to challenge the dominance of the AKP.
To bring up a theory you proposed in 2012, right after the 2011 elections, you wrote, “Turkey might be moving in the direction of a one-party dominant political system.”6 It is interesting because you could interpret the 2014 local elections as confirmation of your argument or, as you just mentioned, it could mean that it is not so dominant a political party as it might appear given the slight decline in their share of the vote.
That is right. We are at an interesting interlude, if you like. Two years ago people were much more certain and many commentators wrote that Turkey is now in the era of one-party dominant politics and a hegemonic system. I do not think we can be as certain now. In the short-term, I think the dominance of the AKP will continue. In the longer term, you may find splits. The problem that I would emphasize is not necessarily with the one-party dominance because you can have an advanced democracy in which you have one party as dominant. Sweden is a very good example of an advanced democracy where Social Democrats have been in power for a very long period of time. Japan has been another case of a highly advanced democracy where the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan has been in office. The problem is you need checks and balance mechanisms. The danger is if you have one-party dominance with weak checks and balances between different parties within the party itself, between the executive and judiciary, between parliament and the executive, the whole system is lopsided, then that is a pathway to authoritarianism. That is the danger. One of the big constraints in the Turkish system for introducing more checks and balance mechanisms is the 10 percent electoral threshold. I think this is a notorious constraint. We are the country with the highest electoral threshold in the world of 10 percent. Russia seems to be the second with 7 percent. A 10 percent threshold is a big constraint because it prevents intra-party competition. For example, we could have splits within the CHP between the more liberal and the more Kemalist or hard line secularists. We could have a split within the AKP between the more religious conservative core versus the liberal, centre-right elements. But people within the parties are not able to take the risk because they know that if you are critical of the party leader, you will be expelled. If you form a new party, it will fail because you will not be able to get more than four or 5 percent of the vote, which means the party, will be wiped out and you personally will be wiped out of politics. As a result, this kind of institutional constraint accentuates leader dominance in the parties. I see this as not the only constraint but one of the major constraints on the emergence of a more pluralistic kind of party system. At the moment, CHP is critical of this threshold but CHP does not have the power. The AKP leadership in their early days wanted to reduce the threshold, but it is not on their agenda.
“In the short-term, I think the dominance of the AKP will continue. In the longer term, you may find splits.”
One of the very tragic events of this year was the Soma disaster. This tragedy has been analysed as a disaster that is emblematic of wider problems in the Turkish political economy – do you think this is true? Does Soma illuminate broader issues in Turkey rather than a mine tragedy?
I think it illustrates this issue of the two faces of the AKP that I mentioned – the inclusionary side and the exclusionary side. I think the Soma incident can also be seen as the more exclusionary face of the AKP, if you like the more neoliberal face. When it comes to labour rights, worker safety, and labour issues I think the party does not appear to be very sensitive to these issues. Soma, I think, is a representation of a wider lack of concern with labour rights and worker safety, which are very serious problems in the Turkish context. So, it is an interesting paradox. People tend to emphasize one or the other. Those who are very critical emphasize the dark face, which is the exclusionary face – inequality, absence of workers’ rights, and lack of worker safety. Those who are more receptive or more optimistic tend to emphasize the socially inclusive side of the AKP – reduction of poverty, provision of public services, transport. Many people who would have to take a long car journey from Malatya to Istanbul – 20 hours, let’s say – are now able to fly at cheap rates. I think a balanced picture requires that you look at both sides. I think it appears paradoxical. Very few people in Turkey take this approach. Most scholars, analysts, and journalists are either critical and focus on the negative elements or are 100 percent supportive and focus on the positive elements but the AKP trajectory – the AKP story – is a mixture of exclusion and inclusion. The Soma incident is a very good representation of the exclusionary side of the AKP, to my mind, something that we should be very concerned about. Self-defence of the AKP on this issue is we have a new law. They are in the very early stages of a new law that has been introduced on worker safety, protecting workers, and improving working conditions. But, to my mind, this reflects a broader problem. It is not enough to pass legislation. This is a problem that is also present in many other countries. Passing the law is not sufficient, if you do not implement it. The implementation is very critical.
“There is a recognition that increasingly both Iraq and Syria will be more fragmented, but obviously the developments have proceeded at such a pace – the rise of these extreme movements – which people could not anticipate.”
Finally, the most recent development in Turkey’s neighbourhood is the current crisis in Iraq. This is also a crisis that brings us back to where we began, with international affairs in the Middle East affecting Turkey. Were scholars, political scientists, and analysts in your community, particularly in Turkey, able to see this crisis coming? You wrote in 2012 that Iraq “looks increasingly fragile and prone to sectarian unrest and fragmentation.”7 Was this a crisis that experts in Turkey saw on the horizon?
I think that many people saw, especially with the growing autonomy and de facto independence of the Kurdistan region that at some point Iraq would be fragmented. Increasingly, I think the Turkish policy has recognized the autonomy of the Kurdistan region in the north. In fact, there has been a policy of direct engagement with Iraqi Kurdistan. I would argue that part of the domestic Kurdish peace process is related to these political considerations. The engagement with the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq and the peace process are parallel phenomenon – trying to contain Turkey’s Kurdish problem and at the same time benefit from the oil resources economically. This has created a rift between the United States and Turkey. It is ironic because in the 1990s Turkish policymakers were critical of trying to fragment Iraq by providing support for the north of Iraq. Nowadays, the United States is critical of Turkey for contributing to Iraq’s fragmentation through its unilateral engagement with northern Iraq, which is also generating a lot of resentment in Baghdad because obviously Turkey has been bypassing them in its direct engagement. For example, Davutoğlu has been flying to Erbil without their permission and this has created quite a lot of conflict. There is a recognition that increasingly both Iraq and Syria will be more fragmented but obviously the developments have proceeded at such a pace – the rise of these extreme movements – which people could not anticipate. So I think the process of fragmentation and instability has been much more amplified in the recent period than people could have guessed perhaps in 2012, which makes a policy approach very difficult. But it links to my earlier argument that unilateralism is the worst approach and over-activism would be the worst approach in this kind of very unstable environment.
It is also an interesting case given that you warn against Turkey “championing the Sunni cause against the rising support of Shiite influence which is reflecting the growing engagement of Iran in the region”8. But this is a case where Sunni militants are on the attack and it may be that Turkey and Iran are actually on the same side, pitted against these militant forces.
And it is quite clear – Turkey has been doing this – which the way forward is to be extremely critical of militant Sunni activism. This is the way for Turkey to show that we are not in favour of this just because they are Sunnis; this is not permissible. And cooperation with Iran is also a positive development as a way of overcoming this notion of Turkey and Iran being on different sides on the basis of sectarian conflict. My argument – and this is not universally accepted, and there is evidence that the AKP favours Sunni Islam, there are still problems in terms of the rights of the Alevis, which is a contested issue in Turkish domestic politics – but when you look at the foreign policy vision of Davutoğlu and the AKP, their approach is being an important factor in the Muslim world, so the Muslim world as a whole. Trying to develop relations with Iran throughout the 2000s, so I do not think the aim was to be the champion of Sunni Islam, the idea is Turkey contributing to a more powerful Muslim block which is unified and this idea of civilizational dialogue with the West was based on the idea of Muslim unity. But the more Turkey was involved, given the fact that the Assad regime was of Shiite foundations, supporting the opposition gave the impression that Turkey was supporting the Sunnis against Shiites, whereas I think the main motive was opposing Assad’s regime and providing an environment where Syria would move from authoritarian to a more open political system. So it was not just opposition of Assad because, in the past relations, were extremely good in the pre-Arab Spring period so I find the reading that Turkish foreign policy was just in support of the Sunni cause in Syria a rather simplistic interpretation of Turkish foreign policy. But in the background, one could sense that, especially in Erdoğan’s statements about the rights of the Sunni people, a preference for Sunnis is a part of AKP’s policies, but I do not think it was the intention to take sides in the dispute. The main motive for the AKP is to play a strong leadership role in the region rather than championing certain sects and taking sides. But over-involvement put the AKP in an awkward position of facilitating the growth of some of these extremist movements, which they have now become aware and now they are very strongly critical. And I think that is a step in the right direction.
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Please cite this publication as follows:
Research Turkey (July, 2014), “Interview with Professor Ziya Öniş: Explaining the Politics behind Turkey’s Stormy Year”, Vol. III, Issue 7, pp.52-79, Centre for Policy Analysis and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, ResearchTurkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=6701)
Endnotes
1 Öniş, Ziya. “Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Regional Power Influence in a Turbulent Middle East.” Mediterranean Politics 19, no. 2 (2014): 13.
2 Öniş, Ziya. “Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Regional Power Influence in a Turbulent Middle East.” Mediterranean Politics 19, no. 2 (2014): 14.
3 Öniş, Ziya. “The Triumph of Conservative Globalism: The Political Economy of the AKP Era.” Turkish Studies 13, no. 2 (2013): 141.
4 Öniş, Ziya and Kutlay, Mustafa. “Rising Powers in a Changing Global Order: the Political Economy of Turkey in the Age of BRICS.” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 8 (September 2013): 1419.
5 Öniş, Ziya. “Sharing Power: Turkey’s Democratization Challenge in the Age of the AKP Hegemony.” Insight Turkey, 15, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 114.
6 Öniş, Ziya. “The Triumph of Conservative Globalism: The Political Economy of the AKP Era.” Turkish Studies 13, no. 2 (2013): 136.
7 Öniş, Ziya. “Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between Ethics and Self-Interest.” Insight Turkey 14, no. 3 (2012): 5.
8 Öniş, Ziya. “Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between Ethics and Self-Interest.” Insight Turkey 14, no. 3 (2012): 13.